Unravelling Local Dynamics in the Sino-North Korean Border Region

ABSTRACT

Contrary to the conventional understanding of North Korean borders as classic barriers that block infiltration of outside influences, this paper argues that the Sino-North Korean border region has undergone considerable transformations, especially at the local level. By analysing local-level trans-border activities, it shows that North Korea seeks to develop the Sino-North Korean border region as a space of opportunity. Even the heightened political conflicts between China and North Korea and the tightened international sanctions against North Korea failed to dampen local actors’ economic imperatives, particularly after the 2012 and 2013 decentralisations in North Korea. Local actors were active in driving trans-border economic practices and, in turn, transformed the Sino-North Korean border region into potential cross-border cooperation zones. Although there has been conflict and competition in border region development between North Korea and China, we argue that local governments and entrepreneurs’ efforts to maximise economic independence in the border regions are persisting, and their geo-economic imperatives are important factors in reshaping the Sino-North Korean border region by initiating and advancing trans-border interactions.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. During the field research, it was very challenging to get reliable information about trans-border projects, not to mention North Korea’s domestic situation as disclosure of information is regarded as sensitive to informants’ North Korean partners. We tried our best to arrange interviews with key persons and thoroughly cross-check the information with other data from written official documents, existing literature, and media.

2. Megoran (2012, 468) explains de-/re-bordering dynamics with the concept of ‘boundary biographies’ – how borders ‘materialize, rematerialize, and dematerialize’.

3. In addition, there are some meaningful studies to focus upon informal economic activities (such as smuggling) (Bruns and Miggelbrink 2012; Dorfman, França, and França 2017; Golub 2015). While smuggling also plays a critical role in cross-border trade between China and North Korea, it is challenging to obtain substantial data.

4. Since the 2000s, a group of scholars have challenged the horizontalism within social science and noted the verticality of geopolitical processes (Billé 2020; Elden 2013; Graham 2004, 2016; Weizman 2017; Williams 2013).

5. For instance, a new book titled Decoding the Sino-North Korean Borderlands (Cathcart, Green, and Denney 2021) discusses various aspects of the Sino-North Korean border. While it offers useful insights into the historical and recent dynamics of this region, our discussion is distinguished in that it focuses upon the inter-scalar interactions across the border.

6. Rajin-Sonbong is now called Rason Special City (province-level) after North Korea re-arranged its administrative system in 1993, 2000, and 2010. It is adjacent to Hunchun City, Jilin province of China, and Hassan City, Russia. To take advantage of its geographical location, North Korea has kept promoting the SEZ policy here since the 1990s.

7. Unlike the other three special economic zones, Sinuiju was designated as a special administrative region (SAR) in 2002.

8. In August 2012, Jang Song-thaek, then-vice chairman of North Korea’s National Defence Commission, and China’s then-Commerce Minister Chen Deming signed the agreements to jointly develop Rason and Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa islands SEZs.

9. An official of the Dandong government expected that opening of the New Yalu River Bridge would reinvigorate the ‘dead’ New District. He argued that taking advantage of geographical proximity with North Korea would attract more external investment into this district (author’s interview on 23 April 2018).

10. It was only after the 2018 Xi Jinping-Kim Jong Un summit meeting that these projects were resumed along with the construction and renovation of border-crossing bridges in Jilin Province,

11. A Chinese businessman in Yanji explains that the local governments like Yanji and Hunchun brought in North Korean workers for not just manufacturing industries but also information technology industries like animation. However, the sanctions made big companies located at the local industrial complexes in these cities leave due to the concerns about the secondary boycott (author’s interview in Yanji on 2 May 2018).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korean government (MSIT) – 2018R1A5A7025409 and 2019S1A5A8033766.