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ABSTRACT
In a very short time period, China has become a major economic actor in Central Asia. Such economic gains should, according to both the international political economy literature on trade dependence and security ties, result in security gains for China. From that arises the article’s main research question: To what extent is China’s increased economic engagement in Central Asia resulting in Chinese security gains in the region? While Central Asian states are not bandwagoning with China on security matters, China’s primary security objectives in Central Asia are largely being achieved. I argue that Central Asian states will not bandwagon with China as the sole security guarantor, but Chinese security gains will continue to accrue.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Jeff Primiano for their helpful suggestions, as well as Cali Goulet for her assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Safovudin Jaborov, “Chinese Loans in Central Asia: Development Assistance or ‘Predatory Lending?’” in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: And Its Impact in Central Asia. (ed) Marlene Laruelle. (Washington, DC: The George Washington University Press, 2018) 34–40, 39.
2 For the Chinese government, stability means being very aggressive in targeting Uyghurs, as the detention camps in Xinjiang demonstrate. David O’Brien and Christopher B. Primiano. “Opportunities and Risks along the New Silk Road: Perspectives and Perceptions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” In International Flows in the Belt and Road Initiative Context: Business, People, History and Geography, (ed.) Hing Kai Chan, Faith Ka Shun Chan, and David O’Brien. Palgrave Macmillan: Singapore, 127–145.
3 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43
4 See Robert S. Ross, “On the fungibility of economic power: China’s economic rise and the East Asian security order,” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 1, (2019): 302–327, 303–304
5 Anonymous 8, 9, and 20.
6 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. (Princeton University Press, 2001), 22
7 Robert J. Art, “American foreign policy and the fungibility of force, Security Studies 5, no. 4 (1996): 7–42, 15.
8 Other studies (e.g. Pack and Pack 1990) also use the term fungibility in examining other issues, such as foreign aid. Howard Pack and Janet Rothenberg Pack, “Is Foreign Aid Fungible? The Case of Indonesia,” The Economic Journal 100, no. 399 (1990): 188–194.
9 2019.
10 Anonymous 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 25.
11 Anonymous 9, 11, 15, 20, and 37.
12 Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia.” Security Studies 24, (2015): 696–727, 696
13 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment behavior toward China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 500–514, 504
14 2015: 104.
15 Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005/2006:, 145–167.
16 2011.
17 Evelyn Goh “Great Powers and Hierarchal Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/2008): 113–157.
18 Mohammad Salman and Gustaaf Geeraerts “Strategic Hedging and China’s Economic Policy in the Middle East,” China Report 51, no. 2 (2015): 102–20.
19 2005/2006.
20 Brock Tessman and Wojtek Wolfe. 2011. “Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy.” International Studies Review. 13(2), 214–240.
21 Jeremy Garlick and Radka Havlova, “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Economic Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf: Strategic Hedging amidst Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 49, no. 1 (2020): 82–105,
22 Garlick and Havlova, 2020, 85.
23 Susan A. Thornton, “China in Central Asia: Is China Winning the ‘New Great Game?’” Brookings, (2020). Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. (Oxford University Press, 2012). Annette Bohr “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004): 485–502.
24 Anonymous 17, 18, 37.
25 Anonymous 22.
26 Anonymous 20.
27 Anonymous 38.
28 Cooley, 2012.
29 Anonymous 32, 33, 35, and 38.
30 Anonymous 9.
31 Cooley (2012) provides numerous examples demonstrating this point.
32 Anonymous 26. This is very similar to what a Western Embassy official (anonymous 23) stated.
33 Anonymous 21.
34 1994.
35 Interview with Umida Hashimova, August 2020.
36 Interview with Hashimova, 2020.
37 Robert Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political Science Quarterly. 125, No. 3 (Fall 2010), pp. 359–391. 125, No. 3 (Fall 2010), 359–391, 390
38 2019.
39 Ross, 2019: 318.
40 Ross, 2019: 318.
41 Ross, 2019: 304.
42 Ross, 2019: 304.
43 David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” International Security 42, no. 1 (2018): 85–127.
44 TV Paul, “When balance of power meets globalization: China, India and the small states of South Asia,” Politics 39, no. 1 (2019): 50–63, 51.
45 Paul, 2019: 51.
46 2018.
47 2019.
48 2019.
49 Jardine and Lemon, “In Russia’s Shadow,” (2020).
50 Jaborov, 2018: 38.
51 Jaborov, 2018: 35.
52 Jaborov, 2018: 38.
53 American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker, 2023. https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/
54 Marlene Laruelle, “Introduction: China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Quo Vadis?,” in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: And Its Impact in Central Asia. (ed) Marlene Laruelle. (Washington, DC: The George Washington University Press, 2018), x-xii, x.
55 Anonymous 14 and 22.
56 Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China’s Initiative in Regional Institutional Building.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 4 (2011): 632–656, 634.
57 Bruce Pannier, “Will Central Asia Host U.S. Military Forces Once Again?” Radio Free Europe April 23 2021.
58 Anonymous 25.
59 Anonymous 2, 3, 4, 13, 21.
60 Jardine and Lemon, 2020: “In Russia’s Shadow,” 10.
61 Jardine and Lemon, 2020: “In Russia’s Shadow,” 8.
62 Jardine and Lemon, 2020: “In Russia’s Shadow,” 8.
63 Raffaello Pantucci, “Not-So-Hidden Dragon: China Reveals Its Claws in Central Asian Security.” Carnegie, (2021).
64 Interview with Umida Hashimova August 2020.
65 Jardine and Lemon, 2020: “In Russia’s Shadow,” 2.
66 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon, “In Russia’s Shadow: China’s Rising Security Presence in Central Asia.” Kennan Cable May No. 52. (2020).
67 Interview with US Embassy official, anonymous 24.
68 Anonymous 38.
69 Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China’s Initiative in Regional Institutional Building,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41, no. 4 (2011): 632–656, 652.
70 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon “In Post-American Central Asia, Russia and China are Tightening their grip.” War on the Rocks Nov 7. (2021).
71 Anonymous 14.
72 Jardine and Lemon 2021, 3.
73 Nurly Zhol, which Kazakhstan proclaimed in 2014, is an infrastructure plan that aims to connect the regions of Kazakhstan with Chinese FDI and FDI from elsewhere.
74 Nargis Kassenova, “Kazakhstan’s adaptation to the Belt and Road Initiative: tracing changes in domestic governance.” In M. A. Carrai, J.-C. Defraigne and J. Wouters (eds). The Belt and Road Initiative and Global Governance. (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020). 182–203, p. 190.
75 Anonymous 31, 2022.
76 Natalia Konarzewska, “Kazakhstan’s president visits China amid troubles at home.” The Times of Central Asia Nov. 16. (2019).
77 Western Embassy official, anonymous 23.
78 Interview with Nargis Kassenova, July 3, 2020.
79 Anonymous 9, 18, and 23.
80 Gaziza Shakhanova and Jeremy Garlick, “The Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union: Exploring the ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership.’” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 49, no. 1 (2020): 33–57.
81 interview with Nargis Kassenova, July 3, 2020. In 1994, the leaders of China and Kazakhstan settled a border agreement that went into effect in 1995.
82 see M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes.” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 46–83.
83 Cooley, 2012: 79–80.
84 Reuters, “Kazakhstan summons Chinese ambassador in protest over article.” April 14 (2020).
85 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, The China Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, Social Change and the Chinese Factor. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012) 108.
86 Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2012: 108.
87 See Aziz Burkhanov and Yu-Wen Chen, “Kazakh perspective on China, the Chinese, and the Chinese migration.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no. 12 (2016): 2129–2148, 2131
88 Matthew Sussex “Too little, too late? Washington rediscovers Central Asia.” East Asia Forum March 28 (2020).
89 Sergey Sukhankin, “The Security Component of the BRI in Central Asia, Part Three.” China Brief, (2020).
90 Sukhankin, October 2020.
91 Glenn Diesen, Kazakhstan: Imaging Globalization 2.0.” The Astana Times, (2020) May 8.
92 Jardine and Lemon, 2020, “In Russia’s Shadow,” p. 8.
93 Christopher B. Primiano and Nygmet Ibadildin, “‘Kazakhstan’s Failed Authoritarian Bargain: “Bloody January” and the unstructured political participation of masses in Almaty.” Presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention (2023).
94 Anonymous 24.
95 Anonymous 36.
96 Anonymous 37.
97 Anonymous 9.
98 Nurlan Aliyev, “Protest Against Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan: Sinophobia or Demands for Social Justice?” CACI Analyst April 16 (2019).
99 Reid Standish, “China’s Belt And Road Grapples With Mounting Debt Crisis, Impacting Central Asia, Pakistan, And Beyond.” Radio Free Europe (2022).
100 Nurlan Aliyev, “Protest Against Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan: Sinophobia or Demands for Social Justice?” CACI Analyst April 16 (2019).
101 Elizbieta Pron and Emilie Szwajnoch, “Kazakh Anti-Chinese Protests and the Issue of Xinjiang Detention Camps.” CACI Analyst Oct 31 (2019).
102 Jaborov, 2018: 36–37
103 Stephen Blank “Revising the Border: China’s Inroads in Tajikistan.” China Brief July 29 (2011).
104 Bradley Jardine. 2020. “China Tightens Its Grip on Central Asia.” The National Interest July 11.
105 Jardine and Lemon, 2020, “In Russia’s Shadow,” 8.
106 Aliyev, Oct 22, 2019.
107 Lemon and Jardine, July 24, 2020.
108 Bradley Jardine and Edward Lemon “Tajikistan’s security ties with China a Faustian bargain.” Eurasianet March 2 (2020a).
109 Suzanne Levi-Sanchez, “China’s gambit in Tajikistan: partner or overlord?” Lowy Institute September 21 (2020).
110 Eurasianet, “Was Tajik leader’s rant at Putin defiance or a plea for greater dependence?” October 17 (2022).
111 Edward Wong, “U.S. Faces Tough ‘Great Game’ Against China in Central Asia and Beyond.” New York Times February 13 (2020).
112 Nurlan Aliyev, “China-Russia Security Cooperation in Central Asia.” CACI Analyst Oct 22 (2019).
113 Niva Yau Tsz Yan, “Operation Reality of the Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia” in China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia, pp. 36–67. (OSCE Academy, 2020), 54
114 interview with Turkmen military official, anonymous 14 summer 2020.
115 Kassenova, 2020; Marlene Laruelle, “Why No Kazakh Novorossiya? Kazakhstan’s Russian Minority in a Post-Crimea World,” Problems of Post-Communism, (2018b): 65–78.
116 see Ross 2019.
117 2019.
118 2018.
119 2019.
120 see Cooley 2012.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Christopher B. Primiano
Christopher B. Primiano is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Huntingdon College. Chris’ research focuses on Chinese and Central Asian international politics.