Fixing things from the outside? Diaspora politicians and transnational political engagement

ABSTRACT

Scholarship on diaspora political engagement is unfolding in novel ways exploring the participation of second-generation diaspora individuals and engagement patters of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Focusing on the unique role of diaspora politicians, I contend that these individuals adeptly leverage their identity to impact politics and advocate for change. The article demonstrates their adaptability in different settings and evolving advocacy strategies. The article employs a multilingual analysis of social media, public interviews, and public appearances in Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina using an exploratory case study of a German-Bosnian politician. This exploration underscores their flexibility and evolving advocacy dynamics. Furthermore, it illustrates the way these politicians enhance their profiles within the countries where they’ve been elected and in countries of their descent. This serves to strengthen their chances of re-election on one hand while also drawing attention to authoritarian tendencies, potentially clearing a path for democratic advancement on the other.

KEYWORDS:

• Diaspora
• second generation
• hybrid regimes
• social media analysis

Introduction

The Western Balkans are known for high levels of outmigration. Guestworkers of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, followed conflict-generated populations during the 1990s, and subsequent ‘new’ diaspora populations continue to settle in Western European countries, leading largely transnational lives (Karabegović & Meśić, 2023). Despite this migration trend, these states have largely refrained from systematically engaging with their diasporas. Instead, they have directed their efforts towards state-building after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Over the last decade, increased corruption, stagnation, and democratic backsliding have become evident. Among these states, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a hybrid regime, riddled by an ethnonationalist political elite that has continued to hold the state capture and has stalled democratic reform since the end of the 1992–1995 war (Andjelic 2022; Mujanović 2018). The state's hybridity is institutionalized through its constitution, part of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, in what has previously been called a straitjacket (Keil & Perry, 2015), a captured state (Hulsey, 2018), or simply, a frozen conflict (Perry 2019). Hybrid or transitional regimes, called by a variety of different names, are a growing phenomenon, and classification, definition, and understanding has become somewhat of a pastime for scholars trying to better understand democratic backsliding and authoritarian turns. Annual rankings of democracy and corruption help to comparatively analyze across cases and draw out theoretical insights (Bogaards, 2009). Freedom House's rankings of ‘Nations in Transit’ places Bosnia and Herzegovina in the hybrid regime category with a democracy score of 3.21 out of 7 in 2023. It notes the continued dysfunctional state of government, ethnonationalist political elites who hold a disproportionate amount of power, the weak civil society sector and judiciary, and an electoral system that serves to reinforce discrimination and uphold the status quo as some of the major reasons for this ranking.¹

As the introduction to this special issue has highlighted, scholars are increasingly focused on the question of diaspora engagement and authoritarian home countries’ transnational repression attempts. As countries have experienced authoritarian turns, they have shifted their diaspora policies towards repression (Böcü & Baser, 2024). In turn, diasporas’ responses to authoritarian turns, including intergenerational differences among diaspora populations, are broadening understanding of the relationship(s) between diaspora and home countries (Baser & Böcü, 2024; Wackenhut & Orjuela, 2023). Hybrid regimes have not been examined in this regard. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its diaspora policies have never taken full advantage of its diaspora potential, nor has the state attempted to repress the population. Instead, the diaspora is seen primarily as an important economic contributor through remittances and investments, and often touted in the media for contributions and accolades achieved both in the country and abroad (Karabegović & Hasić, 2019).

In the beginning of June 2022, Bosnian media outlets excitedly announced Ed Husić's new role as the new Minister for Industry and Science, proclaiming his innovative engagement. A few years prior to that, the same went for news announcements of Alma Zadić's new role as Minister of Justice, touting her anti-corruption stances, her time spent as a Fulbright Scholar in the United States, and her professional accomplishments. Still, a few years before that it was Aida Hadžialić's progressive stances on education and social justice in her new role as Minister for Upper Secondary School, Adult Education and Training. However, none of these three prominent Bosnian-born ministers would be joining the government in Sarajevo. Instead, each were elected or held these positions as citizens of Australia, Austria, and Sweden respectively.

The Bosnian media's fascination, and to some degree Bosnian politicians’ congratulations and engagement with these individuals, serves as a reminder that, despite the country's lack of diaspora policies and institutions on a broad scale, validation, and recognition of diaspora politicians remains consistent. Perhaps this has been most visible with Adis Ahmetovic, a Member of the German Bundestag who was selected to be Germany's Western Balkans rapporteur in 2021. The disconnect between a coherent state policy towards diaspora in combination with a diaspora population that increasingly includes elected officials in other countries, provides an interesting case study at the intersection of diaspora political engagement, homeland responses, and migrant and migrant origin political incorporation in host countries.

Although scholarly discussions about diasporas’ loyalty to a homeland or a host state have been examined through the lens of transnationalism, integration, or citizenship regimes, this article introduces a topic that has been understudied – namely, political office holders of the 1.5 and second generation who draw on their diaspora identity. This is especially relevant in relation to hybrid and authoritarian homeland contexts where there is potential of clashing with domestic politics in countries of residence. How do second generation politicians leverage their identity in their political engagement at home and abroad? I explore this using a case study of a German Bundestag Member with Bosnian roots, drawing primarily on his outreach efforts and presence on both conventional and social media. For the purposes of this article, I use the term diaspora politician rather than migrant politician as these individuals do not always have migration experience themselves, or were rather young when their parents migrated to the countries in which they ultimately are elected in. Thus, their diasporic belonging and identity, especially so in the second generation, become part of the narratives they tell, and part of the ways they explain their political motivations. In other words, they ‘adopt a diasporic stance’ (Brubaker, 2017).

I argue that in hybrid regimes like Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other countries experiencing authoritarian turns, diaspora politicians can utilize their identity to forward political narratives in the countries of residence and attempt to lobby towards change in the countries their parents left. Unlike authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes provide opportunities for (foreign) politicians to engage in the public space and allow for some public discourse. This article thus presents an exploratory case study with preliminary insights about how second-generation politicians in democratic countries relate to hybrid and authoritarian regimes they have diasporic connection to. I demonstrate how the savviness employed by such individuals not only benefits them politically, but how these individuals shift debates about diaspora belonging and political participation in respective countries. Ultimately, I show that diaspora engagement with younger generations can be channelled in innovative ways, with greater potential for political change by democratic means. Research has demonstrated how states attempt to include or exclude its diaspora populations, especially engaging with younger generations of diaspora (Orjuela, 2023).

The next section provides a brief introduction on Bosnia and Herzegovina's hybrid regime and its diaspora engagement policies, before providing an overview of scholarship on diaspora and political participation and the literature on diaspora as political agents. The section thereafter elaborates on the methodological approach employed for the case study. In the sections that follow, I trace the ways in which Ahmetovic has utilized his diasporic background as well as how he has navigated between German and Bosnian contexts in the period leading up to his election and the first year of office, before using the conclusion to argue how this case can inform further scholarship at the intersection of diaspora political engagement and homeland politics.

Bosnia and Herzegovina – of hybrid regimes and diaspora engagement

The initial post-conflict period and complicated political system in BiH was not conducive for diaspora outreach as state and peacebuilding dominated the agenda. Diaspora policy was not initially included as part of BiH's foreign policy in this initial period due to political disagreement among the major ethnonationalist political groups over the role of diaspora. The country's 2003 foreign policy objectives did not explicitly address the diaspora; however, it outlined certain policies for ‘citizens abroad’, primarily focusing on consular services. The Council of Ministers’ initiated a diaspora cooperation policy through the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) and other state level institutions, thus beginning to formalize diaspora governance, resulting in a Diaspora Policy only in 2017. The BiH Presidency followed by including diaspora relations as a foreign policy goal in its 2018 strategy, signalling mandates within the state for diaspora engagement (Karabegović & Hasić, 2019).

Meanwhile, outmigration has continued over the last three decades due to the country's political instability, levels of corruption, and lack of opportunities for young people. Today, many Bosnians are choosing to pursue work or higher education opportunities in the European Union, and the desire to migrate among young people is on the rise. Its conflict-generated Bosnian diaspora predominately hold citizenships in the countries in which they settled during the 1990s. In general, Bosnians are one of the best integrated migrant groups, regardless of their country of settlement (Halilovich et al., 2018). Still, their homeland's engagement towards the estimated two million individuals continues to lack sustainable approaches, arguably limiting the country's potential to strategically engage with its diaspora around the world, and to build effective diaspora governance (Gamlen, 2019).

Localities throughout the country have reached out to their diaspora populations to create stronger links and to encourage peacebuilding in the post-conflict period, though this has had mixed results. In fact, most of these efforts have been diaspora initiated (Hasić, 2018). This lack of state engagement and of integrated institutional support for diaspora has been recognized as a major diaspora grievance (Karabegović, 2019). The way the country's political system in the post-war period operates, and the internally contested sovereignty has resulted in weakened state institutions (Mujanović, 2018) thus also limits diaspora engagement. The convoluted political climate in the country, and a lack of transparent, democratic governance has thus hindered diaspora policy development, with diaspora actors making the best of their personal connections, ambitions, and collaborations with other actors to impact change in the country. Others have disengaged from political processes altogether, evident in the low number of eligible citizens who vote from abroad, or their continued grievances about the country's post-war politics (Karabegović, 2019). Today, the country has multiple projects, often co-financed by state institutions and external actors such as USAID or IOM, that help to foster diaspora and development, but without any emphasis on political engagement. Despite the already mentioned outmigration trends, none of the leading political parties in the country have engaged with these themes in public discourse or during elections. Active engagement by diaspora actors despite this lack of state engagement is thus interesting as it is not incentivized but rather a result of transnational political engagement, one that has the potential to also ‘challenge the state’ (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The following sections place focus on research at the intersection of political engagement and participation of migrants and diaspora actors, especially in terms of seeking political office and governing.

Scholarship on diaspora engagement and political participation

Migrants and their descendants are increasingly visible political actors. For example, US Representatives Ilhan Omar and Rasheeda Tlaib, both 1.5 generation diaspora, have had their loyalty questioned by conservative domestic actors, all while highlighting their refugee and migration backgrounds and the importance of their respective communities in helping to elect them. In Chile, Gabriel Boric's Croatian roots became a topic of media coverage and discussion when he was chosen to be President of the country.² In fact, this growing visibility of immigrant and refugee origin individuals in politics has prompted more scholarly discourse on their inclusion and impact on political systems (Dancygier et al., 2015; Itzigsohn, 2000).

Scholarly debate about the incorporation of underrepresented individuals, including minorities and migrants, has broadly focused on attempting to disaggregate which factors lead to more representation and how political systems can adjust to encourage the election of non-traditional candidates to office. As communities increasingly become more diverse, they are more likely to vote for candidates that represent this diversity. In fact, a special issue dedicated to the representation of individuals with immigrant origins and intersecting identities presents one of the few scholarly engagements with these topics (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013). This section provides an overview of existing literature on how the participation of diaspora individuals affects countries of destination.

While the intersection of diaspora engagement and political participation has garnered attention due to its impact on both destination countries and diaspora populations, scholarship that acknowledges the complexities inherent in second-generation diaspora political participation remains nascent. For example, transnational political engagement is more active when dual citizenship policies are in place (Wright & Bloemraad, 2012), but differing citizenship regimes and the intricacies of defining and tracking second, and potentially, third-generation diaspora members make comparative work challenging (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013; Mollenkopf & Hochschild, 2010). Survey data in Germany has found differences between political participation between individuals whose parents are both migrants vs. those with only one migrant parent, noting that political participation increases when only one parent is a migrant (Ceyhan, 2013).

Rather, research that has focused on immigrant-origin politicians has turned its attention to their engagement in the countries in which they are elected, or the processes which help them gain office. For example, scholars have examined how political parties make decisions on individual candidates, pointing to political party behaviour and the potential for different outcomes. Of course, this varies in certain countries where political party lists have less dominance, especially because of different perceptions towards migrant groups (Michon & Vermeulen, 2013; Wüst, 2016). By taking a detailed examination on election results from 2018 in Flanders through an original dataset based on both immigrant origin as well as gender, a multi-faceted picture emerges that denotes that immigrant-origin politicians are often supported by voters where there are higher numbers of immigrants (Van Trappen et al., 2021). At the same time, immigrant origin politicians might play their identities up or face challenges in being elected if there is increased interethnic conflict in their homelands or in the countries of destination. For example, a study in Germany notes how immigrant-origin politicians are increasingly choosing to enter political life, and remaining active actors within numerous political debates, including at parliamentary levels (Wüst, 2014).

Taking a more systematic approach, Ghaem-Maghami and Kuuire (2022) take stock of the existing research on political participation by migrants and their descendants to better understand how this agency helps individuals not just create new lives but find ways of becoming engaged in politics and carve out spaces for their voices and perspectives. Based on 44 studies, their review analyzes 56 factors that foster more political agency to be exercised by migrant and diaspora actors in politics, highlighting nine salient factors. These include macro-level, meso-level, and micro-level factors that helps to better understand the potential of immigrants to be included and remain involved in political processes. Micro-level factors that encompass prior political and civic experience, integration into society, campaign strategies, and personal attributes like education and gender play the greatest role (Ghaem-Maghami & Kuuire, 2022). While the review offers insights into how structural factors intersect with political parties and societal factors, it also underscores the entrepreneurial spirit of political participation among migrants and, by extension, diaspora actors.

Research on diaspora politicians can help to better understand the dynamics of political engagement of those with migrant backgrounds, whether in terms of political participation, running for political office, their impact transnationally, or other ways in which their political agency is practiced (Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008). As societies become more diverse, it is important to gain better insight into how transnational political engagement influences communities in multiple countries, especially considering the number of diaspora politicians will likely continue to rise. This study contributes to this through an exploratory case of a second-generation diaspora politician, encouraging a future research agenda that considers not only political participation of diaspora actors in multiple countries, but also how their diaspora identity may play a role when they run for and serve in political office. The following section reviews the existing literature in diaspora studies looking at diaspora as political actors before delving into the empirical sections of the article.

Diaspora as political agents

Diaspora scholarship ranges from definitional debates to how to interpret diaspora actors amidst a multitude of others in social fields related to topics of migration, mobilities, citizenship, and development (Brubaker, 2017; Féron, 2013; Grossman, 2019; Ragazzi, 2012; Sokefeld, 2006). Meanwhile, diaspora political participation in countries of destination can take many forms and has most been examined through different forms of activism, transnational and migration networks, and different forms of civic engagement, including demonstrations and civic initiatives (Gabrielli et al., 2017). Often, scholarly work either explicitly focuses on diasporas or lumps them together with all migrants. Non-formal political engagement in countries of destination or countries of origin is to be expected for those leading transnational lives, especially if they have dual citizenships (Kastoryano, 2005; Schlenker, 2016). Openings for diaspora to become politically engaged are plenty, as has been theorized, questioned, and empirically examined by many scholars over the years (Brinkerhoff, 2012; Burgess, 2014; Gamlen, 2019). Scholarship has become much more nuanced and conscious about how different contexts influence the ways in which diaspora become engage and respond (Féron & Baser, 2023).

Conflict-generated diaspora populations over time also include multiple generations, with those from later generations diverging in their viewpoints from earlier generations, and without conflict or migration experiences. Their political engagement may differ as well, focusing on their countries of birth. In fact, sometimes a relationship to the perceived homeland needs to be established in the first place. The resulting exploration of identity and relationship to the homeland has been described as ‘tourism’ for some scholars (Huang et al., 2016). This feeling of being the ‘other’ in the homeland can lead second and later generation individuals to mobilize on claims in their host countries rather than in the homeland as this is where they are politically socialized and where they feel their rights are represented best (Hess & Korf, 2014). Essentially, the political mobilization in the diaspora involves a nuanced process of expressing their perspectives across different countries. This becomes particularly intriguing when some pursue political careers, opening the opportunity to engage on a political level in official discourses. Before delving into the case study examined in this paper, the following section offers a brief overview on methods.

A note on methods

In the contemporary political landscape, social media plays a central role in helping politicians engage with their electorates and the broader public. Research in political communication has focused on how a politician's use of social media leads to their political success including in campaigning (Sobieraj et al., 2020; Stier et al., 2018). Moreover, research has shown how personalized social media accounts are part of politicians’ strategies in engaging with their voters to mobilize their support and to brand themselves (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Taking this into account, and the research on diaspora transnational political engagement, I undertook an analysis of Adis Ahmetovic's main form of engagement on social media – his Instagram profile. There, he presents and argues for his political agenda, shares clips of his Bundestag speeches, engages with his voters (and beyond), and shares media appearances and interviews. The account was opened towards the end of 2019 and accrued over 15,000 followers by the end of 2022 with a total of 274 posts as of January 2023. It's worthwhile to mention here that once he started campaigning for the Bundestag, his social media activity increased significantly, from only a few thousand to over 6,000 followers in early 2022. Ahmetovic responds to comments and engages with his followers interactively, utilizing the platform to forward his own image and his political views.³ In order to triangulate his social media engagement, I also conducted desk research of his public interviews as well as media coverage, explained in detail in the following paragraphs. All the quotes and text analyzed in this article were translated by me from the original Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BCS) or German.

Firstly, I went through his Instagram posts until January 2023, 274 in total, coding which ones were related to local politics, German national politics, international politics, Bosnian politics, his identity and personal story, other activities, etc. The primary focus of the analysis included posts that were of a political nature or those concerned with his views on identity or Bosnian heritage. Moreover, I went through the texts accompanying his images, coding for the same. Here, I paid specific attention to mentions of background, identity, and democracy, and searched for themes and patterns, such as engagement with the political party he is a member of, to demonstrate the consistency of his message. Often, Instagram posts were related to speeches he had, meetings, and other events he attended, and posts were much more consistent once his political campaign started. Thus, these posts were the major focus of analysis.

Second, I went through Ahmetovic's public interviews (all available on YouTube) and profiles in both German and Bosnian media outlets. He has been featured in multiple profiles in well-read German newspapers and media outlets, and he regularly also makes statements regarding the political situation in the Western Balkans, often with a primary focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. As he is relatively fluent in BCS, he has had multiple media appearances in Bosnia and Herzegovina during his official visits to the region, or by virtue of providing statements or video appearances. These all served to triangulate his social media outreach, but also to demonstrate how he skillfully navigates the media landscapes of multiple countries.

Finally, I went through media coverage of Adis Ahmetovic in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to January 2023 to better understand how he is perceived in the public political sphere. For this, I relied on Klix.ba, an online news portal that provides daily news and is the most widely read outlet by diaspora members and the local population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also acts as an aggregator, often borrowing or publishing similar texts, including translating foreign media. Thus, an overview of the available media on Klix.ba offered me the broadest spectrum of coverage of Adis Ahmetovic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This included 43 articles on Klix.ba, by far more than any other non-Bosnian politician, including national leaders and others whose international significance would far exceed that of a rank-and-file member of the German Bundestag.⁴ Moreover, this indicates the level of interest in his activities and the influence and interest he enjoys in the Bosnian public space.

‘I will always carry a piece of Bosnia within me.’ Ahmetovic's engagement with identity

In the German Bundestag, there are at least 83 parliamentarians of migrant descent, 18 of them with a Turkish background. These parliamentarians represent Germany's increasingly diverse population and the coming of age of a second and third generation of Germans whose parents and grandparents emigrated to the country. Two of them have Bosnian roots – Jasmina Hostert and Adis Ahmetovic. Ahmetovic belongs to a new generation of politicians, digital natives, who engage with their electorate through social media regularly. His social media engagement provides a venue for him to not only shape his public image in his Hanover constituency, but far beyond among Bosnians and Bosnian diaspora members. This section explores Adis Ahmetovic's political engagement and the ways in which he has positioned himself in Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina since being elected to the Bundestag.

Adis Ahmetovic was born in Hanover, Germany in 1993 to refugee parents who had fled the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Germany accepted nearly 320,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina during the conflict, and, among Austria and Sweden, was one of the main countries that provided a haven for those fleeing war. However, unlike other countries that provided a path to citizenship, many of those who came to Germany were ultimately unable to stay in the country due to a temporary refugee regime. Thus, they returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina or relocated to third countries including the US, Canada, and Sweden (Karabegović, 2019). Ahmetovic's family struggled to remain in Germany, ultimately gaining the right to remain after multiple legal battles and the engagement of Matthias Miersch, a family lawyer and Social Democratic Party (SPD) member who advocated for them.

Ahmetovic became a German citizen at age 22. He joined the SPD in 2008 and held multiple functions within youth groups in the party. He was elected to office for the first time in 2016, at age 23, in municipal elections in lower Saxony. After studying at the University of Hanover, he completed a Master of Education in 2019. Professionally, he held multiple research and advisory functions for various SPD members, including working in an advisory role for governmental planning and principles at the Lower Saxony State Chancellery. He was elected to the German Bundestag in 2021, receiving 44,570 or 34.9% of the vote in his district – an impressive result for someone of his age in a region that traditionally has voted more conservatively.

Although he featured in Bosnian media on a few occasions in the past, Ahmetovic gained media attention in Germany and Bosnia and Herzegovina after his election. A German profile that featured other young, diverse, recently elected politicians noted his zeal and energy, highlighting his belief he did not think he would have ever been elected in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the politics in the country, and outlining his social democrat agenda for the future of Germany.⁵ In the Bundestag, as the rapporteur for the Foreign Policy Working Group of the Western Balkans by the SPD parliamentary group, he has leveraged his diaspora identity and connection to the region while promoting Germany's foreign policy. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, he's supported politicians from social democratic parties, and has commented on democratic backsliding. He's repeated that he always carries a piece of Bosnia with him in multiple interviews, alluding to the relevance of his diasporic identity. He draws on his youth and becoming a German citizen as part of a broader narrative of migrants belonging to Germany.

Ahmetovic's Instagram profile consists of 136 posts from his initial post to the end of his first political campaign. In this period, there was only one mention of Bosnia and Herzegovina, related to an interview he gave in January 2021 focused on migrants in Greece and Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting the importance of the EU providing support for migrants in these countries. Since his election towards the end of September 2021 until the end of 2022, there were 138 posts, representative of his first year in political office. Except for standard holiday greetings and one personal post related to becoming an uncle, all posts are of a political nature, speaking to his activities in and around Hanover, German foreign policy, or his political party (SPD). Of these, 25% relate to Bosnia and Herzegovina or his diaspora identity. On one hand, these posts speak to the importance of providing bilingual education in local communities in Germany, easing the naturalization process in Germany, and the diversity and wealth of Germany as a country that is accepting of migrants. Ahmetovic draws on his second-generation identity in each, striking a balance between being Hanover born on one hand, but also his ‘roots in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. This he considers as a major aspect of his political identity and links it to the values of the Social Democrats in Germany in promoting democracy, equality, and freedom.⁶ Political communication scholars have established the power of social media engagement and political engagement, especially among youth (Xenos et al., 2014). In the case of diaspora politicians, this kind of engagement resonates, often because they speak the language, have personal ties, or are generally better versed with the culture and customs and thus able to get their messages across more effectively. The following sections analyze his social media, media coverage, and public statements through this lens.

Ahmetovic’s advocacy: democratic reform and European integration for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ahmetovic uses his platform consistently to lobby for democratic reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for its European integration. He highlights the importance of strengthening democracy in the country and the region, and its place in the European Union, to be pursued through, firstly, candidate status, and then accession, both of which he has advocated for in his posts and his speeches to the Bundestag. Ahmetovic has consistently indicated that he is committed to advancing a German and European foreign policy that promotes the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region.⁷ Promptly upon returning from his first official visit to the region after being elected to the Bundestag, he posted pictures meeting with Bosnian politicians, the OHR representative, and youth activists, commenting,

The aim of Germany and the EU must be to bind this region closer to itself, e.g. through integration into the European Union. We must not allow the Western Balkans to become the plaything for third parties to assert their own interests.⁸

He underlined this sentiment in January 2022 upon becoming Germany’s rapporteur for the Western Balkans, highlighting the interconnection to his own party ideals and how progress for Bosnia and Herzegovina feeds into policy goals for Germany and the EU.

Our goal is to translate the social-democratic principles of peace and understanding into concrete action. In the future, the preservation of peace in Europe will not only be decided at the Ukrainian-Russian border, but also decisively in the Western Balkans, explicitly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I want to play an active role in the stability and preservation of peace in this region. EU enlargement must take place.⁹

This rhetoric leaves little room for autocratic leaning or Eurosceptic politicians in the country and signals the desire for a more proactive approach by Germany and the EU in the country. This is especially important considering Russia's ongoing attempts at gaining influence in the region by supporting nationalist rhetoric (Andjelic, 2022).

This active role translated in large part to pursuing a return of German participation in the EUFOR Althea mission which had waned since 2012 and represented one of Ahmetovic's main agenda items in 2022. He spoke in the Bundestag about the importance of continued military engagement for the region, and Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically, highlighting secessionist threats by Bosnian Serb politicians, and arguing for the ‘historical and European responsibility for peacekeeping, stability and strengthening of the region, especially in BiH’.¹⁰ He repeated this in April 2022, in connection to the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the 1992–1995 war. ‘The majority of people in the Western Balkans think and feel European. Let's take that as a maxim and work and fight together in an alliance of democratic forces on a European future for the people’.¹¹ He connected the importance of military support in Ukraine with democratization efforts in the Western Balkans, drawing on a speech by Olaf Scholz on Germany's foreign policy taking an important turn and being more engaged in the region and beyond.¹² Following the successful vote, he gave an impassioned speech focused on democratic values and processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Invoking Bosnian-born writer and Nobel Laureate Ivo Andrić's words on the need to build bridges, he spoke about the need to build democracy:

As members of the German Bundestag, we all try to be political architects. The foundation on which we work is our liberal-democratic basic order and our deep European conviction. Bosnia and Herzegovina also wishes for such a construct with identical cornerstones: peace and freedom, democracy and prosperity. And that is why, dear colleagues, today's debate and the adoption of the two motions, marks a historic turning point for the future of this young democracy.¹³

Ahmetovic promotes a more democratic path for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region more broadly by connecting this with German foreign policy goals. By combining this political agenda with his own identity, as the next section highlights further, he promotes a European path for the country, while also highlighting the success of his own political party in the German political landscape.

Second generation identity as an advantage in political life

Ahmetovic's understanding of how to take advantage of his second-generation identity, including sharing his struggles to become a German citizen, demonstrate he is an effective and passionate speaker, both in Germany and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several years prior to his election to the Bundestag, he was interviewed by a Bosnian diaspora media outlet for a show featuring successful diaspora members. In it, he spoke about the challenges and his long-term political engagement with the Social Democratic Party in Germany, highlighting the importance of gaining German citizenship, to be able to run for election. Still, he warmly reminisced about spending summer holidays in Bosnia with his family while growing up, being teased for not knowing certain words in Bosnian, and feeling like the small cities his parents grew up in were home.¹⁴ This kind of balancing act is evident in his political engagement and signals the ways in which he leverages his identity effectively. More recently, he has engaged in German political debates about the need for more lenient policies regarding dual citizenship, with a specific focus on individuals in Germany with Western Balkan heritage.¹⁵ While he has not taken up the issue for himself, he clearly advocates for diaspora members in Germany to have dual citizenship options.

Ahmetovic has spoken about what he calls the ‘German Dream’ in relation to his family's struggles to remain in Germany. In a post in December of 2022, he noted that he had the status of ‘Duldung’,¹⁶ in Germany 18 times, that the family was threatened with deportation, and that he had waited for German citizenship for 4 years after initiating the process in 2011.¹⁷ He has used this family experience to advocate for easing German migration and citizenship policy with some success. Namely, individuals who have had the ‘Duldung’ status for over 5 years, starting in 2023, will have the opportunity to apply for permanent residence for a period of 18 months.¹⁸ This policy change is a direct result of the coalition government that Ahmetovic is part of. He noted this change in policy is ‘coming full circle’ for him. ‘Germany needs this new law – and people deserve it: to live in a country of immigration with recognition, respect and appreciation!’

Thus, Ahmetovic places himself at the centre of relevant German political debates about citizenship reform and immigration policy. On one hand, this echoes much of the existing research on how immigrant-origin politicians speak about questions related to immigration (Geese, 2020). However, in Ahmetovic's case, it has become part of his political narrative, with his biography and his close friendship with the German lawyer and fellow SPD politician who helped his family win their case to stay in Germany as another example of the ‘German Dream’. This relationship has widely been reported in German media,¹⁹ Ahmetovic's own social media,²⁰ and it has subsequently also been picked up by Bosnian media outlets.²¹ During his first official trip to the region with Michael Roth, the Minister of State for Europe at the German Federal Foreign Office, he marked it, noting,

Over 28 years ago, millions of people fled war in the Western Balkans, as did my family. I am now returning to the region on my first trip abroad to promote peace and stability as a German politician. It was an honor for me, as a Hanoverian and German parliamentarian, to have been on such a trip.²²

This consciousness and ongoing utilization of his background to engage with his constituents, while simultaneously striving to shape German foreign policy and enhance Germany's standing in the region, represents a delicate juggling act among his constituents’ concerns, Germany's regional foreign policy objectives, and diaspora political interests. The German press dubbed him the ‘Translator’ in summer 2022, balancing between his constituents in Hanover and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The profile highlights his foreign policy trips to the region, but also the way young Bosnian activists respond to him, and his reflections on how his is perceived in the German political space. He notes his family has received death threats by mail and that he regularly receives threats from right extremists and nationalists. Still, he sees his role clearly as translating German foreign policy in the Balkans, advocating for more democratic reforms and social democratic values in the region, and, finally, getting reelected.²³

Ahmetovic also connects his background and foreign policy efforts to strengthen his image as a Social Democrat in Germany. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he drew parallels between Sarajevo during the 1990s and Kiev in 2022, stressing the importance of peace and commemorating civilian lives lost.²⁴ In April 2020, he spoke about his refugee upbringing and lobbied for German support for Ukraine and Ukrainians.

When in 30 years here in the German Bundestag we look back at Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Ukraine, a child of Ukrainian refugees who was born in Germany may be standing at the lectern: I hope that he can look back to a Europe of peace. It is in our hands to ensure a Europe of peace and prosperity.²⁵

By the end of 2022, one of his last posts was congratulatory, noting his own lobbying efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina receiving EU candidate status. He explicitly drew on the importance of this decision for the Bosnian diaspora as well, a nod to his parents’ community, including some of his own constituents.²⁶ In a post 3 days prior, he thanked his team in Hanover and Berlin, and shared a picture from their dinner celebrating 1 year in the Bundestag in a Bosnian restaurant in Berlin.²⁷

Ultimately, Ahmetovic navigates his second-generation identity to his political advantage, demonstrating the strength of being able to connect with his electoral constituency in Hanover, engaging around questions related to German foreign policy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and support for military operations in Ukraine. He demonstrates the potential of second-generation diaspora politicians to push forward democratic reform and European integration in hybrid regimes in their countries of origin through foreign policy, while at the same time showing there is also the potential to advocate and achieve change in countries of destination.

Championing change: how Adis Ahmetovic’s political engagement resonates in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the 2022 Bosnian elections, the Bosniak member of the country's tripartite Presidency, Denis Bećirović, as well as the Croat member, Željko Komšić, both members of social democratic political parties, were elected. Bećirović is a member of the Social Democratic Party, whereas Željko Komšić used to be a member prior to founding his own social democratic leaning party, The Democratic Front. Several other Social Democrats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (including Sarajevo's mayor Benjamina Karić) have featured prominently in Ahmetovic's Instagram posts during his two field trips to the region or have commented on meeting with him, favourably underscoring their own proximity to the German politician. As these two parties are aligned, these Bosnian politicians provide Ahmetovic room to engage in the day-to-day politics of the country by sharing pictures of him in their social media posts, while he demonstrates his engagement in the country and support for them in turn. For example, the Bosnian Social Democrat Saša Magazinović highlighted Ahmetovic's support of fellow Social Democrat candidates on his social media, sharing pictures of Ahmetovic meeting and hugging the Denis Bećirović during the campaign. Ahmetovic also regularly participates in conferences hosted by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, historically linked with the SPD, aimed at politically active individuals or officials in the region, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fostering networking and knowledge exchange.²⁸ This way, he maintains a level of visibility in the country and provides a platform for a more engaged and social democratic political discourse.

In an interview aired on one of Bosnia’s prime evening news shows, Enis Bešlagić, one of the country’s most prominent entertainers noted in an interview,

What's the name of our young guy in the Bundestag again? Adis. I watched him the other night … Now we go back to how important it is that he's there, in Germany. That level of lobbying, how important and how relevant it is to have him there. He can say to German politicians, ‘Hans, now we’re voting on something related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, vote for it.’²⁹

This kind of enthusiasm from within Bosnia and Herzegovina, from one of the country's most visible public personas on, arguably, one of the most popular evening programmes that is watched in the country and in the diaspora, demonstrates the level of political capital Ahmetovic has to not only generate discussion but also to be listened to when he comments on politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His connection to the country combined with his personal narrative resonate. Using his appeal in the Bosnian public discourse, Ahmetovic can navigate the political climate of Bosnia and Herzegovina to encourage more democratic approaches, using German foreign policy and his social democratic political platform to fall back on, drawing on norms in one country to encourage change in the other with local political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina he aligns with.

These actions have not gone unnoticed by those in Bosnia and Herzegovina whose disruptive politics continue to account for concerns in the region and Bosnia's peace and stability overall (Bećirević & Turčalo, 2020). The country's EUFOR Mission, aimed at providing a safe and secure environment and help its Armed Forces progress towards NATO standards, represents a mechanism by the EU that responds to potential security concerns and helps to promote stability. Ahmetovic's support for German participation in the EUFOR Mission and critique of Milorad Dodik, the country's pro-Russian, Bosnian Serb politician, led to personal attacks against Ahmetovic in April 2022. Dodik accused Ahmetovic of pursuing a Bosniak agenda and noted Ahmetovic reminded him of someone in the Hitler Youth, insulting his appearance as well as his political engagement. Ahmetovic promptly shot back by noting Dodik's autocratic leanings and asserting that democratic forces would prevail in the country, doubling down on his political rhetoric and supporting further sanctioning of Dodik and ethnonationalists more generally.³⁰ Ahmetovic's prompt media appearances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, coupled with his fluency in the language and adept handling of personal attacks, bolstered by support from the German Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, showcased rapid involvement and effectively undermined the secessionist leader both domestically and internationally.

Bosnia and Herzegovina faces many democratic and demographic challenges, none of which will be solved by any one politician, domestic or diaspora. But, by virtue of Ahmetovic's steadfast engagement on social media and the public sphere, he has stirred debate about political representation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, incorporating political narratives into the domestic sphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflective of his own political views that have benefited local politicians who are not ethnonationalist. Of course, it's important not to overstate the relevance of one politician in the landscape of Bosnian politics, but it is nonetheless worthwhile to note that Ahmetovic, within 1 year of being elected to the Bundestag, is able to dominate Bosnian news media during his visits, have Bosnian politicians engage with him (both positively and negatively), and highlight his political lobbying efforts vis-à-vis the country prominently. His efforts reflect the political goodwill of the EU integration process, one that has continued in small bursts over the last three decades. Moreover, Ahmetovic's commitment underscores the potential influence of diaspora politicians and other like-minded politicians in the country working together to advocate for new political visions in the country. Only through consistent engagement over time and with the political will of politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina can the country ultimately move forward.

Conclusion

Scholarship on diaspora political engagement and transnationalism has evolved, and empirical work on authoritarian or semi-authoritarian home states and their attempts to reach out to their diaspora populations has increased over the last few decades. While research on younger generations of diaspora is increasingly evident, their political involvement, especially in terms of serving in political office, has been understudied. As diaspora populations, especially from conflict-generated diaspora populations with ties to hybrid or authoritarian countries mature and become part of the political establishment, their political engagement both in terms of homeland and host state politics, has potential to be a fruitful source of policy, activism, and research. With authoritarian states that attempt to steer diaspora engagement more actively, this may be more of a challenge whereas with hybrid regimes like Bosnia and Herzegovina, with limited diaspora engagement from the state, there are opportunities to support those working on democratization and transparency.

This study reveals a compelling aspect of diaspora engagement – the strategic utilization of diasporic identity by politicians to shape the political discourse within the countries where they serve, while simultaneously advocating for substantial reforms in their homelands. Using social media engagement and drawing on media analysis in both countries, this article demonstrated how diaspora politicians can engage in practical ways with multiple populations. This duality of engagement highlights the agility exhibited by diaspora politicians in navigating both foreign and domestic political arenas, ultimately contributing to the changing contours of political activism for their homelands and more acceptance for diverse migrant identities in politics in the countries in which they were elected. This dual-pronged approach not only enhances their potential for re-election and continued political success but also facilitates the amplification of awareness about pushback and erosion of democratic norms that might be prevalent in countries respectively.

This study has brought together scholarship on diaspora studies, migrant political incorporation, and transnational engagement, shedding light on the dynamic roles diaspora politicians can play in advocating for change in both their countries. As scholarship in this domain progresses, this exploratory research not only deepens our understanding of diaspora engagement but also contributes to broader discussions surrounding the potential for democratic transformation within hybrid regimes, and the multi-faceted role diaspora can undertake to shape the sociopolitical trajectories of their homelands.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the anonymous reviewers whose insightful feedback and close reading greatly contributed to the refinement and clarity of this manuscript. My appreciation also goes to the editors of the special issue for their guidance and support throughout the publication process, not to mention choosing the best venue to workshop the papers of this special issue. In this regard, I am thankful to all who were at the ‘Authoritarian Regimes and their Second-Generation Diasporas’ Workshop near Gothenburg, as well as colleagues and students who heard me present a version of this article at the University of Salzburg. Finally, I thank Dino Kadich who read through the manuscript in its final stages.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Dženeta Karabegović

Dženeta Karabegović, PhD, teaches at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography at the University of Salzburg. Her academic interests are in international political sociology with a focus on migration, transnationalism, social movements and civil society, diaspora, education, and transitional justice.

Notes

1 Full report available here: https://freedomhouse.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/nations-transit/2022.

2 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/20/the-croatian-roots-of-chiles-leftist-president-gabriel-boric.

3 By all accounts, Ahmetovic seems to be using his social media accounts himself. Although some posts are surely managed by his staff, the consistency and use of his views vis-à-vis the analysis in this article hold.

4 A keyword search using other prominent non-Bosnian politicians’ names (Biden, Putin, Erdogan, Vučić, van der Leyen, Borell, etc.) to search through Klix's archive revealed Ahmetovic to be mentioned most often.

5 The full profile can be read here: https://taz.de/49-Jusos-im-Bundestag/!5807201/. It was promptly translated by Klix.ba and is available here: https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/ahmetovic-ja-sam-adis-nisam-thomas-uvijek-cu-nositi-dio-bih-u-sebi/210927071.

6 This is for example evident in a speech he gave in December 2022 in the Bundestag and then subsequently posted on Instagram speaking about his Bosnian background and his engagement on securing the potential for dual citizenship in Germany. Available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/Clv0_DDuAFd/.

7 Interview with O. Kanal from August 28, 2021, available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKJewiflVC0.

8 Instagram post from December 3, 2021, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CXAxcaLINU2/.

9 Instagram post from January 13, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CYrauWGtdZG/.

10 Instagram post from June 3 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CeWilp6Lw_2/.

11 Instagram post from April 6, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CcBVZ2jFK7a/.

12 Instagram post from May 10, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CdYwuMRNgI9/.

13 Instagram post from July 8, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CfwfDHil2Y2/.

14 The interview is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rUC4eBkwt8.

15 For example, he spoke at the Munich Balkan Days, an annual event organized by Balkan migrants in Germany, on these issues, stressing that it will be discussed in the Bundestag and new dual citizenship laws will be passed in the near future.

16 This status roughly translates to, ‘Toleration’.

17 See post here: https://www.instagram.com/p/ClqZ-NZgh4V/.

18 More details about this here: https://www.migazin.de/2022/12/04/chance-zu-bleiben-das-aendert-sich-im-bleibe-und-asylrecht/.

19 See for example https://www.stern.de/politik/ahmetovic-und-miersch--diese-geschichte-verbindet-die-spd-abgeordneten-30870082.html.

20 See for example his Instagram posts from August 22, 2022, https://www.instagram.com/p/Chjyd8lrhDd/; October 31, 2021, https://www.instagram.com/p/CVs_fl2ozTZ/; and September 29, 2021 https://www.instagram.com/p/CUZkuPFsIJu/.

21 See for example https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/covjek-koji-je-97-sprijecio-deportaciju-adisa-ahmetovica-danas-mu-je-kolega-u-bundestagu/211029055.

22 Instagram post from January 13, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CYrauWGtdZG/.

23 The interview is available here: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/spd-politiker-adis-ahmetovic-dolmetscher-zwischen-deutschland-und-bosnien-a-c2c6db8f-e58c-491a-a452-8c242adf446f.

24 Instagram post from February 26, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CacSefPN61Z/.

25 Instagram post from April 6, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CcBVZ2jFK7a/.

26 Instagram post from December 16, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CmOOzuPNJOq/.

27 Instagram post from December 13, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CmHqqsRLuGC/.

28 Instagram post from October 22, 2022, available here: https://www.instagram.com/p/CkRCLwHrk4A/?img_index=1.

29 The complete interview can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQeXO85gDwE. Ahmetovic also posted a clip from the interview on his social media January 15, 2022, https://www.instagram.com/p/CYwVYBclnGO/.

30 The exchange was featured in both German and Bosnian media outlets.