Legal identity in limbo: humanitarian challenges and responses to civil documentation issued by de facto authorities in Northwest Syria

ABSTRACT

Since the conflict began in 2011, access to civil documentation in Syria has been severely curtailed due to the loss, destruction, and confiscation of documents along with the limited or discontinued function of civil registries, particularly in non-government-controlled areas. The rise of de facto authorities and the issuance of their own civil documentation has posed additional challenges, contributing to a pluralistic legal system. The frequency of changes in territorial control in Northwest Syria has meant that an unknown number of actors have issued various forms of documentation – often as a means of asserting their legitimacy and control – leaving Syrians with a myriad of documents with varying levels of acceptance. This humanitarian and policy-orientated piece examines the state of legal identity under the Syrian Salvation Government and Syrian Interim Government in Northwest Syria. Humanitarian organizations face growing challenges in implementing ‘Do No Harm’ responses where the right to civil documentation could be co-opted for political or other objectives. Additionally, the short, medium, and long-term consequences of possessing or obtaining de facto documentation are impossible to predict when the future for Northwest Syria remains unknown. Against this backdrop, this piece highlights the importance of examining this issue from the perspectives of affected civil populations and identifying how humanitarian actors can best provide assistance and guidance in a principled and protection-focused approach.

KEYWORDS:

• Syria
• civil documentation
• legal identity
• non-state armed group
• northwest Syria
• humanitarian organizations

Introduction

Access to civil documentation and legal identity is a basic human right in itself as well as a prerequisite to the enjoyment and realization of a multitude of other rights, including, inter alia, the rights to nationality, education, family life, health, and freedom of movement. On a practical level, legal identity refers to the registration of vital life events and other identification documents, but as Sosnowski and Klem establish in this collection, legal identity goes beyond mere documents and encompasses the rights and duties of a person. For displaced persons affected by the conflict in Syria and the continuous cycles of displacement, incomplete or missing civil documentation has become a barrier to proving their legal identity and exercising those rights. The consequences of displacement in Syria are becoming increasingly multi-generational, as more children are born into families with lost, damaged, or destroyed civil documents or to families who never possessed these types of documents in the first place. An estimated 51% of households across Syria reported a lack or loss of civil documentation, and only 13% of households in Northwest and Northeast Syria reported possessing all the civil documentation they needed (UNOCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 2022, HNO, 74). The devastating 6 February 2023 earthquake that struck Türkiye and Syria has further exacerbated the humanitarian situation and led to additional waves of displacement, creating heightened vulnerabilities with regard to legal identity, particularly for those whose documents might have been destroyed or left behind in their homes as they fled.

A further layer of complexity, on which this practice and policy-orientated paper focuses, relates to the rise of de facto authorities in Syria and the issuance of their own civil documents to those living under their areas of control. Multiple de facto authorities, including the Syrian Salvation Government and Syrian Interim Government in Northwest Syria, have issued and developed their own documentation systems.¹ This includes both foundational documents, such as birth registration certificates or identity cards critical in recording vital life events and centered on managing ‘identity information for the general population’, as well as functional documents, such as registration for drivers’ licenses that are issued for specific purposes and allow individuals to access particular services (Manby 2021, 6; Holloway, Al Masri, and Abu Yahia 2021, 8). These de facto authorities are ostensibly issuing foundational civil documents to facilitate the daily lives and maintain accurate records for those living under their control. However, as Will Grant-Brook notes in this collection, these authorities are increasingly using documents as a means of legitimizing themselves and establishing credibility.

This article focuses on the foundational documents issued by the Salvation Government and Interim Governments, in particular how the emergence of such documents has left many in Northwest Syria in limbo when it comes to their legal identity. For these Syrians, access to documents issued by the Syrian Government is nearly impossible except for those willing to make the dangerous attempt to cross into government-controlled areas or with substantial resources to pay intermediaries. Meanwhile, while Salvation Government and Interim Government documents may provide short-term practical benefits and facilitate daily life, these may have little value or utility outside Northwest Syria and could create serious protection repercussions, including arbitrary arrest and detention by the Syrian Government.

Academics have addressed the issue of whether de facto authorities are obligated to uphold the same human rights obligations as imposed on states (Hampton 2019; Fortin 2021). For example, in the context of birth registration, Kathryn Hampton (2019, 511) notes that under international human rights and humanitarian law norms, ‘insurgent groups have the inherent power to register births, in order to “take all appropriate steps” to protect children … ’. To date, much of the analysis of civil documentation in the Syrian context has focused on the link between civil documentation and durable solutions, including return, or the procedures and barriers to registration for refugees abroad (Clutterbuck et al. 2019; Ferreri 2022). Because of the precarious security dynamics, the complex role of non-state actors, and restricted humanitarian access, less information has been available on the civil documentation situation for those in Northwest Syria. In addition to a review of the limited existed literature, this article explores this matter based on professional experience, consultation with key stakeholders, survey data, and recent developments by relevant authorities.

This article briefly outlines the documentation systems available for those in the Northwest, the barriers to and consequences of possessing documents issued by these de facto authorities, and the practical challenges that arise for both individuals living in these areas and for humanitarian actors responding to the crisis given the limited value or recognition of these documents outside non-government areas. To do so, the piece draws upon desk research, interviews with humanitarian practitioners, and data collected from humanitarian organizations. The political and legal landscape in Northwest Syria remains fluid and changing, and this piece reflects the state-of-affairs at the time of writing in mid-late 2023.

This article demonstrates that the reality of legal identity documents in the Syrian context is inherently political, which poses challenges for how humanitarian actors engage with such documents, particularly as humanitarian principles require neutrality and independence. Despite these challenges, there are some practical measures that can be taken. First, recognition of de facto-issued documents can be separated from legally validating or recognizing those de facto authorities. From a human rights perspective, it is imperative for all actors to avoid ascribing affiliation or discriminating against individuals based on which documents they possess, particularly as many individuals living in areas under de facto control may obtain non-government documents as a practical measure and not necessarily as a form of allegiance or political support. Second, for humanitarian actors operating on-the-ground, providing information and raising awareness regarding the importance of civil documentation, the different types of documentation available, and the procedures for obtaining such documents are crucial to empowering individuals in making informed decisions based on their individual circumstances. At the same time, humanitarian organizations should avoid overly prescriptive or directive approaches that advocate individuals make one decision over another as this may undermine a principled approach and undercut autonomy for affected displaced persons.

Territorial control of Northwest Syria as of mid-2023

Northwest Syria is home to 4.5 million people, 2.9 million of which are internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 2023, ‘; UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 2023). Many IDPs have had to continuously flee amidst the violence and dire socio-economic conditions. Over the past 12 years of conflict, territorial control in Syria has not remained static and a range of both state and non-state actors have controlled or contributed to control of territory at different times. These actors include, inter alia, the Syrian Government, Russia, the United States, Iran, Türkiye, the Islamic State, the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, the Syrian Salvation Government, and the Syrian Interim Government.

Currently, the primary non-state actors in the Northwest are the Syrian Salvation Government and the Syrian Interim Government. The Salvation Government is the administrative branch of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a dominant military actor operating in the Northwest which evolved from Al-Qaeda. Today, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham maintains that it has broken its ties and allegiance to Al-Qaeda, though it remains a designated sanctioned terrorist organization by many countries and international entities, including the United States, European Union, and the UN (CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 2018). Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham now controls the majority of Idlib province and the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Türkiye (Ali 2020). In November 2017, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham established the Salvation Government with 10 administrative ministries (Al-Zaraee and Shaar 2021). With the emergence of the Salvation Government, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has attempted to distance itself from this terrorist designation and to better facilitate external humanitarian assistance given the constraints related to counter-terrorism legislation (Zelin 2022; Al-Tamimi 2020, 9). Over time, and with the formation of additional administrative structures and laws, the Salvation Government has become more involved in legal administration, including by issuing civil documentation to those living under their areas of control.²

In addition to the Salvation Government, the Turkish-backed Syrian Interim Government operates as the other key non-state actor in Northwest Syria. In November 2012, the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Armed Forces, a coalition of opposition forces formed with the support of international actors, was established (Darwish 2016; Carnegie Middle East Center n.d.). In 2013, the Syrian National Coalition established the Interim Government, currently based in Azaz (ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation - ECOI 2023). The Interim Government’s armed forces consist of the Syrian National Army, the second largest opposition group after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which was established in the end of 2017 (EUAA (European Union Agency for Asylum) 2023, ‘3.4’). Türkiye exerts considerable influence over the Syrian National Army and Interim Government affairs. For instance, the Turkish lira is the primary currency in these areas, public servants receive their salary in this currency, and nearly all goods have been priced in the lira (Tastekin 2020). Like the Salvation Government, the Interim Government has also become increasingly involved and organized in administrative affairs in areas under its de facto control, including with civil registration.

The right to legal identity

The right to legal identity is protected though not clearly defined under international human rights law. As civil documentation provides recognition of a person before the law, ‘it has been the fundamental means of granting legal identity’ (UN Legal Identity Expert Group 2019, 2). The ‘right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ is protected under Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Though non-legally binding, Principle 20 of the UNOCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (1998) affirms this right, further noting that ‘the authorities concerned shall issue to [IDPs] all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights, such as passports, personal identification documents, birth certificates, and marriage certificates’.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) is more explicit when it comes to defining legal identity as Article 8 specifically notes a child’s right to ‘preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations … ’ The right to birth registration is protected under Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Though there has been less analysis of the right to marriage registration, Article 16(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) requires ‘all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory’.

Legal identity additionally has a direct impact on the exercise and enjoyment of numerous related human rights. Unregistered children, for example, are more vulnerable to statelessness trafficking, child recruitment, child labor, child marriage, and illegal adoption, especially when it may be difficult to establish a person’s age or family relationships. Freedom of movement is reduced where individuals lack documents to safely cross checkpoints or prove their identity. Access to education and other essential services is limited for undocumented or under-documented persons. Housing, land, and property rights will be affected, particularly for women with missing or dead male relatives and children who are unable to demonstrate their legal connection with their fathers, resulting in inheritance disputes (UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 2021, 5).

Goal 16 of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes an express reference to legal identity, mandating that states should ‘provide legal identity for all, including birth registration’ by 2030 (UN n.d..). Legal identity facilitates the achievement of at least 10 Sustainable Development Goals, including quality education and gender equality (UN Legal Identity Expert Group 2019, 2). Thus, protecting legal identity not only helps ensure the enjoyment of that right but also facilitates access to other social, economic, and political rights.

Syria is a signatory to all the above-referenced international human rights conventions, and thus is legally obligated to enforce and respect the rights enshrined in those treaties. Additionally, although application of international human rights law to non-state actors like the Salvation Government or Interim Government has traditionally been contested, there is a steady and evolving opinio juris and practice on imposing human rights law responsibilities on de facto authorities (Berkes 2021, 177, 179; UN OHCHR (Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights) 2021, ‘Joint Statement’; Clapham 2006, 28). Under a traditional state-centered lens, human rights law governs the relationship between states and individuals, and does not impose obligations on non-state armed groups or other non-state actors. This is connected to the notion that human rights devolve with territory (UN OHCHR (Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human Rights) 2021, ‘Joint Statement’). Though there remains some debate regarding the human rights obligations of non-state armed groups, a compelling argument can be made for applying international human rights law in non-international armed conflicts due to the protection gaps that would exist otherwise for those living under the control of armed groups (Heffes 2020, 17–18).

An additional basis for the expansive application of international human rights legal obligations arises in contexts where non-state actors exercise effective or de facto control over a territory (Berkes 2021, 182, 196). Both the Salvation Government and Interim Government are de facto authorities and exercise effective control over territory in Northwest Syria. In addition to de facto control over a territory, a non-state armed group can also be held to human rights obligations if they exercise government-like functions. Generally, most non-state armed groups engage in governance-like functions, ‘ranging from registering birth, running clinics and schools to collecting taxes, developing rules and policies and operating dispute-resolution mechanisms or their own prisons’ (Report of the Special Rapporteur 2018, 5). As discussed by Grant-Brook in this issue, the Salvation Government engages in government-like functions as it has an established an administrative structure with 10 ministries which, inter alia, issue identification cards, enact legislation, and collect taxes (Al-Zaraee and Shaar 2021). The Interim Government similarly engages in government-like functions through the issuance of its own civil documentation, tax collections, and establishment of administrative bodies.

One frequently cited argument against imposing human rights obligations on non-state armed groups is that this may lead to legitimizing them and their acts of violence (Geneva Academy 2016, 31–32; Clapham 2006, 46–53). This criticism maintains that advocating for the Salvation and Interim Government to provide civil documentation in areas under their control could be interpreted or misrepresented as recognizing the authority of these non-state actors. This would be particularly problematic with the Salvation Government as its military counterpart, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, continues to be listed as a proscribed terrorist organization by several countries including the United States and Canada. This concern and potential tension, however, has already been addressed in the international humanitarian law context, with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions noting that ‘while humanitarian law provides for equal rights and obligations of the Parties to the conflict in the treatment of people in their power, it does not confer legitimacy on non-State armed groups that are Parties to a conflict’ (ICRC 1949, para. 905). The imposition of human rights obligations does not automatically legitimize de facto actors or ‘entitle[] them to use any sort of violence’ (Clapham 2006, 52). Moreover, failing to impose these human rights obligations would leave protection gaps and ‘generate a dangerous sense of impunity’ for non-state armed groups undermining human rights (Clapham 2006, 52, 54).

Civil documentation under the Syrian Government

In terms of basic administrative practices, both the Salvation Government and Interim Government still largely follow the Syrian Government’s legal framework and procedures on civil documentation. Therefore, an understanding of civil documentation practices under these de facto actors requires an initial overview of those of the Syrian Government. Moreover, Syrian Government-issued documents remain the only internationally-recognized documents, and individuals in non-government areas still broadly prefer Syrian Government-issued documents (Lund 2020a, 2020b). The central legal framework governing civil documentation under the Syrian Government is the Civil Status Law, most recently amended in March 2021, which provides rules and procedures for Syrians both domestically and abroad on the registration of life events. The Civil Status Law establishes the rules around civil registries (commonly known as nofous), which issue civil documents, keep records of vital life events, and certify evidentiary documents (NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2022 ‘2021 Syrian Civil Status Law’, 7, 12). In addition to birth, marriage, and death certificates, the Syrian Government issues identity cards, passports, individual and family civil status extracts, and family booklets. While individuals were previously required to go to the civil registry in their area of origin to obtain documents, the revised Civil Status Law creates a concept of a ‘Single Syrian Registry’ where individuals may approach any Syrian Government civil registry to record their events through a connected electronic system (NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2022, ‘; 2021 Syrian Civil Status Law’ 6–7). While this is a positive development in reducing transportation-related expenses, other serious barriers still exist, primarily security concerns when traveling in and out of government areas.

Other relevant Syrian legal frameworks include the Constitution, Nationality Law, and Personal Status Law. The Syrian Constitution engrains certain principles and rights and requires that the state ‘shall protect and encourage marriage’, which includes marriage registration (UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2018a, ‘Lost Identity’, 24). It further notes that the state ‘shall provide women with all opportunities enabling them to effectively and fully contribute to the political, economic, social and cultural life’, and that documentation and proper legal identity is the foundation to contribute to society (UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2018b, ‘Lost Identity’, 24).

The Nationality Law confers nationality through the patrilineal line and limits the right of women to pass on their nationality to their children except in specific cases. These cases include when the link to the father is not established, i.e., when the father is unknown or when the child is born out of wedlock. In practice, this exception is rarely implemented due to social taboos, stigma, and repercussions of having a child outside of marriage. Finally, the Personal Status Law, largely based on shari’a law, governs family law and procedures for marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship, missing persons, and inheritance. Shari’a courts handle matters on marriage, child guardianship, maintenance, and succession, though there are exception for Druze, Jewish, and Christian Communities (UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2018b, ‘Lost Identity’, 30; Government of Syria Parliament 1953).

Civil documentation under the de facto authorities

As noted above, the Salvation and Interim Governments still largely adhere to Syrian Government procedures when it comes to civil documentation and both apply shari’a principles for personal status matters, including family law and inheritance (Ekman and Meyer 2021, 53). In fact, staff currently working in the Salvation and Interim Government civil registries include many of the same personnel who worked there prior to 2011 when it was still under government control, including civil registries, mukhtars, and medical personnel (IRC International Rescue Committee 2016, 4). Even the actual forms and certificates used mirror those of the Syrian Government and often the only noticeable difference with the Salvation and Interim Government documentation is the logo and insignia (IRC International Rescue Committee 2016, 4).

Increasingly, however, the Salvation Government has been issuing their own legislation and publishing their laws and circulars on their website and through social media (SSG Syrian Salvation Government n.d.). For example, in September 2022, the Salvation Government began a new system of issuing personal identity cards, marking a significant expansion of their role in the administration of civil documentation SSG (Syrian Salvation Government) (2022a) see also Grant-Brook (2024). As Grant-Book notes in this collection, this identity card campaign is likely linked to the Salvation Government’s broader efforts to legitimize itself, including by asserting that the identity cards are per ‘international standards and are fully Syrian affiliated’ (SSG Syrian Salvation Government 2022c). Despite these claims, these identity cards and any other Salvation Government-issued documentation are unlikely to be recognized or in any areas outside Salvation Government-control (Grant-Brook 2024).

As of 24 October 2022, only one month after their initial announcement, the Salvation Government reported that 19,660 people in the Idlib, Al-Dana, Harem, Sarmada, and Kafr Takharim centers had registered for the identity card (SSG Syrian Salvation Government 2022b). The Salvation Government’s rollout of these identity cards has since continued and, by 27 March 2023, a reported 113,398 identity cards had been printed 84,875 of which had already been picked up. There appears to be relative gender parity in the issuance of these documents since, of the 113,398 cards printed 52,092 were for women while 61,306 were for men (Enab Baladi 2023; SSG Syrian Salvation Government 2023).

These identity cards are now mandatory for all individuals aged 14 year and older and are increasingly linked to services in areas under their control. In December 2022, the Salvation Government announced that these cards were required to access basic services, including obtaining salaries and applying for school exams. The Ministry of Education requires the card for employees to be able to receive salaries as well as to apply for elementary and secondary school certificate exams. On 27 March 2023, the Public Transportation Association issued an order preventing the ownership transfer of vehicles without either this identity card or another Salvation Government-issued document. More recently, the Salvation Government stated that travel via the Deir Balloot and Daret Ezza crossings, which allow access in and out of Northwest Syria, will require some form of Salvation Government-issued or other de facto-issued identity card.

Civil registration practices by the Interim Government have followed a similar progression and expansion (IRC International Rescue Committee 2016, 4). In 2015, the Interim Government announced the opening of a civil registry directorates in Aleppo and Idlib to issue documents such as marriage registration and birth certificates (UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 2018b, 33). The Interim Government began to issue family booklets in November 2017 after increased demand by residents living in their areas of control (Clark, Al-Zarier, and Al-Haj Ali 2018). Possessing non-Interim Government documents, including those issued by the Syrian Government or the Salvation Government, potentially pose risks of being interrogated, detained, and arrested by the Interim Government (Clark, Al-Zarier, and Al-Haj Ali 2018).

Barriers in accessing civil documentation in Northwest Syria

For those living in Northwest Syria in areas under de facto control, there are significant barriers in accessing and obtaining any form of civil documentation. Firstly, for the vast majority in Northwest Syria, obtaining Syrian Government documents is a near impossibility as there are no government civil registries operating in the area and, even for those considering traveling into government-controlled areas, crossing between government and non-government areas is extremely difficult, costly, and dangerous (Protection Cluster: North-West Syria, 2022, 10). Individuals attempting cross-line travel, particularly from Salvation Government areas into Syrian Government areas, are frequently treated with suspicion and may face detention and arrest upon arrival. These security concerns are also frequently applied on return trips as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has reportedly engaged in retaliatory practices against those affiliated or perceived to be affiliated with the Syrian Government.

While documentation issued by de facto authorities in Northwest Syria is much more accessible, there remain some significant obstacles. These include access and security concerns; loss, damage or destruction of supporting documentation; and administrative and transportation costs (UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 2018b, 34). These barriers are only compounded by the dire economic situation in Northwest Syria, including skyrocketing costs for basic goods, the instability and inflation of both the Syrian pound and Turkish lira, increased food insecurity, and staggering rates of unemployment.

In Salvation Government areas, according to one 2022 humanitarian needs assessment of 6,795 individuals in those areas conducted, 44% of respondent reported lacking any form of an identity card, 20% lacked a family booklet, 13% lacked a birth certificate, 10% lacked a passport, 8% lacked a family statement, 5% lacked a marriage certificate, and 5% lacked a death certificate, divorce certificate or other document.³ Of those who reported lacking documents, 57% cited barriers related to administrative and transportation costs, security reasons, and loss or lack of required supporting documentation.

For Interim Government areas, another humanitarian survey carried out in 2021–2022 found that 68% of respondents reported barriers to obtaining Syrian Government documents, primarily security concerns, particularly for men of conscription age who may subject to detention and forced to complete their military service.⁴ However, in the same survey, most households did not report significant barriers in obtaining Interim Government-issued documents, with only 8.5% citing barriers such as cost, transportation, access, and security concerns. Survey respondent additionally identified the Interim Government-issued identity card and family booklet as the most necessary and relevant for accessing services and travelling within Interim Government-controlled areas.

Due to these barriers to obtaining documentation, many living in Northwest Syria have resorted to negative coping mechanism, including using costly brokers, paying bribes, smuggling, crossing lines of conflict, obtaining fraudulent documents, or using false identities UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) 2018b). Displaced persons may turn to brokers or intermediaries, but this only increases costs and heightens risks of potentially forged documents. A limited number of individuals in Salvation or Interim Government areas may be able to designate power of attorney to a broker or relative in Syrian Government areas to renew documents. Some undocumented individuals have reportedly attempted to smuggle themselves into government areas, though at enormous risk in the event they are caught. In some cases, parents have registered their children under either false identities or identity cards borrowed from other relatives, which may lead to serious long-term consequences (UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 2018b, 34).

Impact and consequences of lack of civil documentation in Northwest Syria

Against these aforementioned challenges, those living in the Northwest must navigate this difficult civil documentation landscape and determine the best options for themselves and their families. This entails weighing competing risks and choosing between remaining undocumented, undertaking dangerous and unpredictable crossings into Syrian Government-controlled areas, or obtaining documentation issued locally by de facto actors, none of which provide a perfect solution. For example, individuals who are unable or unwilling to obtain either Syrian Government or de facto documentation would be left completely undocumented and potentially with no proof of their existence or that of their children.

As mentioned earlier in this piece, civil documentation impacts a range of other human rights, including access to freedom of movement, health, education, nationality, property, livelihoods, and humanitarian assistance. For instance, where a marriage remains unregistered, any children born into that marriage will not be able to obtain birth certificates, and, given the patrilineal nature of the Syrian Nationality Law, the children are at risk of statelessness. In the event of death or divorce, an unregistered marriage will impede access to alimony or inheritance. For displaced populations, lack of documentation may contribute to family separation and make it difficult to authenticate family relationship or trace missing family members.

Lack of civil documentation additionally has profound gendered impacts, particularly for female-headed households and widows. While men traditionally handled civil documentation matters in Syria, with the onset of the conflict, many more women who lost their husbands became heads of their households and have had to handle these matters (Sosnowski and Hamadeh 2021, 4). Many women who lost their husbands, including those married to foreign fighters or Islamic State members, may have no proof of their husband’s identity or death, obstructing their legal claims to inheritance or to registering their children’s births (Sosnowski and Hamadeh 2021, 4). Some women face challenges as their in-laws may refuse to help obtain death certificates for their husbands to avoid passing inheritance to them. Additionally, renewing or obtaining civil documentation requires fees, transportation costs, and familiarity with the process, and it may be more difficult for women who lack social, family, or tribal support to cover these fees. There may also be a belief that it is not necessary to register the marriage or that informal, customary urfi marriage procedures are sufficient, especially among women. Sometimes the husband does not want to register the marriage to avoid alimony or passing on inheritance.

In addition to such gendered impacts, those with disabilities often face specific physical barriers that prevent them from renewing or registering their documents. It may be more difficult for them to physically travel to the civil registries. Detainees and prisoners are also often without civil documentation upon release, and obtaining family or tribal support to obtain necessary documentation may be considerably difficult as they reintegrate into society.

Stabilization initiatives on civil documentation in Northwest Syria

Beginning in 2013, efforts to fill the legal identity void in Northwest Syria evolved into the establishment of parallel civil registration structures, funded primarily by international development donors. These initiatives were implemented largely through stabilization programs in non-government areas, namely the Swedish-funded International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), and Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) (Adam Smith International (ASI) n.d..). According to ILAC (International Legal Assistance Consortium) 2017, 13), the overarching goal of these efforts was to ‘facilitate a future process to validate all documents and merge with the official registry once the conflict ends’. At the time, the Interim Government was recognized as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the Syrian people by over 20 countries, including the United States, Sweden, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye (Foley 2020, 8; ICG International Crisis Group 2013). As such, these programs were primarily focused on support to the Interim Government ‘with a view to then supporting a new Syrian government after the conflict had ended’ (Foley 2020, 6).

Between 2014 and 2019, ILAC established 21 documentation centers in non-government areas which issued 334,687 documents, many of which bore the insignia of the Interim Government (Fortin 2021, 8; Foley 2020, 6). The Interim Government’s Ministry of Justice monitored these documentation centers (ILAC International Legal Assistance Consortium 2017, 12). According to ILAC, all areas outside government control were supported in using ‘the same documentation forms and systems’ and were specifically ‘designed so that they may be merged with the government system post-conflict’ (ILAC International Legal Assistance Consortium 2017, 81).

At the time, UN officials raised concerns and criticized this project, stating that these documents may put individuals at ‘risk of harm and be perceived as political’ (Lund 2020b). An external evaluation of the ILAC program in Syria undertaken in 2020 further concluded:

The decision by the local Syrian actors to stamp the documents with the SIG [Interim Government] insignia not only risked making the documents worthless, under potential scenarios that were quite foreseeable at the time that [the program] was being designed, but could also quite conceivably have put the holders of such documents at considerable risk. As such it seems to have contradicted a fairly basic Do No Harm (DNH) principle … .ILAC´s decision to align itself with one side in an ongoing armed conflict, fought between numerous different factions and whose outcome was unpredictable was a strategic risk that should have been calculated and assessed at the time. (Foley 2020, 17)

AJACS developed a similar initiative, implemented by Adam Smith International with funding from United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark (Fortin 2021, 8; Rohwerder 2016, 9–10). This program also modelled their centers on Syrian Government civil registries and issued birth, marriage, and death certificates, though they did not issue national identity cards or passports given the political dynamics (UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees and NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 2018b, 34). AJACS additionally operated a National Documentation Office to provide civil registration oversight in northern Syria and partnered with the ministries of the Interim Government (‘National Documentation Office’. 2018). Following the fragmentation of armed actors in the Northwest and the emergence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the AJACS program was operationally and financially suspended in September 2018 as was the ILAC program in February 2019 (Foley 2020, 16, 22).

The prevalence of stabilization projects under these two programs may have inadvertently contributed to the further politicization and fragmentation of civil documentation in the Syrian context. Before exploring the extent to which this may have been the case, an initial explanation of the respective scope, priorities, and objectives of stabilization, development, and humanitarian interventions is necessary. The precise definitions, overlaps, and complementarities of these actors remains uncertain and contentious (Collinson, Elhawary, and Muggah 2010). One helpful though perhaps oversimplified explanation differentiates between ‘the explicitly political aims of stabilisation, the neutral aims of humanitarian action and the apolitical, poverty-focused aims of development’ (Collinson, Elhawary, and Muggah 2010). The ILAC and AJACS programs, which sought ‘to assist Syrian lawyers and judges in their efforts to prevent the complete collapse of the Syrian justice system in parts of Syria where the government no longer is in control’, never purported nor represented themselves as neutral, independent, or apolitical organizations (ILAC International Legal Assistance Consortium 2017). From the perspective of displaced communities on the ground in Northwest Syria, however, these policy distinctions between stabilization and humanitarian actors were unlikely to have been understood. As such, there may have been a significant risk of confusion and potentially blurred perceptions or expectation around the respective roles of stabilization and humanitarian actors from the community standpoint.

Humanitarian challenges with civil documentation in Northwest Syria

While the existence of these stabilization programs may have contributed to additional complexities in designing humanitarian legal identity responses in Northwest Syria, this was certainly not the only obstacle. The more significant challenge was limited guidance or best practices for humanitarian legal aid interventions when it comes to documents issued by de facto authorities (Global Protection Cluster, ‘Legal Aid in Humanitarian Settings’. n.d.). This is particularly challenging in the Northwest context as each document may carry its own risks. Syrian Government-issued documents may require risky travel across active frontlines and potential detention or arrest, while non-state-issued documents are not recognized outside their areas of control and could be perceived as affiliation or support to the Salvation or Interim Governments (Clark, Al-Zarier, and Al-Haj Ali 2018).

In most humanitarian contexts, civil documentation interventions typically entail legal assistance and protection activities aimed at supporting the registration of vital life events (Global Protection Cluster, ‘Legal Aid in Humanitarian Settings’. n.d.; NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) n.d.). The Global Protection Cluster, in particular its Task Team on Law and Policy, has developed significant guidance on legal aid in humanitarian settings, including through a Legal Aid Analysis Framework and Conceptual Framework. However, these tools contain no references or recommendations for legal interventions and engagement with de facto civil documentation. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for internally displaced persons has noted:

Where control over territory is divided, practical solutions for documentation need to be found. National authorities, for instance, may recognize papers provided by de facto authorities as prima facie factual proof of personal status without this implying legal recognition of the entities providing the papers . (Brookings Institution 2010, 39)

Guidance developed in 2020 by the Northwest Syria Protection Cluster, a network of NGOs and UN entities engaged in protection work in the area, recommended that humanitarian actors exercise caution ‘to ensure that they manage the expectations of the beneficiaries on what is within the scope of their intervention’. More importantly, the guidance stressed that the objective of humanitarian legal interventions is ‘not to encourage or discourage a certain action … but rather to ensure that a person has the necessary information upon which to make an informed decision on how to proceed’ (Syria Protection Cluster [Türkiye] 2020). In response to contextual developments and the evolving legal landscape, the Northwest Syria Protection Cluster legal strategy has most recently been updated in 2023. This emphasis on supporting empowerment and agency while avoiding an overly prescriptive approach to legal assistance may offer one constructive approach for humanitarian legal interventions, especially for Northwest Syria. Given the dynamic environment in Northwest Syria, displaced communities frequently struggle to access the latest and most accurate information on civil documentation or may lack awareness of the importance of civil documentation and its link to other rights, including long-term implications. Humanitarian actors may also consider, where appropriate, supporting civil documentation efforts by covering costs of transportation, legal and/or administrative fees, frequently cited as amongst the chief barriers. Depending on the context, humanitarian actors could encourage individuals to obtain documents issued by any available apolitical entities, such as birth notifications (taqrir wiladah) from the hospital or midwife, and birth attestations from mukhtars (shehadat wiladah). In the Guidance on Birth Registration in the Northwest (2018a), the Norwegian Refugee Council and UN High Commissioner for Refugees suggested this as a more neutral option, though acknowledged that ‘it is not certain that these documents will be acceptable’ in the future.

Conclusion

The challenge of legal identity and civil documentation in non-government-controlled areas of Northwest Syria has been described as a ‘ticking time bomb’ (Sosnowski and Hamadeh 2021, 1). Over the past 12 years of conflict, as basic life events have continued unabated and with each passing year, the impact of this documentation crisis increases exponentially. An entire generation of Syrians are at risk of being undocumented or under-documented and may be unable to exercise and enjoy some of their basic rights.

There is, however, no clear answer to addressing the multitude of different civil documents in circulation in Northwest Syria nor clear guidance for legal interventions in line with the humanitarian ‘Do No Harm’ mandate. While debates persist as to whether humanitarian actors should even engage with de facto civil documentation, the immeasurable legal identity gaps support the perspective that ‘the increase in legitimacy gained by insurgent groups … is far outweighed by the protections resulting from engagement’ (Hampton 2019, 534). Despite espousing principled commitments to neutrality, independence, and impartiality, the reality is that humanitarian organizations are increasingly ‘operating in complex political environments’ (Collinson, Elhawary, and Muggah 2010). At the global level, not only is there an increasing intersection between humanitarian emergency responses and areas under the effective control of de facto authorities, but there is also a growing geographic overlap in terms of where humanitarian, development, and stabilization actors operate. These non-humanitarian actors are typically not guided or bound by humanitarian apolitical principles.

From the lens of displaced populations in Northwest Syria, securing their rights to legal identity has never been more difficult or less achievable. Those living in Northwest Syria have struggled for more than a decade to obtain, maintain, and protect their civil documents as well as navigate the benefits and risks associated with each form of documentation issued by different parties to the armed conflict. Humanitarian actors should, therefore, continue providing legal assistance and supporting civil documentation, even in contexts where de facto authorities operate. Additional tools and guidance, potentially through global consultations and with the Global Protection Cluster, could ultimately support a protection-oriented response to such interventions.

Acknowledgments

The authors have submitted this piece in their personal capacities and, as such, the views reflected herein should not be regarded nor interpreted as reflecting those of the Norwegian Refugee Council. The authors further wish to express their thanks to Esther van Eijk for her contributions to the civil documentation research in Northwest Syria.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Other de facto entities such as the Islamic State and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration have also issued their own civil documents at certain points over the last 12 years of the Syrian conflict. See McGee T. 2024. ‘Implications of Legal Identity Documentation issued by the Kurdish-led Self Administration in Northern Syria: Competition and Compromise with the Central State’. Citizenship Studies, this issue.

2. See also Grant-Brook, W. 2024.‘Documenting Life amidst the Syrian War: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Performance of Statehood through Identity Documents’. Citizenship Studies, this issue.

3. Data drawn from an unpublished 2021–2022 community needs assessment carried out by a humanitarian NGO operating in Salvation Government-controlled areas of Northwest Syria. Data on file with authors.

4. Data drawn from an unpublished 2021–2022 survey conducted by a Syrian NGO operating in Interim Government-controlled areas of Northwest Syria. Data on file with authors.