The Disappearance of Intra-Communal Violence as a Legacy of SPLM/A Rebel Governance in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan

ABSTRACT

South Sudan has a long history of civil wars and intra-communal violence. Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (NBeG) state, including Aweil East County, similarly to other pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities, stood out in terms of intra-communal violence. However, since the second civil war (1983–2005), larger-scale local-level violence has substantially reduced and conflicts are settled in different dispute resolution forums. This paper explores factors reducing intra-communal violence in Aweil East. It demonstrates that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has shaped local governance, justice, security, peace and political constellations since the second civil war well into the era of the independent South Sudan.

Introduction

How are people governed after the end of a civil war? What governance institutions, structures, symbolic repertoires and actual practices prevail? How does the legacy of rebel movements shape local governance, particularly security, peace and political constellations, after the end of a civil war? These questions are at the centre stage of this article, exploring the legacy of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army after the second civil war in South Sudan (1983–2005) when the SPLM turned into the ruling political party and the SPLA, the army of South Sudan. To study this legacy, this article applies the definition outlined by Dirkx and Frerks (this issue) in the introduction: ‘legacies of governance by armed groups as the doctrines, practices, symbols and promises of wartime governance that are transmitted after the end of open hostilities due to a rebel victory, defeat or negotiated settlement’.

Soon after the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, the SPLA emerged as key armed opposition group in the South fighting the Government of Sudan under the leadership of John Garang (Johnson 2003). Despite clashes with other armed Southern groups, the SPLA gradually increased its territory. After being forcefully evicted from Ethiopia and an internal split in 1991 which temporarily weakened it, the SPLM/A regained territory (Bure 2005, Bradbury et al. 2006). In areas under its control, the SPLM/A started to establish its own local administration (Duffield et al. 2000, Rolandsen 2005).

In the wake of the split and regaining territory, the SPLM, the political wing of the SPLA, presented the vision of the New Sudan and declared to fight for a politically, economically, and socially equal Sudan at its first convention in 1994 (SPLM 1998, Rolandsen 2005). At the same event, the SPLM/A introduced new political structures, the Civil Administration of the New Sudan (CANS) and a new independent judiciary (SPLM 1994, Leonardi et al. 2005). Building on chieftaincies, the SPLM/A gradually established ‘civil’ local government and judicial structures.¹ Despite challenges including interference by senior SPLA figures, competition, corruption and lack of trained staff, transport and resources, these structures governed, provided some services in cooperation with aid agencies and settled disputes (Chol 1996, Duffield et al. 2000). Presumably, the SPLM/A mainly aimed with them at providing security and keeping the rule of law – which we consider an indispensable part of governance – next to mobilising resources for the civil war (Bure 2005, Rolandsen 2005).

As underlined in the introduction (Dirkx and Frerks this issue), rebel governance and its legacy can vary from context to context. Exploring the case of Aweil East, this article provides novel empirical insights into the localised SPLM/A’s rebel governance legacy with a particular focus on security, peace and halting intra-communal violence. As such, this article is a clear case illustrating how rebel governance has continued to shape politics, governance and security after the end of a civil war. The impact of rebel governance on Aweil East has been very specific due to particular contextual factors that are outlined below.

Aweil East is located in the northwest of South Sudan and borders Sudan. It is one of five counties of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (NBeG) state. NBeG is inhabited by a Dinka speaking majority of agro-pastoralists. During the second civil war, militias associated with the government of Sudan recurrently attacked NBeG leading to two famines, numerous abductions, death and displacement (Rone 1999, Duffield et al. 2000, Fegley 2008). As a result of the attacks, many inhabitants of NBeG fled to the north and neighbouring countries.

From the late 1980s on, the SPLM/A started to take control of parts of NBeG, including Aweil East, while the government controlled Aweil town, the state capital (Duffield et al. 2000, Johnson 2003). In Aweil East, the SPLM/A gradually rolled out its administrative and judicial structures. The SPLM/A in Aweil East was to a substantial extent made up of individuals from Aweil East or NBeG more generally and its attempts to defend communities against attacks, increased its legitimacy among the community.

This article focuses on intra-communal violence in Aweil East and the role of the SPLM/A in mitigating and governing subnational violence. Since the second civil war, intra-communal violence in the form of cattle raids, revenge killing and armed fighting involving communities within NBeG – respondents argue – has largely disappeared and conflicts are resolved peacefully in different dispute resolution forums. Thus, contestations over natural resources and political tensions have tended not to escalate into widespread armed clashes. This article explores narratives on why intra-communal violence disappeared and analyses the link between the SPLM/A’s (rebel) governance, justice, and conflict resolution mechanisms and the absence of larger-scale armed violence within NBeG, after the end of the second civil war in 2005 also during periods of high political tension.² In that connection, the article focuses specifically on the 2010 elections and the most recent civil war which broke out at the end of 2013. At the same time, the article also considers that while NBeG is portrayed as ‘internally’ peaceful, men and youth from NBeG have engaged in armed conflict in other parts of South Sudan while women and girls are affected by physical and sexual violence both by intimate partners and non-partners (see for example Ward 2005, Kenwill International Limited 2015). This article is not a comparative study contrasting different case study areas nor does it study the at times strained relationship between Dinka speakers from NBeG and Misseriya and Rizeqat agro-pastoralists from Sudan, but focuses on the role of legacies of SPLA’s rebel governance in abating tensions and violence among communities from NBeG including Aweil East. The reason we refrain from making comparisons to other regions is that our in-depth data collection was limited to NBeG, especially Aweil East.

Theoretical Considerations and Methodology

This article speaks to the general theme of this special issue ‘Legacies of Governance by Armed Groups’ in that it explores the impact of earlier SPLM/A rebel governance on the management of intra-communal violence and conflict resolution in Aweil East and NBeG since the second civil war. As explained in the introduction to this issue (Dirkx & Frerks, this issue) rebel governance – defined here simply as the conduct of relations between an armed group and civilians – has emerged as a pertinent subject of study and analysis over the last decade or so (see i.a. Arjona et al. 2015, Péclard and Mechoulan 2015, Kasfir et al. 2017), providing insight in its nature, dynamics, empirical manifestations and rationales. We build on this literature by focusing on the legacies of SPLM/A’s rebel governance in NBeG and Aweil East. In line with the introduction, we define the legacies of governance by armed groups as the doctrines, practices, symbols and promises of wartime governance that are transmitted after the end of open hostilities due to a rebel victory, defeat or negotiated settlement. This article contributes to the study of rebel governance legacies by highlighting the downstream consequences of war-time governance by the SPLM/A, not only through the pacification of the area but also by its use of coercion. This case study adopts the conceptualisation of rebel governance legacies as outlined in the introduction and also speaks to the possible sources of variation that were distinguished there. For reasons of brevity we refer to the respective sections of the introduction for further elaborations and details.

Regarding the literature on South Sudan this article refers among others to Rolandsen’s (2005) seminal piece on the SPLM/A’s politics and governance structures in the 1990s, Bure’s (2005) paper referring to the SPLM’s governance and Chol’s (1996) report written for the SPLM that critically reflects challenges the CANS faced. Leonardi et al. (2005), Leonardi (2007) and Branch and Mampilly (2005) studied the CANS and local governance in Equatoria and provide examples of an area where the population was more critical of the SPLM/A. Particularly, Leonardi’s book (2013) is one of the publications that takes a longer-term perspective of governance spanning civil wars and post-conflict contexts. With this article’s focus on the legacy of the SPLM/A’s governance we are able to provide a longer-term view particularly on the provision of security in one specific county which distinguishes it from those earlier works.

This article is based on a qualitative in-depth local case study. Empirical data were collected in 32 interviews by the main author in Juba and NBeG during five field visits between 2007 and 2018. More field research was planned in Juba and NBeG in 2020, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews could only be conducted via skype and in writing.³ Respondents included local government officials, youth, chiefs, spiritual authorities, elders and politicians of different administrative entities, political affiliations and socio-economic strata from Aweil East and beyond. The main author’s network made reaching out to respondents generally unchallenging. The total number of interviews and the consecutive time periods of field work enabled cross-checking and probing information, contributing to the validity of the research. Moreover, the data were corroborated by the study of other available academic and policy publications and media reports. As the study is of a qualitative nature, there are no claims of statistical representativeness, but attempts have been made to interview a wide variety of respondents from different backgrounds. However, women’s perspectives and experiences with sexual and gender-based violence are not represented in this article as this topic was sensitive. Related to the elections of 2010 and the civil war that broke out in 2013, political tensions were high and threats, arrests and violence widespread. In this context, the main author very carefully collected data to mitigate any risks for respondents and herself.

History of Armed Intra-Communal Conflict and Conflict Resolution

During interviews and informal exchanges in Aweil East, respondents underlined the ‘peacefulness’ of Aweil East County and NBeG more generally. They referred to peacefulness as the absence of cattle raids, revenge killing, and armed violence related to conflicts over, for example, pasture, administrative territory and political power involving communities within NBeG. Based on this emic understanding, this article refers to the term intra-communal violence. However, applying this term, we acknowledge that intra-communal violence, as other types of subnational violence, is often driven by socio-economic and political inequality, linked to national-level conflicts and influenced and at times mobilised by political and military interests of state and national-level actors (e.g., Deng et al. 2022a, Krause 2019, Watson 2023, World Food Programme and Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility 2020).

The prevalent narrative among respondents in Aweil East revealed that while conflicts and disputes continue, intra-communal violence has disappeared since the second civil war. Thus, respondents suggested that within NBeG, leaders and communities have been able to settle disputes over livestock, natural resources and political contestations peacefully, even in the midst of the most recent civil war. Recent reports on perceptions of peace (Deng et al. 2022a, 2022b) support the prevalent view that NBeG is perceived as quite safe and relatively peaceful in that high levels of localised violence are absent.⁴

Yet, at the same time, during visits to Aweil East and Aweil town, there was also evidence of high political tensions, divided communities and families, surveillance by security forces, arrests, violence and limited space to air criticism against authorities.⁵ In addition, there were issues such as socio-political and economic inequality, challenges accessing services and the impact of the most recent civil war in the form of loss of lives particularly of men fighting in the army or armed groups, absence of men as primary breadwinners and protracted food-insecurity. Publications of Bøgh (2010), the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (2011–2023), Lerebours and Lapegue (2016), Maxwell et al. (2023) and Mayai et al. (2018) support observations regarding food insecurity, limited access to services, loss of lives and absence of primary breadwinners.⁶ Thus, while NBeG remained peaceful concerning intra-communal violence, other forms of violence, including violence by security forces and structural violence, have prevailed. Kindersley and Majok (2019, 2022) describe aspects of structural violence, for example, about exploitative labour relations and inequal access to land, livestock and revenues for the benefit of few. The following paragraphs explore this phenomenon further and illustrate that the absence of intra-communal violence and coercion are interconnected.

In the past, larger-scale armed violence and fighting broke out within Aweil East and other parts of NBeG and with neighbours from Warrap, Abyei, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and what is now Sudan (Kocjok 1990).⁷ A variety of causes have contributed to armed violence in Aweil East and beyond. Conflict drivers have changed over time and include the arrival of the colonial powers,⁸ contestations over natural resources and livestock, political contestations and civil wars.

Access to contested resources such as grazing land, arable land and water traditionally led to fighting.⁹ Disputes over livestock which is vital for the economic and social welfare of agro-pastoralists¹⁰ and cattle raiding that aims to restock herds and to get cattle for bride wealth, for status, prominence and for influence, repeatedly developed into violence within NBeG in the past. Respondents from Aweil East recalled many clashes: Fighting and raids often drew in relatives and other community members recurrently causing fighting that killed, at times, hundreds of people.¹¹

Besides disputes over natural resources and livestock, political tensions and civil wars have also divided communities within NBeG. During the subsequent civil wars people from Aweil East supported and fought on different sides, for example, on the side of armed opposition groups such as the Anyanya movement during the first civil war and the SPLM/A during the second civil war or on the side of armed groups allied to the government of Sudan such as the militias of Abdel Bagi Ayii and his sons (Kindersley 2017).¹² This led to clashes at the local level.

In NBeG as in other parts of South Sudan, violence and fighting have been governed by rules linked to religious and social taboos that prohibit harming children, women and elderly people (Beswick 1998). Individuals who ignored those rules, risked severe punishment by spiritual powers (Deng 1972). Yet, in practice, violence against women and children has occurred, for example, during the second civil war by members of the Sudanese Army as well as Southern Sudanese armed opposition groups including the SPLA (Rone 1999, Ward 2005, Deng et al. 2022b).¹³

Besides religious and social norms, the government has been governing armed violence. During the Condominium rule (1898–1956), the colonial government used coercion to ‘pacify’ communities by military and police interventions.¹⁴ The first police station in Aweil East was established in response to recurrent armed fighting between Aweil East and Warrap, a respondent noted.¹⁵ He linked stability with coercion and obedience under the Condominium rule: ‘(…) people could see there was stability, stability in the sense that sometimes when the local people fight, they were punished severely and then people became permissive’.

Chiefs – introduced during the Condominium rule as basis of the native administration – were expected to help keeping public order, control violence, preventing conflict and fostering peace (Deng 1972, Leonardi et al. 2010). By settling cases in chief courts, chiefs have been solving disputes and preventing the escalation of disputes into larger armed conflicts since colonial rule. However, before the 1980s, disputes were not always brought to chief courts in Aweil East and regularly led to intra-communal violence.

Violent Attacks and the Disappearance of Intra-Communal Fighting in NbeG During the Second Civil War

During the second civil war, Murahaleen and other militias allied to the government of Sudan and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) raided NBeG including Aweil East, causing severe hardship.¹⁶ Many people were killed or abducted, raiders destroyed houses and assets, and looted livestock and relief aid (Mawson 1991, Fraser et al. 2004). In the late 1980s and late 1990s, the attacks and loss of assets contributed to two famines (Deng 1999, Rone 1999). As a result, thousands of people fled to Northern Sudan or to neighbouring countries.

Many from NBeG including Aweil East moved to Ethiopia where the SPLM/A had its military base (Bradbury et al. 2006). After having received training and small arms, many aimed to return to protect their home area.¹⁷ One respondent explained: ‘What attracted me [to the SPLM/A] was the fact that the Murahaleen took all our cows and also killed one of my uncles in the village. I was ready to go to Bilpam in Ethiopia where you get your gun and fight the enemies’.¹⁸ Other reasons to support the SPLM/A were grievances related to the economic, political and social marginalisation of Southern Sudanese by the Government of Sudan.¹⁹ The SPLM/A promised to transform Sudan into a democratic ‘New Sudan’ offering the same opportunities to all citizens (SPLM 1989). In Aweil East, people (at times voluntarily and at times by force) supported the SPLM/A with recruits, food, livestock, revenues and labour (Bure 2005, Rolandsen 2005, Santschi and Périer 2018). Whilst the SPLM/A introduced administrative and judicial structures and provided protection, aid agencies started to provide food aid and to some extent education and health services (Duffield et al. 2000, Bure 2005).

Interestingly, – according to many respondents – larger-scale intra-communal violence, including cattle raiding and fighting over pasture, has largely disappeared in NBeG since the 1980s.²⁰ Interviewees from Aweil East and beyond described NBeG as stable and peaceful. One elder categorically stressed in Dinka ‘Tongtong aliu’, hence ‘there is no fighting’.²¹ During a get-together in Aweil town in 2011, for example, friends originating from different sections²² from Aweil East recited war songs. Their ancestors chanted these songs when fighting each other before the 1980s.²³ Younger respondents noted that they do not remember inter-sectional fighting in Aweil East and that revenge killing hardly exists any longer.²⁴

Respondents referred to different factors contributing to this reduction of intra-communal violence, but the SPLM/A has played a key role in all these processes.

The devastating raids and attacks by militias associated with the government of Sudan and SAF during the second civil war presumably contributed to the halt of intra-communal fighting. These raids and the resulting famines²⁵ inflicted heavy casualties on the population of Aweil East and NBeG. Thousands of people were killed and many children and women abducted during the civil war.²⁶ Respondents said that these attacks stopped different sections fighting. Instead, they decided to confront their common enemy.²⁷ They realised: ‘Our problem is with the north. So why should we waste time killing ourselves. We forget all these things and then we begin to face the north’, a respondent narrated.²⁸ The SPLM/A played an important role in unifying, training and arming members of the different sections of Aweil East to jointly confront government militias and the SAF.

Besides these ‘external’ pressures, the SPLA itself took measures to prevent violence. The SPLA stopped for example people from moving around with spears and clubs to fight each other. An elder recalled the consequences of this move: ‘Nobody would trouble you. Nobody would speak to you. […] Those of the spears stopped spearing’.²⁹ Moreover, the SPLA tried to settle disputes then and there, and stopped cattle raids by ordering culprits to return livestock.³⁰ It also used corporal punishment and coercion.³¹ A respondent recalled: ‘Later on the SPLM/A came with their policy. “If you fight one another, we collect all your cattle, we beat you up, we torture you”. People reconciled themselves without knowing. […] In the process they became peaceful even without talking’.³²

In at least one case, the SPLA publicly executed individuals who had initiated inter-sectional fighting: According to witnesses, in the late 1980s the SPLA ordered local leaders, men and women to attend an execution. The public execution and the threat of the SPLA to execute culprits, allegedly helped stop intra-communal violence.³³ An elder highlighted: ‘So that one [the public execution] was rather terrorizing. It frightened the people of course’.³⁴ Other elderly witnesses said that after this public execution intra-communal violence vanished.³⁵ This heavy-handed approach and the coercive measures of some SPLA commanders and soldiers played a key role in the ‘pacification’ of Aweil East. Moreover, the SPLM/A provided protection against militias and protected the trade with Misseriya that is up to the present-day of fundamental importance to access goods. In return, members of the SPLM/A collected revenues, mobilised labour and appropriated livestock, women³⁶ and aid.³⁷

The local justice system and different dispute resolution forums have also played an important role in the reduction of intra-communal violence. Chief courts and informal systems of justice have been settling homicide cases and disputes related to family conflicts, elopement, livestock, theft, conflict over land and other issues since the colonial era in Aweil East and other parts of South Sudan (Jok et al. 2004, Leonardi et al. 2010). Neither conflicts over natural resources, administrative boundaries, bride wealth, nor homicide and violence between individuals disappeared since the 1980s. Yet, what has changed is that instead of taking up arms, the conflict parties commonly bring their disputes to courts or informal systems of conflict resolution. The involved elders, family and cattle camp leaders try to settle these conflicts before they can escalate into intra-communal violence. The son of a well-known chief recalled: ‘But later on [in the 1980s] the community sat down and solved it [disputes]. […] When small problems happened in the swampy area, they brought the problems to my father [a senior chief] who then called the other elders from different sections. They sorted these issues out. […]’.³⁸

Post-2005 Power Struggles, Civil War and Stability

After the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, ‘new’ administrative, executive, legislative and judicial structures were introduced at all levels in then Southern Sudan. Moreover, the SPLM transitioned from the political wing of an armed opposition group into the dominating political party of Southern Sudan and the SPLA became the armed forces. However, in practice, the new structures were built on the CANS. Although, the SPLM/A and government structures were formally disentangled, overlap continued between the SPLA (the armed forces), the SPLM (the dominant political party) and the government after 2005 (Santschi 2014). Members of the SPLM/A continued to occupy government positions and wield political, economic, and military influence during the interim period (2005–2011) and after independence of South Sudan in 2011. A career in the SPLA remained key to claim political legitimacy and positions in the SPLM and the government, also after 2005. Although the ‘rebel’ governance of the SPLM/A officially ended in 2005, its legacy continued to shape security, politics and the economy in Aweil East and beyond. Also, the capture of aid, state resources and patronage continued.

It is quite remarkable that since 2005, NBeG has remained ‘internally’ relatively stable, despite political tensions, conflicts over land and boundaries and the most recent civil war affecting South Sudan.

The following paragraphs explore two examples of high political tensions, i.e., the elections and the most recent civil war, and reflect on why these tensions did not slide into armed violence thereby highlighting the legacy of the SPLM/A governance during the second civil war.

Divisive General Elections of 2010

In the run-up to the general elections of 2010, high political tensions developed in NBeG and Aweil East. Many candidates, such as former and active ministers, members of parliament and the SPLA aimed at running for the SPLM, the strongest political party in NBeG and in South Sudan. In NBeG alone, at least 243 candidates registered with the SPLM for 73 posts in the parliaments at the state, Southern Sudan and Sudan level, as well as for the post of the state governor (Sudan Tribune 2010a). As a consequence, the elections were highly competitive. This competition points to the continued influence of the SPLM and the fact that it remained ‘the only show in town’³⁹ and an entry point to power, government positions and state resources.

An SPLM Electoral College selected the candidates according to a list of criteria considering among other things engagement for the SPLM.⁴⁰ However, the nomination process came under scrutiny for alleged favouritism of individuals close to the SPLM chairman of NBeG and Governor Malong.⁴¹ In January 2011, the nominations were announced in the courtyard of a government building in Aweil town. Police officers wearing riot gear with helmets and shields – equipment never seen in NBeG before – guarded the fence. Security forces thoroughly checked arrivals, including incumbent post holders. These security arrangements caused bewilderment among high-level state officials running for the elections. Moreover, they illustrated the tensions related to the nomination process and showed the coercive power of the state executive and the SPLM leadership enforcing the nominations.

After the announcement of the SPLM nominations, some candidates who did not make it to the SPLM list rejected the nomination. Some were deeply frustrated. One respondent – who fought for the SPLA during the second civil war – noted: ‘The SPLM does not respect what I did. They disowned us’.⁴² Part of the unsuccessful contenders decided to run as ‘independent’ candidates for the elections (Sudan Tribune 2010a). Tensions, divisions and rumours overshadowed the campaign and the elections. Competition developed mainly between SPLM and independent candidates and their supporters who accused each other of unlawful practices.

The atmosphere was threatening both before and during the elections in April 2010. Some campaigns of independent candidates were hampered, intimidation and detentions took place,⁴³ and some candidates, chiefs and other individuals engaging in the election process faced threats and physical violence.⁴⁴ Moreover, military police, soldiers and ‘civilians’ arrested ‘critical’ individuals.⁴⁵ These acts caused consternation, fear and division as those who carried out the arrests and the detained individuals were often from the same community. The involvement of the military police and the SPLA illustrated how strongly the SPLM and the SPLA remained entangled after 2005. In the elections of 2010, the SPLA served the interests of the SPLM leadership in NBeG. The election itself was affected by serious interference casting doubt on the results. One critical observer noted: ‘The elections were rigged. […] They closed the election centres where they knew they would not get votes. […] They have beaten up people, put them in prison and told people to vote for the star [election symbol of the SPLM]’.⁴⁶ The Carter Center (2010, p. 8) reported grave irregularities ‘during polling and counting, attributed largely to the incumbent governor and county commissioners’ in NBeG.

Competing SPLM and independent candidates contested for support within their own communities and families. As a result, their supporters and community members were also pulled into political contestations and tensions. This division worried many: ‘The elections divided and traumatized people’, one individual noted.⁴⁷ The elections also deepened existing cleavages, such as between inhabitants from Aweil North and East. The election for governor was, for example, between the incumbent governor Malong Awan from Aweil East and his strongest contestant Dau Aturjong from Aweil North. Accordingly, the resulting political tensions could easily have led to intra-communal violence between the different counties.

At a meeting in March 2010, a speaker indeed called for the support of the SPLM and stressed the risk of the elections causing violence if the SPLM was not supported: ‘We do not know what will happen. Things may turn around or things may become bad or people may have some tribal conflicts or even the [political] parties may have problems with other parties’.⁴⁸ He warned that the government of Sudan might again try to be divisive and use some independent candidates for their own purposes.

In view of the divisions splitting the SPLM and the opposing local political elite in NBeG, chiefs – including chiefs from neighbouring communities who were well-known mediators – elders, community leaders, members of formal and informal fora of dispute resolution, and senior SPLM members were brought in as early as January and February 2010 to mediate between the SPLM and the independent candidates in Aweil town (Sudan Tribune 2010c, 2010e). At the local level, elders, chiefs and other individuals tried to mediate in the disputes and tensions that arose due to the contestations, arrests and intimidation linked to the elections. Yet, they did so outside formal chief courts. While these attempts were not able to halt political competition and fully reconcile people, they might have helped to prevent intra-communal violence. For example, an individual who had been arrested recalled that after 30 minutes in prison he was set free. A prison officer sent him and the individuals who had arrested him back home telling the latter that these arrests could cause serious intra-communal tensions. The prison officer was related to the arrestees and the ‘civilians’ who had conducted the arrests. Back in the village, community elders calmed down aggrieved relatives of the arrested individual.⁴⁹

Informal dispute resolution by SPLM members and senior chiefs certainly helped mitigate tensions and prevent uprisings or intra-communal violence. In other areas of South Sudan, unsuccessful candidates including David Yau Yau, Gatluak Gai and George Athor took up arms against the government after the elections in 2010. David Yau Yau, for example, rebelled and mobilised armed youth in Jonglei (Sudan Tribune 2010b).

Other factors might also have prevented intra-communal electoral violence. The fear that some independent candidates were used by the government of Sudan to divide people, to foster conflict ahead of the 2011 referendum on the independence of South Sudan and to weaken the position vis-à-vis the North was real. SPLM members skilfully fuelled and used this fear to delegitimize independent candidates and to secure support for the SPLM. Moreover, the display of coercive power at the announcement of the SPLM nominations as well as the intimidation and arrests before and during the elections indicated that attempts of creating unrest or intra-communal violence would have been quelled with force. Hence, the threat of coercion might have discouraged any uprising and local-level violence.⁵⁰

Insurgents and Stability in the Wake of the Recent Civil War (2013–2018)

In late 2013, South Sudan declined into a civil war leading to violence, death, and a severe humanitarian crisis. Even though this civil war divided NBeG politically and militarily, NBeG was only to a limited extent directly affected by violence. Large scale fighting mainly took place elsewhere. However, NBeG was severely impacted by the civil war-induced economic crisis causing a dire food security situation that forced many to flee to Sudan.⁵¹

Individuals from NBeG fought on different sides. While many were part of the SPLA and community defence groups turned pro-government militias, the Mathiang Anyoor, others joined armed opposition groups including the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO). The rationales to join the SPLA changed over time. In 2011 and 2012 youth from NBeG was recruited to protect the border with Sudan.⁵² This was in response to clashes at border. In September 2012, South Sudan and Sudan signed an agreement according to which the SPLA had to leave the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone including the contested Mile 14 area (Small Arms Survey 2013, Craze 2014). The agreement led to protests in NBeG as many feared that this would create an excuse for the government of Sudan to control the area covering 14 miles south of the river Kiir/Bahr el-Ghazal.⁵³ Accordingly, looming threats of losing territory to Sudan, once more led to recruitment in NBeG.

After the outbreak of the civil war in late 2013, the groups mobilised for the border defence were drawn into national-level politics and fought for the SPLA or allied militias, whilst political and military leaders continued to recruit in NBeG to combat the SPLM/A-IO (Boswell 2019). Besides the SPLA, the Mathiang Anyoor⁵⁴ fought in Greater Upper Nile and later in Greater Equatoria. Boswell (2019, p. 3) noted: ‘While Mathiang Anyoor members were initially recruited for defensive border protection on the Sudan border, many in Kiir’s Bahr el-Ghazal political base accepted – or exploited – a prevailing narrative that the Mathiang Anyoor were mobilised to defend Kiir against a coup attempt by former first vice-president and leader of the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), Riek Machar’. Mathiang Anyoor have been accused of having committed atrocities and human rights abuses such as killing and raping in Greater Equatoria⁵⁵ including Juba, Greater Bahr el-Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile.⁵⁶

Many from NBeG died in the battlefield after December 2013 leaving their families vulnerable.⁵⁷ During visits in NBeG in 2014 and 2017, criticism against the mobilisation of recruits from NBeG was harsh and many were frustrated about the loss of relatives and the impact of the civil war more generally.⁵⁸ Some critical voices argued that while elites struggled over resources and power, the ordinary families’ sons fought and died on the battlefield.⁵⁹ One elder critically stressed: ‘The government is spoiling the country. The leaders are our problem’.⁶⁰ A number of respondents told in informal exchanges that relatives had been lured into joining the SPLA or Mathiang Anyoor. Fighters initially mobilised to protect the border were sent off to other parts of South Sudan after 2013. In later recruitment campaigns, young men – often without any other employment opportunities – were allegedly promised salaried positions within the security forces or money and sent off to the frontline without proper training. In some cases, poor individuals such as street boys and gang members were forcefully conscripted.⁶¹ As noted by Kindersley and Majok (2019) particularly young men from poor families got stuck in an exploitative economic system managed by armed or economic actors within NBeG, other parts of South Sudan or Sudan.

After the outbreak of the civil war in late 2013, the SPLM/A-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) emerged as the largest opposition group fighting the government of South Sudan. Although the SPLM/A-IO initially gained support among Nuer speakers in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei, members of other ethnic groups including Dinka speakers from NBeG also joined. Dau Aturjong from Aweil North, who had unsuccessfully run for the governorship in NBeG in 2010, other independent candidates as well as individuals from different counties of NBeG became members of the SPLM/A-IO.⁶² Despite grievances linked to their defeat in the elections and political marginalisation, Aturjong and other SPLM/A-IO supporters only engaged in a limited number of battles with the SPLA and attacks in NBeG from their base in Sudan (Copnall 2015). In 2016, Aturjong and his troops left the SPLM/A-IO for the SPLA and in late 2017,⁶³ he took over the command of the SPLA division in Aweil East (Sudan Tribune 2017b).

Besides the SPLM/A-IO, other armed groups with senior members from NBeG emerged. In 2016 Agany Abdel Bagi Ayii and Costello Ring Garang both hailing from NBeG established the South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army (SSPM/A).⁶⁴ They claimed to be active in Aweil East (Deng 2018). The SSPM/A have joined the South Sudan Opposition Coalition for the negotiations over the revitalised peace agreement signed in 2018 and participate in the Transitional Government of National Unity South Sudan established in 2020. Hussein Abdel Bagi Ayii – brother of Agany Abdel Bagi Ayii – is one of five vice-presidents in South Sudan. In May 2017, former governor of NBeG (2008–2014) Malong was dismissed as SPLA chief of staff.⁶⁵ After a failed attempt to move with troops to Aweil, he was put under house arrest. In April 2018, Malong announced the formation of the South Sudan United Front/Army and did not sign the revitalised peace agreement in 2018.

In practice, the influence of these different armed opposition groups was limited, and they failed to control larger areas within NBeG.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, armed opposition groups and the SPLA clashed in NBeG resulting in casualties. Moreover, armed groups were accused of having ‘looted’ and abducted civilians,⁶⁷ and having attacked and controlled some areas. In August 2017, for example, the South Sudan Patriotic Army (SSPA) claimed to have seized an area in Aweil East. However, a SPLA representative argued that they had repulsed the fighters (Tamazuj 2017). In this and other situations, authorities claimed that NBeG was stable and under control by the SPLA and the government.⁶⁸ The SPLM dominated government and SPLA’s ability to provide stability and protection and to control the territory had also during the most recent civil war continued to be an important factor to claim political legitimacy and power. Even though the civil war divided NBeG and Aweil East politically and militarily and partly also along community lines, these divisions did not translate into severe armed clashes between the armed groups and the SPLA nor into large-scale intra-communal violence.

The Legacy of the SPLA and Rationales Countering Armed Conflict within NbeG

What prevented larger-scale violence within NBeG during the elections, the most recent civil war and in relation to other contentious issues? One key rationale is the fear that a divided NBeG would be (again) an easier target for attacks from Sudan. Although relations with Misseriya and Rizeqat have improved since the 2000s and traders and transhuman pastoralists from Sudan move into NBeG,⁶⁹ distrust continues to exist between the communities (i.e., Gorur et al. 2014). Recurrent clashes and tensions over the border in NBeG have continued to foster the fear of losing land and territory to Sudan.⁷⁰ This fear was actively used if not promoted to rally support for the SPLM during the elections of 2010 and to mobilise recruits for the SPLA and community defence groups to defend the border in 2011/12. Accordingly, inhabitants in NBeG continue to rely on a common position vis-à-vis the government of Sudan as well as Misseriya and Rizeqat. While the SPLM/A has a long legacy of playing a role in uniting and arming people from NBeG against Sudan, it has skilfully been using this legacy to rally political support for the SPLM and to recruit for the SPLA and affiliated armed groups.

Secondly, the threat of coercion and violence by the SPLM/A might have played – as during the second civil war – a key role in preventing larger-scale violence but also fostered public disapproval. In relation to the elections of 2010 and the civil war that broke out in late 2013, space for public criticism shrank further.⁷¹ Journalists, critical individuals and persons associated with independent candidates in 2010 and after 2013 with the armed opposition were threatened and arrested in NBeG as in other parts in South Sudan.⁷² The situation was tense, and many people were scared to make critical comments in public. In April 2016, Radio Tamazuj, for example, reported the SPLA had arrested up to 154 people in NBeG. Accounts of the motives behind these arrests suggested that either critics of senior SPLA cadres or individuals associated with recruitment for the SPLM/A-IO were detained (Tamazuj 2016b). Also, after Malong’s announcement to have founded his own armed group, security forces were put on alert in NBeG.⁷³ Referring to the threat of coercion and limited space for public criticism a respondent noted in 2014: ‘It is not politically stable here. People are pacified. If people were allowed to talk, things would be different’.⁷⁴ Hence, as during the second civil war stability, peace but also the narrative of NBeG being an ‘island of peace’ was enforced with coercion by the SPLM dominated government and the SPLA. Nonetheless, respondents’ views were often critical and they raised contentious issues including the most recent civil war and the recruitment of youth in public.

A third aspect preventing armed violence within NBeG are formal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms and local justice. During the second civil war, the SPLM/A built ‘new’ justice structures on the existing chief courts, but the chiefs continued to play a pivotal role in settling conflicts, not only in chief courts but also in informal systems of justice.⁷⁵ Chief courts have prevented the escalation of minor conflicts into intra- or inter-communal violence and contributed to stability and peace in communities (Santschi 2014). Accordingly, since the second civil war individuals and groups who are in conflict in Aweil East and NBeG generally, seem to respect and use the court system including county and chief courts or other more informal arenas of dispute resolution. As a result, vigilantism is not widespread.⁷⁶ One respondent explained: ‘The chiefs of this area they solve these cases by their rules. People are loyal to the administration of the chiefs and their government’.⁷⁷ Chiefs and other community leaders, including elders and senior politicians, are solving disputes over, for example, administrative boundaries but also in relation to political tensions. It seems that their engagement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding does not halt conflicts and political tensions per se but contributes to prevent larger-scale armed violence.

Even though the justice system prevents larger-scale armed violence within NBeG, access to justice and personal security can still be a challenge for ordinary citizens. In informal exchanges, individuals complained that they had no chance for a fair judicial process or that their personal safety was at risk when they challenged senior members of the SPLM/A and the government. Accordingly, while Aweil East and NBeG seem to be less affected by intra-communal violence, the prevailing absence of violence did not translate into a governance and judicial system that provides equal opportunities for all citizens.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in this article, NBeG and Aweil East have experienced the absence of larger-scale armed violence since the second civil war. Major factors contributing to the decline of intra-communal armed violence were the fear of attacks from Sudan, coercive ‘pacification’ by the SPLA in addition to local dispute and conflict resolution dating back to the SPLM/A’s Civil Authority of the New Sudan. In this connection, we argue that the legacy of SPLM/A’s rebel governance has played a major role in keeping NBeG and Aweil East relatively peaceful.

Coercive approaches to quell intra-communal violence but also uprisings and public criticism have allowed maintaining the status quo in NBeG. Hence, the power of the SPLM/A political and military leadership that dominated NBeG during the second civil war has been further entrenched with coercion and patronage after 2005. SPLM/A wartime leaders continued to rule NBeG as government and SPLM/A officials according to similar principles as during the second civil war. They have provided protection against aggression by Misseriya and Rizeqat and internal violence, managed the trade relations with Misseriya traders in return for controlling power, government resources, land, labour and economic opportunities in NBeG at the cost of societal equity.

However, while armed violence involving community members from NBeG disappeared since the second civil war, structural violence has continued since 2005. A small elite competes over power and the shrinking state resources, whereas a growing section of the inhabitants of Aweil East and NBeG in general has been affected by chronic food insecurity, a severe livelihood crisis and very limited opportunities to make a living.

While respondents from NBeG confirmed the image of NBeG internally being more peaceful than other areas of South Sudan for decades, many men and youth – often from poor families – have joined the SPLA during the second and the most recent civil war. In that sense, fighters from NBeG have been involved in clashes and armed violence against external forces outside NBeG.

Why, in contrast, the legacy of the SPLM/A’s rebel governance did not lead to the end of intra-communal violence in other parts of South Sudan could be addressed in future comparative studies. In this single case study we have focused on the particular factors prevailing in NBeG and Aweil East that led to a relative peaceful condition despite the ongoing occurrence of several conflict issues and major challenging situations of high political tension.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Network for International Studies and the Swiss National Science Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Martina Santschi

Martina Santschi is a senior researcher at swisspeace/the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Georg Frerks

Georg Frerks is a professor emeritus of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management at the Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University, the Netherlands; and professor emeritus of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Notes

1. e.g., Branch and Mampilly (2005), Leonardi et al. (2005), Leonardi et al. (2010), Rolandsen (2005).

2. In informal exchanges individuals from Aweil East referred to Aweil East particularly and NBeG more general as ‘paradise’ and ‘island of peace’ compared with other parts of South Sudan. A facebook post from 14 August 2020 referred to Aweil as a ‘house of peace’.

3. Interviews are based on informed consent that included information on the nature and purpose of the study; data is anonymised and context information kept limited to protect respondents.

4. Deng et al. (2022a) collected most data in Aweil town which is inhabited by individuals originating from all counties in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, the rural sites were located in Aweil Centre County. Deng et al. (2022b) collected 1/3 of the data in the urban context of Aweil Center County, thus in Aweil town which is inhabited by individuals originating from all counties in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and 1/3 among returnees who also tend to originate from different parts of NBeG, including Aweil East.

5. e.g. , Human Rights Watch (2009), observation and informal conversations in 2007, 2009, 2010.

6. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) data from 2011–2023, Aweil East had either a stressed, crisis or critical food security status.

7. In 2011, Southern Sudan separated from the rest of Sudan and became an independent state, South Sudan.

8. In the case of NBeG, the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration in Aweil town divided community leaders and their supporters. While some leaders such as Atiek Atiek cooperated with the administration, the spear master Ariandit actively resisted with armed men (Kocjok 1990, Mawut 1995).

9. Interview with a son of a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014. Interview with an agro-pastoralist from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

10. e.g. interview with a cattle keeper from Aweil East County, Aweil East, February 2008.

11. e.g. interview with a former government employee from Aweil East, Aweil East, February 2010.

12. Abdel Bagi had a long history of allying with the government of Sudan against armed opposition groups from the south (Kindersley 2017). The example of Abdel Bagi Ayii and his militias illustrates that Aweil East – despite being an SPLM/A stronghold – was politically and militarily divided during civil wars.

13. Informal exchanges with individuals from Aweil East, Aweil East, Aweil town and Juba 2007–2010.

14. e.g., Interview with elder/member of peace committee from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

15. Interview with a former government employee from Aweil East, Aweil East, February 2010.

16. In the early 1980s (agro-)pastoralists from Kordofan and Darfur affected by loss of land to agricultural schemes and drought joined the Murahaleen to raid NBeG (Johnson 2003).

17. e.g., interviews with a journalist from Warrap, Juba, August 2017, a church employee from Aweil East, Juba, August 2017 and a teacher from Aweil East, Aweil East, June 2018.

18. Interview with a church employee from Aweil East, Juba, August 2017.

19. e.g., interview with a former CANS official from Aweil East, Juba, August 2017.

20. e.g., interviews with a spear master from Aweil East, Aweil East, February 2008, a respondent from Aweil East, Aweil, February 2010 and a senior chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

21. Interview with a senior member of the county administration in Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

22. Members of one section share and control natural resources including pasture, arable land and they jointly defend land, livestock and communities against the claims and attacks of other groups. In Aweil East, sections consist of different descent groups (Santschi 2014).

23. Informal conversation with a government employee from Aweil East, Aweil town, October 2011.

24. e.g., interviews with a cattle camp member from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014 and a cattle camp leader from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

25. While the famine of 1988/89 killed an estimated 250,000 people (Rone 1999), more than 100,000 people died due to the 1998 famine in Bahr el-Ghazal (Deng 1999).

26. The Sudan Abductee Database names more than 5,000 persons killed and of 12,000 persons abducted in NBeG and Abyei from 1983 to 2002 (Fegley 2008).

27. e.g., interviews with a SPLM/A member from Aweil East, Juba, May 2009, a peacebuilding expert from Aweil East, Aweil, August 2014, a senior county official from Aweil Center, Aweil, August 2014, and a skype interview with an international peace building expert, August 2020.

28. Interview with the son of a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

29. Interview with a court member from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

30. e.g., interviews with a senior chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014 and a trader from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

31. e.g., interview with a community member from Aweil East, Aweil East, November 2009 and the son of a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

32. Interview with a peacebuilding expert from Aweil East, Aweil, August 2014.

33. Interviews with an elder and peacebuilding expert from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014 and a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

34. Interview with an elder and peacebuilding expert from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

35. Interviews with a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014 and another chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

36. Forced marriage by members of the SPLA occurred in Aweil East (Interview with a respondent from Aweil East, Aweil East, February 2008. Informal exchanges in 2007 and 2008.

37. e.g., skype call with aid worker in July 2020. Interviews with former official from Aweil East, Juba, August 2017 and former senior official from Aweil North, Juba, August 2017. (Duffield et al. 2000).

38. Interview with the son of a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

39. Informal exchange with South Sudanese scholar in Juba, September 2014.

40. e.g., informal exchange with SPLM members in Aweil town, January 2010.

41. Informal exchanges in January and February 2010, Wau, Aweil town and Aweil East.

42. Informal exchanges in Aweil, April 2010.

43. One government employee suggested that more than 200 individuals were arrested in relation to the elections in Aweil East (Informal conversation in Aweil, April 2010).

44. Informal conversations, observations and e.g., Sudan Tribune (2010d) and Carter Center (2010).

45. Informal exchanges in Aweil town, Aweil East, March 2010 and observation.

46. Informal exchange with a critical SPLM supporter in Aweil town, April 2010.

47. Informal exchange in Aweil town, March 2010.

48. Meeting in Aweil East, March 2010.

49. Informal exchange in Aweil East and observation, April 2010.

50. Daniel Akech Thiong (2018) stressed the role of fear as a political tool in South Sudan.

51. Observation and informal exchanges with relatives and partners of individuals who had moved to Sudan and observations in NBeG and Juba, 2014, 2017 and 2018. e.g., in early 2017 in some areas of NBeG homesteads had been abandoned and chiefs stressed that in some of their villages many people had moved out. Further source: Sudan Tribune (2017a).

52. Informal exchanges with relatives and partners of individuals who had moved to Sudan and observations in NBeG and Juba, 2014, 2017 and 2018.

53. e.g. , The Niles (2012), Craze (2014). Interview with a National NGO staff member, Aweil East, August 2014.

54. Mathiang Anyoor stands for brown caterpillars (Deng 2017).

55. In informal exchanges Equatorian respondents associated the Mathiang Anyoor and the Dinka speaking SPLA members with atrocities in Juba and northern Uganda 2017 and 2018. According to Deng (2017, p. 24) the Dotku Beny (Dinka for ‘rescue the chief’) emerged in 2013 from gelweng and Mathiang Anyoor. ‘The Dotku Beny along with the Presidential Guard are reported to have carried an initial recce of Nuer households on 9 December 2013 before carrying out atrocities against Nuer civilians from 15 December 2013’. Other sources: e.g. , Human Rights Watch (2017).

56. e.g., Deng (2017), UN Human Rights Council (2018).

57. In informal exchanges in 2014 and 2016, individuals referred to relatives killed fighting for the SPLA or for the Mathiang Anyoor. Some noted that they had lost half of their brothers and that Christmas was not celebrated in Aweil East in 2014 because of the high number of losses.

58. e.g., interview with Church leader, Aweil, August 2014. Expressions of frustration at a meeting in Aweil East in March 2017. Interview with court member from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

59. e.g., interview with Church leader, Aweil, August 2014. During research in other contexts of South Sudan for example in Lakes state in 2014 and in northern Jonglei and Unity in 2014 and 2018, respondents made similar critical comments about the political and military elite in South Sudan.

60. Statement of an elder during a meeting in Aweil East in March 2017.

61. Informal exchanges. Boswell (2019) also referred to forceful recruitment and minors joining the Mathiang Anyoor.

62. e.g. , Sudan Tribune (2014b).

63. In July 2016, Dau’s forces returned from Sudan and later became integrated into the SPLA in NBeG and took over the command (Tamazuj 2016a).

64. Agany Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol is a son of Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol who fought the SPLM/A during the second civil war.

65. Malong took a hardline position towards the peace agreement, allegedly tried to undermine the implementation of the peace agreement and seemingly tried to get support for a coup against Kiir from neighbouring countries (Boswell 2019).

66. Informal exchanges with individuals from NBeG in Aweil town and in Aweil East and with expatriates in Juba in 2018. See also Copnall (2015).

67. e.g., members of armed opposition groups allegedly abducted civilians, attacked villages and looted food and medication in Aweil Centre and Aweil West, claims which the armed groups rejected (Sudan Tribune 2014d).

68. e.g. , Sudan Tribune (2014c, 2014d).

69. Access to pasture is negotiated at annual meetings and incidents of theft, cattle raiding and killing involving Misseriya, Rizeqat and Dinka Malual culprits continue to take place but are usually settled in chief courts or at peace conferences. See e.g., Wilson (2014).

70. In early 2013, e.g., community members from NBeG collected the equivalent of 70’000 USD for the SPLA ‘in defence of the state’s territories’ (Sudan Tribune 2013). Armed conflict broke out more recently in early 2022 (18th −23rd January 2022) leading to the death of at least 24 people from Aweil East and the displacement of thousands of people within in Aweil East (Food and Agricultural Organization et al. 2022).

71. Journalists and critical individuals have been arrested on different occasions in NBeG under different governors.

72. Journalists were also threatened for reporting about rebels’ attacks, e.g., Sudan Tribune (2014a).

73. Observation and informal exchanges in 2018.

74. Exchange with a staff member of a local Civil Society Organisation, Aweil town, March 2017.

75. Also in other parts of South Sudan. e.g. Leonardi et al. (2010).

76. Interview with a senior official from Aweil South, Aweil, August 2014. Interview with the son of a chief from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.

77. Interview with an official from Aweil East, Aweil East, August 2014.