Control body, representative of regions, or elitist chamber of wisdom? The perceived roles of upper chambers and the case of the Czech Senate

ABSTRACT

Existing research on bicameralism has paid rather limited attention to examining the legitimacy of upper chambers. This paper addresses this research gap and examines the unintended roles of upper chambers using the case of the Czech Senate. It explains how citizens perceive the role of the upper chamber and how their perceptions can differ from the chamber’s actual role. The research employs content analysis of semi-structured interviews with two groups of citizens (30 in total). The results show that the Senate is perceived as an elitist, apolitical institution that is or should be composed of wise, experienced, and moral people. A minority of citizens perceive the Senate as a body representative of local interests. However, these perceptions do not correspond to reality. The difference between the Senate’s perceived and real role can have both negative and positive effects on the institution’s legitimacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Bicameralism
• elitism
• legitimacy
• perceptions
• second/upper chambers
• the Czech Senate

Introduction

Upper chambers are specific political institutions in the sense that their existence in a political system is not essential. There is a long-term, ongoing debate about their desirability or necessity. Furthermore, upper chambers are specific in how they can take on different roles within the political system – this distinguishes them from most other institutions that are traditionally part of a democratic constitutional order, such as lower chambers or governments.

Theories of bicameralism distinguish multiple roles that justify the existence of upper chambers of parliaments. Upper chambers may represent different specific interests, or they may have only a stabilising or controlling role in the system. Previous research in this area has typically focused on the statutory definition of these roles (the intended roles of the upper chambers as envisaged by law and lawmakers) and thus examined the powers or compositions of upper chambers. A welcome exception is works that also emphasise the legitimacy of upper chambers – these have begun to emerge more recently (e.g. Medeiros et al., 2018; Mueller et al., 2021). For an institution whose place in the constitutional order is not guaranteed, legitimacy is the crucial issue and should be further studied.

This paper thus develops the theme of legitimacy and its centrality for the concept of bicameralism (Russell, 2013). It assumes that an upper chamber can spontaneously take on an originally unintended role, either de facto or merely as perceived in the eyes of the electorate. Previous research has generally neglected how the roles of upper chambers are understood by citizens (their implicit or unintended roles) and how the intended and spontaneous roles of institutions may differ, as well as the consequences that differences in perceptions of the upper chamber’s role may have on trust in the institution or voter turnout. The latter question is of great importance – if citizens perceive an institution differently than what it is empowered to do and how it actually functions, it can significantly impact the evaluation and overall legitimacy of the institution. This may ultimately be reflected in voter turnout (Hruška, 2023).

This research addresses this research gap using the example of the Czech Senate, the upper chamber of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The objective is to show how the electorate perceives the role of this constitutional institution and how the perception of the institution is formed. It also examines how different perceptions of the constitutional institution relate to voter turnout, level of knowledge of the institution, and the overall attitude towards the institution in terms of its legitimacy.

The Czech case is worth exploring in this respect because there is an ongoing debate about the need for this constitutional institution, and several alternative conceptions of this institution coexist. What is also interesting from the perspective of constitutional engineering is that the Czech Senate is a relatively new institution established after the fall of the communist regime.¹ Some authors even argue that the creation of an upper chamber is a usual part of the democratic transition (Ketterer, 2001, pp. 137–138; Russell, 2001). Last but not least, there is also the pressing problem of the extremely low turnout for Czech Senate elections and the potential negative consequences for its legitimacy. This only confirms Russell’s words that ‘a conception of legitimacy based purely on direct election, whereby directly elected second chambers are assumed to be legitimate and strong, and unelected chambers illegitimate and weak, is far too crude’ (Russell, 2013, p. 385). It is therefore also worth examining how different understandings of the role of this constitutional institution relate to voter turnout and whether there may be some relationship.

Due to the nature of the research, which focuses on understanding people’s perceptions about political institutions and which cannot build too much on previous empirical research in this area, we conducted a content analysis of semi-structured interviews with 30 citizens of the Czech Republic who differed in basic socio-economic attributes and who formed two subgroups.

The contribution of this work is first theoretical, as the paper reflects the current lack of research on the implicit roles of upper houses and political institutions in general. The paper thus takes a novel approach to the long-standing debate on the need for upper chambers. At the same time, it contributes to the enduring debate on the need for and role of the Czech Senate by bringing to the attention of academic researchers the perspective of the often-neglected ‘other side’ (citizens), which can offer more profound conclusions than a quantitative survey. At the same time, this research has practical relevance as it partly addresses the problem of the extremely low voter turnout that haunts Czech Senate elections.²

Theories of bicameralism and the Czech context

The existence of upper chambers is generally legitimised either by representing specific interests or exercising control under the principle of horizontal separation of powers. Haas (2000) labels these two roles as (1) the principle of representation, referring to the representation of specific interests such as territorial units, minorities, or ethnic groups, and (2) the functional principle, referring to the controlling role of upper chambers within the separation of powers. Schefbeck (1997) works with the concepts of legislative improvement and representation of specific interests. Tsebelis and Money (1997) talk about the efficiency argument (oversight over the content and technical improvement of laws) and the political argument (representation of distinct social interests).

In terms of the representation of specific interests, the role of the upper chamber can be further divided. It can include the representation of territorial interests, the interests of minorities (national, ethnic, or religious), the interests of professional groups and classes, or the interests of the privileged classes. In the latter case we can observe the absence of democratic reforms, as in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. A frequent and recurring view is that the House of Lords needs some reform (despite the difficulties involved) since the chamber as it stands, representing the privileged classes, seems rather unacceptable in the context of current democratic standards (Barber, 2014; Bochel & Defty, 2020; Russell, 2009; Shell, 1994).

If an upper chamber does not represent any specific interests, it functions on the basis of the principle of horizontal separation of powers (Loewenstein, 1969, pp. 167–170). The upper chamber’s multiple sub-roles can be subsumed under this term. These include improving legislation, achieving deeper and longer-term compromise, defending against the tyranny of the majority, acting as a check and balance, and acting as a constitutional safeguard (Bogdanor, 1992; Riker, 1992).

In discussing the Czech Senate³, it is possible to quickly exclude most of the theoretical roles that might legitimize the upper chamber. The roles that the Senate can play (either from the perspective of its constitutional definition or from the perspective of popular opinion) are discussed in detail below.

Control within the horizontal separation of powers

Although several roles and rationales for the existence of the Senate were considered during the drafting of the Constitution, the concept of separation of powers and the theory of checks and balances ultimately prevailed. The Czech upper house was conceived by the architects of the Czech Constitution as the chamber of second opinion. It was not conceived to be an advocate for any specific interests, not even territorial ones (Kysela, 2004, p. 427). The decision was justified by the fact that the Czech Republic was established as a relatively small and unitary state with a homogeneous population, with little need for an upper chamber representing territorial interests. Importantly, at the time of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, further decentralisation and regionalisation were perceived negatively. This was also reflected in the decision not to divide the new Czech state into regions corresponding to its three historical constituent nations (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) (Dvořáková & Kunc, 1999).

Most experts agree with this understanding of the Senate (see Gerloch, 1998; Syllová, 2015; Vodička & Cabada, 2007). There are two important characteristics of Czech bicameralism in this regard. First, the Senate has no special powers concerning territorial units, which is a defining feature of upper chambers representing particular territorial interests (Kysela, 2004, p. 125). Second, the geographical boundaries of the single-mandate constituencies in which senators are elected do not correspond to any territorial-administrative units, although some voting districts resemble and are often named after counties. It is often the case that a constituency crosses the borders of regions, and a Senate constituency is then located within two different regions (see Figure 1 in the Appendix). Representing such districts as territorial units would be all the more difficult. An essential element of this system is that the Senate is expected to have a different composition than the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber), which is ensured by using a different electoral system and different election dates.

In this conception, the Senate is to be understood as an institution that fulfils two sub-roles (see Kysela, 2004, p. 54). The first is a stabilising role, whereby the Senate acts as a stabiliser in the system and, among other things, acts to ensure long-term compromise. At the same time, it helps to guard the existing democratic system as a whole. The second function is a revising role, where the existence of the Senate ensures the improvement of the legislature’s performance. In practice, this is mainly reflected in the process of adoption of legislation, in which the Senate offers a second opinion.⁴ It is important to note that both types of control are political; they are performed by politicians who are (usually) members of political parties.

In a negative sense, performing such roles can mean the Senate is perceived as an institution that slows down the process or, in the worst case, blocks it. It can also be argued here that this function is dispensable for the functioning of the political system, especially in reference to some other countries in the region with unicameral parliaments (e.g. Slovakia and Hungary).

Representation of territorial interests

Despite the statements above, it is not possible to easily abandon the idea of the Czech Senate as a representative of territorial interests. This idea was already promoted by some in the opposition during the debates on the design of the Constitution. Although the idea of the Senate as a formal representative of the territories was eventually rejected, the country’s division into small single-member constituencies for electoral purposes was adopted (Kysela, 2004, pp. 418–419). That elections take place within 81 single-member constituencies is one of the main facts supporting arguments that the Senate also functions to some extent as a representative of local interests. This logic of election may create a certain impression among voters that the Senate is composed of representatives of constituencies whose particular interests the senators defend. The natural desire of senators to seek re-election also contributes to this. They know that it is the voters of their constituency who will decide. Therefore, it is in the interest of senators to promote the interests of their constituency as best they can and to address the problems that affect that constituency. This argument was emphasised by Petr Pithart, former Prime Minister and President of the Senate, according to whom local interests accumulate in the Senate. Pithart thus described the Senate not long after its creation as ‘the highest level of local politics’ (Pithart, 1999, p. 12).

Balík (2017) emphasises the important role of the electoral system, noting that the Senate’s electoral system was deliberately designed to contrast as much as possible with the lower chamber’s system that leads to partisan elections. The Senate was intended to be a different kind of chamber, composed of independent persons or persons with ties to local politics (Balík, 2017, p. 154). While Kysela (2004) rejects the idea that the architects of the Constitution intended to create an upper chamber based on the principle of regional representation, he points to the fact that upper chambers may acquire an originally unintended role. Members of the upper house may represent certain interests explicitly, but (in this case, thanks to the technique of election and constituency delimitation) they may also defend certain specific interests implicitly. As Kysela explains, this is ‘a situation in which members of the upper chamber, in fact, predominantly represent a particular social interest, without this being taken into account when the chamber was designed’ (2004, p. 125). In this context, Kysela speaks of the spontaneous regionalisation of the Czech Senate, which is composed of many current and former mayors and municipal deputies.

Additional evidence supports the thesis of spontaneous regionalisation of the Senate. Even though the Senate constituencies do not correspond to any defined territorial units, many candidates present themselves as the representatives of their districts when campaigning (and afterward), although, according to Malcová (2012), candidates often make promises they cannot keep. The fact that Senate constituencies are often named after county capital cities may also play a role here. Voters may get the impression that the senator represents the county after which the senate constituency is named. Furthermore, we also observe senators trying to promote the interests of their constituency even though they have no formal powers to do so. This is often the case when it comes to the development of important infrastructure or the provision of services in the constituency or wider region, such as the building of highways, roads, hospitals etc. It is not clear which instruments senators use and what the real effects of such activities are, but it is important that some senators (in the context of very limited knowledge among the general public of the Senate’s powers – see Hruška, 2023) present themselves to the citizenry in this way.

An alternative perception of the Senate – the chamber of wisdom

Apart from the two conceptions of the Senate described above, which are based on existing theory, it should be mentioned that there may be other alternative perceptions by citizens of the Senate. One of these is most often referred to as the ‘Chamber of Wisdom’. In this role, the Senate is seen as a control chamber that is not primarily populated by representatives of political parties but is made up of independent persons possessing a specific set of characteristics. This perspective is close to that of upper chambers as representing certain privileged classes. Blom (1992) explains that, according to this theory, some groups of citizens are more likely to participate in government than others. This may be on the basis of accumulated experience, wisdom, or certain specific moral qualities. It is, therefore, possible to speak of a chamber of elites.

Of the existing upper chambers in Europe, the British House of Lords is closest to this concept. However, as Kysela points out, such a conception is usually associated with a system of constituting other than universal popular election, e.g. by appointment or ex officio membership (2004, p. 427). In the case of the Czech Senate, the legal regulation that supports this concept in some way is the relatively high age limit for eligibility, which is set at 40 years. This rule supposes a chamber of more experienced and mature individuals. However, in addition to experience, supporters of this idea seem to favour independent politicians. The intention of constructing a similar kind of chamber is also described by Balík (2017). According to Kysela, the independence of senators has met with increasing support from the electorate (2004, p. 427). On the other hand, we do not have a coherent picture of this conception of the Senate, nor is there a complete theory that describes this type of upper chamber. Therefore, it is one of the aims of this paper to develop this notion.

Data and methods

As mentioned in the introduction, due to the nature of the research, which focuses on understanding people’s perceptions of political institutions and which is conducted in the context of a lack of previous empirical research in this area, content analysis of semi-structured interviews with 30 respondents was used. The sample consisted of two subgroups of respondents, 15 people in each. Half of the respondents (15) were citizens less willing to participate in Senate elections compared to other elections. This might mean that they did not vote in Senate elections and voted at least occasionally in all other elections (or in most of them) or that they always voted in other elections and only occasionally in Senate elections. The other 15 respondents voted in all elections, including Senate elections. This approach allowed us to compare perceptions between these two subgroups and thus to examine the relationship between perceptions of the institution and voter behaviour.

Respondents were found in two ways. The first was to spread the call on the internet and social media. Those interested completed a short online questionnaire about their socio-economic characteristics and voting habits. To ensure the sample included people not using the internet (e.g. the elderly), the researchers asked acquaintances to spread the call among their contacts. Over 500 respondents volunteered to participate through these two methods. From among these volunteers, fifteen respondents were randomly selected for the two research subgroups for the first round of interviews. This number was estimated to be sufficient to achieve saturation. If saturation was not achieved at this stage, the project foresaw another round of interviews. However, this proved to be unnecessary as saturation was achieved. The random selection process was modified to create a sample that would be diverse in the basic socioeconomic characteristics that traditionally influence voter turnout. Given the small sample size and the qualitative logic of the research, the aim was not to create a representative sample; however, the selection process ensured sample heterogeneity for variables such as gender, age, size of place of residence, educational attainment, and personal income. At the same time, both subgroups had similar socioeconomic characteristics (see Table 2 in the Appendix).⁵

The published call stated that the interviews would be about views on politics and political institutions, and did not indicate that the primary target of the research was the Senate. All respondents signed an informed consent form prior to the interview. Respondents were motivated to take part in the research by a financial reward (1000 CZK)⁶ to make sure not only people interested in politics applied. As the interviews revealed, this was achieved.

The interviews were conducted in November and December 2021. The interviews were primarily conducted in person at a location of the respondent’s choice, but some interviews were conducted online due to the worsened Covid-19 epidemiological situation at the time. In such cases, a webcam was always used. Each interview lasted between 25 and 60 minutes and included a core list of questions, but follow-up questions were asked in reaction to respondents’ answers. Among other things, the interviews included direct questions about the role of the Senate. Emphasis was also given to differences in understanding the Senate compared to the lower chamber. Further questions focused on the desired characteristics of senators, again compared to members of the Chamber of Deputies. Other questions then explored voters’ views of the Senate indirectly.⁷ From the answers, it was possible to infer each respondent’s rough level of knowledge about politics and the Senate specifically. All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed.

The data obtained through the interviews were then subjected to content analysis. The research logic can be described as abductive, with the analysis primarily focusing on theories of bicameralism and detecting evidence for them in the respondents’ answers, but at the same time searching for other less expected codes in the data and thus new findings. In the first phase of the analysis, we identified codes that were expected, based on theoretical findings relating to the functioning and roles of upper chambers. Similarly, new unanticipated codes were identified. These codes were categorised according to the alternative roles of the Senate as described in the theoretical section above (see Table 1). For example, the code ‘apoliticality of senators’ was assigned to the role of the Senate as the chamber of wisdom. Then, other types of codes (e.g. relating to institutional knowledge or voting behaviour) were searched for. The relationships between these and the codes already identified as representing Senate roles were analysed. In order to strengthen the reliability of the results, coding was performed independently by the two authors. There was no significant inconsistency in coding – the value of intercoder agreement was 89.36%.

Analysis

The interviews showed that most respondents had a generally low level of knowledge about the Senate and found it difficult to answer specific questions about the upper chamber. This type of knowledge can be distinguished from general political knowledge, as questions on other political topics were relatively less difficult for the respondents to answer correctly. The majority of respondents tended to refer to the Chamber of Deputies as the Parliament, thus isolating the Senate as an institution standing outside the Parliament itself. This finding confirms previous observations that knowledge about the Senate is both very low, and lower than knowledge about politics in general (see Hruška, 2023).

Control within the horizontal separation of powers

Analysis of the interviews shows that only a limited number of respondents saw the role of the Senate as envisaged by the architects of the Constitution, i.e. as a standard political control body within the framework of a dual legislative power, where senators are not seen as significantly differently from deputies or other politicians.

Respondents who understood the Senate as an institution of political control were much more likely to talk about the revising function within the Senate’s control role – that is, only one of the two sub-roles mentioned above in the theoretical section. Respondents often gave the example of correcting the actions of deputies or improving the work of the lower chamber but mentioned most often the legislative process. They also talked about the Senate as a brake or a safeguard, but mainly by referring again to the approval of ordinary legislation and review of the work of MPs. This can be illustrated by the statement of respondent no. 4, who described the Senate’s role as follows:

I think that kind of healthy … that kind of healthy counter-opinion. If indeed a given draft of a given law and a given decree etc. could not be done better, if there are some loopholes that would be beneficial in that final approval etc.

In contrast, the stabilising sub-role of the Senate within the concept of political control was mentioned by respondents significantly less often, or only as a secondary role. For example, none of the respondents mentioned the Senate’s power to approve election laws or ratify international treaties. The important role of the Senate in approving constitutional amendments was very rarely mentioned.

Respondents with this perception of the role of the Senate were variously critical of the Senate. Furthermore, this view was held by those who did and did not vote in Senate elections. Similarly, this view of the Senate was held by its supporters and those who suggested its abolition. However, the interviews suggest that respondents who reported only a revising role had a lower level of knowledge about the Senate than respondents who also reported the stabilising role as a sub-role of the Senate. The respondents who learned about some of the Senate’s powers performed within this sub-role (e.g. the approval of constitutional laws) during the interviews found this information important. In some cases, the respondents even modified their position on the importance of the Senate.

On the other hand, respondents who described the role of the Senate more comprehensively, i.e. referring also to the stabilisation sub-role, demonstrated a clearly higher level of knowledge of the institution and general political knowledge as well. There was only a very small number of such respondents. An example is respondent no. 18, who first talked about the role of the Senate in the legislative process, but then added on his own:

And maybe sort of a second thing is … that it actually has, if there should be any change to the Constitution or anything, it’s sort of an insurance policy over … if we’re talking about bills, it has … if the Chamber of Deputies is put together and has a majority, I guess it’s just sort of a hold-up, but it has no problem overriding the Senate. … But if we’re talking about some constitutional things and constitutional amendments, they can’t actually outvote the Senate there. … so, there’s sort of a counterbalance.

Such respondents were also, on average, much less critical of the Senate and more appreciative of its role. Not only could they name more of its sub-roles, but at the same time, the interviews revealed that the stabilising role of the Senate was perceived by respondents as more important, as the Senate cannot be bypassed here. Respondents mentioning both sub-roles also showed much more interest in voting in Senate elections.

Conversely, on the topic of legislative control, respondents repeatedly complained that the Chamber of Deputies can override the Senate anyway, which reduces the perceived importance of the Senate. Also, the Senate’s exercise of political control was often seen as unnecessary or dysfunctional, commonly in reference to the small size of the Czech Republic. This criticism was frequently interspersed with a general distrust of politics and politicians. In this context, the Senate seemed more expendable than other institutions. This is well illustrated by the statement of respondent no. 3:

Well, it seems to me that for such a small country there are so many politicians and chambers of Parliaments … Both the Parliament (author’s note: meaning the Chamber of Deputies) and the Senate are just too much … It would be better if everything was simpler and more efficient.

Representation of territorial interests

Even fewer respondents saw the Senate as an institution whose primary role is to represent the interests of territorial units. While a number of respondents mentioned the role of senators in representing the regions, most did not see this as their primary role. Moreover, the respondents usually did not mention this role themselves but instead simply reacted to the question about this role. In addition, in most cases, respondents said that they do not expect senators to perform this function more actively than, for example, MPs – suggesting that this expectation of regional representation actually applies to all elected politicians. The high number of senators with experience in local politics can be explained by the fact that respondents voting in Senate elections prefer candidates they know. Local politicians fit this description well.

On the other hand, there were still a few respondents who clearly stated that the primary role of the Senate is to represent the interests of territorial units. Alternatively, some respondents considered this role to be as important as the control role, or that the two may overlap, with political control being exercised by the representatives of territorial units. Two respondents (no. 19 and no. 22) clearly identified the Senate’s primary role as representing local interests, while several other respondents said it is important that the Senate, among other things, represents the constituency’s interests, even beyond the representation of MPs of their constituencies.

This perception of the Senate is well illustrated by the statement of respondent no. 19:

The Senate … even though it is referred to as a useless institution, it is simply not a useless institution. A senator is elected within his district and represents his district, yeah? A priori. So at that moment, if I’ve elected a party, there’s an MP, it’s a lot harder for me to call him and say “we’ve got such a problem here” than to call a senator who just has a relationship with that region.

Respondent no. 22 described his view of how the two chambers of parliament function differently in this respect. ‘The Senate … should be like the representative of those individual districts and those particular people there, and the Chamber should determine some high-level policies’.

According to the interviews, the representation of regional interests seems to be related to a positive perception of the upper chamber. All respondents who perceived the Senate as primarily representing local interests (or at least as one of its important roles) viewed the upper chamber in a very positive light. This was subsequently reflected in attitudes towards voting. All the respondents who saw regional representation as an important role and who reported this during the interview on their own initiative regularly participated in Senate elections. A statement by respondent no. 29 showed that a greater connection with the regions could legitimize the Senate. Otherwise, he was critical of the Senate. Respondent no. 13 saw the Senate’s primary role in the legislative process and viewed the upper chamber as rather useless, preferring its abolition. However, he was positive about the relationship between senators and their constituencies (although he did not see this as a real role of the upper chamber) and suggested that if the Senate is abolished, there should be a stronger constituency-politician relationship among MPs.

Representation of local interests, in general, is thus seen as a positive and legitimising factor. This could be true not only for the upper chamber, but for some other political institutions as well. As the interviews showed, local issues are salient and relatively easy for ordinary citizens to see. Changes in this sphere can be better appreciated by citizens than the often abstract policies at the national level. This tendency can be further explained by the fact that citizens build an identity and grow in attachment to the particular place where they live, and want to improve it. It is worth noting that the respondents who emphasised the Senate’s role in representing regional interests were engaged in some form of political activism.

It is possible that many candidates and sitting senators are aware of the positive perception of representation of local interests and therefore emphasise this dimension of the Senate. In doing so, they contribute to the distorted popular perception of the Senate. Given the Senate’s lack of power to actually represent local interests, it is a question how senators can perform this role. The respondents did not have a clear idea of this dilemma (given their little knowledge of the Senate and its powers), but their accounts suggest that senators can be more accessible to the public than MPs, even though MPs also maintain offices in their constituencies (which are considerably bigger geographically). In the end, it may be that the very idea that a senator is defending local interests and is open to communicating about any issue is most important, even though, realistically, it may be difficult for them to take action. Also, if conditions in the constituency improve or an issue is somehow resolved, it is challenging for citizens to judge whether this is really due to the actions of their senator.

The chamber of wisdom

Most respondents’ perceptions of the Senate differed from the first two roles described above. Analysis of the interviews revealed that while most respondents saw the Senate as a chamber of oversight, their perception of the upper chamber diverged from the constitutional conception. First and foremost, the respondents had strict qualification standards for senators. These included, most notably, experience and related advanced age, wisdom, moral qualities, independence, maturity, and the ability to discern the common good. In this context, some respondents also mentioned that senators should have a ‘certain culture’ and should look at things from a distance, that is, be less attached to issues.

According to this perception, the Senate should not be a political body; instead, it should function as a watchdog of politicians. Respondent no. 15 even directly distinguished between ‘politicians’ and ‘senators’, using the term politician to describe MPs but clearly not senators. Thus, in this conception of the Senate, there is a very strong demand for independent and apolitical senators. Respondents repeatedly stated that their role was to supervise and hold MPs (and possibly other politicians) accountable. A paternalistic narrative was evident, with the Senate being placed in the role of responsible parents. Respondent no. 27 literally compared the Senate to parents who have to ‘direct their children (MPs) if they misbehave’. Respondent no. 16 stated that ‘the Senate should give the MPs a piece of its mind when necessary’.

The Senate was also referred to as an institution ‘superior to the Chamber of Deputies’ or ‘above the MPs’. Not only is it the upper chamber, but it is superior in the sense of being a higher authority. Respondent no. 8 used the analogy of different levels of education:

Well, I sort of perceive that the Senate is above the deputies. So there, I would sort of equate it in my own way that the Chamber of Deputies is like an elementary school, and the Senate is already the high school. That there are just the more selected ones already there and that actually candidates from the Chamber of Deputies can go to the Senate.

Respondent no. 14 referred to intellectual superiority:

They should be people of class, like a little bit … intellectual. … A deputy can be just a specialist in one area. A senator should be someone who is intellectually even above him and just has insight and can sort of make a decision that we don’t have to be ashamed of.

In this view, senators make decisions (e.g. passing laws) based not on their political beliefs or party affiliation but on their recognition of some objective good or for the benefit of the people. Respondent no. 25 stated that senators should be able to judge what ‘is good and not good’. In some ways, this is reminiscent of the judiciary’s role. As a matter of fact, some respondents expected the Senate to review the constitutionality of laws passed to it by the Chamber of Deputies. Some respondents expected the Senate to fight corruption.

Two categories of respondents with different views can be distinguished here. For the first, this is how the Senate actually functions, which positively affects their trust in the institution. For the second category, this should be the role of the Senate, but its actual functioning differs, which makes them critical. This understanding is widespread among voters and non-voters alike. Respondents in the second category who did not vote saw the Senate either as unnecessary or criticised it for deviating from its non-partisan oversight role. A recurring criticism was that senators make decisions based on their partisan interests rather than objective assessments of the common good. Respondent no. 9 expressed this criticism and demanded the abolition of the Senate ‘ … because they do not decide according to the factual things, for example, contained in those laws, but, but according to which political party has pushed it through. And that’s why they use vetoes … ’ Similarly, respondent no. 6 complained that ‘party interests are prioritized over the interests of others’ in the Senate.

An excellent illustration in this regard is offered by the testimony of respondent no. 20, who voted automatically in all elections, including Senate elections, but was otherwise very critical of the Senate and its current function:

… they should control the laws that come out of Parliament, and they should judge them according to whether it is possible, not possible, or whether it violates some other provision of, say, the Constitution or something, the law. Right? Whether it’s the right wording or what should be changed in there or something like that. But that’s the problem, if there were non-partisans or members, who … how should I say it … who are independent, yeah, well then yes, then it makes sense because they’ll consult and they’ll just judge the factual thing from a factual standpoint. It’s just that if there are members of a party and that party controls them, then there’s just no way that there’s going to be any of that … 

The problem is that this perception does not correspond to reality and some of the standards by which respondents judged the Senate were clearly unrealistic. While it is observable that senators have a looser relationship with political parties than MPs (due to the nature of Senate procedures and the two-round majority electoral system that allows for strong independent candidates), no elected officeholder can be expected to be entirely apolitical or lack specific political beliefs. Also, in the Czech Senate election system it is possible to vote primarily for parties, and many voters do so.

Here we find respondents expressing a preference for a certain type of upper chamber composed of privileged classes. A certain elitist or sophocratic conception of democracy is evident in this view. At the same time, this concept evidently reflects dissatisfaction with politics and a distrust of politicians. In response, there is a demand for politics without politicians, political parties, and even politics itself.

Conclusion and discussion

This paper responds to the lack of research on the legitimacy of upper chambers of parliament. It builds on the argument that perceived legitimacy is central to concept of bicameralism (Mueller et al., 2023; Russell, 2013) and thus goes beyond considerations of formal powers and differences in the composition of legislative bodies. Specifically, using the case of the Czech Senate, this paper aimed to explain how citizens perceive the roles of the upper chamber (its implicit or unintended roles) and how these perceptions may deviate from the formally defined roles of the institution.

The results show that a relatively small number of respondents understood the role of the Senate consistently with its constitutional definition. However, the majority of such respondents emphasised only the revising sub-role of the Senate. Only a few respondents within this group were aware of the two sub-roles, including the stabilising role of the Senate. Such respondents demonstrated the greatest knowledge of the Senate from among all the respondents and also a strong motivation to participate in Senate elections. This view of the Senate’s control role may possibly be explained by the fact that the institution’s powers relating to the second sub-role are not exercised often.

Only a few respondents saw the Senate as an institution that represents the interests of territorial units. However, the majority of these respondents saw this as a secondary, less important role. Based on the interviews, there seemed to be a relationship between this perception and a positive view of the Senate. For respondents, belief that the Senate represents local interests enhanced its legitimacy, and this had positive implications for their participation in elections. Moreover, the interviews suggest that this relationship between representation and legitimacy could be true not only for the upper chamber, but for some other political institutions as well. The interviews showed that local issues are salient and relatively easy for ordinary citizens to see. This tendency can be further explained by the fact that citizens typically build their personal identity in relation, and grow in attachment, to the particular place where they live, and want to improve it. In this regard, our results are line with previous research on trust in local politics in Western Europe (Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016; John, 2001). However, it is still not apparent how Czech senators represent local interests when they are not empowered to do so. This should certainly be a subject of future research.

Most respondents perceived the Senate as an apolitical oversight institution, and therefore believed that senators should be independent, apolitical, experienced, wise, and morally strong individuals who make decisions based not on partisanship but the common good. Overall, this can be described as an elitist or sophocratic view of the functioning of the upper chamber. In the context of the contemporary debate on reform of the House of Lords (Barber, 2014; Bochel & Defty, 2020; Russell, 2009), which is seen as too elitist, this is a rather surprising finding. The findings also partially contradict Russell’s premise that ‘the elite model of bicameralism has now very much declined and been overtaken by the territorial model’ (2013, p. 373). However, whether this is so depends on the definition of the elite model, i.e. whether we refer to the rules of the electoral system or how the chamber and its legitimacy are understood. This finding, nevertheless, certainly contributes to the debate on different modes of representation, especially the non-political or elitist conception of democracy. It shows that a democratically elected upper chamber can have an elitist character (at least in the eyes of citizens), which may be relevant for the debate on reform of the House of Lords.

The elitist view of the Senate seems to reflect dissatisfaction with politics and distrust of politicians. Demand for politics without politicians and political parties is evident. This demand may be related to the evolution of Czech populism, in which criticism of the existing political establishment dominates as a central theme (Engler et al., 2019; Havlík, 2015). Although this was the most common perception within our sample, it does not correspond to the theoretical justification for the institution’s constitutional foundation or to its powers. Logically, if people’s expectations of the Senate’s performance are unmet, institutional trust may suffer, which consequently may affect voter turnout (see Hruška, 2023). Given widespread and growing popular dissatisfaction with politics and the strengthening of populist parties in democratic regimes, these conclusions are relevant far beyond the Czech context.

The research results show that different popular perceptions of the upper chamber can coexist within one system, and that these perceptions may not accurately reflect its powers or composition. Different perceptions may, then, be associated with different levels of legitimacy. Based on our case study, it can be claimed that greater knowledge of the upper chamber is associated with a more positive perception of it. The Czech Senate’s legitimacy also seems to be enhanced for those who believe that senators represent local interests. Simultaneously, our respondents clearly favoured senators characterised by wisdom and independence rather than partisanship. Importantly for upper chambers in general, our results demonstrate that legitimacy is determined not only by the formal powers and composition of the institution, but also by how its roles are perceived by citizens.

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Acknowledgments

This research was written at Masaryk University and was supported by the Operational Programme Research, Development and Education (OP VVV) project of the ‘Internal Grant Agency of Masaryk University’ reg. no. CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/19_073/0016943, and by a Specific University Research Grant provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic. The Masaryk University Research Ethics Committee confirmed that the research is not subject to ethical approval. Respondents interviewed by the authors signed informed consent.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Specific University Research Grant provided by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic; Internal Grant Agency of Masaryk University [Grant Number Reg. no. CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/19_073/0016943].

Notes on contributors

Jan Hruška

Jan Hruška is a Ph.D. student in his final year in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University. He is interested in the research of bicameralism, electoral behaviour, political institutions, and Czech politics. Jan Hruška has previously completed a study stay at the University of Bologna and a research fellowship at the University College London as the recipient of the Bracewell Travelling Scholarship.

Stanislav Balík

Stanislav Balík is a professor in the Department of Political Science, Masaryk University and the dean of the Faculty of Social Studies. He is interested in local politics, nondemocratic regimes and contemporary Czech politics. He is author and co-author of several books published both in Czech Republic and abroad.

Notes

1 Although the Constitution envisaged the existence of the Senate from the state’s very foundation (1 January 1993), the institution itself was, in fact, not created until the end of 1996.

2 Over the years, the average turnout for the first round of Senate elections has been 37.1%, and for the second round only 21.7% (Czech Statistical Office, 2022). In all, 81 Senators are directly elected for six-year terms in single-member constituencies using a two-round majority system, with the top two candidates from the first round moving to the second round. The Senate is continuously renewed in thirds; 27 senators are elected every two years.

3 The Czech Parliament consists of the Chamber of Deputies (200 members) and the Senate (81 members). Unlike the majority system used in Senate elections, the lower chamber is elected via a party-list proportional representation system. Both elections are characterized by multi-party competition, which reflects the rather broad multipartism characteristic of the Czech party system. Czech bicameralism is asymmetrical. The Senate has only a suspensive veto in the legislative process. However, the Senate’s consent is required in some specific cases, including the approval of constitutional and electoral laws, the ratification of international treaties, and some other decisions. The Senate also has some other, mainly creation or control, powers (e.g., appointment of constitutional judges). According to Patterson and Mughan (2010), the Czech Senate is thus an upper chamber with delay and advisory functions. For more information about Czech parliamentarism, see Kopeček (2017), and about the Czech party system see Pšeja (2017).

4 For data on the Senate’s work within the legislative process, see Senát Parlamentu České republiky (2023).

5 Respondents were guaranteed complete anonymity, hence the names of the respondents and any other identifying information are not included. In the text, direct quotations from the respondents are referenced through numbers.

6 Approximately 42 EUR.

7 The complete list of questions is attached in the Appendix.