‘On the front line of the battle for reunification': Nationalism and Romania’s identity paradiplomacy in Moldova

ABSTRACT

The literature on sub-state diplomacy has revealed that identity entrepreneurs representing minority nations like Quebec engage in foreign affairs, normally defined as identity paradiplomacy. This article argues that the concepts of the identity entrepreneur and of identity paradiplomacy should be broadened to refer to any sub-state decision-maker, not only those representing minority nations, that disseminates identity or nationalist ideas in engagements with foreign actors. The reconceptualization advances scholarship by incorporating a more diverse array of types of identity paradiplomacy and refines our understanding of both the causes and the consequences of nationalist-driven paradiplomacy. As an empirical illustration of this proposition, the article offers a case study of the diplomatic affairs of Romania’s sub-state governments toward the Republic of Moldova, which were dominated by nationalist narratives shared by central authorities and included no references to regional identity.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, the editor, Michelle Sabourin, and Derek Glasgow for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. All mistakes are my own.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 This is a quote from Buzău mayor Constantin Toma, who said that assistance to the Moldovan city of Soroca would help the town he leads claim a place on ‘the front line of this battle, if you like, of reunification.’

2 Romania also includes the institution of the ‘prefect,’ who represents the central government at the local level (Stanus and Pop 2011, 220).

3 It should be noted here that there is a difference between self-determination claims made by sub-state decision-makers that represent a minority nation and non-minority elites that are largely satisfied with representation at the local level (or do not even reflect on such issues). In particular, minority claims for self-determination usually refer to more autonomy, up to and including secession and independence. In the Romanian case, however, self-determination is a major argument in favor of the unification of Romania and Moldova (thank to you an anonymous reviewer for pointing to this important distinction). This category is valid for the purposes of this research, however, since self-determination rhetoric in both instances refers to a claim that the nation – however defined – should be granted the right to determine its own future. Romanian sub-state elites used the principle of self-determination to argue that ethnic Romanians in the Republic of Moldova have historically been prevented from being given the right to do so and that this historical injustice should be rectified.

4 The speaker did not elaborate on this statement, but is presumably referring to the fact that Covasna has previously received help from those that have been better off, namely European authorities.

5 The Centenary celebrating 100 years since the unification of Romania and Basarabia in 1918.

6 The Romanian case may also be valuable because it has identity entrepreneurs of the kind described in prior scholarship and the kind explored in this article. On the one hand, the local decision-makers examined in this article disseminate nationalist discourse that refer to the Romanian nation. On the other hand, some of Romania’s județe (Covasna and Harghita in particular) are majority Hungarian; they therefore constitute a minority nation whose administrative power allows identity paradiplomacy. On this latter topic, see Jenne (2015).