Programmatic change in Southern European radical left parties: The impact of a decade of crises (2010–2019)

ABSTRACT

The 2008 economic crisis brought new scholarly attention to Southern European radical left parties (SERLPs). Yet, important aspects of these parties remain empirically unexplored, such as their programmatic development. Using empirical data from party manifestos, this article examines the programmatic evolution of SERLPs during the 2010s – a decade full of crises (economic, migration, climate). Despite their different trajectories on various policy dimensions, the results suggest that these parties were able to adapt their programmatic appeals to capitalize on poor economic conditions and growing discontent with the EU, while showing signs of being attentive to the emergence of new issues on the public agenda – such as anti-growth concerns. Moreover, they also provide support for a moderating effect of government participation (and proximity to power) on RLPs.

KEYWORDS:

• Radical left parties
• Programmatic change
• Southern europe
• Party manifestos
• Far left

Introduction

The 2008 economic crisis brought electoral success and new scholarly attention to European radical left parties (RLPs). The rapid electoral rise of parties such as the Greek SYRIZA or the Spanish Podemos turned them into standard-bearers of this increasingly influential party family, for instance at the level of governance and policymaking. Since 2010, 19 RLPs have integrated cabinets or provided parliamentary support to minority governments in several European countries.¹

Despite the growing literature (e.g., Chiocchetti, 2017; March & Keith, 2016), several important aspects of RLPs remain empirically unexplored. Some studies have examined the diversity of their programmatic appeals (Gómez et al., 2016) or how their ‘ideological (and strategic) positions differ across countries and regions’ (March, 2011, p. 7). However, it is still unclear how RLPs’ policy positions have changed over time or how new issues have been incorporated into their political agenda (Gómez et al., 2016, p. 369). In particular, little is known about the impact of ‘government participation, economic crises, or the emergence of new social movements (e.g., climate, anti-austerity)’ on their programmatic profile (Lourenço, 2021, p. 770). RLPs’ programmatic development has been analysed more generally (Fagerholm, 2017), as well as the nature of their ‘greening’ (Wang & Keith, 2020) and Euroscepticism (Charalambous, 2011; Keith, 2018). But the extent to which these changes have occurred over the past decade, or on other more specific policy issues (e.g., welfare, immigration), remains to be studied in greater depth.

This article seeks to address this gap through a comparative study of programmatic change in Southern European radical left parties (SERLPs) during the 2010s. This is justified for several reasons. First, this decade was filled with events with potential impact on Southern European political systems, namely the economic, migration and climate crises. Second, this region has seen a growth in electoral support for its RLPs since the onset of the Great Recession,² with most experiencing government participation – often for the first time in decades (e.g., in Greece or Portugal). Finally, the socio-political context in these countries has also led to the emergence of a new wave of social protests (Roca et al., 2018), and the salience of new issues in the political arena – such as climate change or immigration – in line with the rest of Europe (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Taylor et al., 2019).

Drawing on the literature on party policy change, this study uses empirical data from the Manifesto Project Dataset (Volkens et al., 2021) to analyse the evolution of SERLPs’ policy positions and salience across the three main dimensions of European party competition – socio-economic, socio-cultural and European integration (Bakker et al., 2012; Costello et al., 2012). The results show that, despite different trajectories, most Southern European RLPs managed to adapt their programmatic appeals to political and social circumstances – albeit temporarily – in order to capitalize on poor economic conditions and growing discontent with the European Union (EU), while showing signs of being attentive to the emergence of new issues on the public agenda (e.g., anti-growth). By analysing in detail the programmatic changes in this group of RLPs, this article offers a renewed look at the impact of this ‘decade of crises’ on the programmatic dimension of political parties, and their mechanisms of strategic adaptation, contributing to a better understanding of party change and political competition.

Studying party policy change

Parties are ‘politically purposive’ organizations (Luther & Muller-Rommel, 2002, p. 6). They carry a set of ideological values and policy preferences that are decisive in the performance of their mediating role in representative democracies (Vassallo & Wilcox, 2006). But while a party’s ideology is primarily related to its long-term political values and ‘identity’, its programmatic profile may be more contextual and strategic (Mair & Mudde, 1998), with party manifestos having ‘a predominantly external orientation’ (Mudde, 2000, p. 20) designed to appeal to the public and the media (Harmel, 2018). The positions and issues that parties choose to emphasize at a given moment (or election) are therefore more volatile and subject to short-term changes, and ‘may be more or less closely connected’ to their ideologies (Volkens & Klingemann, 2002, p. 145).

Like other organizational aspects, the programmatic dimension of political parties is also under pressure for change. For instance, socio-economic transformations in post-industrial societies – such as European integration or changes in citizens’ values and political communication – have posed significant challenges to parties, forcing them to rethink their connection to voters and political platforms (Müller-Rommel, 2016). However, according to Harmel and Janda (1994), change in parties usually occurs as a result of internal factors (e.g., changes in leadership or dominant faction) and/or in response to an ‘external shock’ – such as poor electoral results (see also Harmel et al., 1995). Thus, while gradual changes are certainly important for understanding programmatic change in political parties (e.g., Volkens, 2004; Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009), recent literature has mainly focused on short-term (or between-election) changes to study the causes behind ‘party policy change’.

Empirical research on party policy change has been dominated by two theoretical approaches. The first is that of spatial models of party competition – influenced by Downsian theories and the seminal work of Ian Budge (1994) – through its central premise that, while constrained by their ideology and uncertainty about their support among the public, parties compete by adopting different positions on a given policy dimension (e.g., economic left-right). The other is the literature on issue competition, which argues that parties also compete by selectively emphasizing issues that favour them electorally (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Carmines & Stinson, 1993). They seek in this way to influence the political agenda and attract voters, for example by focusing on issues in which they are seen as competent (‘issue ownership’) (Petrocik, 1996), or by politicizing those ignored by their opponents (‘issue entrepreneurship’) (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015). While these two types of competition ‘are not mutually exclusive’ and can co-exist (Green-Pedersen, 2007), they differ in the sense that the former is concerned with ‘the question of what makes parties adjust their policy positions’, while the latter with their competition ‘over the saliency of particular issues’ (Abou-Chadi et al., 2020, p. 750).

The increasing integration of these two perspectives has allowed the identification of a set of internal, systemic and social factors that drive or condition policy change in parties – such as leadership change, electoral performance, their governmental status or changing economic conditions (for a detailed discussion, see Abou-Chadi et al., 2020; Adams, 2012; Fagerholm, 2016). And while it is not the aim of this article to assess the causes of policy change in SERLPs, nor to delve into the country-level factors that influence it, the concepts of policy ‘position’ and ‘issue salience’ – that is, the positioning towards different issues and the relative importance attached to them (Laver, 2001) – have been used in several empirical studies to analyse the programmatic development of political parties (e.g., Fagerholm, 2017; Manwaring & Holloway, 2022; Wagner & Meyer, 2017). Thus, our study combines core elements of these two traditions to test a set of (essentially descriptive) hypotheses concerning their changes on various policy dimensions and issues during the 2010s, while reflecting on their possible causes.

Programmatic change in Southern European RLPs

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Eastern Bloc (1989–91) brought profound changes to the communist party family and the parties of the so-called socialist left. Those that did not disappear completely, went through a phase of deep organizational and strategic adaptation, or reinvented themselves ideologically as non-communist RLPs (Botella & Ramiro-Fernández, 2003; March & Mudde, 2005). In the late 2000s, a ‘New European [Radical] Left’ (Hudson, 2012) would eventually emerge from the ashes of communism and consolidate as a distinct and renewed party family, with an increasingly coherent ideological and programmatic profile (March, 2011).

Like the ‘old’ communist family, this ‘new’ radical left is also distinguished by its anti-capitalist socialism and strong defence of the role of the state in promoting social justice and socio-economic equality (Fagerholm, 2018; March, 2011). However, most post-communist RLPs now combine the traditional economic causes of the left with the socio-cultural and post-materialist agenda of the ‘new left’, such as ecology, feminism or opposition to traditional morality – themes once marginal to many communist-inspired parties (Fagerholm, 2017; Gómez et al., 2016). Contemporary RLPs maintain a strongly internationalist profile, while now directing their contestation towards ‘neoliberal’ globalization, imperialism and – to varying degrees – European integration (Fagerholm, 2018; March, 2011). A growing number of RLPs have also incorporated populist appeals into their political rhetoric (e.g., Damiani, 2020; Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2019).

A persistent idea among scholars has been that of a ‘de-radicalization’ of the European radical left. March (2011, p. 10–11) argues that strategic concerns have led to a ‘rhetorical moderation and even a certain social-democratization’ of many RLPs. As Fagerholm (2017, p. 19) notes, after 1989, ‘many of the policy goals traditionally pursued by RLPs – including nationalization, a centrally planned economy, and proletarian internationalism – were viewed with great suspicion by the political mainstream’, leading these parties to adopt an essentially welfarist and neo-Keynesian economic agenda (Chiocchetti, 2017; March, 2011). Moreover, an increasing participation in government also seems to have exerted ‘a noticeable moderating effect’ on RLPs, with a ‘softening’ of their criticism of liberal democracy and European integration (March, 2011, p. 203–206). This thesis has found support in some empirical studies. For instance, Fagerholm’s (2017) longitudinal study identified three ‘main evolution trends’ in the policies of Western European RLPs since 1989: an economic moderation (starting in the 1990s), a re-radicalization ‘during the late 2000 and early 2010s’, and a growing interest in non-economic issues – ‘mostly related to New Politics’ (p. 32). Other authors have highlighted RLPs’ increasing attention to environmental issues (Wang & Keith, 2020) and a moderation in their Euroscepticism in recent decades (e.g., Almeida, 2012; Charalambous, 2011).

This raises several questions about the programmatic development of RLPs in Southern Europe. First, whether it followed the general trends of the party family or had particularities of its own. Second, if the 2010s promoted lasting (or temporary) changes in their policy profile, or brought new programmatic dynamics, for example as a result of their governmental participation (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal). Finally, on the programmatic impact of an external shock such as the Great Recession (2008–15), in a region where austerity has put welfare states and political systems under strain (see, e.g., Bosco & Verney, 2016; Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014). Indeed, the literature suggests that economic recessions and ‘crisis-like events can induce short-term change to the political agenda’ (Gessler & Hunger, 2021, p. 1) and in parties’ policy positions (Adams et al., 2009; Calca & Gross, 2019). Moreover, the 2010s were further marked by the so-called refugee and climate ‘crises’, which re-politicized immigration and environmental issues in Europe (e.g., Krzyżanowski et al., 2018). Southern European countries thus provide a privileged setting to conduct an empirical assessment of the programmatic evolution of RLPs during the last decade.

Hypotheses

The programmatic response to the Great Recession has been assessed across different regions (Charalambous et al., 2021), party families (Bremer, 2018; March & Keith, 2016) and policy issues (e.g., labour, Euroscepticism) (Lisi, 2021; Real-Dato & Sojka, 2020). However, while the economic crisis was particularly intense in Southern Europe, the multiple nature of the challenges posed to SERLPs during the 2010s – electoral success and decline, government participation, migration and climate crises – suggests the existence of potentially broader changes in their policy platforms during this decade. Thus, and while it is difficult to assume that these events have had a homogeneous impact on SERLPs’ programmatic change – due to the existence of important contextual factors (e.g., at the country and party level) – we develop a set of general hypotheses that seek to assess their programmatic evolution across the three main policy dimensions: socio-economic, socio-cultural and European integration.

The Great Recession constituted the strongest external shock to the radical left party family since the fall of Eastern communism (1989–91) (cf. March & Keith, 2016). Economic issues gained a new centrality in electoral politics, creating an (apparent) opportunity for RLPs (and the Left in general) to re-politicize this political dimension. Indeed, during the crisis, socio-economic issues seem to have become more salient in party manifestos (Bremer, 2018), particularly in Southern Europe (Charalambous et al., 2021). And in left-wing parties, this was even accompanied by a leftward turn in some of their economic positions (Bremer, 2018), with Fagerholm’s (2017) finding evidence of a RLPs’ ‘shift towards the socioeconomic left (…) during the late 2000s and early 2010s’ (p. 32). While it is unclear whether this was a lasting shift or just a temporary reorientation, we expect that worsening economic conditions in Southern European countries after 2008, and growing popular discontent, may have led SERLPs to feel more comfortable embracing a more overtly ‘anti-capitalist’ programmatic appeal, advocating more salient and ‘radical’ economic positions in their 2010s manifestos, countering previous trends towards economic moderation:

H1:

In the 2010s, SERLPs increased their programmatic emphasis on socio-economic issues (H1a) and adopted more radical (leftist) positions (H1b) than in the previous decade.

A greater emphasis on economic issues may also have occurred at the expense of attention devoted to other non-economic issues. In recent decades, most RLPs seem to have become more interested in ‘new politics’ issues – such as the environment (Fagerholm, 2017) – and to have benefited electorally from adopting centrifugal strategies on the socio-cultural dimension (Krause, 2020). However, the socio-political context in Southern Europe during the 2010s was heavily marked by economic difficulties, removing incentives for a possible strategic focus on the cultural dimension of political conflict – perhaps with the exception of recently re-politicized themes such as the environment and immigration (especially from 2015 onwards). And indeed, unlike other European regions, in Southern Europe the economic crisis seems to have ‘contained the emergence of socio-cultural issues’ (Charalambous et al., 2021, p. 15). We therefore expect that SERLPs have neither increased their attention to societal issues – except for the environment and immigration – nor significantly changed their positions on the socio-cultural dimension:

H2:

In the 2010s, SERLPs have neither increased their emphasis (H2a) nor significantly changed their positions on socio-cultural issues (H2b).

Regarding European integration, the literature has described a moderation in RLPs’ Euroscepticism since the early 1990s, with few parties now supporting an exit from the EU (Charalambous, 2011; Keith, 2018). This seems to result from a wider de-radicalization of RLPs and an attempt to adopt ‘office-seeking or semi-responsible opposition strategies’ (Almeida, 2012, p. 93). But while some studies found no evidence that RLPs have ‘become more Eurosceptic over the years’ (Fagerholm, 2019, p. 191), the Great Recession has been referred to as a potential turning point also in terms of their attitudes towards the EU. Amini (2015, p. 12–13) argues that if ‘before 2009, Eurorejectionism could only be found among a few conservative communists’ (e.g., the Greek KKE or the Portuguese PCP), after the crisis one could ‘expect a gradual shift towards Eurorejection among the RLPs’. And indeed, negative assessments about the economy and the EU seem to explain part of the growing electoral support for RLPs after the crisis, having allowed them ‘to attract pro-EU voters (…) concerned with the economic situation’ (Beaudonnet & Gómez, 2017, p. 3). Moreover, some empirical studies have described ‘a general anti-European shift’ among Eurosceptic left-wing parties (Braun et al., 2019), from which RLPs also seem to benefit electorally (Wagner, 2021). This suggests that a mismanagement of the Eurozone crisis by EU institutions may have led SERLPs to accentuate their anti-EU rhetoric – even if only temporarily – by adopting more Eurosceptic positions and placing greater programmatic emphasis on this issue:

H3:

In the 2010s, Southern European RLPs devoted greater programmatic attention to European integration (H3a) and adopted more Eurosceptic positions (H3b) than in the previous decade.

Although these hypotheses are formulated at a very general level – and do not consider country and party specificities – they set the stage for a broader discussion on the programmatic development of the different SERLPs.

Data and operationalisation

This empirical study examines the programmatic evolution of Southern European RLPs between 2000 and 2019. It seeks to analyse and describe changes in their salience and positioning on the three main dimensions of party competition – socio-economic, socio-cultural and EU integration – and on some specific policy issues over time. Since it focuses on the analysis of an intermediate number of cases (six parties), over a relatively short period and on multiple policy issues, it does not engage in the kind of in-depth qualitative analysis of other individual case studies (e.g., Manwaring & Smith, 2020) or single-issue comparisons (Charalambous, 2011), nor the statistical analyses that characterize many recent large-n studies (e.g., Braun et al., 2019; Fagerholm, 2019; Wagner & Meyer, 2017).

Our longitudinal evaluation is based on data from the Manifesto Project Dataset (MARPOR) (Volkens et al., 2021), the longest and most widely used empirical data series of party manifestos. It encodes the ‘quasi-sentences’ of individual manifestos according to 56 issue categories that can be used to construct the scales to compare party positions over time and across different policy dimensions. The MARPOR – and measurement with human-coded party manifesto data – has been criticized on several grounds (viz. Gemenis, 2013; Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 2014; Mikhaylov et al., 2012). However, several authors argue that there is no ‘gold standard’ measure to gauge parties’ policy positions and that existing alternatives (e.g., expert and voter surveys) are no better than those provided by MARPOR (for a methodological discussion, see Meyer, 2013). Given that our study aims to examine the ‘programmatic’ change of parties – and not their ideology or ‘true position’ – empirical manifesto data seems the most valid measure to assess it.

Since each study tends to include different MARPOR categories in the policy scales it uses, we reviewed the existing literature to build our own scales. Thus, our socio-economic scale includes 18 MARPOR categories, the socio-cultural 13, and the European integration 2. Party ‘positions’ are estimated using the logit method proposed by Lowe et al. (2011), resulting in a scale ranging approximately between −7 and +7. Measures of ‘salience’ are obtained by summing the quasi-sentences on each issue and presented as the percentage space (%) occupied in each manifesto. In the case of specific policy issues (e.g., welfare, environment, immigration), we also follow the measures used in previous studies or the categories originally provided by MARPOR. A detailed discussion of these scales and measures is provided in Online Appendix E.

Following similar approaches in the study of programmatic change in political parties (e.g., Fagerholm, 2017; Manwaring & Holloway, 2022; Wagner & Meyer, 2017), our hypotheses are analysed and discussed at different levels. First, from an aggregate perspective, examining the overall evolution of SERLPs in each policy dimension. Then, at the party level, comparing their programmes before and after 2010, and analysing their individual trajectories ‘to detect more detailed patterns and trends’ (cf. Fagerholm, 2017). The small number of observations available for each decade (Total N for 2000–2019 = 48) makes statistical analysis inadvisable.

Regarding case selection, this study includes all Southern European RLPs available in MARPOR and that have won at least one seat in parliament, thus ensuring a minimum criterion of relevance. Only six SERLPs meet this requirement and provide consistent data for the entire period under analysis: AKEL (Cyprus), KKE and SYRIZA (Greece), PCP and BE (Portugal) and IU (Spain).³ The presentation of disaggregated data for these parties allows the identification of relevant nuances to answer the research hypotheses and better understand the policy changes that occurred in the SERLPs. Including parties from the three main subgroups of RLPs – conservative communists (KKE, PCP), reform communists (AKEL, IU) and democratic socialists (SYRIZA, BE) (see Keith & March, 2016, p. 8–11) – also allows us to assess possible differences in their trajectories. Other relevant RLPs – such as Podemos (Spain), DIMAR (Greece), PRC or SEL/SI (Italy) – are only included in the aggregate analysis due to the lack of data for a substantial part of the period.

Discussion of results

This section presents and discusses the results obtained for the different levels of analysis. The evolution of SERLPs’ policy positions and salience is first analysed at an aggregate level, and then in more detail on each party, seeking to identify their most relevant patterns of programmatic change in the 2010s. The main findings and implications of the study are then discussed and framed in the wider literature on the development of European RLPs.

Programmatic trends: an aggregate analysis

Figure 1 depicts the general trend of the programmatic evolution of SERLPs across the three policy dimensions. These trend lines include data from the manifestos of all SERLPs that have won at least one seat in parliament since 2000 (N = 48). To avoid a ‘centrist’ bias in the results, manifestos from centre-left electoral coalitions in which some SERLPs participated – for example in Italy – were excluded (see Table D1 in the Online Appendix). They provide an overview of the programmatic change of the Southern European radical left as a whole, but should nevertheless be considered with caution due to the limited number of observations available for each period.

Figure 1. Evolution of mean salience and position of SERLPs on socio-economic, socio-cultural and EU issues (2000–19).

Note: Loess fit line. Parties and manifestos included are listed in Appendix Table D1.

The trend in the upper chart (A) reveals a substantial increase in the salience of socio-economic issues in SERLPs’ manifestos during the 2010s. This lends support to hypothesis H1a, suggesting a greater centrality of the socio-economic dimension for these parties in the wake of the Great Recession. SERLPs also appear to have begun to reverse an earlier trend towards economic moderation around the same time. By the late 2010s, their average economic position (chart B) was already the most left-leaning of the entire period, also supporting H1b. Among the issues whose emphasis seems to have increased most in their manifestos, we do not find particularly radical or ‘anti-capitalist’ economic policies – such as nationalizations or direct control over the economy – but rather the defence of the welfare state, labour and market regulation (see Appendix Figure H1), issues traditionally associated with a more social-democratic and welfarist agenda.

The aggregate results also confirm a relative stability in SERLPs’ overall attention to socio-cultural issues (hypothesis H2a). However, contrary to expectations from H2b, we find significant variation in their average socio-cultural position over this period, with a trend towards less socially liberal positions in the 2000s also being reversed in the 2010s. The reasons for this shift are difficult to discern from aggregate data. However, it appears to be associated with less attention to ‘law and order’ issues, and a greater emphasis on liberal social issues such as environmentally sustainable growth, democracy, individual freedoms and human rights (see Appendix Figures I1– 2). In particular, the incorporation of ‘anti-growth’ concerns suggests that SERLPs paid attention to the agenda of the new climate social movements that emerged in the late 2010s (e.g., Fridays for Future climate strikes), which does not seem to have occurred with immigration and the 2015 migrant crisis.

Figure 2. Salience of socio-economic (black circle), socio-cultural (dark grey square) and EU issues (light grey circle) per party.

Finally, they show a greater programmatic focus on EU issues in the early 2010s (H3a), which seems to dissipate over the years (Figure J1 in Appendix shows this more clearly). Similarly, we find no evidence of a turn towards more anti-EU positions in their manifestos (H3b), except very slightly during a brief period between 2008 and 2012. The temporal association of these policy shifts with the years of the economic crisis (2008–15), is compatible with a strategic (but temporary) response of SERLPs to the re-politicization of the European integration dimension during this period.

Thus, the aggregate results suggest that SERLPs’ programmatic change in the 2010s occurred mostly through a greater emphasis on relatively moderate socio-economic issues, and some specific socio-cultural themes (e.g., anti-growth, human rights), while reversing previous trends of moderation in their positioning on these two dimensions (i.e., becoming more leftist and liberal). They also hint at a possible strategic response to the Eurozone crisis, with SERLPs’ manifestos only temporarily increasing their focus on EU issues and adopting slightly more Eurosceptic positions.

Change across parties: average values per decade

While the aggregate results provide empirical support for some of our hypotheses, the overall patterns may hide significant variation across parties. Or, rather than reflecting actual policy changes, result instead from party ‘emergence and substitution’ (Wagner & Meyer, 2017, p. 98) or more frequent elections in some countries. Thus, the next two sections analyse programmatic change in the six SERLPs with consistent data for the whole period: AKEL, KKE, SYRIZA, PCP, BE and IU. The aim is to confirm the trends found earlier and analyse their programmatic development in greater detail, attending – as much as possible – to the specific context of each party. Following Fagerholm’s (2017) analytical approach, in this section this is done by comparing their average values in each decade (i.e., before and after 2010).

Table 1 presents the variation in the average salience and position of each SERLP between the 2000s and 2010s. A hypothesis is considered ‘supported’ when 5 or 6 parties move in the expected direction, and ‘partially supported’ when only 4 do so.

Table 1. Average salience and position of Southern European RLPs in the three main policy dimensions.

			SOCIO-ECONOMIC			SOCIO-CULTURAL			EU INTEGRATION
						SALIENCE
Country	Party		2000s (SD)	2010s (SD)	Change	2000s (SD)	2010s (SD)	Change	2000s (SD)	2010s (SD)	Change
Cyprus	AKEL		31 (2)	44 (15)	+13 ✓	36 (4)	27 (15)	−9 ✓	1.6 (1.8)	0.9 (1.3)	−0.7 ✕
Greece	KKE		41 (22)	33 (17)	−8 ✕	6 (5)	3 (3)	−3 ✓	4.6 (2.8)	13.0 (4.5)	+8.4 ✓
	SYRIZA		33 (12)	40 (7)	+7 ✓	17 (5)	20 (12)	+3 ✕	2.4 (2.9)	2.3 (1.5)	−0.1 ✕
Portugal	PCP		44 (4)	49 (5)	+5 ✓	17 (2)	13 (3)	−4 ✓	2.4 (0.4)	6.4 (2.6)	+4.0 ✓
	BE		47 (3)	54 (11)	+7 ✓	21 (8)	21 (6)	0 ✓	3.8 (1.3)	3.8 (2.9)	0.0 ✕
Spain	IU		25 (5)	51 (5)	+26 ✓	31 (4)	29 (4)	−2 ✓	2.3 (1.1)	0.4 (0.3)	−1.9 ✕
	SERLPs		37 (8)	45 (8)	+8 ✓	21 (11)	19 (10)	−2 ✓	2.9 (1.1)	4.5 (4.7)	+1.6 ✓
						POSITION
Cyprus	AKEL		−2.6 (0.5)	−3.5 (0.9)	−0.9 ✓	−0.1 (0.4)	−0.3 (0.4)	−0.2 ✓	1.7 (2.3)	1.2 (1.7)	−0.5 ✓
Greece	KKE		−4.0 (1.5)	−3.6 (0.6)	+0.4 ✕	−0.5 (0.8)	1.7 (1.6)	+2.2 ✕	−2.5 (1.3)	−3.7 (1.0)	−1.2 ✓
	SYRIZA		−4.0 (0.4)	−2.2 (1.4)	+1.8 ✕	−3.4 (0.6)	−3.4 (0.5)	0.0 ✓	−0.5 (0.7)	0.3 (2.7)	+0.8 ✕
Portugal	PCP		−2.3 (0.3)	−2.8 (0.2)	−0.5 ✓	−1.0 (0.8)	−0.7 (0.3)	+0.3 ✓	−2.5 (1.4)	−3.0 (0.5)	−0.5 ✓
	BE		−3.8 (0.5)	−4.2 (0.8)	−0.4 ✓	−1.3 (0.4)	−1.4 (1.1)	−0.1 ✓	−1.0 (0.6)	−3.0 (1.9)	−2.0 ✓
Spain	IU		−3.7 (0.4)	−4.3 (1.1)	−0.6 ✓	−3.2 (1.0)	−4.6 (1.2)	−1.4 ✕	−0.5 (0.7)	−1.2 (1.3)	−0.7 ✓
	SERLPs		−3.4 (0.8)	−3.4 (0.8)	0.0 ✕	−1.6 (1.4)	−1.5 (2.3)	+0.1 ✓	−0.9 (1.6)	−1.6 (2.0)	−0.7 ✓

Note: SD – standard deviation. ‘Salience’ values = % of manifesto. ‘Position’ scales range from −7 (Left/Liberal/Anti-EU) to + 7 (Right/Conservative/Pro-EU). Value comparison across decades: no trend = ± 2 (econ./cult. salience), 0.5 (EU salience) and 0.3 (position); ✓ = hypothesis supported; ✕ = not supported.

The results for the socio-economic dimension largely confirm the previous findings. Socio-economic salience increases for most SERLPs in the 2010s (H1a) – sometimes very significantly (IU, AKEL) – and 4 of the 6 parties also adopt a more left-wing positioning (H1b), the exception being the two Greek RLPs.

On the socio-cultural dimension, the results are less congruent with the aggregate analysis. The expectation of lower or identical attention to socio-cultural issues in the 2010s (H2a) also finds support at this level of analysis. However, contrary to the aggregate trend, we find no substantial changes in the average socio-cultural position of most SERLPs (4 out of 6) – partially supporting hypothesis H2b.

Regarding European integration, only the two conservative communist parties (KKE and PCP) offered, on average, more space from their manifestos to EU issues in the 2010s (H3a not confirmed). Moreover, and contrary to the trend detected earlier, positions on European integration became on average more Eurosceptic (or less pro-EU in AKEL) for all parties except SYRIZA, thus supporting H3b.

The differences between the two levels of analysis suggest that a more detailed assessment of the trajectories of these parties becomes necessary to confirm the plausibility of our hypotheses and better understand the programmatic dynamics at play.

Change across parties: individual trajectories

Figures 2 and 3 present the individual trajectories of the six SERLP in the three policy dimensions. They provide further insight into the programmatic developments under scrutiny, helping to confirm (or refute) the results obtained in the previous sections. However, some caution is also recommended in interpreting these results. Sometimes, due to the nature of the data used, sharp variations between elections may reflect – for example – ‘the coding of proxy documents’ (Gemenis, 2013, p. 9) or changes in the structure of party manifestos, which in some cases are very short and poorly detailed (e.g., KKE, or SYRIZA in the late 2000s). Still, this level of analysis complements and significantly enriches the previous ones, allowing for a more in-depth perspective on the programmatic change of SERLPs during the 2010s.

Figure 3. Positioning on socio-economic (black circle), socio-cultural (dark grey square) and EU issues (light grey circle) per party.

On the socio-economic dimension, these trajectories largely confirm the previous findings. Most SERLPs (AKEL, PCP, BE and IU) exhibit a clear and lasting trend towards greater attention to socio-economic issues in the 2010s (H1a), with their most recent manifestos presenting the highest salience values since 2000. This trend is less clear in the two Greek RLPs; but while in SYRIZA it suggests the same, KKE’s manifestos oscillate between extreme values that may result from being very short documents and often more prone to emphasize the party’s own competence (MARPOR item ‘political authority’) than its policies. This indeed seems to result from a greater focus on welfare and labour issues, and only in some cases (KKE, PCP and BE) also on radical policies associated with ‘anti-capitalist socialism’ (see Appendix Figure H3). A socio-economic turn to the left is also evident in the early 2010s (H1b), although – with the exception of AKEL – all SERLPs appear to partially moderate their positions by the end of the decade, suggesting that an ‘economic radicalization’ may have occurred only temporarily in response to the worsening economic crisis.

Although several factors may help explain these trajectories, the most plausible seem to be the economic and social events related to the Eurozone crisis. Harsh bailout programmes and record levels of unemployment led to the emergence of strong anti-austerity social movements in several countries – such as the Indignant in Greece, 15 M in Spain, or Screw the Troika in Portugal – with the more leftist economic manifestos of the SERLPs largely coinciding with this period. A more overtly welfarist and labour-focused policy platform also seems to have emerged possibly in response to the disruption of Southern European welfare states.

While the consequences of government participation are more difficult to assess, it seems to have effectively exerted a moderating effect on most SERLPs. The radical U-turn of the SYRIZA-led coalition government (2015–19) is hardly captured by the data, but strategic concerns seem to have led the party to substantially moderate its economic positions from June 2012, as it grew in electoral support and became a serious contender to govern Greece. Its manifestos in the two Greek general elections of 2015 are the least left-leaning of all six SERLPs. In the same vein, AKEL’s most moderate economic programmes were presented during its participation in the Cypriot government (2003–13), whereas the Portuguese BE also moderated its positions after providing parliamentary support to a minority government led by the social democrats (2015–19) – unlike the PCP.

The results in Figure 2 also confirm that most SERLPs maintained or reduced the salience levels of socio-cultural issues in the 2010s, particularly during the economic crisis (confirming H2a). This is the case even for Greek RLPs, where a politicization of immigration (and the socio-cultural dimension) by the far-right could lead us to expect greater programmatic attention to this type of issues. Still, a more detailed analysis (Appendix Figure I3) reveals that several SERLPs (PCP, BE and IU) considerable increased their emphasis on environmental issues towards the end of the decade, suggesting a potential response to the international climate strikes that emerged in 2018, without however finding evidence of a similar reaction to the migrant crisis and on immigration. Their positional trajectories are more diverse, with some parties maintaining a stable positioning throughout the decade (AKEL, SYRIZA), and others steering towards more conservative (KKE, PCP) or liberal (BE, IU) positions – refuting H2b.

While we find greater stability on the socio-cultural dimension, the migrant and climate crises appear to have had a distinct relationship with the SERLPs’ policy offer, with several parties apparently responding to the re-politicization of environmental issues in the late 2010s, but not immigration. This may be due to several reasons. For example, ‘green’ issues and climate change concerns are possibly electorally more rewarding for RLPs – much like immigration for the far-right. Furthermore, the MARPOR category used to measure immigration issues (‘multiculturalism’) may not be the most appropriate, with SERLPs possibly framing this issue also as one of ‘human rights’. In addition, we lack data for post-2015 Greece – the country most affected by these exceptional migration flows.

The existence of diverse trajectories in this dimension also suggests that these may be driven by specific factors at the national and party level, rather than by more global dynamics. In the case of BE and IU, their turn towards more liberal positions appears associated with a greater concern for environmental issues and democratic rights and freedoms, reflecting their ‘new left’ profile. In the opposite direction, the ‘conservative turn’ of KKE and PCP – which visibly devote less attention to socio-cultural issues⁴ – seems to result, at least in part, from the increasing appeals to ‘national sovereignty’ for which these parties are known (Keith & Charalambous, 2016) and which are absent in other SERLPs (IU, BE and SYRIZA). The case of AKEL is more sui-generis, as the party has reoriented itself towards more socio-economic concerns after years of a greater centrality of socio-cultural issues and, in particular, the solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’ (cf. Katsourides, 2016, p. 130).

Finally, we confirm that most parties have only temporarily increased their attention to EU issues (H3a) in the early 2010s. This is particularly evident in KKE and PCP, and to a lesser extent in SYRIZA, BE and AKEL. The same is true for their positions on European integration. Figure 3 reveals a sharp turn by most SERLPs towards more anti-EU positions in the early 2010s (H3b), after considerable moderation in the 2000s. This is the case even for traditionally less Eurosceptic parties like SYRIZA, IU or BE. But as with the socio-economic dimension, these positions seem to have been partially reversed in the late 2010s, suggesting that the Eurozone crisis led SERLPs to accentuate their Eurosceptic rhetoric and pay more attention to the EU issue only in a temporary and strategic way.

Again, this programmatic response seems to be linked to the intensity of the Eurozone crisis in Southern Europe, leading SERLPs to seek to capitalize on popular discontent with the bailout programmes and austerity policies imposed by EU institutions. The fact that this has dissipated over the decade also highlights the strategic adaptability of SERLPs in this dimension. For example, the two ‘Eurorejectionist’ RLPs (KKE and PCP) – known for their principled opposition to European integration – were the parties that most increased their emphasis on EU issues and radicalized their positions during the crisis (along with BE), even if we find extremely Eurosceptic positions among the SERLPs traditionally less critical of European integration (SYRIZA, BE, IU).

In this respect, SYRIZA’s trajectory is particularly interesting. Presenting neutral to soft-Eurosceptic positions in the 2000s, the party accentuated its anti-EU rhetoric at the height of the crisis, moderating it significantly as it came closer to power, and then resuming a more Eurosceptic position in the September 2015 elections. For its part, AKEL, being less critical of European integration (Charalambous, 2011, p. 304) and having headed the Cypriot government between 2008 and 2013, seems to have had less scope for contesting the EU. Moreover, the nature of RLPs’ positions towards the EU acquired a new complexity in the wake of the ‘SYRIZA experiment’ (2015), with several parties – including the Portuguese BE and the Spanish Podemos – adopting the so-called strategy of ‘Disobedient Euroscepticism’ (Bortun, 2022).

Overall, our findings reveal significant changes in the programmatic dimension of Southern European RLPs during the 2010s. In particular, the Great Recession indeed seems to have constituted a considerable ‘external shock’ for this group of parties (cf. March & Keith, 2016), having been associated with a re-politicization of socio-economic and EU issues, and a temporary radicalization of their positions on these two dimensions in the early 2010s – echoing the findings of several recent empirical studies (e.g., Braun et al., 2019; Bremer, 2018; Fagerholm, 2017). An assumedly more welfarist and labour-oriented economic platform also confirms that SERLPs primarily sought to assert themselves as a bulwark in defence of the welfare state and the traditional agenda of social democracy (cf. Chiocchetti, 2017; March, 2011), at a time when several centre-left governments embraced austerity across Europe and new social protest movements have emerged. These changes are less evident in the socio-cultural dimension, although environmental issues and new ‘anti-growth’ concerns gained new relevance in their policy platforms following its re-politicization in the late 2010s (cf. Fagerholm, 2017; Wang & Keith, 2020) – which was not the case for immigration.

Yet, we also found significant variations in the development of the different SERLPs, reflecting their distinct ideological and policy profiles. While a greater concern with the economy and materialist issues was common to all, some parties (KKE, PCP and BE) also seem to have taken advantage of the crisis to present more openly ‘anti-capitalist’ economic platforms. Moreover, on several other issues, the SERLPs followed divergent trajectories. For example, the two conservative communist parties (KKE and PCP) – which have historically favoured an exit from the EU – have more strongly accentuated their contestation of European integration and defence of national sovereignty (as suggested by Keith, 2018). In contrast, SERLPs with a ‘New Left’ profile – the Portuguese BE and the Spanish IU – embraced the environmental and human rights agenda more enthusiastically in the late 2010s, fitting with the typology proposed by Gómez et al. (2016). Likewise, governmental participation (and proximity to power) seems to be associated with programmatic moderation in most RLPs (cf. Almeida, 2012; March, 2011) – particularly on economic and EU issues (e.g., SYRIZA, AKEL, BE) – although not all (PCP).

In sum, while these changes have not radically altered their core programmatic identity and policy profile, they provide further evidence that Southern European RLPs were able to adapt and reinvent themselves programmatically during the 2010s to capitalize on the socio-political context, appeal to voters and remain politically relevant in a challenging context.

Conclusions

This article analysed the programmatic evolution of Southern European RLPs during the 2010s – a decade full of crises. Overall, it found that this decade brought a lasting re-politicization of socio-economic issues to these parties, and a temporary radicalization of their economic and EU positions, suggesting a strategic programmatic response to the Eurozone crisis. And despite their different trajectories in the cultural dimension of political conflict, it also revealed an uneven relationship of the migration and climate crises to the programmatic offer of RLPs, which, in Southern Europe, paid increasing attention to environmental issues politicized by the new social movements for climate justice (e.g., anti-growth) – which did not occur with immigration. Finally, this study also provides support for a moderating effect of government participation in RLPs, while allowing for a broader discussion of the programmatic trajectories of some of the most relevant parties in Southern Europe.

Our findings also relate to particular developments in Southern European party systems. The economic crisis indeed seems to have brought a greater emphasis on economic issues – especially welfare – and ‘contained the emergence of the socio-cultural dimension’ in political parties’ programmes (Charalambous et al., 2021, p. 17). Furthermore, the politicization of EU issues and the increasing polarization of party systems over European integration has also led to the emergence of increasingly Eurosceptic positions – especially among more radical parties (Charalambous et al., 2018) – and of a ‘new divide related to European austerity’ (Hutter et al., 2018, p. 20). Yet, and as with RLPs, the impact of the crisis on Euroscepticism among Southern European parties and voters seems to have been only temporary (see e.g., Lisi, 2020; Teperoglou & Belchior, 2020). Still, the electoral success of RLPs, ‘the tri-polarization of Southern European party systems’, and the emergence of centrifugal dynamics of party competition during this decade (Lisi & Tsatsanis, 2020, p. 30) seem to have made their political platforms more audible and influential than ever, having sought to position themselves as bulwarks against austerity and welfare state retrenchment.

However, this study is not without its limitations. While it discusses some of the events associated with the trajectories of the different SERLPs, it cannot assess all the factors that potentially affected their policy changes during this decade (cf. Fagerholm, 2017, p. 33). Moreover, as several authors point out (e.g., Harmel, 2018; Mudde, 2000), party manifestos are primarily intended to appeal to the public and the media, differing from the actual policies implemented when they are in government (i.e., policymaking). A paradigmatic example is that of SYRIZA’s radical policy shift between January and September 2015, which is barely captured by the MARPOR manifesto data.

This study also raises several questions that merit further investigation. First, that of understanding whether this programmatic development was identical in RLPs from countries less affected by the economic crisis (e.g., Nordic RLPs). Second, the long-term impact of government participation on RLPs’ programmatic appeals, for example, to assess whether its moderating effect has occurred more widely and is a lasting one – for example, in the Icelandic VG, the Finnish VAS or the Spanish Podemos. Third, to examine the consequences of these policy changes on RLPs’ cooperation with other left-wing parties and on government formation. Finally, it would be equally important to analyse the programmatic influence of new RLPs with innovative features (e.g., ideological, organizational and communicational) – such as the Spanish Podemos (2014), the French LFI (2017) or the Greek MeRa25 (2018) – or of other landmark events, such as the War in Ukraine (2022) on their foreign policy. Moreover, the academic relevance of these questions is broader and could be explored in the study of other party families outside the political mainstream (e.g., in radical right or green parties).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2022.2129191

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by the Portuguese FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology (SFRH/BD/132534/2017), and financially supported by the GOVCOPP - Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (UIDB/04058/2020), also funded by national funds through FCT.

Notes

1. For a list of RLPs’ acronyms and government participation (2000–21), see Online Appendix A – B.

2. The recent electoral performance of Southern European RLPs is summarized in Online Appendix C.

3. For full information on case selection and data, see Table D1 in the Online Appendix.

4. In the PCP, partly due to its long-standing electoral coalition with the Greens (PEV).