Wizards of depth – Israel’s area of operations and lessons learned from its depth dimension

ABSTRACT

This article aims to broaden the understanding of Operational Depth (OD) by rethinking how it can be perceived. The emphasis when doing so is dedicated to cognitive effects, thus another dimension of depth, compared to the mainstream physical- or temporal approaches to depth in military thought. The empirical focus draws on Israel and explicitly the case of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah to provide an example where a lack of physical depth is skillfully handled, hence the title Wizards of Depth. The empiric inquiry is guided by an analytical framework, departing from a theoretical elaboration where OD is approached as a circular trinity: the ability to project, absorb, and manoeuver available coercive assets along offensive and defensive lines of operation. By using this definition in concert with the analytical framework, the article represents a mediation − a dialectic practice between the linear approaches to operations of the West and the more circular, often non-contiguous, and evolving perceptions found further east. When doing so, the article demonstrates how depth can be perceived in various ways, subsequently providing possible avenues to extend depth for actors beyond the Israeli example. A qualitative approach is employed, drawing on extensive fieldwork in Israel.

KEYWORDS:

• Land warfare
• war
• defence
• Israel
• operational depth

Introduction

“Depth is a creation of the human mind.”

(IDF Brig.Gen Shimon Naveh, personal interview 2022a)

This article is about Operational Depth (OD). It takes a broad approach, arguing that OD needs to be understood as an all-domain societal construct (de Jomini 1996, 75, 178f.), thus something beyond strictly military approaches.¹ Doing so requires a comprehensive effort based on resources mustered by society, thus exploiting the relationship between state apparatus and war machine (Deleuze and Guattari 2010) to achieve synergetic- or multiplying effects needed when resources are limited.

Manifesting this argument, OD is recurring visible without the prefix operational- as the addition of boundaries in this respect is believed to add more vulnerability than strength.

In support of these claims, Israeli prominent abilities to handle a lack of physical depth are examined using an analytical framework − or recipe for depth, subsequently suggested to be employable for other actors.

The article exploits the operational relationship between front, depth, and dividing actions with cognitive effects (shock), Soviet thoughts further elaborated by Israeli Operational Arts experts Naveh (1997) and Graicer (2015). Doing so, OD is treated- and defined as a circular trinity (Figure 1) comprising the ability to project, absorb and manoeuver available coercive assets along offensive and defensive lines of operation (Detienne and Vernant 1978, 46; Ekholm 2021, 402).

Figure 1. The holistic trinity of depth. (the author’s figure).

The article ads- and exploits the cognitive dimension to depth as an extra dimension, complementing the usual physical- or temporal approaches in mainstream military thought.² Connecting to this logic, manoeuvre comprises not only shifts in the direction of effort; likewise, it can support a cognitive approach, thus enhancing depth by shifting the direction of attention.

When doing so, the empirical focus is thus dedicated to the Israeli setting, more explicitly drawing on the case of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah to answer the question: “How does Israel, a state with severe geographical/physical limitations, create and maintain its operational depth?” To succeed with this, it focuses on experiences of the 2006 war: rather than providing another explanation- or in-depth study of the event, it uses the case to extend the understanding of OD.

Throughout the article, OD is viewed as holistic, comprised of all available assets, thus an actor-specific approach focused on exploiting the emerging potential of the situation. For such an inquiry to be successful, it is essential to include the enemy system and possible friction and resistance created within the friendly system, as this will determine the range of tools and approaches available (Graicer 2015, 27, 43; Jullien 2004). The latter represents a dimension that has emerged in many of the author’s interviews in Israel, engaging with general-level respondents who stress the importance of revealing- and possibly manipulating opposition posed by the friendly side to become an autarkic commander: thus, an independent agent enjoying freedom of action within his frame of operation (For example, IDF Brig.Gen Goffman, personal interview 2022; IDF Maj.Gen (ret.) Eitan, personal interview 2022; IDF R. Adm Hagari, personal interview 2022; IDF Maj.Gen Veruv, personal interview 2022; IDF Maj.Gen Finkelman, personal interview 2023).

Design and case selection

The article takes a qualitative approach, drawing heavily on extensive fieldwork and interviews with practitioners in Israel and less so on written sources. A total of four research visits have been conducted, each lasting for 1–3 weeks; during these, the operational environment and the culture of society have been studied in great depth through guided staff rides, a plethora of elite interviews and exposure to intensive, personal training in leading-edge Israeli Operational Art with the head of Strategema, IDFs General’s Course.

The choice of Israel as a case study is suitable as it represents a state with severe physical limitations requiring a holistic and comprehensive approach to OD. Therefore, the article diminishes artificial boundaries such as between civil-military or between levels of warfare, rendering OD − and Depth without prefix synonymous. Further facilitating understanding of Israeli depth requires the ability to juggle two different perceptions: the linear and the circular. Due to her limited physical space, attempted linear divisions between forward and rearward remain valuable analytic categories. However, it is best employed conceptually, as a linear perception of Israeli physical depth is blurred due to a theatre of operations not fully contiguous in physical terms. The latter is an example promoting the added value of the circular − and the cognitive perceptions of depth.

Methodology and disposition

In greater detail, the approach is explorative, and through the iterative nature of abductive reasoning (Douven 2021), it provides a broadened understanding of depth exploitable by actors beyond the object. Doing so, the main foundation of this enterprise is empiric, drawing on a mix of semi-structured and open-ended interviews with some 20 general-level interlocutors and a range of prominent others, some of them on several occasions, directly and indirectly in support of this enterprise.

The remaining article is structured as follows: First, the theoretical section commences, quickly presenting a tentative table outlining the main lines of the guiding structure. Second, this analytical framework, initially constructed of timeless features of operational fighting, is unpacked and further elaborated with the help of experienced Israeli experts. Doing so ensures transparency while theory related to OD is refined and made a manageable supporter when sorting − and analysing the subsequently studied empirics, which comprises the third step. Finally, the most prominent features are presented, summarising and concluding the article.

Theory- approaching operational depth

The need to clearly articulate the role of operational depth emerged in the wake of the First World War. Here, it became clear that tactical battles or other coercive tools hardly win the war independently; they need to be coordinated, sequenced − and sustained to achieve the desired end state or objective, hence the addition − and meaning of the operational level (House 2001, 4ff). Although the cognitive perspective of OD employs centre stage in this article, the traditional physical- and temporal dimensions of depth are not diminished – they are complementary. As pronounced by Liddell Hart (1967, 327): “In studying the physical aspect, we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach.” It is not farfetched to assume that the conversely applies as well.

Furthermore, listening to Israeli Operational Arts expert Ofra Graicer, an elaborating discussion on OD always needs to be put in context to make any sense (personal interview 2022b), a suitable remark, considering the wide range of interpretations offered by the term.

Depth- points of departure and the analytical framework

“The theater of operations of an army embraces all the territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to defend.” (de Jomini 1996, 75)

Inspired by this implicit, early expression of depth, this article confirms two analytical points of departure: First, depth can be understood in different ways, the division between forward – and rearward being one of them: “… strategically there are only two elemental postures (or forms of deployment), offensive/defensive, which dichotomise global strategies to this day …” (Graicer 2015, 41–57). Put differently, the forward depth is created at the opponent’s expense, and the rearward ditto on your own;

Second, it acknowledges the complexity encountered when physical resources are lacking, thus supporting the holistic definition of OD [project-absorb-manoeuvre] presented in the introduction. Inspired by Detienne and Vernant (1978, 46) and Van Creveld (1994, 2), this definition reflects a more circular perception of depth where manoeuver manifests the vital interplay between forward- and rearward depth (Maher 2016); in other words, the shift between on the one hand, offensive (Deep) operations, defence-in-depth and the pivotal importance of reserves to handle the dynamic relationship between momentum and culmination (Bellamy 1987; Crow 1986; Gunlicks 1986; Leonhard 1998; Van Creveld 1994).

Henceforth, deep operations shall be understood as: “… a significant deployment of force […] intended to create a systemic effect to bring about the enemy’s collapse …” (Shelah 2022). The fundamental notions here are offensive- and systemic effects, thus not necessarily deep nor large, measured in physical, linear, or quantitative terms.

This trinity comprised of Deep operations, defence-in-depth and a reserve substantial enough to enable an effective shift between the two, represents timeless features of great importance that became clear at the beginning of the previous century in the trenches of northern France (Biddle 2004; Maher 2016) and recurring confirmed almost daily as features of great importance to both parties in Russia’s war against Ukraine as well as to the Israelis during its multi-front engagement during the ongoing operation Swords of Iron.

Continued, the Forward and Rearward approach to OD (de Jomini 1996; Maher 2016) is employed as an analytical division manifesting the nature of the operation and its pivotal interplay between the offensive/defensive in pursuit of depth. Doing so represents a mediation where the circular is embraced while the added value of the linear is still acknowledged thus: “… operational action always develops from the rear, i,e., depth, towards the front …” (Naveh 1997, 17). Subsequently, continuously leaning on Graicer (2015, 53), we can also confirm the logic of approaching OD as a circular trinity from the project – absorb-manoeuver perspectives:

Project relates to offensive power projection (Forward Depth). Absorb, to the capacity to contain- and endure enemy thrusts (Rearward Depth). Manoeuver is about connecting the two, thus the ability to shift between offensive and defensive efforts or − Forward Depth and Rearward Depth. However, manoeuver, from a cognitive perspective, can also refer to a shift of attention supporting an effort.

Re-connecting to the words of Jomini that started this section, within Forward Depth, there is a need to capture the Deep Operations aspect and the ability to create and sustain momentum (see Table 1). For Rearward Depth, avoiding culmination is, by definition, crucial, and essential to maintaining needed forward momentum.

Table 1. Depth: Between the linear and the circular- the tentative analytic framework.

Rearward Depth	Forward Depth
Rearward Depth and avoiding Culmination	Forward Depth and Deep Operations
Rearward Depth and Preparations	Forward Depth and Momentum

Following these notions, let us continue unpacking their content.

Thus, momentum and culmination constitute the core of the project/absorb and offence/defence aspects. Table 1 presents them separately, although they are subsequently discussed under a shared heading due to their interlinked logic.

The final category, preparations – of the armed forces and the public alike, was initially added as common knowledge, although later confirmed and qualified by the pilot study, as crucial aspects of Rearward Depth.

The cognitive departure

Departing from the notion of Forward Depth − or the ability to deny an opponent the possibility to employ his strengths (Pape 1992, 426ff), let us consider two critical operational ideas connected to the cognitive perspective provided by Liddell Hart: First, he draws our attention to strategy and suggests exploitation of the aspects of surprise and movement, to affect the mind of the opponent. Doing so, he offers an exciting relationship between surprise and movement, where the latter generates the former and vice versa.

Secondly, similar to contemporary warfare, stressing that military means are not the only means to achieve the objective, Hart suggests an indirect strategy to dislocate the enemy based on a combination of psychological and physical features, where not only the least resisted line but also the least expected lines are employed. This perspective of dislocation is reached through the opponent’s mind- the cognitive perspective, resulting in the sense of entrapment (Liddell Hart 1967, 323ff). Teased by this short ingress, we turn to the first pair of notions employed to facilitate the elaboration of OD:

Forward depth and deep operations

Before the Second World War, the concept of Deep Operations evolved in the Soviet Union. This concept approaches the opponent as a system to be dismounted and exploited by employing defensive- and offensive manoeuvres, producing the desired operational shock (Marcus 2018, 167f; Van Creveld 1994).

Following the systems approach − as well as the emphasis on shock coupled to the Russian concept, illuminates several aspects of operational depth elaborated upon in this article: first, to achieve the desired operational effect (shock), an actor not only needs the abilities to project, absorb and manoeuvre. Actions need to be coordinated and configured to act according to the potential of the evolving situation, thus breaking the physical links and pushing the system into paralysis (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Naveh, personal interview 2022c; Jullien 2004, 16); secondly, echoing Sun Zu; you need to “know your enemy,” hence the cognitive rationales that direct responses and employed courses of action (Jordan et al. 2016, 64; Adamsky 2010, 139f); third, and perhaps even more critical, as an operational commander you need to know-, master and possibly manipulate the friendly system to have it work in your favour, ensuring freedom of action, something that can be even harder to master than the opposing system (IDF Brig.Gen Roman Goffman, personal interview 2022; IDF Maj.Gen (ret.) Itzhak Eitan, personal interview 2022; IDF R.Adm Hagari, personal interview 2022; IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Gershon Hacohen, personal interview 2023).

The German blitzkrieg concept also sought systemic breakdown − or collapse through manoeuvres, far in the enemy rear. The enclosed problems connected to these concepts were the exploitation formations and their vulnerability to counter-attacks if the enemy did not collapse rapidly (Jordan et al. 2016, 118f), highlighting the temporal aspect of depth; thus, an emerging risk of culmination is a function of increasing physical forward depth and, subsequently, more vulnerable lines of communication. These are features of recent actuality concerning the “thunder-run” attempt and subsequent withdrawal displayed by Russian VDV forces outside Kyiv and Hostomel airport in the spring of 2022 (Watling and Reynolds 2022, 2ff).

Both these offensive- and depth-intense ways of operational fighting focus on the cognitive perspective of the opponent from two aspects: first, due to their strive for collapse- or breakdown; secondly, because: “nothing is so scary to a soldier than enemy formations in the rear areas” (Van Creveld 1994, 19). The natural countermeasure to these offensive operational concepts was the combined arms concept of defence-in-depth designed to unpick, disassemble, and ruin the attacker’s ability to employ- and project the dilemmas of combined arms (Jordan et al. 2016, 119).

More recent and popular labels describing similar ideas would be to disrupt enemy key capabilities (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel 2022a, personal interview and thereby dislocate hostile strengths- or friendly weaknesses (Leonhard 1998, 61–79). IDF Deep Operations Commander, Maj.Gen Veruv (personal interview 2022) suggests an offensive, in-depth approach going directly to the “end of the story,” thus aiming for unoccupied areas in the rear, subsequently pushing the enemy from behind towards an anvil of friendly forces. Extending his argument, Veruv suggests that, logically, the enemy will send his best formations to the front. Therefore, the friendly force moves to achieve momentum should focus on going to the end. Thus, as potent enemy formations are only partially engaged in the front, their ability to bring strength to bear is effectively dislocated. This modus operandi, successfully displayed and rehearsed in Cyprus during Operation Chariots of Fire in May 2022, supports the boxer analogy, effectively inspiring cognitive − as well as physical perceptions of depth (deep, close, support, and consolidation perspectives) when discussing operational fighting (Liddell Hart 1921; Van Creveld 1994, 2; Mirto 2019, 1–5; Ekholm 2021, 390):

Thus, the anvil constitutes the jab, intended to draw attention frontally (close), while the hook aims for the weak spots for effect (deep- directly to the end). Moreover, enduring abdominals and effective footwork represent the rearward support and consolidating areas enabling manoeuvre (Mirto 2019, 1–5).

IDF Maj.Gen (res.) and INSS Managing Director Tamir Hayman (personal interview 2022) support the Deep Ops logic provided by Veruv, thus: “… depth shapes the front … ” Further elaborating, Hayman underlines the strength of the cognitive perspective:

“… by using cyber warfare, by using decoys or using un-manned capabilities by using drones […] You can create the false notion of the enemy that something is wrong in the depth, something happening in-depth […] then you can find all the added values of depth operation without really physically creating something in the depth. [sic.]”

Interdiction and disruption – raiding & penetrability

As aspects of forward depth with increasing importance to contemporary warfare, we must consider disruption- or early interdiction of rising enemy capabilities – as a modern version of deep operations.

The Hebrew name for the Israeli version is mabam, which means “war between wars” – perpetual, low-intensity warfare or “active deterrence” operation (IDF Researcher Preisler, personal interview 2022). Put differently, an ongoing pre-emptive operation without a recipe conducted in different ways, depending on the potential available in the framed situation − or setting (Jullien 2004, 16; Graicer 2015, 30f). The overall intent of mabam is to constantly force an opponent to “let off steam” through a systematic disruption of arising capabilities to postpone the next “big war” (IDF Lt.Col (res.) Siman-Tov, personal interview 2022). Operations conducted within this frame take place on a level ranging from “public” through “hidden” to “secret,” pending on purpose and desired objectives (Preisler, personal interview 2022).

These operations exploit the cognitive perspective through the “idea of presence,” thus a constant signal of ambiguity: sometimes I am there and sometimes not (IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Baidatz, personal interview 2022), and sometimes I seem more significant than I am (IDF R.Adm Hagari, personal interview 2022). Regardless, a vital feature of these operations is that they should consider the dangers of escalation by offering the opponent the ability to deny, thus a way out without losing face (IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Baidatz, personal interview 2022), or put differently: “The less noise – the more potential.” (Gen. Naveh during an interview with Gen. Baidatz, 2022). Accordingly, “you need a cultivated ability to deny when the situation demands” (IDF Interlocutor A- anonymous 2022).

Depending on how mabam is considered, it can be perceived as either a defensive means to extend the rearward depth- or societal protection through active prevention of threats from entering the home front or as an offensive tool to increase the cognitive depth by exposing hostile vulnerability- and conversely, friendly capability. A third intention could be to embarrass − or blacken the opponent. Regardless of the purpose, to be able to employ such courses of action, “you need a big stick behind your back” to be credible (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel, personal interview 2022a; 2022b). Further following Finkel (2022c), we find support for the argument to disregard boundaries:

The mabam., I am not sure that somebody called it operations, they just called it mabam […] I’m not sure that somebody’s attaching a title or whether or not it’s operational- or strategic depth. [sic.]

As the employment of mabam is usually reflected by operations within enemy territory − or against enemy systems, it resides under forward depth as a modern subset of the classic deep operation. Some say it may have replaced war by acting as a cognitive campaign (IDF Lt.Col (res.) Siman-Tov, personal interview 2022) below the threshold of war. Others do not believe mabam to be a viable option to prevent hostile rearmament in the long run because it has a built-in contradiction concerning preparations for the “big war;” you must always consider what capabilities you expose during mabam to keep new abilities secret to promote surprise in the event of war (IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Brom, personal interview 2022).

Nevertheless, through conducting deep operations facilitated by intelligence and rising modern technology, “fires can be put out before they develop strength,” to use the words of IDF Brig.Gen Ortal (personal interview 2022), when describing the evolving “anti-fires manoeuvre” concept, intended to solve the problems encountered when meeting “hit-and-run” disappearing enemies. By employing swarms of connected sensors aided by automation processes, launches of hostile munitions are rapidly detected and engaged by networked missiles deployed within the friendly tactical formation. This concept will potentially restore the manoeuvrability of the IDF ground forces and offer a cheaper defence of the home front based on the exploitation and dislocation of the stealth enemy’s main strength – the brief exposure at launch only (Ortal 2022).

That said, we temporarily close the book on Deep operations and turn to the following timeless pair of notions:

Forward depth and momentum/rearward depth and avoidance of culmination

An obvious source under this heading is von Clausewitz (1984), who provides a conceptual approach − and thus a timeless feature of warfare: the initially superior strength of the attack, fading with time, and conversely, the power of the defence, growing with time.

The implication of time (Leonhard 2017) is thus a central factor to momentum and culmination, whether from a defensive aspect, absorbing abilities vital to enduring enemy aggression (Gunlicks 1986) until he reaches the culmination point. Alternatively, from an offensive aspect, thus, the ability to create and maintain the momentum needed to secure a rapid victory mainly through offensive action (Adamsky 2017).

Moreover, to create- and sustain momentum and prevent culmination, generic force multipliers/enhancers are available, such as surprise, indirect approaches and manoeuvre warfare, as well as dilemma-producing concepts, such as combined arms/multi-domain operations as well as disruption and dislocation. In short, various conceptualised methods − or stratagems available to mitigate the asymmetric relationship that marks all conflicts.

Elaborating further on the logic implied by momentum and culmination, but also the employment of mabam, it is essential to understand the historical- and thus doctrinal points of departure in the Israeli setting, where the lack of territorial depth has enabled justification of the pre-emptive strike as a concept to be used at any time (INSS senior researcher, Prof. Zaki Shalom, personal interview 2022).

The importance of objectives and expectations

Under this brief paragraph, we focus on a more abstract and cognitive feature: the say-do-gap, a pivotal aspect to mastering balancing between momentum and culmination. Thus, unrealistic objectives render public expectations impossible to fulfil, and once a fact, momentum in terms of public support is destroyed, and cognitive culmination emerges.

Informed by IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Shlomo Brom (personal interview, 2022), societal resilience, or rather the public’s acceptance of prolonged hostilities, reflects a contemporary aspect of momentum. By the same logic, providing the military commander with reasonable- and obtainable objectives constitutes an effective protector against fading societal resilience and, thus, cognitive culmination by avoiding the looming say-do gap.

As a bottom line, achieving definitive victory in a contemporary armed conflict might no longer be possible, neither decisively nor on points. Thus, listening to IDF Adm. (ret.) Ami Ayalon (personal interview 2022), a better way might be to approach the enemy as we treat crime: you cannot beat it; the idea is to reduce it and find ways to go on flourishing, thus a cognitive, holistic manifestation of depth.

Skill, complexity, and speed

To create momentum, a high level of employment skills is essential. Thus, to exploit the situation’s emerging potential and seize opportunities as they arise (Jullien 2004, vii, viii, 8), troops need master improvisation, which requires proper training and a permissive environment (Shamir 2011, 195, 198). Enhancing momentum, not least when resources are limited, requires skill to be exploited through sound and effective operational configuration and force employment. Doing so, the multiplying effects of combined arms can be available in various strength formulas, from complementary effects via dilemmas to synergies (Leonhard 1991), depending on ambition and the complexity of employment you are willing to accept.

The next feature that could release multiplying effects would be the speed lever. Thus, other modes might be employable, depending on the skill available. From this perspective, the choice stands between sequenced- and levels of simultaneous employment (Leonhard 2017), with revenues ranging from dilemmas to convergence and overmatch (U.S. Army 2018). The prominence of skill as an enabler for speed, simultaneous employment, and subsequent high revenues is not just theoretic rhetoric. Informed by IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Jerry Yitzhak (personal interview 2022), it was a prominent key feature to enable the now legendary IDF simultaneous swarming attack that led to the highly effective defeat of the opponent in the Kasbah of Nablus in 2002.

Re-connecting to the same Clausewitzian duality, we can extract a final pair of notions as essential abilities to enhance OD: Thus, to gain momentum- or deliver a decisive blow one needs the ability to master the inner lines of operation (de Jomini 1996, 114f) to concentrate and orchestrate available coercive assets at a time and space offered by the emerging situation and your desired operational configuration (Graicer 2015, 33, 42f, 50).

Conversely, the ability to disperse available formations in depth must also be mastered to either effectively shift to a defensive modus or provide the opponent with a less tangible target. Both aspects are effective protectors against culmination.

Rearward depth and preparations

Preparation is essential to provide strength and stamina to military operations (Gray 2014), whether tactical engagements or large inter-service or joint operations. Put differently, proper preparations could act as an enhancer of momentum and, conversely, a protector against culmination.

About OD, as outlined in this article, not only are military preparations essential but perhaps even more so societal, as the acceptance of a prolonged struggle could exemplify a contemporary provider of momentum (IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Brom, personal interview 2022) and conversely, protector against culmination. Subsequently, societal understanding and expectation management reflect preparations that enhance resilience, thus strengthening the rearward depth from temporal and cognitive perspectives.

In a setting marked by severe physical limitations, the rearward depth- or the ability to absorb enemy thrust – needs to be artificially enhanced, extending both physical protection and resilience and the cognitive depth based on reassurance and credence, obtained through a combination of physical protection and practical exercise (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel, personal interview 2022b; 2022c); IDF Lt.Gen (ret.) Ya’alon, ISDEF 2022).

The need and importance of these dimensions initially emerged from common knowledge, later confirmed by a pilot study conducted in Israel in March 2022.

Summarising and modifying the analytical table

Concluding the discussion on OD, several critical features are extracted- and added as analytical sub-categories under respective categories (See Table 2):

Table 2. Depth: Between the linear and the circular- the refined analytic framework.

Rearward Depth	Forward Depth
Rearward Depth and avoiding Culmination	Forward Depth and Deep Operations
Temporal implications	Disruption and Cognitive Depth
Objectives and Expectations	Deep Operations and Cognitive effects
Rearward Depth and Preparations	Forward Depth and Momentum
Artificial Depth enhancers	Coordination and Multipliers
Cognitive Depth and Resilience	Skill, Dilemmas and Revenues

Guided by this framework, let us exploit the case study.

Within Forward Depth and Deep Operations, the sub-categories Disruption and Cognitive Depth have emerged alongside Deep Operations and Cognitive effects. Attached to Forward Depth and Momentum, we find Coordination and Multipliers next to Skill, Dilemmas and Revenues; within Rearward Depth and Culmination, Temporal implications have emerged together with Objectives and Expectations; and finally, attached to Rearward Depth and Preparations, Artificial Depth enhancers are found next to Cognitive Depth and Resilience.

Analysis- the 2006 war in Lebanon

This section employs the analytic tool to engage with the features of a modern armed conflict. When doing so, we can learn the hard-fought lessons of a democratic actor conducting high-intensity warfare against a state-like actor under blurry conditions.

“As long as he does not lose, he wins.”

These words by Van Creveld (2017, 99) serve as a condensed and illustrating image of Hezbollah’s effort during the 2006 War against Israel and, conversely, the frustration that must have saturated the IDF while trying to find and fix a disappearing enemy hiding in rugged terrain within the civil population.

Following the abduction of two IDF soldiers, the situation escalated into war (Johnson 2011, 9, 12, 14; Eilam 2018, 4f, 36f). Moreover, after an initial air-centred campaign and reluctance to employ ground forces, the IDF went after the defending party in an environment of hostile advantage (Luttwak 2001, 147f): a maze of fortifications and prepared positions in rough terrain (Johnson 2011, 45f; Eilam 2016, 118f).

Echoing Shmuel Bar (2020), Israel and its armed forces do not have the depth needed to contain an attack on Israeli soil while simultaneously preparing a counter-attack. Although the most potent military power in the Middle East, it cannot approve of any defeat (Adamsky 2017, 165f). It must be able to field strong enough forces and act pre-emptively and decisively if needed. Put differently, the IDFs recognised superior strength and determination should act by refraining from enemy action (Bar 2020, 321ff, 328f), thus a reflection of cognitive depth.

Traditional Israeli doctrine prescribes a disproportional price extracted for any attack towards its population (Bar 2020, 329f, 334), which also, at least to some extent, characterised the 2006 War. To effectively handle its complex neighbourhood, Israel needs to have a combination of solid standing forces with high readiness and a quickly mobilised, adequately trained, and capable reserve, thus, as expressed by IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel: “In the Israeli terminology, operational depth is meaning that you land forces in the depth. [sic.]” (personal interview 2022a). Building on these desired features, one of the core problems encountered during the 2006 war was the fact that neither standing force nor reserve had received appropriate training to be able to conduct the high-intensity, combined arms operations needed when faced with fortified- and armed, in-depth deployed Hezbollah warriors in the complex environment of southern Lebanon (Kober 2008, 30f; Johnson 2011, 15f, 19; House 2001, 284f; Eilam 2016, 118f).

Forward depth and deep operations

Disruption and cognitive depth

Initially, the IDF employed a modus operandi based on stand-off fires mainly delivered by air power. It did not provide any additional physical OD as no sustained control of territory was created, despite extensive and successful targeting intended to disrupt Hezbollah’s high-value targets such as fighters, leadership, and re-supply routes. The IAF inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah, although its commitment did not produce the systemic shock to alter the opponent’s will (Johnson 2011, 13f, 32).

Operation Web of Steel comprised an offensive IDF ground operation intended to raid a considerable Hezbollah operating base, a symbolic act to strengthen IDF posture − or depth from a cognitive perspective. The intention was not a seizure but killing as many enemies as possible during a limited time frame before withdrawing from the area (Marcus 2018, 193f), an operational idea that appears in tune with the logic shared with us by IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Shlomo Brom (personal interview 2022), when elaborating on forward depth in modern wars that are won on points rather than on knock-out:

“Now it’s another kind of virtual forward depths, you don’t achieve these depths by capturing territory. You capture territory sometimes, because sometimes for the purpose of creating enough harm to the other side […], but you shouldn’t stay there; that is the principle. [sic.]”

The cognitive effects of Web of Steel were to act in two directions: on the one hand, lowering Hezbollah’s confidence and affecting its cost–benefit calculus. On the other hand, determination and resolve should enhance IDF’s reputation and confidence (Marcus 2018, 193f), thus cognitively resulting in an extended OD. However, the conduct revealed poor coordination, diffuse objectives (Shelah 2021, 7), outdated intelligence and a lack of adequate pre-training to cope with the realities the IDF soldiers met on the complex battlefield (Marcus 2018, 194f): hardly any of the features that would enhance the cognitive OD of Israel.

IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel underlines the importance of succeeding in the war’s first battle and conversely stresses the need to cause early enemy failures to affect confidence in both directions (Finkel, personal interview, 2022b) obviously an enhancer of cognitive OD. Drawing on logic provided by Gen. Naveh and Graicer (personal interview 2022a; Graicer 2015, 24f), perhaps a more thorough system-framing inquiry- and analysis intended to reveal “the potential of the particular situation” leading up to Operation Web of Steel could have facilitated such a purpose if its operational configuration had been executed with enough determination and against reasonable objectives.

Deep operations and cognitive effects

Even though some claim an IDF defeat during the 2006 war, due to the disability to end the operation swiftly and decisively as during previous high-intensity wars, deterrence was restored, and despite some sour taste departing from the expectation gap, the strength of Hezbollah’ strategic weapons, were denied- or dislocated through effective disruption conducted by IAF targeting. On the other hand, considering that no ground forces “north-to-south” manoeuvre warfare “clean-sweep” were dared nor executed, it became impossible to unilaterally withdraw from the war with IAF at its apex due to the thousands of rockets and grenade launchers available in southern Lebanon bordering to Israel (Graicer, personal interview 2022a).

However, drawing on Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Nasrallah’s statement after the war, the ferocity of the Israeli response to the abduction igniting the war will probably make Hezbollah (and others) think twice before triggering a similar event again (Byman and Simon 2006, 55f, 58; Cordesman 2007, 32, 35). Therefore, Israel’s depth increased, at least from a cognitive aspect, as deterrence was restored.

Deep raiding, either in concert with a partly frontal engagement − or not – is in tune with the ideas of Fuller or Liddell Hart regarding deep operations in the operational depth of the enemy (Bellamy 1987, 64). Liddell Hart favoured the paralyse from within- or behind, an effect possibly obtained if the plans of envelopment through Syria (IDF Interlocutor B- anonymous 2022) were executed, thus drawing on the same operational logic [start at the end] as currently prescribed by IDF Deep Operations Commander, as well as the analogy used by former Israeli prime minister Bennett: “Fight the cat, not its paws” (Shelah, personal interview 2022).

However, according to IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Hayman, Northern Command Operations officer at the time, no such plans existed, only ideas, which is a huge difference, not least if attempting to get political approval (personal interview 2022).

Nevertheless, suppose the IDF, contrary to the Clausewitzian direct approach, had committed to its tradition and employed manoeuvre warfare, we might have seen another outcome (Kober 2008, 6): Just as the boxers’ jab draws attention, and the hook delivers the fatal blows (Ekholm 2021), a limited frontal attack towards southern Lebanon could have acted in concert with encircling- or multidirectional deep raids (Marcus 2018, 176ff, 187, 191ff). However, reservations against operations of this type should not be underestimated.

Forward depth and momentum

Coordination and multipliers

According to IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel (personal interview 2022c), the main effort in the Israeli setting would typically consist of manoeuvre from the front, although the very potent air force will be used whenever possible. However, “… when you are operating only the Air Force in the depth, we don’t call it operational depth. [sic.]” (Finkel, personal interview 2022c): valid in 2006 as well, as the forward depth needed to halt − or compel the cancellation of rocket fire towards Israel could not be established by air power alone, leaving a crucial part of her rearward depth, the home front, under continuous threat (Eilam 2016, 114f). On the other hand, although the air campaign established no control or added forward depth, depth was increased indirectly due to effective targeting (attrition), thus, the relative destructive power available.

Initial reluctance to commit fully to a large-scale assault on the ground prevented the IDF from enjoying the force-multiplying effects available if its ground forces could operate simultaneously with the air force, raising the momentum and possibly creating the dilemmas of combined arms (House 2001, 4f, 7, 116f; Leonhard 1991, 91ff). Later, the IDF eventually committed to its ground operations and thus enhanced its ambitions to increase its forward OD by establishing a forward defence zone in southern Lebanon. However, a lack of determination and a disappearing enemy contributed to the absent but desired battlefield decision (Kober 2008, 5).

The tactical level − or the activity of executioners is far more reliant on doctrine, schemes, manuals and training, not least when it comes to reserves − ordinary people with another occupation on a day-to-day basis (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Naveh, personal interview 2022a). This basic fact was noticed during the 2006 war. Some complained about the ground forces modest performance. This critique probably had substance: the lack of training in high-intensity combined arms warfare resulting from many years of “policing operations” in the territories had led not only to a lack of skill at all levels (Finkel 2011, 226f) but also to an underestimation of Hezbollah (Cordesman 2007, 65f).

The lack of training and subsequent modest results was probably not the effect of conscious neglect but rather due to uncertainty related to how- and when the ground forces should be employed in “deep” offensive operations, a problem to this day still in acute need of consideration and decision in the IDF (Lt.Col (res.) Siman-Tov, personal interview 2022). However, proper training is not enough, and neither is fighting spirit, although it can last longer, which has been evident in the ongoing Ukrainian struggle against their Russian invaders.

Skill, dilemmas, and revenues

Regardless of preferred configuration- or fighting doctrine, expected performers must be given the proper prerequisites if they are to succeed, not least in the highly channelising terrain found in northern Israel bordering Lebanon (author field research 2022): Properly used, each road requires at most, platoon-sized units equipped with standard anti-tank mines and weapons, a mobile modus and mortar support to raise serious havoc on the attacker: a problem that will need operational coordination and combined arms dilemmas (House 2001, 4f, 7, 116f; Leonhard 1991, 91ff) to find its solution.

Momentum, the logic companion of forward depth, is not only an ability to focus the direction of the main effort effectively. Level of training, the feasibility of the plan and the importance of commitment are equally important areas that must be considered when conducting high-intensity warfare against a well-prepared enemy. This fact makes sense at all levels, although problems in these areas presumably increase the further down the artificial levels of warfare one moves. Thus, drawing on Israeli Operational Arts expert Ofra Graicer, flexible, change-thriving operational concepts are, in fact, the opposite of doctrinal behaviour (Graicer 2015, 30f; Graicer, personal interview 2022a), which is of the essence when conducting operations in the complex environment that characterises contemporary warfare.

IDF Deep Operations Commander Maj.Gen Itai Veruv (personal interview 2022) acknowledges this and stresses the importance of constant movement and avoiding being enslaved under the vicious stability imposed by formalised concepts. Instead, a restless Vagabond-like movement and exploitation of the evolving potential of the situation should direct how operations are configured and conducted (remark by Gen. Naveh during the interview with Gen Veruv 2022.)

Some of the effects of absent training and subsequent lack of momentum might have been mitigated if the ground forces had the chance to act in concert with the high-performing Israeli air force and the excellent available intelligence (IDF Brig.Gen Brom (ret.), personal interview 2022). However, it requires a total commitment on all levels to do so: in retrospect, immediate mobilisation of reserves, subsequently putting designated ground formations in pole position for a full-strength charge in close coordination with the IAF and proper intelligence, ready to create the dilemmas of combined arms warfare.

Moreover, even if the desired level of skill were lacking due to many years of different operations, the IDF could still have aimed for complementary effects based on sequenced employment and left the higher ambitions and possible revenues (synergetic results) available through simultaneous- or convergent engagement (Leonhard 1991; U.S. Army 2018), for a later occasion.

Rearward depth and culmination

“Depth is something one can imagine – but is related to capacities.”

(IDF Brig.Gen Shimon Naveh, personal interview 2022a)

Temporal implications

The interplay between defensive and offensive actions also connects to opportunity and denial (Crow 1986). A dichotomy that can be used to describe- and distinguish the operational depth from the tactical ditto: Thus, if an attacker successfully breaks through the tactical formations of the opponent, he is presented with an opportunity that, if immediately exploited, could lead to success and disaster for the opponent (Crow 1986; Ekholm 2021).

Conversely, if enduring the attack, the defender might be presented with an opportunity of his own from two possible aspects: On the one hand, considering the declining effect of the attack described by von Clausewitz (1984), as time passes, the strength or momentum of the attack declines, and the attackers’ culmination point moves closer (Van Creveld 2017, 107f), thus, an emerging opportunity on behalf of the defender. On the other hand, when possible surprise effects fade, the attacker finds himself in a territory relatively unknown compared to the familiar one of the awaiting defender (Luttwak 2001, 147f).

This elaboration points at two things: first, the impact of time concerning OD; second, the implications of the cognitive perspective, initially in favour of the attacker, but less so as time goes by without decisive action: initially reflected by frustration- and gradually by a loss of collective confidence, a reasonable description of the IDF conduct in 2006. Furthermore, reserves and dispersed resources needed to be concentrated, and the equipment necessary for a swift concentration of main effort and creation of momentum were and are still available in the central parts of Israel (author field research 2022). However, this strength − or critical feature of OD − is effectively dislocated if not called upon in time.

IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Brom elaborates further on temporal sustainment in wars like 2006 when lacking the appetite for occupying territory: a meaning of momentum (and protector against culmination) is to ensure that you have enough targets, ammunition and intelligence built for this purpose (personal interview 2022). Some claim that the Israeli air campaign reached the culmination point of victory on the first day by removing the enemy’s long-range weapons. However, additional weeks of air strikes could still not stop the rocket attacks on Israel (Marcus 2018), manifesting an aspect of temporal − and cognitive culmination.

Enduring the rage of the IDF, Hezbollah gained an opportunity to employ the cognitive advantage of the inferior struggling against an aggressive bully and successively altered external support for the Israeli cause. Doings so, the temporal aspect of OD was employed in concert with the cognitive, limiting IDF’s available time to meet its objectives before an externally imposed cease-fire. On the other hand, judging from Hezbollah’s statements after the war concerning the ferocity- and intensity of the IDF raids (Byman and Simon 2006, 56), one can argue that these contributed to an extension of future Israeli OD from a cognitive perspective.

Objectives and expectations

Following Van Creveld (2017, 98f) and the Clausewitzian view on defence, one should not underestimate the strong position enjoyed by the defender, not least given the favourable terrain at his disposal, his preparations and closeness to the social fabric, making endurance and logistical sustainment possible given the expectations departing from a humble objective (avoid defeat).

Furthermore, as time passes, the cognitive perspective is gradually put into play at an increasing pace in another dimension, as external actors’ are further affected by the operation as it evolves without conclusion, which was evident during the 2006 war (Marcus 2018, 197), as well as during the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and the evolving Israeli counter operation Swords of Iron, following the Hamas terror assault of October 7^th. Thus, momentum in the cognitive perspective gradually diminishes, and culmination emerges as violence and casualties accumulate without a decisive conclusion.

Returning to IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Brom: who defines the unintentionally prolonged campaign as the most significant looming operational trap from the Israeli perspective, something that was quite obvious during the 2006 war; a unilateral attempt to withdraw and cancel hostilities became impossible due to the enemies sustained rain of rockets and IDF disability to stop it (personal interview 2022). Furthermore, the temporal aspect of depth is lifted as a critical feature of resilience. Thus, keeping the campaign short is a vital ability to enhance societal resilience and avoid cognitive culmination, and; “To have a people that accept a prolonging of hostilities is the key to momentum in a democracy” (Brom, personal interview 2022) – both, prominent aspects of cognitive rearward depth.

Relating to the definition of OD employed in this article [… project, absorb, manoeuvre], it is not hard to imagine the favourable position enjoyed by Hezbollah during the IDF ground force engagement later in the war. Physical inferiority was mitigated through adept use of the dramatic terrain, modern weapons and skill (Kober 2008, 15f, 30). Features enabling the ability to ambush-, regroup − and ambush again, thus avoiding being pinned down- and fixed for destruction.

The multiplying features following this kind of easily orchestrated modus operandi become evident to anyone with knowledge and experience of ground forces- and combined arms tactics when visiting the Israeli front bordering Lebanon (author’s personal experience of the operational environment, March and August 2022).

That said, let us return to the notion of commitment, or perhaps rather lack of it: in 2006, a problem belonging to the higher echelons of power, not least when it came to decisive employment of the ground forces, beginning with the indecision to activate the reserves in time (Marcus 2018, 195f, 199f). Thus, the IDF chief of staff did not believe nor accept the operational concept adopted before the war (IDF Lt.Col (res.) Siman-Tov, personal interview 2022; Graicer, personal interview 2022a), which led to confusion, overreliance in the air force and lack of determination.

Rearward depth and preparations

Artificial depth enhancers

In the Israeli setting, the rearward depth, the protector against culmination, provider of momentum and enhancer of resilience, obviously needs active cultivation due to its limited spatial nature. It also offers advantages- or possibilities such as short inner lines facilitating the effective and rapid concentration of force- or directional change of effort as well as logistical- and reserve force sustainment. However, constant proximity to enemy forces and reach of munitions also endangers freedom of movement, sustainability and civilian protection. These implications have contributed to the artificial shaping of the physical environment, thus increasing the cognitive depth- or resilience through sophisticated defence systems such as Arrow, Iron Dome and cyber capabilities, as well as border fences- and (underground) barriers (Shelah 2021, 7, 13; Brun and Finkel 2021, 60f).

The need for artificial depth amplifiers is apparent from several additional perspectives, like the mandatory shelter built into each new home since 1991, as well as total-defence aspects such as “emergency village teams” available in all villages, formalising the notion that “you are not alone” (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel, personal interview 2022b; 2022c).

Another important example of measures that have evolved after the endured rocket rain of 2006 is the missile alert system that, coupled with different layers of autonomous interceptor systems, is capable of eliminating up to 90% of incoming munitions (IDF Maj.Gen Gordin, ISDEF Conference 2022). In addition to these artificial depth enhancers, another layer comprises effective orchestration of concerned organisations. Thus, drawing on former IDF CGS, Lt.Gen (ret.) Ya’alon; “the strength is in the municipalities” – lessons learned of something that did not work during the 2006 war. Hence, preparations are conducted and coordinated so everyone knows what to do and can work together immediately (Ya’alon, ISDEF Conference 2022).

Cognitive depth and resilience

Apart from international support and the space/depth enhancing features of coalitions (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel, personal interview 2022b), cooperation (IDF Maj.Gen Veruv, personal interview 2022) and building relationships (IDF Brig.Gen (ret.) Brom, personal interview 2022), we can add two more critical rearward aspects of cognitive OD: opinion and societal resilience.

Resilience could be described with several features, although under this paragraph, the intended aspect is the societal ability to support and endure the ongoing military venture, hence relying on public opinion and morale (Eilam 2016, 149f). IDF’s inability in 2006, to stop- or limit the rocket rain into Israel through the use of air power not only seriously injured the image of IDF’s decisiveness, but it also shocked the Israeli public (Johnson 2011, 65), thus affecting the cognitive depth both in terms of support and endurance. The indecisive appearance in light of continuously incoming rockets injured not only the IDF’s reputation but also negatively affected the deterrent ability of Israel (Johnson 2011, 78).

Instead, if objectives, narratives- or doctrinal manifestations are kept in tune with factual abilities, the say-do- or expectation gaps will be avoided, and possible disappointment will be replaced with a sense of success as objectives are met. Several events during the 2006 war reflect examples with ambitions- or objectives being “symbolic,” stressing the cognitive perspective’s importance (Marcus 2018, 191ff). These symbolic, raiding-, or swarming operations could be seen as attempts to enhance Israeli societal confidence and opinion, thus preventing cognitive culmination related to public disbelief in its armed forces.

The unique closeness between society and the IDF enhances Israeli cognitive depth. However, informed by former MK and INSS Senior Researcher Ofer Shelah (personal interview 2022), the closeness between society and the IDF, as well as the intimacy within the IDF, might be a counter-productive aspect increasing reluctance- or ambivalence when it comes to conducting extensive operations in depth, as you will know the people you are sending in harm’s way. INSS Senior Researcher Prof Zaki Shalom (personal interview 2022) goes further and suggests that the Israelis have become a spoiled people, not ready for the sacrifice that comes with offensive ground operations.

Although the sense of disability in deciding the outcome of the 2006 war should not be underestimated, Israeli society prospered (Cohen 2014, 18), holistically reflecting a rearward depth of substantial measures.

Conclusions

This article has studied the concept of Operational depth from the perspective of an actor with severe physical limitations. The angle of approach has considered a normally resource-focused concept from a comprehensive perspective. OD, typically understood in linear terms, has been approached holistically and more circularly as a trinity balancing the abilities to project, absorb and manoeuver available coercive assets along offensive and defensive lines of operation. Doing so, an analytic tool created through a dialectic practice, mediating the circular and the linear perceptions of depth, has been employed to engage with one of Israel’s more recent operations to provide a broader understanding of how depth can be perceived.

When conducting the inquiry, the cognitive aspect of depth was added as an auxiliary analysis perspective, illuminating several valuable aspects for actors lacking the physical ability to challenge or compete with their antagonists fully.

Project, absorb, manoeuvre – learning from Israel

The limited physical environment of Israel puts particular demands on its armed forces, not least considering its strategic environment as externally challenged − and internally saturated by foes, although acknowledging Depth-increasing, cooperative actions, such as the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan as well as the recent Abraham accords.

Forward depth in the contemporary Israeli setting is mainly established through firepower, which could be observed during the 2006 war through the employment of stand-off fires and in the present through perpetual disruption (mabam) of enemy capabilities. Temporary seizure of essential parts of enemy territory to “burn the enemy”, restoring deterrence and thus extending depth cognitively, is a viable option, contrary to the occupation of territory that does not represent a desired outcome. The political echelon also favours the employment of firepower contrary to ground manoeuvre as a means to create forward depth because, if decided, an ongoing operation can be immediately halted (IDF Maj.Gen (res.) Hayman, personal interview 2022). The latter, a manifestation of the dynamic relationship between the democratic state and its war machine as described by Deleuze and Guattari, further underlines the need for an increasingly all-domain approach to depth as desired martial abilities suddenly can reside “out of bounds” due to imposed political vetoes.

Due to the proximity to its enemies and the trauma of the 2006 rocket rain, Israel has created a highly effective, artificial rearward depth based on sophisticated technology, providing a vital early warning when acted upon, which will mean the difference between life and death. In addition, a sophisticated, multi-layered system of interceptors is employed, capable of downing most incoming hostile munitions. -however, not all of them: During the ongoing operation, “Swords of Iron,” a substantial number of rockets hit populated areas, stressing the importance of “act accordingly” when alarmed, as well as the need for solid and able municipalities where everyone knows what to do when needed, thus a crucial feature of cognitive depth and also a manifestation of the all-domain approach to depth described in the introduction.

Although these artificial rearward depth-enhancers have proven highly effective, Israel is still exposed to a considerable threat, considering some 170,000 munitions being available to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Therefore, an evolved concept of contemporary mabam has been suggested, where the need for human search and destruction of every missile hidden in the defensive maze is replaced by technology (Ortal 2022; Marsden 2023). Expressed in MDO terminology, employing such features in convergence with movement leads to overmatch by dislocating the disappearing enemy’s inherent strength, restoring ground forces’ manoeuvrability. Implementing such a concept will pose a severe challenge to disperse-delay style tactics as used by Hezbollah in 2006; however, if it can help breaching a mine-saturated defence-in-depth such as the Russian defensive positions displayed in 2023 in eastern Ukraine, remains to be seen.

Even though the limited Israeli geography further blurs the possibilities of conceptual, physical divisions such as “forward – rearward,” “tactical – operational − strategic,” or “frontline – homeland,” it also provides advantages such as short inner lines, supporting fast and effective directional changes of main effort. The latter is much more complicated if confronted with a 1000 km front line like the contemporary Ukrainian defence forces. On the other hand, as the Israeli forward depth constitutes both the contiguous close areas and the non-contiguous deep areas such as Iran, it offers a complexity of another kind, favouring collaboration between linear and circular perceptions of depth. Not least, as supporting − and consolidation areas vary from Israeli territory to distant forward mounting bases such as Azerbaijani territory, Cyprus or empty areas in other neighbouring countries (IDF Maj.Gen Veruv, personal interview 2022).

Re-connecting to the circular trinity of OD employed, coupled with the two-sided logic of concentration/dispersion and opportunity/denial as depth-amplifying avenues facilitating momentum and avoiding culmination, a brilliant example of depth-enhancing force deployment from strategic/operational demands rather than societal convenience, was the relocation of the Golan height’s division a decade ago: an adequate adaptation to an operational environment of emerging complexity in the aftermath of the 2006 war.

Thus, following the collapse of the Syrian regime, it was moved to a more central location in the lower Galilee: “… So it can go very fast to Gaza, to the Golan, to Lebanon …” (IDF Brig.Gen (res.) Finkel, personal interview 2022c). Listening to IDF Maj.Gen (ret.) Eitan (personal interview 2022), this relocation appears even more logical, thus: “in my time we have a front in Lebanon, and front in the West Bank and Gaza, now we have front all over: in Iran, in Golan Heights, in Lebanon. [sic.]”

Although respecting the looming feelings of strategic defeat (Fayutkin 2009, 204) or missed opportunity in 2006 (Shelah 2021, 9), the OD, Israel’s prominent ability to project − absorb and manoeuvre available coercive tools − or assets along physical − or cognitive, offensive − and defensive lines of operation, were maintained. Lessons and wake-up calls crucial for future reform were obtained (Fayutkin 2008, 215), and prospects for further enhancement of Israeli OD were secured due to perceived wartime shortcomings.

Generic takeaways

A recurring cognitive aspect of OD encountered when engaging with general-level interlocutors in the Israeli setting is the need to embrace the operational reality as a continuously re-framed system, characterised by a constant movement where emerging opportunities and friction are discovered and exploited through manipulation and open mindsets. Conversely, caution is raised about the dangers implied by repetition and the risk of being caught as a slave under a vicious strive for stability, manifested through tradition, doctrine, and organisational rigour.

Another aspect is culmination, an operational feature that comes in many shapes and forms, thus not only as a disrupted flow of logistics and fading momentum. As shown, an additional dangerous aspect includes the disability to keep operations short and prevent prolonged operations. This aspect might represent the main operational trap looming in the Israeli setting, a possible cause of cognitive, rearward culmination due to fading societal − or international support − and subsequent problems to continue an ongoing operation. Put differently, this refers to the importance of feasible objectives to clear the looming expectation gap. Thus, raising the expectations beyond the reasonable, as has been done with the Ukrainian counter-offensive by outside spectators (and possibly by the IDF when stating the objectives of Operation Swords of Iron), can easily result in disappointment − a cognitive trap easily avoided.

Although the contemporary Israeli setting enjoys sophisticated rearward depth enhancers and thus cognitive reassurance factors, a sustained hostile rocket rain such as experienced during the 2006 war or the ongoing Operation Swords of Iron, will still eventually risk leading to lost momentum and increased risk for culmination, as short-range rockets are cheap and interceptors are expensive (Brom, personal interview 2022).

Finally, to answer the question of how to configure and employ defensive ground forces in future deep operations to either disrupt-, interdict or respond to an act of war, we can once more turn to the ongoing Russian madness in Ukraine; we can watch and be impressed by Ukrainian determination at the same time hear the echo of General Naveh stating: “the time of big formations is over.” Furthermore, a lesson learned and a natural mitigation to cope with the demands of contemporary deep operations could be to change the ratio of professionals/reserves in favour of the former (Naveh, personal interview 2022a). On the other hand, considering the many archaic features that distinguish the Russian war against Ukraine also proves the timeless value of substantial reserves as a critical aspect of depth, which makes the choice of path even more complicated.

Acknowledgments

My greatest gratitude goes to my mentor, operational arts tutor and friend, Shimon Naveh, for his unlimited support, patience, and generosity during my research visits to Israel. Special thanks to my dear friend and tutor, Ofra Graicer, for her extreme helpfulness, responsiveness, and hospitality. Thanks also to Mikael Weissmann, Niklas Nilsson and Markus Göransson, Swedish Defence University, for their support and important contributions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anders Ekholm

Anders Ekholm is a Swedish Lieutenant Colonel (A) pursuing his PhD in the Department of War Studies and Military History at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). His research resides within the subject of Operational Art, specifically, the ability to create Depth when physical conditions are limited or absent. In his quest for knowledge and understanding in this area of research, his primary interest is dedicated to the Israeli environment, which is studied in detail, recurring on-site.

Notes

1. See, for example, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), U.S. Army 2018); Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), Lockheed 2023).

2. For OD discussions, see Gunlicks 1986; Bellamy 1987; Krulak 1999; House 2001; Naveh 1997; Graicer 2015; Glantz 2021.