‘Outsider’ socialization: Sweden’s interactions with NATO in civil defence prior to membership

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the impact of NATO socialization upon an ’outsider’ country, using Sweden in the area of civil defence as a case study. Relying on 33 interviews from 2020 and 2022 with civil servants from Swedish government agencies, the article gives a unique empirical account of practitioners’ perceptions on the interactions (or the absence thereof) with NATO prior to Sweden’s NATO membership, covering a crucial phase under which the country knocked on the alliance’s door. It expands the existing socialization literature by developing the ’outsider’ perspective, while also contributing to the understanding of the impact of the socialization process on a practical level. To that end, the study develops a theoretical framework based on exclusion, interactions, incentives, and compatibility which serves to elevate the analysis that highlights challenges for ’outsiders,’ while proposing subsequent strategies to mitigate them. Furthermore, it unlocks a discussion on NATO’s role in national resilience of present and future member countries.

KEYWORDS:

• Socialization
• resilience
• civil defence
• NATO
• Sweden
• total defence

Introduction

The deterioration of European security over the past decade has brought a sense of urgency to the reconstruction of defence and security policies in many European states individually, and collectively in defence alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (and the European Union (EU) for that matter). Amid contemporary challenges of military and non-military nature, these policies aim to remedy all sorts of hybrid threats using both military and civilian means. For instance, Sweden tackled this by reintroducing in 2015 its historic total defence doctrine, consisting of military and civil defence, where the former aims to defend against armed attacks and asserts a country’s territorial integrity, while the latter seeks to ensure societal resilience in situations of crisis or war by relying on civilian means. In doing so, the total defence doctrine adopts a holistic approach to national security involving various actors, both private and public, to build up resilience, including the protection of civilian population as well ensured societal functionality in times of diverse crisis or war (Wither 2020). According to Swedish official documents, this is to be done in cooperation with other states and actors, NATO included, even though Sweden was neither a member nor an applicant to NATO at the time of the adoption of the doctrine.

Many NATO member states have during the last decade experienced similar uncertainty and have started to acknowledge the importance of resilience, defined as “a state’s ability to resist and recover from major shocks such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack” (2022b). By perceiving resilience as “the first line of defence” (Frizzelle, Garey, and Kulalic 2022; Roepke and Thankey 2019) the alliance leaders have elevated Article 3 of the founding treaty and made commitments¹ “to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats” (NATO 2016). Concurrently, NATO has formulated seven baseline requirements² (NBR) pointing to areas of particular need for societal resilience. These are directed not only at member states but also used as points of reference by NATO’s partner countries at the time such as Sweden in rebuilding its civil defence (The Swedish Government Office 2021).

Thus, already prior to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent Swedish membership application³ to join the alliance in May 2022, NATO’s presence in the Swedish defence policy has been prominent, both in military and civil defence.

That is regardless of the fact that, before the rapid political decision to join the alliance, Sweden’s relationship with NATO was formally confined to a partnership with no membership prospects in sight (Petersson 2018). Consequently, all socialization – a process essential to pursuing cooperation and “inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005, 2017) – between NATO and Sweden had been strictly restricted to partnership, with Sweden being an “outsider” in the alliance context.

In the light of recent developments, however, many important questions arise concerning how socialized Sweden has become with NATO now at the verge of membership? This has both empirical and theoretical implications. Empirically, the Swedish experience is a unique one (apart from perhaps that of Finland) as previous research has argued, maintaining that the Sweden-NATO relationship in the military sphere has been as close as can be without membership and consequently NATO structures are well established in the Swedish Armed Forces (Agrell 2011; Edström 2011; Petersson 2018; Wagnsson 2011; Wieslander 2019). Hence, on the military side of the total defence coin, Sweden has been understood as quite well socialized with NATO, which is likely to ease its transition to membership.

However, we have scant knowledge on how Sweden’s budding civil defence policy relates to NATO’s and hence on how socialization has played out in that realm. Has the official desire to advance the Swedish civil defence policy in tandem with NATO’s, been implemented thus far in practice, paving way to a smooth adjustment to membership even in this area? Although perceived as mainly a national responsibility, cooperation in the field of resilience has become progressively important, particularly so after the lessons learned from the invasion of Ukraine (on Ukrainian resilience, read Hedenskog 2023). Thus, for NATO member states, “national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks” (NATO 2022a) and therefore, to “pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats” remains one of the main objectives of the alliance. (NATO 2022a) Certainly, as a member of the alliance, Sweden will be expected to contribute to this objective.

Beside its immediate policy-relevance, the potential impact of NATO socialization process in Sweden’s civil defence – an “outsider” country at the time – offers many theoretical insights. By adopting an “outsider” perspective to socialization, the analysis departs from the notion that outsiders are inevitably disposed to exclusion from the community and moves to outline a framework for analysis, based on outsiders’ need for interactions, importance of incentives, and the compatibility of domestic policy and structures. In doing so, the study advances the existing, yet scant, scholarship of “outsider” socialization, previously discussed for instance in the context of the EU candidate or neighborhood countries or opt-outs (Adler-Nissen 2014; Fagan and Sircar 2020; Meyer-Sahling, Lowe, and Van Stolk 2016; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020) and contributes to the literature with new knowledge on how the process is experienced and managed in practice. Furthermore, by placing practitioners at the forefront of socialization processes, in contrast to the typical elite and state level perspective, the study also contributes to our understanding of if and how socialization processes transition from policy to practical implementation.

The article relies on unique data composed of 33 interviews, conducted in 2020 and 2022, with civil servants from 20 government agencies assigned to represent Sweden in NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Committee’s (CEPC)⁴ planning groups (The Swedish Government Office 2021) and covers the period from announcing the rebuilding of civil defence in 2015 to the significant year of 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine with profound implications for Sweden’s as wells NATO’s defence doctrines. While this period holds the years of the global corona pandemic, it also signifies an important phase for understanding the genealogy and conditions under which Sweden applied to NATO.

The paper unfolds as follows. First, it provides a brief background to Sweden’s relations with NATO, reviewed in the context of total and civil defence. Then, it examines “outsider” socialization and outlines the framework which will be used to guide the analysis. Prior to the empirical analysis, the methodological aspects of the study are addressed. The analysis is then conducted, preceding a final discussion on the empirical and theoretical implications of the study.

Sweden-NATO cooperation in military and civil defence

Sweden has a long history of NATO cooperation, one that has continuously transformed over time. Prior to Sweden’s joining the PfP⁵ program in 1994, the relationship with the alliance was rather restricted due to the official policy of neutrality and nonalignment. In reality, however, the roots of cooperation were already implanted by the time when the relationship was formalized, and they have grown ever since (Agrell 2011; Petersson 2018). More recently, Sweden’s devoted partnership status was extended in 2014 when it entered NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partner program, launched for greater operational cooperation and compatibility among NATO and its partner states, as well as signed a Host Nation Support Agreement (HNS) with the alliance in 2016, giving Sweden a “partner number one” status and the “gold card” in NATO (Petersson 2018; Ydén, Berndtsson, and Petersson 2019; von; Hlatky and Fortmann 2020; Goldgeier and Shifrinson 2023). Consequently, the alliance’s structures are well embedded into Swedish (military) defence, both politically – through various formalized agreements, willingness to participate in joint missions, as well as public discourses; and functionally – by incorporating NATO standards into different aspects of the Armed Forces, including equipment, training and the command systems (Edström 2011; Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 2001; Petersson 2018; Wagnsson 2011; Wieslander 2019).

However, Swedish defence is based on the total defence principle consisting of military and civil defence, restored in 2015 as a consequence of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Historically, the concept of total defence developed as an element of total war doctrines, mainly adopted by neutral states, and referred to “a whole of society approach to national security intended to deter a potential enemy by raising the cost of aggression and lowering the chances of success” (Wither 2020, 62). Beyond Sweden, this preparedness to mobilize not only the military but also the civilian society in case of a war (for example to provide shelter, ensure the functioning of critical infrastructure, as well as assist the military in varied ways) could be found in Finland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. However, after the end of the Cold War, total defence in Sweden was dismantled⁶ (S. S. Larsson and Rhinard 2021).

So, upon the revival of the total defence, the underlying idea remains the same – that of a comprehensive approach to national security. The military defence has reintroduced conscription and is rebuilding its territorial defence capacities. The changes on the civil defence side, however, are much more significant, as the modern civil defence comprises all societal operations that are needed to protect the civilian population and maintain societal functionality in times of crisis or war. To that end, it has seven intertwined objectives,⁷ involves both private and public actors, and is to be built on crisis preparedness practices in cooperation with other states and actors, including NATO (Wither 2020; O. L. Larsson 2021; Stiglund 2020; The Swedish Government Office 2020).

Indeed, although not a NATO member state at the time, Sweden’s civil defence policy has advanced with NATO in mind. The cooperation in this field has been carried out within the framework of PfP generally and in what is now called Resilience Committee⁸ planning groups more specifically. To that end, representatives from the Swedish national agencies are, upon invitation, involved in NATO’s resilience work and can both contribute to and benefit from the collective initiatives. For instance, due to the historical roots of the total defence principle, both Sweden and Finland were considered by many NATO members states to have valuable experiences in the area of resilience and therefore, both countries were invite to get involved in the development of the NATO baseline requirements for resilience, that now, in turn, provide a point of reference for Sweden’s own civil defence policy (The Swedish Government Office 2021). Thus, as in recent years the matters related to civil defence have been high on the alliance’s agenda, and continue to be so with ambitions to “pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats” (NATO 2022a), the possibilities for cooperation have been considerable, even for partner countries such as Sweden.

If taken advantage of, this involvement could induct countries outside of the alliance into common political and operational norms in the field of resilience, and be “a step on the road to full integration – i.e. membership – for those seeking that goal” (Cottey 2018, 50; Petersson 2011). However, up until the historic decision to join the alliance, NATO membership has not been Sweden’s political ambition, rather the opposite since it has officially pursed to its agenda of neutrality and freedom of alliance. The official desire has been to make full use of the opportunities offered by the enhanced partnership to contribute to transparency and influence, strengthened policy dialogue, better operational impact, cost-effectiveness and increased interoperability (The Swedish Government Office 2021). However, considering that civil defence is not the most internationalized area as resilience is first and foremost a national concern, the impact of the political desire to engage with NATO on the practical level should not be overestimated. Yet, the opportunities and initiative to get exposed to the NATO’s resilience work should not be underestimated either. Therefore, the question of whether and how that objective has been instigated in practice is highly relevant not only to the topical case of Sweden-NATO relations but also to the study of socialization in principal terms as it offers insights to “outsider” socialization and to the process’ potential to transition from policy to practice. Exactly how will be discussed in the following theoretical section.

‘Outsider’ socialization

The impact of socialization in relation to practitioners in “outsider” states is a rather unexplored subject in the vast body of socialization literature. The majority of the existing studies that do adopt a similar perspective are mainly concerned with Europeanization of candidate (Central and Eastern European States (CEES)) or neighbourhood countries in their pursuit for a place in the European community (Fagan and Sircar 2020; Kelley 2004; Meyer-Sahling, Lowe, and Van Stolk 2016; Sasse 2008). In these cases, socialization – “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2017, 594) – is used to explain European institutions’ impact on national actors and policy behaviour.

In order to make sense of the practitioners’ experiences of “outsider” socialization, an understanding of some of the mechanisms behind the process is in order. The mechanisms identified in the existing literature are manyfold, originating from both rationalist and constructivist perspectives. Thus, they “may range from coercion and bargaining all the way to persuasion and imitation” (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006, 2). Indeed, various studies on international socialization provide arguments for both sides, presenting valuable evidence from cases of socialization with the EU or NATO by probing their influence on national or individual level (Alderson 2001; Beyers 2010; Checkel 2005, 2017; Flockhart 2004; Major 2005; Michalski and Danielson 2020; Morin and Richard Gold 2016; Murdoch et al. 2019; Schimmelfennig 2000; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006; Thies 2003, 2012).

However, for the purpose of this study and its focus on national practitioners’ experiences of the potential impact of socialization in practice, the theoretically relevant factors pertain specifically to the outsider perspective. In order to further knowledge of socialization of “outsiders,” focus is on how to handle the inevitable exclusion which comes with outsider-status. In order to analyse this conundrum, I will focus on the need for interactions between outsiders and the organization-members, the use of incentives as well as the compatibility of domestic policy and structures. A theory of “outsider” socialization is based on the premise that outsiders will inevitably lack certain access, reserved for members only and thus disposed to exclusion in certain crucial domains.

That dynamic can also occur within a community, where states can be “outsiders” while at the same time being on the inside. For instance, Adler-Nissen (2014) describes how opting out from the European Monetary Union clearly influences how the “outsiders” (in her case the UK and Denmark) – though still EU member states – are often stigmatised, stereotyped, and excluded from the community. Consequently, the “outsiders” have difficulties to have a say in discussions and decision-making or get access to information, all essential factors in socialization, which may reduce its impact. But there might also be differences between new and old members and thus “relative differences in power, status, and prestige between the member and the novice” while often “the novice is within the sphere of influence of the member” (Thies 2012, 28) that could also influence interactions. In order to further understandings of how socialization can be achieved, despite the unescapable conditions that non-membership brings, I suggest a threefold framework of analysis.

First, interactions need to be in focus. These should preferably be frequent and constant to enable socialization processes as it is only through interactions that actors – be they states or individuals – can engage in bargaining processes, as per rationalists, or gradually adapting to common behavioural norms and even identity of the group, as maintained by constructivists. Therefore, the greater the exposure to and interactions within the international environment, the more likely the adoption of international norms as interactions provide forums for common discussions and potential learning (Beyers 2010; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005). Hence, intergovernmental institutions provide an arena for international socialization as, through allowing outsiders to interact within these organizations, it allows for exchanges of ideas, the gaining of information, familiarization with the rules of the group, and development of sentiments of trust (Chelotti, Dasandi, and Jankin Mikhaylov 2022). However, if direct interactions are restricted, how do the outsiders engage with the community? Do they even want to?

This brings us to the second socialization mechanism, that is the importance of incentives – whether they are political, material, or social – to cognitively motivate actors to socialize as there is something to gain from it – be it access or improved image (Schimmelfennig 2000). For an “outsider,” the greatest incentive comes perhaps in form of conditionality that hold either a concrete promise of eventual full membership in the community or harbour aspirations for one (Meyer-Sahling, Lowe, and Van Stolk 2016; Sasse 2008; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020). Indeed, NATO and the EU are known for their use of material reinforcements and political conditionality as they only admit new members once they have complied with fundamental community rules, including advanced democratic consolidation (Gheciu 2005; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006). Yet, what happens if there is no aspired membership incentive in sight?

Third, since certain exclusion is unavoidable for outsiders, diverse strategies to increase compatibility between them and the organization they wish to socialize with are needed. For instance, Fagan and Sircar (2020) explore how pre-accession tutelage from trainings and hands-on interventions, silent professionalization through day-to-day engagement with policies (see also Meyer-Sahling, Lowe, and Van Stolk 2016), or policy harmonization are associated with attitude changes in Serbia with regards to corruption. Indeed, the compatibility of the existing structures and policy traditions are additional factors that determine socialization between outsider and organization and the quality of their relations (Rieker 2004). Therefore, harmonizing domestic arrangements with those of the international community can hence increase compatibility and thus enable socialization. Additionally, Adler-Nissen (2014, 98–110) proposes to challenge exclusion by being extra prepared, a role model, or demonstrating willingness to join the group, as well as creating harmonious relations with others and gaining social acceptance.

Clearly, in the existing literature there is an inbuilt presumption to depart from a perspective where the outsider aspires for a place in the international community. But what if the “outsider” is effectively an insider of the community but has voluntarily opted for partnership instead of a membership – what is the impact of socialization in practice in this case? Does it transfer from the level of policy to practice if outsiderness is a fixed precondition? To answer these questions, we need a more nuanced understanding of “outsider” socialization and domestic actors’ experience and expectations thereof. When and how are outsiders excluded and included into the community and what is the consequence of this exclusion in practice. Also, how, if at all, is exclusion managed?

With this in mind, the following analysis will take its vantage points in the consequences and limitations of being an outsider and per definition be excluded in certain respects. I will hence analyse the consequences of exclusion and the potential strategies to bypass it. These have to do with alternative forms of interaction with the community; the use of incentives to encourage socialization; and finally, the compatibility of domestic policy and structures as an alternative path to enabling or challenging outsider socialization in practice. Taken together, the analysis based on this framework will enable increased knowledge on processes which condition the socialization of Sweden as an outsider in NATO relations.

Methodology

This study relies on interview methodology, “concentrating on the distinctive features of situations and events, and upon the beliefs and personal experiences of individuals” (Lowndes, Marsh, and Stoker 2018), which in this case are related to interactions with NATO. To that end, semi-structured interviews were conducted digitally⁹ in 2020 (16 interviews) and 2022 (17 interviews). Thus, the empirical data consists of a total of 33 transcribed interviews¹⁰ with civil servants from 20 government agencies, all of which are named in the document guiding NATO cooperation within civil defence (The Swedish Government Office 2021). In addition, written correspondence was retained, when possible, in cases where interviews were declined (4 agencies) (see a detailed overview of interviews in Appendix 1).

During the interviews the respondents, all of whom were working with matters related to international cooperation at the time of the interviews, were asked to reflect on international cooperation within civil defence in general (in 2020) and with regards to NATO in particular (in 2022). More specifically, the questions touched upon the practical relevance of the alliance, forms and frequency of interactions, opportunities and challenges, as well as expectations for (future) cooperation (see the 2022 interview guide in Appendix 2). This line of questioning enabled to uncovered the Swedish civil defence practitioners’ understandings of themselves as members (or not) of NATO community, their decisions and actions regarding interactions with this community, as well as the various conditions under which these interactions have taken place.

In the following analysis the respondents are divided into leading (referenced as Lead) and supporting agencies (referenced as Support), as proposed in the government document directing the civil defence cooperation with NATO (The Swedish Government Office 2021). The agencies that are pointed out as leading ones in a specific policy area are the Department of Justice, the Swedish NATO delegation and six agencies assigned to officially represent Sweden in the respective NATO planning group meetings; the agencies with a support function include everyone else, tasked with providing support and participating in meetings when necessary (see a detailed overview of the agencies in Appendix 1). While this division allows for a greater anonymity for the respondents, it also reveals the possible differences in the conditions for agencies named as responsible and those providing support.¹¹

Socialization with NATO in the Swedish civil defence

The following empirical analysis focuses on the Swedish civil defence practitioners’ perceptions of NATO socialization and is structured under the previously outlined framework for “outsider” socialization. It starts by discussing the inevitable exclusion of partners and its consequences in practice, followed by an assessment of the role of alternative forms of interactions, the use of incentives, and compatibility of policy and structures for “outsider” socialization process. Each section concludes with a short summary of the main findings. The paper is then concluded with a final discussion.

The limits of partnership – the inevitability of exclusion

According to the Swedish civil defence practitioners, not being a NATO member leads to various, yet intertwined, limitations for socialization in practice. These have to do with the gaining of access to the community and its information, and having low awareness of the given community on practical policy level and subsequently low motivation to get involved in the first place.

In order to be socialized into an institutional structure, actors need access to it. For members, accessibility is rarely a problem whereas non-members have little control as it is often the institution/community that sets the rules for interaction. As one respondent described, there are meetings relevant to civil defence issues held probably on a weekly basis, but Sweden is invited perhaps only once or twice per term, thus limiting the overview of what is going on in the alliance:

my view is, and I’ve been working on NATO issues for quite some time, that what you don’t know, you don’t suffer from. What we’re not in, we don’t know it even exists. Sometimes it gets a little bit like this with our partnership, when it comes to some issues, that we stand under the streetlight and look because that’s where it’s bright. We don’t understand what’s out in the dark. (Lead 2, 2022)

Thus, being a partner significantly limits the possibilities to get involved and these possibilities might vary over time, depending on the preferences of the community.

We are a partner country and that means that we are not in all meetings. And over the years it has been a little different, depending on the phase NATO is in. So, some years we’ve barely been to any meetings at all, we haven’t been invited. (Lead 5, 2020)

Similarly, another respondent elaborates that “during a certain period, based on partly unclear grounds, NATO was a bit exclusionary toward Sweden, and that creates a slightly strange situation … but maybe you shouldn’t make too big deal out of it. We are not members, after all” (Lead 4, 2022). Also, during COVID-19 pandemic, partly because of technical issues, but also due to “NATO discussions, for example the development of the baseline requirements and different criteria and the allies’ detailed work around them, have meant that we have not been invited as much” (Lead 3, 2022).

Furthermore,

NATO itself made a new division in the groupings … since then it is going really slow, you can say … there has been probably much discussion on Covid but we don’t know that because we have been disconnected … We kind of can’t push the work ourselves in these working groups either because we are dependent on NATO doing it for us. (Support 3, 2022)

However, for socialization to occur, there needs to be meetings and opportunities to discuss potential collaboration (Support 3, 2022). While there is a general agreement amongst the respondents that in recent years NATO has been more open to involving Sweden, the limits of partnership still persist:

I feel that they want to have us with them a lot but sometimes it can be things that they don’t want us to hear, especially the internal discussions and meetings where there is a lot of stuff, we are not let in … so there is always a risk that we can’t take part in everything that we could take part in if we were aligned … But it is probably quite open. The attitude at least among most allies is that Sweden and Finland should be involved. (Lead 1, 2022)

This, in turn, influences the awareness of the alliance, which is perceived to be high on the central level, yet lacking in the practical policy sphere. The former is expressed mainly through policy documents and public discourses as “NATO is very important in the general discussion. After all, we are completely dependent on them and we base our entire security policy doctrine on getting help – military help – and in practice it is from NATO countries, NATO allies” (Lead 2, 2022).

This awareness, however, does not necessarily extend to the lower levels of governance, among which are national agencies working with civil defence. Indeed, there is a shared perception among the respondents that the awareness of NATO in general and of what can be gained from cooperation in particular is really low in the civilian agencies. “NATO is quite anonymous at the agency as a whole and in the management team” (Lead 5, 2022). Therefore, NATO is down-prioritised by some agencies that do not even send their representative to meetings and consequently, “have no cooperation in practice with them” (Support 8; 11, 2022).

At one agency, NATO’s anonymity became especially evident in the results of an exercise where the lack of knowledge on how to get assistance from NATO (or the EU for that matter) in case of a serious crisis was “a bit unsettling actually … and yes, awareness-raising efforts are needed” (Lead 4, 2022). The reasons for this lack of awareness are of course diverse but many respondents assign it, at least partly, to the fact that Sweden is not a member state and thus, has been so far rather “invisible in myndighetssverige¹²” (Support 2, 2022).

In conclusion, one interesting empirical observation here is that the limits of partnership with its restricted access to and knowledge of the community, affect socialization for leading and supporting agencies alike. While not entirely surprising in the case of the latter, one could expect that the leading agencies are more involved and aware of the alliance. It is also obvious, and expected in outsider socialization, that interactions with the alliance are entirely initiated by the community and thus, as NATO’s newfound openness to involve Sweden is very recent, both the policy practitioners and NATO are still navigating the prospects for socialization.

Alternative forms of interaction

Considering the constraints to direct interactions discussed above, much of the partnership with NATO is upheld through domestic, indirect socialization efforts that introduce and maintain (whether successfully or not will be discussed in short) NATO’s presence in the civilian agencies’ work in Sweden. These domestic forms are national coordination led by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) as well as spill-over from the military defence that is already well integrated into NATO structures.

For instance, MSB, in their own words, has been assigned with the task of “explaining the importance of NATO, translating its structures and driving the development of NATO cooperation in the agencies’ works” (Lead, 2022), which they do through distributing memos and, most importantly, through coordination meetings that take place twice a year and involve all agencies that are singled out as relevant to NATO. (The Swedish Government Office 2021) In other words, they promote NATO socialization and provide insights to the alliance. “MSB takes on board quite a lot of what is happening in NATO in terms of concepts, dimensioning aspects, and pushes out to the Swedish system and thus it affects [our] sector” (Lead 4, 2022). In turn, as elaborated by a support agency representative, they adjust their work according to what MSB sends out as they set the guidelines for how agencies should work with societal resilience, and thus the NATO collaboration is “channelled to us via MSB who is the coordinator” (Support 1, 2022) as “we do not have our own channel [to NATO]” (Support 6, 2022). Thus, MSB could be perceived as a national agent of (NATO) socialization. In their work, “they are trying to capture within NATO coordination both the top-down and bottom-up work. We [MSB] sit like the link between there” and “push out ideas in the hope that someone would bite at it” (Lead, 2022).

In addition, the Swedish Armed Forces play a role in indirectly socializing civilian agencies into NATO structures. That is because “on the military side, we have always had NATO cooperation” and “use the same methodology and the same structure … NATO’s methodology is the basis of what most Western countries use and then it is easy [for us] to jack into it” (Support, 2020). Since direct NATO socialization is limited, to say the least, in practice “NATO [cooperation] is indirect, via MSB’s coordination group and the Armed Forces. We don’t have our own NATO cooperation” (Lead 6, 2020, 2022). Thus, the civilian agencies that cooperate and provide support to the Armed Forces often need to learn and incorporate their structures into their work:

The agency has quite a lot of cooperation with the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces is much more integrated and uses for example the same terms as NATO … Even certain things such as time perspectives and requirements, etc., how they have formulated and how it has emerged are then to some extent, or sometimes completely, taken from NATO to Swedish conditions … and some regions have chosen to look and learn from NATO’s structures … and follow the same concepts as Armed Forces do. (Lead 4, 2022)

Thus, the fact that the Armed Forces have had NATO structures for many years means that “it’s spilled over onto the civilian side, so we’re going to start gradually introducing it … We use more the concepts that the Armed Forces have used, which in turn are based on NATO then” (Support 8, 2022).

To sum up, national coordination provides an alternative, indirect, track for socialization, considering that a direct line of interaction with the given community is not always an option for partners, not least for agencies with a supporting role. Thus, having an assigned central point of contact – a national agent of socialization of sorts – is an effective strategy for engagement, especially for agencies that have an “official” responsibility to further cooperation with the given community. Additionally, indirect socialization is enabled through already socialized groups, in this case the Armed Forces that, in accordance with the total defence policy, has to closely cooperate with the civilian agencies.

Political and practical incentives

What motivates practitioners to interact with NATO in the first place? There are indeed various incentives for Sweden to socialize with NATO, both political and practical. For instance, as partnership is a political arrangement, the political incentives for NATO socialization on the central level of governance are noticeable, as discussed in the context of awareness above and in the background section earlier. Yet, according to practitioners, it is clear that these incentives have not really been translated into practice.

To that end, practitioners express that the importance of NATO has not been communicated to the various actors involved in the Swedish civil defence. Consequently, what is gained from NATO, both in cases of direct and indirect interactions, remains obscure. Thus, top-down strategic communication is needed in order to translate these incentives and

to raise awareness among the Swedish people. If you think it is important, it should be communicated … That in itself is threshold-raising even for our own total defence … Thus, there is nothing that excludes that civil cooperation within NATO can reach as far as the military cooperation without Sweden being a member. If you start from that, there are all possibilities in the world. (Support 2, 2022)

So far, there has been few concrete guidelines provided for the agencies which is why no significant steps towards NATO have been taken, as well as why “the agency’s knowledge of this is pretty poor when it comes to NATO’s civilian parts” (Support 8, 2022).

One respondent admitted in 2020, that even when their representatives have been taking part in NATO meetings,

what is gained remains a mystery as there is nothing documented about what we have said or done at these meetings or what issues we have pursued and thus it is very difficult to have knowledge of the benefit of the meetings. (Support 9, 2020)

And even when participation is documented, the intentions that practitioners do bring home do not materialize in practice,

I have written extensive notes and memoranda and questions and sent out to a large network with many recipients and I do not get any reaction at all [from my agency]. But then I have sent to MSB and there I have received positive feedback. Then I sent to the Ministry of Defence and received a positive response. To the Swedish NATO Embassy, I have received a positive response. But within my organization, there has been a lot of dis-interest … and I don’t know why … They are interested, but this is a drowning well among many other things that are more pressing. (Lead 8, 2022)

Although there is a shared perception among the practitioners that “the NATO issue has sailed up in Sweden again” (Lead 7, 2022) and “now it’s really on the agenda” (Support 2, 2022), and visible even within their respective organizations (Lead 8, 2022; Support 6, 2022), a more prominent perception is that this increase is rather abstract and has not really led to any significant changes in NATO socialization in practice.

We have not previously had a mission that we should increase NATO cooperation as we have now, so that in that way there is more spotlight on it … So, it depends a little bit on how politics goes on these issues, how important it becomes … we have tried to ask the government what they mean by that we should expand cooperation with NATO because it is not so very clear. (Support 3, 2022)

This points at a limited reach of socialization from political sphere to the practical one as there are no clear instructions and incentives of how partnership should be played out in practice. As long as this is the case, “politically nationally, NATO may be more important, but just within [my] sector, [there] is not a major change indeed” (Lead 4, 2022; Support 3;5;7;8, 2022) and this “low-intensity interest will never be really prominent, I don’t think, unless we become members and then things will certainly change. But this we don’t know about” (Support 4, 2022). Yet, even with a membership, the practical changes would take time as “the membership would have to be interpreted and applied” (Lead 4, 2022) in accordance with the domestic public administration culture.

In case of indirect interactions, the incentives become more practical in nature and so do motivations to either engage with the community or not. The majority of agencies find the MSB meetings, in particular, to be useful and productive as they gain knowledge and information about NATO in these meetings. However, there are a few that believe the “meetings could develop a great deal, to put it kindly” (Lead 4, 2022) and also agencies that have not taken part in those in the first place (Support 8; 11, 2022). According to one respondent, that might have to do with the purpose of the meetings being mainly the distribution of information. In order for the them to have a value for the practitioners, one suggestion is to “have more workshop format” (Support 5, 2022). The efficacy of this approach was proven by one leading agency that took an initiative to organize a thematic workshop for the sector’s agencies with the purpose of providing “joint planning conditions” to agencies, ministries, the armed forces and MSB, “in order to be able to identify synergies and important dependencies for continued national coordination to achieve the desired ability to give and receive civil-military support within the framework of the total defence” (Lead, 2022). Now other sectors have similar ambitions in order to approach NATO cooperation with a “united front as Swedish agencies” (Support 3, 2022). In addition, in case of indirect socialization through the Armed Forces, the practical benefits for adopting to NATO structures are clear, as “there are several practical advantages to it – speak approximately the same language and work in approximately the same way. So, there has been a change in a few short years’ time there” (Lead 4, 2022; also Support 8, 2022).

Thus, it can be concluded that the gains from direct NATO socialization have not yet become visible in practical policy and therefore, the government’s ambitions for deepened NATO cooperation have not really been implemented in practice, especially in supporting agencies. Therefore, in order for socialization to reach this level, the political incentives need to be communicated through concrete policy guidelines. Without the expectation of membership, there are little incentives to make practical changes in the policy field. However, the motivation to engage with NATO increases when the incentives are concrete and practical, be it well-coordinated views on NATO or universal use of the same language.

Compatibility of policy and structures

What has become clear is that much of the socialization in partnership transpires on the national arena and therefore domestic preconditions and their compatibility with those of the community are of great importance. Although resilience is primarily a national concern, NATO member state still take cues from the community in their policy development. However, considering that Sweden is not a member state in the alliance, its civil defence policy is therefore more prone to be shaped by domestic preconditions, although there are examples of attempts to match national preconditions to those of NATO in order to foster socialization. One such is the fact that national guidelines for NATO collaboration were changed in 2021, assigning new leading agencies to specific planning groups because “the [NATO] planning groups were redesigned, we needed to match them from the Swedish side” (Lead, 2022). In policy terms, most visible attempt is perhaps the insertion of NBR into national planning for civil defence, or arranging for the HNS:

These Swedish goals for crisis preparedness and Swedish goals for civil defence have … [been] taken or retrieved a lot from NATO. They have just been reworded a little bit so that it is in an indirect way that NATO has a meaning and influence. In my experience, I think many people don’t even understand that a lot has been taken from NATO and sort of interpreted and translated. (Lead 4, 2022)

However, the government’s attempts to harmonize civil defence policy with NATO’s do not necessarily improve the practical implementation of it as some feel that on the political level “much of our reconstruction of civil defence is based on NATO, it is not based on how we want Swedish society to function in crisis. This analysis has not been carried out, I dare say” (Support 9, 2020). Others perceive NATO’s policy to not match with that of Sweden’s (Lead 2; 7, 2022) and adhering to domestic policy preconditions is perceived to be more important, as described by one respondent:

In NATO’s context, the civilian line of NATO has a clearer goal towards the military part … If you compare then with Sweden’s total defence then the military defence is so small and it can be much, much more important that the civil defence also works for the total defence to be strong. So, therefore … I personally see more benefit of focusing on national civil defence than NATO’s civilian line – the baseline [NBR] concept. (Support 2, 2022)

Moreover, these efforts to match policy might not have a desired effect if the policy pace does not match that of the community. For example, the reconstruction of the Swedish civil defence is still in its early stages (and grossly delayed, due to the pandemic) and therefore the practitioners feel that there is no room for a NATO perspective to be adopted as, at this stage, all efforts are focused on the national arena:

Since the work with total defence resumed, the focus has been at the regional and local level in Sweden. NATO you’re probably not quite ready to talk about. Or the EU for that matter, actually. So, it’s a maturity issue and a little bit of a knowledge issue. They [agencies] do not have the resources to handle even the Swedish resumed work on total defence. How then can one care about the UN, NATO, and the EU, to simplify it, very much. (Lead 4, 2022)

Similarly, other agencies reflecting on their current stage suggest that, “the basic elements or base for international cooperation and exchange is that you first have national coordination” (Lead 5, 2022). Therefore, the agencies have chosen to focus on the national instead of international aspects of the policy. After all, “they [agencies] must be allowed to find their own identity before you can say the word NATO … . So, my take on it is that we’re only at the beginning of this” (Support 5, 2022). To that end, the “work on NATO cooperation has not yet begun” in the field of civil defence (Support 11, 2022).

That said, there are instances where sharing similar policy ambitions with the community could still foster socialization, especially when partners’ policy traditions are attractive to the community. This is the case with the Swedish “new-old work with total defence” (Lead 4, 2022) that many alliance countries are interested in and which is why “NATO is very positive about us. They think we have come much, much further than everyone else conceptually, us and Finland … They are always interested in hearing our view … So, it’s like this, what should we say, benchmarking” (Lead 2, 2022). A few concrete examples of initiatives that have sparked NATO’s interest are the revival of the Swedish agency for psychological defence (in January 2022) and the sending of brochures for preparedness for crisis and war to Swedish households (in May 2018) as well as the overall coordination of the civil-military cooperation (Lead 1; 2, 2022). Consequently, the practitioners perceive that they have become more appreciated as a partner, as they are somewhat of a role model in this field, which has led to greater opportunities for interaction with the community (Lead 5, 2022), hence better conditions for socialization in practice.

In summary, domestic preconditions have significant influence on international socialization, as the empirical evidence shows that socialization becomes secondary when domestic policy development is still in its early stages and the match between domestic policy pace and ambitions are not deemed compatible with those of the community. Meanwhile, having similar policy ambitions increases the possibilities for interaction through benchmarking, where the outsider can become a role model and is consequently granted access to the community.

Concluding discussion

This study has revealed a striking lack of NATO presence among practitioners active in Swedish civil defence prior to the country’s membership in NATO. Hence, the impact of NATO socialization in this field has been limited in practice, regardless of the political ambitions to build national resilience together with the alliance. Reasons for this are manyfold but have mainly to do with the exclusion due to the fact that Sweden has been a partner and not a member state in the alliance. Consequently, the knowledge of NATO’s resilience work is noticeably subdued among civil defence practitioners and so is motivation to interact in the first place. So far, the majority of interaction with the alliance in this field has been mainly managed indirectly through MSB and the Swedish Armed Forces, the latter of which is already well socialized into the NATO structures. Furthermore, it is also perceived by practitioners that NATO’s resilience goals do not necessarily match the Swedish preconditions and the practical implementation of the civil defence policy, not least due to policy pace and traditions, although the government’s efforts to harmonize these, by for instance incorporating NBRs into the existing policy, have been renowned. Thus, before Sweden’s membership in NATO, the incentives to socialize in the field of civil defence have been perceived to be predominantly political and thus the impact of the process has stayed on the central level of governance. In order for that impact to reach the practical sphere, what could be gained from NATO socialization should have been made visible and tangible in practice.

Apart from these empirical findings, the article has offered theoretical tools by which to study socialization of outsiders. While it has further confirmed that the “outsiders” are indeed largely excluded from the community and the interactions that are essential for socialization to occur in the first place take place under the community’s lead, it has advanced this existing knowledge by shedding light on: 1) alternative forms of interaction that provide opportunities for the outsiders to indirectly engage with the community and in doing so get exposed to it; 2) the importance of incentives that for socialization to reach policy implementation need to be communicated and concrete; 3) as well as the compatibility of domestic policy and structures that, when matched with those of the community, have the potential to facilitate socialization.

Furthermore, by offering insights on the difficulties of socialization of practitioners with partnership status, this study contributes to the existing research that mainly focuses on outsider states’ that are clearly incentivised to interact, predominately due to a promise of an eventual membership in the community, by showing that once (future) membership incentive is removed, socialization does not really transition from the level of policy statements to the practical sphere of enactment. That is mainly because of low engagement caused by a sense of exclusion among practitioners which lowers motivation to get involved as well as their awareness of the rules of the organization, hindering the enactment of outsider strategies for socialization discussed in previous literature, such as showing willingness to join the group, creating relations within it, or silent professionalization.

However, the analysis also reveals several approaches to lessen the many challenges, such as offering competence through benchmarking, which can grant access to the community and enable direct interactions, information sharing and mutual learning prospects. Additionally, outsiders are practically incentivised to adopt to community’s language and structures if these are used by national agents of socialization, hence through indirect socialization. Thus, the impact of indirect socialization as well as the role of domestic socialized agents in international socialization in general and in regards to “outsider” socialization in particular are topics worth exploring further, not least from a practitioner perspective. Granting more scholarly attention to socialization process in the policy implementation sphere, in contrast to solely focusing on the central level, would no doubt advance theories of socialization.

While the subject of Sweden-NATO relations is highly topical at the moment, so is the subject of NATO’s role in the field of resilience and its members’ resilience policies. As stated earlier, there are many empirical indications of Article 3 being elevated politically. However, the question of what that entails for member states’ policies in practice remains to be seen and should be subjected to future research. Perhaps the lack of NATO presence in Swedish civil defence is not that different from other member states domestic policies and the country’s becoming a member of the alliance will provide an opportunity for Sweden to contribute to, perhaps even lead, the building of collective resilience. As pointed out by this study, there is indeed much potential for NATO states to cooperate and learn from each other in their quest for building resilience. Tapping into this potential would only make the alliance stronger, which may be more imperative now than ever.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jana Wrange

Jana Wrange is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Lund University. Her research interests include small state security and defence issues. Her Ph D project concerns international preconditions for Swedish civil defence.

Notes

1. “Commitment to enhance resilience” was issued by the heads of state and government participating at Warsaw Summit in 2016, and was followed by the “Strengthened Resilience Commitment” at the Brussels Summit in 2021.

2. The seven NBRs are: (1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; (2) resilient energy supplies; (3) ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; (5) ability to deal with mass casualties; (6) resilient civil communications systems; (7) resilient civil transportation systems.

3. And Finland, for that matter, applying for NATO membership together with Sweden in May 2022.

4. Restructured into Resilience Committee as of October 2022.

5. “The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation” (NATO’s homepage: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm)

6. Contrary to Sweden, Finland never abandoned the total defence principle and continued to develop it, which is why today the two countries’ approaches to the principle are somewhat different.

7. These are (1) to protect the civilian population; (2) ensure the most important societal functions; (3) maintain a necessary supply; (4) contribute to the capabilities of the military defence in the event of an armed attack or war in Sweden or its close proximity; (5) maintain society’s resilience to external pressures and contribute to strengthening the will to defend; (6) contribute to strengthening society’s ability to prevent and manage severe strains on society in peace; and finally (7) with available resources, contribute to the ability to participate in international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

8. Previously called Civil Emergency Planning Committee.

9. Both in 2020 and 2022, in-person interviews were initially planned and booked but replaced with digital interviews due to COVID-19 restrictions.

10. All interviews were held in Swedish and have been translated to English by the author.

11. And while not a subject of the analysis in this paper per se, this raises an interesting question regarding the effects of different degrees of partnership (or membership) – a topic worth examining further in future research.

12. A concept referring to the Swedish public administrative model with many (approximately 250) formally independent government agencies being involved in the central governance.

Appendix 1.

Overview of the interviews

Table

	Agency	Interview 2020	No of participants	Interview 2022	No of participants	Comments
Lead	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	April	1	March	2	In-text mention as MSB
	The National Board of Health and Welfare	N/A	N/A	April	1
	Department of Justice at the Government Office	N/A	N/A	February*	1
	Sweden’s Delegation to NATO	N/A	N/A	February*	1
	Swedish Energy Agency	March April	1 1	February*	1
	Swedish National Food Agency	March	1	January	1
	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	April	2	February*	1	No audio recording in 2020 – transcript based on notes
	Swedish Transport Administration	April	2	February*	1
Support	Swedish Defence Research Agency	N/A	N/A	February*	1
	National Veterinary Institute	April	2	February*	2
	Swedish Maritime Administration	March March	1 1	February*	1
	Swedish Defence University	N/A	N/A	February* March	1 1
	Swedish Armed Forces	March	1	February*	1	No audio recording in 2020 and 2022 – transcripts based on notes
	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority	March	1	February*	1
	Swedish Board of Agriculture	April April	1 1	February*	1
	Sweden’s Civil Aviation Administration	March	2	February*	1
	Swedish Coast Guard	N/A	N/A	Declined	N/A	Written correspondence
	Swedish National Grid Authority	March	1	Declined	N/A	Written correspondence
	Public Health Agency of Sweden	N/A	N/A	Declined	N/A	Written correspondence
	Swedish Transport Agency	March	1	Declined	N/A

*All interviews held in February 2022 were conducted prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the 24^th of February 2022.

Appendix 2.

Interview guide 2 (Translated from Swedish to English)

General questions

• Please describe what your agency actually does within civil defence

• How do you relate to cooperation with NATO within civil defence?

• How does cooperation with NATO in civil defence look at your agency? How does it happen in practice?

• How often does your agency interact with NATO?

• Who is the driving force in the interaction?

• What does your agency contribute with and what do you get out of interactions with NATO?

Change over time

• Do you feel that there has been any change in the interaction with NATO? If yes, over what period of time?

• Is there a greater connection to NATO now than before in your work with civil defence? Is NATO present in the agency’s civil defence work in any way now that they were not before?

• Is NATO more important now than before? How? Why do you think that is so?

• Has collaboration with NATO led to changes within your work? Do you think or act differently as a result of interactions with NATO? Have you, in any way, adapted your work with the civil defence to NATO (and its seven baseline requirements)?

• Are there any documents/guidelines for the cooperation with NATO in regards to total defence/civil defence at your agency?

Assessment questions

• What are the expectations within your agency for interactions with NATO? What expectations do you think the Swedish government and MSB have?

• What are the expectations within NATO for your participation?

• How would you describe the agency’s role within NATO? Sweden’s role? What do you think this role entails?

• Is there some kind of contact point between agencies in Sweden that cooperate with NATO?

• All cooperation means opportunities as well as challenges. What would you say these are in cooperation with NATO?

• What measures do you think must be taken to achieve the government’s ambition regarding deepened cooperation with NATO within civil defence?

• What does the way forward look like for you regarding NATO cooperation?