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ABSTRACT
Numerous countries have established local elected governments to improve public goods delivery and reduce information asymmetry between the state and citizens. These governments remain dependent on upper levels for funding which has been found to be influenced by patronage politics and partisan alignment. In this paper, we show that the networks of locally elected officials and bureaucrats determine the allocation of discretionary funds and resources to local governments. Villages whose elected heads reported stronger connections with local bureaucrats were more likely to win a one-time inter-village competition for funds organized by the district administration of Palwal - a district in the North Indian state of Haryana. Locally elected officials in the district also report that bureaucratic connections are at least as necessary as political ties with higher-level politicians to obtain funds for their villages. This centrality of bureaucratic connections can be partly attributed to the institutional design in India.
Acknowledgments
We thank Anustubh Agnihotri, Amit Ahuja, Bhumi Purohit, Rajkamal Singh, and Rahul Verma for their valuable feedback and comments. We would also like to thank Maniram Sharma and Abhinav Vats for their help in conducting this research, and Dhananjai Joshi (Cicero Associates) for sharing the data with us.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Name changed to maintain anonymity.
2 Bussell (Citation2019) reports that village and block level politicians in India spend almost three times as much time dealing with bureaucrats as working with fellow politicians.
3 In some states, the Sarpanch is directly elected, while in others indirectly elected by Panchayat members.
4 The title for these positions may vary across states. For instance, the BDPO is referred to as the Block Development Officer (BDO).
5 At the time of our data collection, the district had five blocks.
6 The CMGGAs are contractual associates appointed by the Haryana Chief Minister's office for one year as its local representatives in each district.
7 Table A1 (see online supplementary file) lists the tasks.
8 The average score of villages in the competition was 173 points, and at least 330 points were required for ‘winning’ the competition. As all villages completed at least one task, the competition's minimum score was 60 points. The 12 villages that completed all tasks secured 485 points in the competition and were joint recipients of the first prize.
9 IRB protocol: 2021-05-14329.
10 The field investigators failed to interview four Sarpanchs despite multiple attempts.
11 See Table A2 (see online supplementary file) for details.
12 The ZP president serves as the chairperson of the DRDA in Haryana and also, as the head of the top tier of local government. This position is usually held by relatively powerful politicians or candidates endorsed by them.
13 These findings are similar to Bussell (Citation2019). It is plausible that Sarpanchs overstate contact with bureaucrats and politicians due to social desirability bias. While this may affect the direction of the responses, it is unlikely that the bias would differ for politicians and bureaucrats.
14 See Table A3 (see online supplementary file) for details. The index computes a respondent's score over four items - regular interface with Panchayat Samiti Chairman, Zila Parishad President, MLA and MP.
15 Many states have increased the quota and reserved 50% seats for women.
16 Men who function as proxies weren't categorized separately due to low sample size.
17 Sarpanchs whose immediate family has held the Sarpanch position at least once in 2005 or 2010 were categorized as experienced Sarpanchs.
18 Why are bureaucratic connections associated with performance in the competition? Some of the tasks required capital expenditure. Utilizing funds from Panchayat accounts requires bureaucratic approval and the process takes considerable time. Thus, Sarpanchs had to initially incur the expenditure privately and then subsequently are reimbursed from Panchayat funds. In interviews, Sarpanchs connected with bureaucrats expressed less reluctance to incur this private expenditure. They seemed more confident of getting their reimbursements approved from the bureaucracy in the future.
19 ‘Roadmap for the Panchayati Raj (2011-17) - An All India Perspective’ published by Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. Available online at https://www.panchayat.gov.in/documents/20126/0/Panchayati_Raj_Final_pdf_02-5-11.pdf/8aa0a6bd-bdfa-0144-b89b-cd7a78d79981?t=1554872219971
20 Table A4 (see online supplementary file) provides sections of Panchayat Acts pertaining to suspension and dismissal of Sarpanch by bureaucrats and state governments for 12 major states.
21 Newspaper report accessed online at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/two-Sarpanches-suspended-over-stubble-burning-674232.
22 Newspaper report accessed online at https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/fgg-flags-issue-of-sarpanches-suspension-to-governor/article35448631.ece.
23 The Finance Commission is a constitutional body established every five years for making recommendations regarding the distribution of central government funds (both tax and non-tax sources) between various levels of the government.
24 As per the 5th State Finance Commission (SFC) report in Haryana, less than one-fourth (22.3%) of Panchayat revenue in 2015–2016 came from own sources (both tax and non-tax). These sources include house tax imposed by the Panchayats, rent from land leased out by the Panchayats, and other common property resources. The primary source of untied funds to the Panchayats are grants-in-aid from the centre and the state based on the 14th Central Finance Commission (33.9%) and SFC formulae (12.1%). Discretionary grants from the district plan and the Haryana Rural Development Fund (HRDF) are another major source of funds for villages' developmental works.
25 The model guidelines prepared by the central government while drafting the Gram Panchayat Development Plans (GPDP) state this quite explicitly.
26 Report published by Centre for Policy Research, Delhi in Citation2014 - ‘Rural Local Body Core Functions and Finances’
27 See https://bangalorerural.nic.in/en/gram-panchayat-role/ for details.
28 In Uttar Pradesh, an MLA organized a formal protest against the local District Magistrate because his supporters' names were missing from voter lists for local government elections. The local MLA could not automatically get the bureaucrat transferred for this action. See https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/uttar-pradesh-bjp-mla-dheeraj-ojha-carries-high-voltage-drama-at-dms-residence-watch-video.