https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4369-1449
Words matter. Not only in and of themselves, but also for the purposes of collective identity, social cohesion, political mobilization and, ultimately, for secessionism. For instance, in 1974 Yugoslavia changed article 1 of its constitution from ‘a federal state of voluntarily united and equal nations’ into ‘a federal state having the form of a state union of voluntarily united and equal nations’ (131; original emphasis). Interpreted by Karlo Basta in this book as having ‘converted Yugoslavia from a federal state into a federal-confederal hybrid’ (ibid.), instances such as these of central governments conceding (too much) in the symbolic dimension to minorities cause a ‘majority backlash’. This backlash takes the form of state-wide or at least national majority counter-mobilization. Because this in turn emboldens minority radicals, especially if concessions granted or promised are subsequently rescinded, the stage is set for a full-blown secessionist crisis. Words matter.
Basta’s argumentative chain is of course much more sophisticated and elaborate than sketched here (ch.s 1–3). For starters, there are two ‘rounds’ each of minority demands, majority concessions, and (counter-)mobilizations. In round one, a minority nation demands both instrumental and symbolic concessions. Among the former, fiscal and political autonomy are key levers with which to protect and enhance regional national consciousness and well-being. Autonomy will be granted, Basta’s argument goes, provided the broad policy goals of regionalists coincide with those held at the centre, i.e. if both levels of government pursue either interventionist (Quebec/Canada 1960–84) or pro-market strategies (Catalonia/Spain 1980–, Croatia/Yugoslavia 1964–; p. 42). Where they clash (e.g. interventionist Slovakia vs. pro-market Czechoslovakia in 1989–92; ibid.), autonomy is withheld and the game ends – in this specific case with the elite-negotiated dissolution of the state (chapter 7).
Round two begins when regionalist-nationalists discover the limits of policy autonomy granted and/or continue to see their demands for symbolic concessions frustrated. Such demands take the form of being acknowledged ‘a nation’, in the case of Catalonia; ‘a distinct society’, for Quebec; or the above-mentioned confederalism, for Croatia. Crucially, when the centre eventually does give in to symbolic demands, this awakes the sleeping giant in the form of majority consciousness regarding their relations to and position in the overall state, both of which appear now threatened. These vicious circles of reaction, counter-reaction, and nationalist outbidding on both sides are beautifully traced in Canada (ch. 4), Spain (ch. 5) and Yugoslavia (ch. 6). Chapter 8 concludes with a more self-critical reflection and outlook than is customary, which is all the more refreshing and stimulating. In short, words matter, but how and why the same or different words matter differently or similarly in different places at different times is yet to be explored in greater depth.
From a comparative federalism perspective, the three main avenues for further research that this book stimulates relate to the study of ‘the multinational state’ (e.g. 1) as such; the role and tools of elites in mobilizing and counter-mobilizing; and the import of institutions other than those related to regional self-rule strictly speaking. For starters, this book is also an attempt to found a (sub-)discipline or ‘separate field expressly dedicated to theorizing multinational systems’ (164). Yet for all its centrality to the dynamics evoked here, the multinational state remains surprisingly under-specified and taken as a given. If the ills such as a ‘chronically conditional legitimacy’ or, for minority nations, the ‘enduring possibility of being politically assimilated’ (5; emphases removed) that characterize it constitute its very definition, then surely there are different degrees to which these dangers exist in different states and periods. The ethnic vs. civic distinction, although somewhat dated, is equally likely to play a role for how irreconcilable the different visions of the (federal or quasi-federal) state are in practice for the majority and the minority or minorities.
A similar point applies to the political elites, who although central to the argument because activating and linking the different steps and rounds, remain somewhat in the shadow of the larger structural and ontological forces that seem to shape them. Their precise motivations and calculations at any given point in time, their hopes and fears in relation to their personal or partisan views of ‘the state’, and the conditions, lastly, for their responsiveness to and capture by non-partisan actors are crucial pieces of evidence that much of the literature has only just begun to unearth. The odds are also still out on whether the people at large really care about how their state at federal or regional level is defined in the constitution – or only if prompted by pollsters and/or reminded by political entrepreneurs and the media.
Third and finally, the entire concessions game in its two variants, instrumental and symbolic, could equally likely play out in the horizontal and shared rule dimensions. While true that the asymmetry pursued by minority elites serves above all a differentiation and insulation purpose with regards to both the central government and other regions, not by chance have regional nationalists in Spain for instance begun to discover the power of inter-regional alliances and influence-seeking in the centre(s), including Brussels. For as much as the territories inhabited by national minorities are not typically theirs exclusively (anymore), there is nuance and territorial differentiation on the side of the majority, too. The increasingly acrimonious urban-rural polarization is just one of many examples. How these and related new (or also old) cleavages shape and modify the wording attached to, or interpreted through, the state are promising extensions of our newly gained sense of the importance of institutional symbolism.