Redefining NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships: cooperative security meets collective defence and deterrence

ABSTRACT

When the 2010 Strategic Concept first established NATO’s partnerships as essential in the core task of cooperative security, global partnerships were primarily intended to support non-Article 5 contingencies. However, given the structural changes in the international system, NATO’s partnerships outside the Euro-Atlantic area are adapting to respond to the new security challenges. This article examines the evolution of NATO’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and offers insights into future developments. There is a clear alignment between the Alliance and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) in the way they diagnose the interconnectedness of security developments of their respective regions. Both sides increasingly see these partnerships as significant for their own defence and deterrence, rather than as instruments in pooling resources in the provision of security for third parties.

Introduction

When cooperative security was first introduced in the 2010 Strategic Concept, managing partnerships with states in the Indo-Pacific – or what was then still more commonly referred to as the Asia-Pacific – was seen as central in supporting the non-Article 5 crisis management operations. However, given the shift in the international security paradigm away from prioritizing threats such as transnational terrorism and state failures to the great power competition, NATO’s global partnerships are being adapted to respond to the changed structural realities. In the context of NATO’s global partnerships, the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) have come to occupy the pivotal position in the ecosystem of NATO’s partner states even if the grouping does not constitute a formal partnership framework. This was most evident at the 2022 and 2023 NATO Summits in Madrid and Vilnius where the leaders of government of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand were all present, as well as in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept which for the first time referred to the Indo-Pacific as a region of consequence for the Euro-Atlantic security.¹

NATO and the individual IP4 states are aligned in their assessments that structural changes in the international system – from the rise of China and the return of great power competition to the weaponization of economic interdependence and the advent of emerging and disruptive technologies – have created conditions under which security changes in the Euro-Atlantic space affect the security of the Indo-Pacific and vice versa in a more consequential and perilous fashion than at any point in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, the move away from the apex of unipolar era along with the backlash against US foreign policy unilateralism, have prompted both the United States and its allies to tackle security challenges in an increasingly interconnected world through novel means. As a result, NATO and IP4 partner coordination and engagement channels have become even more relevant to the security in both regions, creating a strong common basis for cooperation. If managed well, NATO’s IP4 partnerships remain a vital tool to enhance its core tasks of cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, they have the potential to contribute to both NATO’s and partners’ defense and deterrence, strengthen their competitive advantages, and shape the environment in ways that serve their interests and values.

This article traces the key junctures in the partnership development between NATO and the IP4 and argues we are seeing a major redefinition of NATO’s partnerships with these four countries. This is mainly due to NATO’s formulation of stance on China as a security challenge, and the consequent recognition of the Indo-Pacific as a theater of security interest and the interdependence between security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific given the global implications of the Russia’s war against Ukraine and the growing Sino-Russian alignment. The article utilizes strategic partnerships literature to situate the evolution of the partnerships and assess the extent of the current alignment. It seeks to make several theoretical and empirical contributions. Firstly, it revisits the strategic partnerships lifecycle framework and adds a distinct phase which could be best described as “partnership redefinition.” Secondly, it critically interrogates the theoretical assumptions which treat strategic partnerships as solely goal-based and functional in nature and situating them in the present era of competitive multipolarity.² Lastly, it emphasizes the qualitative differences between the contextual and institutional factors that informed the formation and implementation phases of NATO’s partnerships with the IP4 compared to the evaluation and redefinition phases. While the creation and evolution of these partnerships has been a two-way process between NATO and each of the four Indo-Pacific states, this article approaches them from the perspective of the IP4 informal grouping. Yet, it will inevitably tease out the most important points of similarity and difference among the four states in their individual relations with the Alliance. The scope of a single article is insufficient to address the intricacies of each of these countries’ individual partnerships with NATO. However, on the whole, we have seen a movement in the similar direction as NATO and its respective IP4 partner states have deepened and broadened the scope of their relations, even if with different levels of ambition.

Strategic Partnerships in the Multipolar System

The strategic partnership literature in the disciplinary confines of international relations is a growing intellectual enterprise. There is a scholarly consensus that the post-Cold War era made relations in the international system more open to less rigid relations between states, where alignments took precedence over alliances, thus opening the way to this particular form of security cooperation.³ Some experts went as far as to claim we would be seeing the end of alliances altogether.⁴ These days, it is clear the announcement of the death of WWII-era alliances was premature, as they appear to be stronger than ever. Though equally, strategic partnerships only seem to be growing in number, and many of those that have been around for some time seem to be broadening and deepening in their scope.

A lot of scholarly effort has been dedicated to analyzing and explaining strategic partnerships from both the international relations mainstream and critical approaches. There are already at least three identifiable waves of study of the phenomenon; 1) the early efforts with rich empirics, 2) a single actor driven frameworks, and 3) attempts to integrate different IR approaches to arrive at a more holistic explanation.⁵ Clearly, it has been useful to build beyond the simplistic definitions that borrowed heavily from the business and organizational studies literature, and to better adapt to the IR’s disciplinary jargon. At the same time, these days it appears more parsimony is needed to avoid the mystification of this form of cooperation at the expense of conceptual clarity.

Strategic partnerships occupy a space between alliances and coalitions as they are not as rigid as the former, and yet, they are more permanent and durable than the latter.⁶ They make for security alignments in the broad sense. In other words, they mirror the shift from “narrow” definitions of the concept of security to “broad” (or “extended”) versions that include economic, political, environmental, societal aspects, as per the theorizing of the Copenhagen School.⁷ At minimum, a “partnership” between two states or entities implies a security commitment from each partner not to threaten the other. Beyond this, the scope and depth of cooperation is entirely case-specific and subject to change over the course of partnership.

There is an overall agreement in the literature that strategic partnerships differ from alliances and coalitions in another important way – they tend to be goal-based rather than threat-based.⁸ Empirical research shows that the language surrounding strategic partnerships is regularly dominated by expressing aspirations to “address common challenges and seize joint opportunities, rather than countering a particular country or group.”⁹ Moreover, they are said to “allow states to pursue multidimensional bilateral, regional, and global issue agendas and diverse domestic goals without compromising freedom of action.”¹⁰ In this manner, the security cooperation is said to be more about inward capacity-building and exchange of resources as a way to address both chronic and acute security issues. At the same time, the partners retain sufficient autonomy and flexibility, and reduce the risks traditionally related to alliance management such as entrapment or free riding.¹¹

Much has been written about the “strategic” aspect of partnerships. In plain terms, a strategic partnership can be separated from a “regular” partnership if the security cooperation is the superstructure underpinned by a substructure of economic and political cooperation.¹² Beyond the alignment of these three planes, there needs to be sufficient political investment and institutional infrastructure to implement the stated cooperation plans. Again, what this looks like in practice can differ widely between cases and is a function of different historical and contemporary variables. The review of relevant literature refers to the most common determinants of strategic partnership, which include formal institutional links at multiple levels, regular and multi-leveled contacts, shared interests and converging strategic goals, mutual loyalty and commitment, as well as the long-term design and functioning of the relationship in question.¹³ Meanwhile, the “second-order” variables include the formal design of the partnership, a greater mutual understanding, respect and trust, actors’ converging views on international and regional issues and the system as such, their closer interaction in security affairs and the economic area, including possibly broad coverage of other areas of cooperation, and shared values and norms.¹⁴

As more of these determinants come into play, the strength of a strategic partnership tends to increase. Nevertheless, gauging a partnership’s strength solely by ticking off these variables from a list would be challenging in practice. It is thus crucial to consider dynamic measures that offer insight into the lifecycle of the partnership. For instance, an uptick in coordinated government-to-government interactions during a partnership’s initial stages might signify a strong commitment from both parties. Similarly, the creation of distinct bureaucratic bodies to oversee the partnership could indicate its maturation. Hence, it is critical to contemplate the evolution of strategic partnerships – from the factors that precipitate their formation, through to their implementation and evaluation, and potentially the redefinition that might follow as a result. Thus far, the literature has focused more on the formation and implementation phases, while comparatively little attention has been dedicated to the evaluation and even less so to what this article refers to as partnership redefinition.¹⁵ In addressing the latter, this article seeks to contribute to the literature of collaboration lifecycle.

There is another important intervention in the academic oeuvre that is needed. Given the changing nature of the international system, the longstanding assumption that strategic partnerships make for less provocative forms of cooperation than the traditional alliances or coalitions due to their less rigid nature and a broad slate of activities needs to be revisited.¹⁶ While there is no doubt leaders in democracies will have an easier time “selling” such form of cooperation to the public, these days alignment in form of strategic partnership has all the potential of being interpreted as threatening to competitor and rival states for at least two reasons. As the fault lines between status quo and revisionist powers in the international system grow more apparent and solidify, partnerships within these broad groups could more than likely be interpreted as provocative for those who are on the opposite side.¹⁷ Secondly, the idea that functional cooperation is shielded from provoking great power rivalry is not corroborated by recent evidence. For instance, given the weaponization of supply chains we have witnessed over the past couple of years the idea that trade relations could somehow be shielded from the realpolitik calculations is no longer convincing. Similarly, cooperation on functional fronts as wide and varied as infrastructure development, connectivity, or scientific exchange can these days be interpreted as war-minded as traditionally only military and defense cooperation would have been seen.¹⁸ Therefore, Nadkarni’s idea that strategic partnerships are as “a safe policy option for secondary powers” calls for a careful review.¹⁹

Finally, this article posits that analyzing NATO’s relations with the IP4 group of states benefits from the perspective of evolving strategic partnerships rather than competing theoretical approaches.²⁰ The literature review in this section demonstrates there is a solid body of literature that examines strategic partnerships in the context of security cooperation that falls short of formal alliances, but that has more structure and durability than coalitions. More importantly, strategic partnerships adopt a broad concept of security and thus include economic, political, environmental, and societal aspects, rather than solely a defense-based cooperation.

NATO’s Partnerships in Context

NATO was among the first intergovernmental organizations to launch partnerships with nonmember states. While these partnerships were not labeled as explicitly “strategic” the original Partnership for Peace (PfP) policy framework from the early 1990s had all the previously described hallmarks of strategic partnership as it was primarily meant to integrate the former communist states into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture by fostering democratic transition and transforming their defense capacities.²¹ In the 2000s the focus turned to efforts in “projecting stability” in NATO’s southern neighborhood through capacity-building, counterterrorism cooperation, and by developing interoperability.²² Since then, NATO’s portfolio of partner countries has vastly grown and now outnumbers the total number of members of the Alliance. The network of partners covers over forty states in Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Indo-Pacific.²³ NATO officials maintain there is no hierarchy among partners and each of the partners is equally valuable to the Alliance.²⁴

At minimum, NATO’s partnerships involve political dialogue and some form of practical security and defense cooperation. There is no one-size-fits-all partnership model as partners vary from aspirant countries and countries where NATO carried out or continues to carry missions, to regional powers that decided to pool resources with NATO in addressing common challenges. Consequently, some partnerships prioritize capacity building and promoting defense and security sector reform, while others tend to focus on building and improving interoperability, mutual understanding and awareness. Over nearly three decades of partnering with nonmembers, NATO has implemented a number of different mechanisms to support practical cooperation. These include a Partnership Cooperation Menu featuring over a thousand activities covering education, training, and consultations.²⁵ The Alliance also offers advice and support for reforms, participation in exercises, cooperation in science and technology, and lessons-learned for future policy.

NATO’s partnerships are primarily bilateral, but from a public-facing standpoint, NATO still thinks of them from a roughly geographical and regional standpoint. The groupings include Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) – as a forum for Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the Partners Across the Globe (PAG). However, these arrangements are a relic of the 1990s enlargement and 2000s operational imperatives, with some being largely defunct and sometimes referred to as “zombie” groupings (such as the EAPC).²⁶ Adding an additional layer of complexity, in 2014, NATO launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) to improve the quality of partners’ contributions to NATO-led operations, missions, and exercises. Within this framework, the Enhanced Opportunities Partnerships (EOP) program has offered additional pathways for cooperation to partner countries that include Australia, Georgia, Jordan, and Ukraine, as well as Finland and Sweden prior to them becoming members in 2023 and 2024.²⁷

Arguably, NATO’s partnerships were at their peak between mid-2000s and mid-2010s. Given the experience of cooperating with partners in missions that ranged from the Western Balkans to Afghanistan, NATO elevated cooperative security to a core task in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Following this announcement, the Alliance implemented a major set of reforms to partnership policies. In 2011, the foreign ministers meeting resulted in what came to be known as the Berlin partnership reforms.²⁸ The menu of reforms had a central aim of sharpening the bilateral focus of NATO’s cooperation with partners and demoting the regional groupings for political consultations. The Berlin reforms broadened cooperation beyond the PfP group, allowing all partners to access previously restricted activities. Additionally, new mechanisms were introduced, involving partners more deeply in NATO’s operational planning. NATO also enhanced cooperation by defining strategic objectives and establishing a political framework in memorandums of understanding for the first time.²⁹

Following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its active support for the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region between 2014–2021, as well as its assertiveness along the eastern border of the Alliance, the urgency of responding to security threats in the Euro-Atlantic area replaced the post-9/11 focus on out-of-area operations. All the while, the deteriorating security environment in the Middle East and North Africa made it imperative not to lose focus of NATO’s southern flank. Given the shifting strategic priorities, many believed that the broader cooperative security momentum lost its steam as NATO returned to focus primarily on collective defense and deterrence.

Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the NATO2030 campaign and the groundwork for the new Strategic Concept signaled a vision of a more active global partnerships agenda. A lot of emphasis was placed on the political dimension of the Alliance as it has called for an increased cooperation with like-minded countries, signaling both the potential of deepening the existing partnerships and widening the scope of PAG. Yet, the events of February 24, 2022, and everything that ensued since, cemented the view that defense and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia would be the paramount priority for the Alliance. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept was unequivocal about this.³⁰ Yet, given the diagnosis that the strategic environment contains other pressing challenges beyond Russia’s revanchism, primarily in form of China’s growing assertiveness and the myriad of transnational challenges, cooperation with partners was singled out as one of the chief avenues of addressing these issues. The understanding of these critical junctures provides crucial context to explain the evolution of NATO’s partnership with the IP4 countries.

The Evolution of NATO’s Partnerships with the IP4

The following section traces the development of NATO’s partnerships with the IP4 countries. It follows the strategic partnerships literature in explaining the formation, implementation, and evaluation stages, and adds to it by suggesting we are seeing a redefinition of partnerships that is in the early stages of implementation. It argues that NATO’s strategic partnerships with the IP4 countries continue to undergo a major transformation because of the changing order of priorities with respect to NATO’s core tasks. The lifecycle of IP4 partnerships is depicted in Figure 1, while the following subsections focus on each of the phases.

Figure 1. NATO-IP4 strategic partnership in phases (1990s-2020s).

NATO’s partnerships with Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand were created during the height of crisis management paradigm in the context of non-Article 5 missions and thus helped pave the way for cooperative security as NATO’s third core task. The implementation phase saw greater ambition for the partnerships at the height of cooperative security paradigm in the early 2010s. Given Russia’s growing assertiveness and aggression during this period, some of the partnerships slowly became transformed to fit in with the renewed focus on collective defense and deterrence. However, the evaluation phase began in earnest when NATO began signaling growing interest in China’s foreign and security policy since it was visible it was beginning to have an explicit impact on the Euro-Atlantic space. The final catalyst of transformation of partnerships with the IP4 came as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. NATO’s Madrid Summit was the first public demonstration of the transformed partnerships, which has been accompanied with a new type of partnership agreements. Moreover, while the basis of cooperation is primarily bilateral, the redefinition of partnerships has also seen the Alliance’s push for greater minilateral coordination and cooperation among the IP4 countries.

The Formation Phase

There was already some contact between NATO and different IP4 countries during the Cold War, mainly through bilateral contact with Anglo-Saxon NATO allies and familiarization with NATO doctrine and operational procedures. However, that level of cooperation was never formalized to pass the threshold of being considered a partnership. During the 1990s most of these countries participated in a range of UN operations alongside NATO members and became part of broader discussions on interoperability. Yet, it was the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan that served as the focal point of formalizing partnerships with countries from the Indo-Pacific and led to the creation of broader partnership structure in form of the “Partners Across the Globe” grouping. NATO’s assumption was that the primary threats to Alliance security stemmed from beyond NATO’s territory and thus a global network of partners was seen as one of the instruments in combatting threats that stemmed primarily from transnational terrorism.³¹

Yet, it would be ahistorical to assert that the formalization of partnerships with the IP4 came about smoothly. This period coincided with the debate about the future of the alliance which was broadly cast in terms of the “out-of-area, out of business” versus the “global NATO.” On the one hand, allies such as France and Germany expressed concerns about exceeding boundaries and having imprudent ambition in expanding partnerships beyond NATO’s immediate neighborhood. They strongly advocated for setting limits on partnerships, particularly in terms of practical cooperation, such as that within ISAF. On the other hand, some allies and analysts called for a more institutionalized “global partnership forum” with other US allies, and some even advocated a transformation of the Alliance into a “global Alliance of democracies.”³² While the NATO summits from 2002 began referring to the need to forge partnerships beyond the existing ones, the progress on formalization was slow. For instance, while by 2005 all four of the IP4 had established some form of dialogue with NATO, the Alliance kept on referring to them as “contact countries” rather than partners such as those within the EAPC, MD, and ICI groupings.

However, once the partnerships agenda was set and the cooperation between NATO and IP4 in Afghanistan intensified, particularly considering some of the individual contributions such as those made by Australia, it became clear that the contact status would need to be revised and formalized.

The Implementation Phase

In the second half of 2000s institutionalized “global partnership forum” was no longer being mentioned as there was neither intra-NATO consensus, nor was it demanded by the partners. NATO adopted a “customer approach” which left it to the IP4 countries to define their individual level of ambition in cooperating with the Alliance.³³ As a result, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit the Alliance developed Tailored Cooperation Programmes (TCPs) which focused on a range of activities, including exchange of information, participation in training activities, joint exercises, intelligence, and technology exchange. Politically, leaders met in the framework of the then “28 + 1” format, addressing the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on issues of common political interest.³⁴

Moreover, the individual IP4 contacts with NATO began building up at all levels and functional areas. Foreign and defense ministries representatives engaged in regular talks with the NATO International Staff (IS), International Military Staff (IMS) and the strategic commands (Allied Command Operations, ACO, and Allied Command Transformation, ACT) as appropriate. On NATO’s side, there was a push for better coordination of various partnership outreach programs, which resulted in bringing them all under the purview of a single politico-military committee, i.e., the Political and Partnerships Committee (PPC).

In 2010, NATO launched its new Strategic Concept during the Lisbon summit. It was the first such strategic pronouncement in the post-9/11 era and it stood out as a milestone document by formally enshrining cooperative security as one of NATO’s three core tasks. The Concept vowed to strengthen existing partnerships and to give operational partners a “structural role in shaping strategy and decisions in NATO-led missions to which they contribute”.³⁵ Moreover, it highlighted the Alliance’s ambition to retain a global outlook and to work with global partners beyond Afghanistan. While it did not refer to the Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific as a region of interest for NATO, it explicitly stated the intention to “develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organizations across the globe”. For many, this signaled the potential of future cooperation with a number of Asian counterparts – from China and India to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The period following the Lisbon Summit saw a flurry of activities that made good on the promise of operationalizing cooperative security. For instance, soon after the summit the framework for cooperation in military missions was negotiated in a way that allowed partners agency in shaping decisions in such missions, formally known as the “Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations.”³⁶ The NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Berlin during early 2011 introduced a fresh partnership package aligned with the Active Engagement in Cooperative Security document. It outlined broad and ambitious strategic objectives, including the boosting of regional security and cooperation, fostering collaborative efforts on shared concerns, supporting NATO-led operations, increasing security awareness via early warning, and promoting confidence-building.

At the same time, the Alliance began doing away with the specific partnership framework and revising the format of the “28+n” formula. Namely, political consultations with partners were now focused on thematic issues and no longer tied to a specific partnership framework. NATO also moved toward replacing the TCPs with the tailored Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes (IPCPs).³⁷ The IPCPs signaled an ambition to deepen and broaden partnerships by defining the strategic objectives. This also meant revising the broader political framework within which the practical cooperation with partners would take place. Between 2012–2014 all four Asia-Pacific partners signed their respective IPCPs and there was a visible momentum behind various initiatives related to cooperative security.³⁸ At the same time, there was also a sense that as the ISAF mission was coming to a close it would be harder to sustain the energy that propelled the formation and formalization of these partnerships.

The Evaluation Phase

The idea of cooperative security in the broadest sense as it was articulated in the 2010 Strategic Concept fell by the wayside after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Wales Summit was notable as it was referred to as a wakeup call about NATO’s unpreparedness in face of the Russian threat since the Strategic Concept referred to Russia as a partner.³⁹ Collective defense and deterrence were prioritized as was evident from the adoption of the so-called NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the transformation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) into a new, revitalized mode as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) capable of deploying within a matter of days. The summit also brought about the launch of a comprehensive PII recognizing the need to maintaining and enhance interoperability built up with partners during years of operations in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, and in preparation for future crisis management. Shortly after the Wales Summit, five NATO partners at the time (Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden) were granted the EOP status which created provisions for a more tailor-made relationship to help sustain such contributions.⁴⁰

Yet, apart from Australia’s intensified cooperation with NATO during 2014 due to the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight in Ukraine and on board of which there were several dozen Australian citizens who died along with the rest of the passengers and crew, it appeared the partnerships with the IP4 countries began to languish. The prevailing assessment at the time was that the Alliance would remain preoccupied with the Russian threat for years to come, while the IP4 would have to focus on the big strategic trends in their own region. Emblematic of such views was the Australian Office of National Assessments statement that Russia had an excessive ability to be a “geostrategic wrecking ball” given its role in the Ukraine conflict, but it cannot realistically match Western capabilities and global influence.⁴¹ Thus, Russian aggression in Ukraine was a strategic development worth noting, but ultimately peripheral to the core interests of those in the Asia-Pacific. For some, like Japan, it was also an obstacle to previously announced ambitious agenda of engaging Russia.⁴²

As the 2010s progressed it was clear that beyond sporadic bursts of energy driven by individual partners, NATO’s relationship with IP4 countries suffered in the post-Afghanistan era given the absence of a joint large-scale operation that would demand greater cooperation and being that both sides now focused their strategic attention to their own region. The latter began to change around 2018–2019. China’s growing assertiveness was slowly becoming the norm prompting the formulation of strategic responses from individual NATO allies. By this point, the United States already recalibrated its national and defense strategies to usher in the language of the return of great power competition.⁴³ European NATO allies followed in response as it became clear that there very increasingly adverse aspects to China’s influence on the European continent.⁴⁴ Moreover, the geostrategic jargon converged on the Indo-Pacific as a region of utmost significance for the future of 21^st century given the strategic competition between the United States and China. As a result, a number of NATO allies and partners began publishing their own Indo-Pacific strategies.⁴⁵ Most of those strategies pointed to the value and urgency of cross-regional cooperation and partnerships among like-minded countries.

Thus, at the prompt of individual allies, NATO’s institutional stance on China began to shift and led to the first public pronouncement at the London meeting in late 2019. The London Declaration identified China’s growing international influence and military might as a challenge that needs to be addressed (NATO 2019).⁴⁶ This was complemented by the NATO2030 institutional campaign report in 2020 and June 2021 Brussels Communiqué that detailed these challenges, along with opportunities for dialogue.⁴⁷ For some academics and commentators this was far too little and too late as they asserted “NATO has been conspicuously absent” in the transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security.⁴⁸ At the same time, it reflected the reality of robust internal debates and consensus-seeking process that by this point required the agreement of thirty allies.

Around this time and as the efforts to formulate NATO’s new Strategic Concept accelerated, the institutional leadership began an outreach campaign and intensified contacts with the counterparts in the IP4 countries. This was visible in a series of high-level visits and targeted public diplomacy efforts to raise and improve NATO’s profile in the region.⁴⁹ These opportunities were used to renew the IPCPs with all four IP4 countries. In December 2020 NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held with the presence of the IP4 minsters, paving the way for an increased presence of IP4 representatives at NATO’s top-level meetings.

The Redefinition Phase

There is no way of overstating the extent to which the escalation of Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 2022 impacted foreign and security policy changes among the IP4. Moreover, it galvanized cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific partner states in a way that has been unprecedented and perhaps unimaginable just a decade ago. This is a context one should bear in mind when approaching the new phase in the lifecycle of NATO’s IP4 partnerships.

Firstly, all these countries have explicitly cited Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a critical juncture prompting major reviews of their own capabilities and committed to supporting Ukraine as they deem there are plenty of parallels between Russia’s present aggression and the potential for China’s military escalation against Taiwan. For instance, under the new security strategy, Japan has committed to nearly doubling its defense spending to 2% over five years and upgrading its defense forces. If fully implemented, the expenditure plans will make Japan the third largest military spender in the world, eclipsed only by the United States and China.⁵⁰ While ROK has not directly provided military aid to Ukraine due to its arms exports policy that precludes supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict, it has still doubled its defense exports in 2022 by striking deals with NATO’s key frontline states. In fact, ROK has found itself uniquely positioned in the global arms market with weapons that are relatively affordable and meant to defeat Soviet-based conventional systems. This has in turn boosted ambitions of the incumbent ROK government to rely on the defense industry as a growth engine and place the country among the top five weapons exporters by 2027.⁵¹ Meanwhile, Australian governments from the opposite sides of the political spectrum have offered unequivocal support and approved record-setting aid packages for Ukraine, cited by some as the top non-NATO contributions in aid.⁵² Both the previous and the incumbent Commonwealth governments stated that helping Ukraine’s fight against Russia was important for broader preservation of international stability, alluding to the deteriorating security in the Indo-Pacific.

All heads of government of the IP4 were present at the 2022 Madrid Summit which was significant for several reasons. Firstly, the new Strategic Concept for the first time referred to China’s ambitions and policies as a major challenge to the Alliance’s security, interests, and values. Secondly, it pointed to the increased Sino-Russo cooperation which seeks to undermine the rules-based international order. Thirdly, it explicitly referred to the Indo-Pacific region as the region “important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security,” thus making a case for strengthening existing partnerships in the region and developing new ones.⁵³ Such a diagnosis of the international security environment converged with the general assessment of the trends as seen from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, and Wellington. China’s growing assertiveness combined with the alignment of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping has been described as perilous for democracies in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific alike. Thus, the push toward building up military capabilities and societal resilience in both theaters can only be beneficial in building coalitions to counter threats emanating from expansionism on part of the revisionist and revanchist authoritarian states. The IP4 heads of government attended the NATO summit for the second consecutive time in Vilnius in 2023. The Vilnius Summit Communiqué included over a dozen mentions of China, continuing the trend from the 2022 Strategic Concept and pointing to the need to “address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security” and to protect “against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance.”⁵⁴

The Madrid and Vilnius Summits were a chance for the IP4 countries to demonstrate their support for Ukraine – whether in direct military and economic aid, via sanctions against the Russian Federation, or through a whole slate of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. The concrete examples of support were accompanied with unison language on the need to preserve the rules-based order and coordinate actions regarding both Russia and China.⁵⁵ On the Alliance’s side, the investment in innovation to strengthen all member states across the technology domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber, space and hypersonic missiles was touted as precisely what was needed in countering China, thus offering potential for cooperation.⁵⁶ Along with this, individual and multilateral efforts by NATO allies in stepping up of their assistance for capacity-building in the Indo-Pacific was likewise a welcomed example of cross-theater cooperation.

Emblematic of the greater ambition for cooperation was NATO’s initiative to move to a new type of partnership document that would replace the existing IPCP framework. Throughout 2022 new Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) documents were being negotiated with all IP4 countries. By late 2023, all of them have either already upgraded to this framework of cooperation or were close to signing it. The ITPPs have been described as more comprehensive and detailed than the IPCPs, specifying the concrete areas and activities a given country will work on with NATO. They include strategic objectives, as well as concrete partnership goals and associated milestones and dates, with progress evaluation scheduled every few years. Given the more general nature of the IPCPs, this was a clear signal of partnership strengthening, although it is too early to assess given much will depend on inputs and priority from capitals.

Furthermore, in redefining bilateral relations, NATO has signaled ongoing efforts aimed at these partners as a group, in a true NATO-IP4 fashion, rather than a collection of four individual partnerships, and has deemed them a special collective.⁵⁷ This was affirmed both by NATO personnel and partner embassies, and is also the way in which NATO itself publicly promotes its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. To this end NATO and the IP4 agreed to a number of priority areas that could be pursed with the four partners together, taking advantage of the added value of all four. This includes cooperation on emerging and disruptive technologies; countering disinformation; maritime security; climate change; resilience; supporting the rules based international order; space; cyber; and understanding/sharing insights on the global security situation.⁵⁸

Lastly, in Vilnius, the IP4 leaders spearheaded the initiative to release a joint statement to denounce a North Korean long-range ballistic missile launch. This demonstrates that the informal grouping is not just a product of NATO’s approach to these partner states in a way they could be useful to the Alliance, but also that the four states are beginning to use their collective voice to rally support on issues that are top of the agenda in their region. Therefore, despite its informal nature, the IP4 has adopted some characteristics and shown potential to remain a more durable partner grouping. From NATO’s perspective at least, there is no doubt that this is a preferred path forward.

NATO-IP4 Strategic Partnership Beyond Crisis Management and Cooperative Security

The analysis of the evolution of NATO’s relations with the IP4 countries shows that there have been significant qualitative changes in the way these partnerships operate today compared to how they functioned when they were first created. These changes have been the result of an interplay of several factors: 1) the formulation of NATO’s stance on China; 2) NATO’s recognition of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region as a theater of security interest; and 3) the joint recognition of the interdependence between security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific given the global implications of the war in Ukraine and growing Sino-Russian alignment.

In brief, the formation of partnerships did not signal much ambition beyond coordination on matters related to crisis management in non-Article 5 missions which included matters of interoperability in combat operations and cooperation in capacity-building in states where these operations took place. At this stage the partnerships with the IP4 countries were hindered by the reluctance from some of the NATO allies to engage more substantively with partners outside of NATO’s immediate neighborhood. Likewise, the general institutional approach left the partners to dictate the terms of engagement in a “customer-driven” template.

The implementation period resolved some of these issues by elevating cooperative security to the level of a core task, producing more concrete frameworks for cooperating with partners in form of ICPCs, and demoting the importance of regional groupings while highlighting the worth of individual partner contributions around specific themes and issues. However, this period also coincided with the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan which initially galvanized the cooperation with PAG countries and strategic reorientation of the IP4 countries closer to their own neighborhood.

The evaluation of partnerships began as a result of NATO’s growing interest in responding to China’s rapid military modernization and assertiveness, which was first cast in terms of cooperative security. Namely, how the working and learning from the IP4 countries could help NATO develop capabilities and calibrate its response. The redefinition occurred around and following Russia’s escalation of war in Ukraine in 2022, when it became clear that NATO’s collective defense and deterrence was being brought into question. Thus, presently, the case for cooperation with the IP4 has been made by both individual allies who have in their Indo-Pacific strategies identified most or all these countries as partners, as well as by the institutional leaders. This can be seen in the proposed changes to the partnership frameworks in form of ITPPs, intensified and more visible contacts between the two sides, and lines of effort to reach out to the IP4 as a group on top of the bilateral efforts.

Yet, even though there is a broad consensus on the challenges that China poses for the alliance, the details of how to address these challenges and NATO’s specific role in doing so are not elucidated in the most recent Strategic Concept. This reflects a diversity of views of views within NATO which are driven mainly by the following factors: the importance of China for national economies, desires for European autonomy from the United States on security and defense decision-making, concerns about and prioritization of Russian security threats, and bilateral policies and prerogatives regarding the Indo-Pacific and China.⁵⁹ The most vocal and controversial recent example of dissent among the allies was in French government’s opposition to opening a NATO liaison office in Japan. Following the Vilnius Summit, French President Emmanuel Macron at a press conference defined the coordinates of IP4 partnership development by stating “I think we made the right decision to stick to a close partnership, coordination and strategic intimacy but not wanting to expand the areas of conflict because it’s not the right time and it’s not why we’re here.”⁶⁰

Furthermore, judging by their appearances at the past two summits, the IP4 present a relatively united front as a group in the context of cooperation with NATO. However, their perspectives and interests still diverge on a number of important points. Firstly, there are both commonalities and disparities across the four nations concerning their views on China. Secondly, while there are shared foundational expectations regarding NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, variations still exist among them. None of them anticipate NATO taking a substantial and direct role in the Indo-Pacific security. Instead, their expectation is for NATO to engage in coordination with them on shared concerns originating from or affecting the Indo-Pacific. All four partner countries have expressed an interest in collaborating with NATO on identified mutual concerns, such as cybersecurity, emerging technologies, and resilience. Furthermore, they exhibit a collective interest in NATO amplifying its public diplomacy efforts toward both them and the Indo-Pacific region. So far, the greatest alignment among them has been observed in their collective stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Australia boasts the deepest integration into NATO’s military operational structure among the Indo-Pacific partners and holds the esteemed status of an EOP. The country perceives NATO as a crucial ally for crisis management and safeguarding the rules-based global order.⁶¹ For Australia, engaging with the European security community through NATO offers a more efficient approach compared to bilateral endeavors with individual nations. Additionally, it serves as a platform for accessing specialized technical and professional resources for its own defense capabilities.⁶²

Japan maintains the lengthiest association with NATO among the Indo-Pacific partners and expresses the highest level of enthusiasm regarding its affiliation.⁶³ The nation prioritizes informing Europe about China and highlighting the significance of Indo-Pacific security within NATO’s purview.⁶⁴ Tokyo seeks to bolster ties among US alliances in response to China’s increasing strength relative to the United States.⁶⁵

Until recently, relations between ROK and NATO have traditionally been relatively superficial though this has started to change.⁶⁶ ROK views NATO positively as an extension of the US-ROK Alliance, aligning with states that share common values and enabling political dialogue on mutual transnational threats.⁶⁷ While NATO seems of limited practical relevance in addressing the ROK’s primary security focus on North Korea, recent changes – including the conflict in Ukraine and the current administration’s efforts to build supportive European partnerships – have energized ROK-NATO relations.⁶⁸

New Zealand’s perception of NATO is influenced by various contextual factors, including its anti-nuclear stance, modest size, and commitment to an independent foreign policy. NATO partnership benefits New Zealand through enhanced interoperability, bolstering its armed forces’ capabilities, information exchange, and contributing to global security and upholding the rules-based order.⁶⁹ However, New Zealand traditionally views the direct practical advantages of NATO collaboration for regional security in the South Pacific as limited.⁷⁰

Overall, the findings presented above satisfy the previously laid out primary determinants of strategic partnerships which include formal institutional links at multiple levels, regular and multi-leveled contacts, shared interests and converging strategic goals, mutual loyalty and commitment, as well as the long-term design and functioning of the relationship in question. As the partnerships evolved and matured, they saw the expansion of areas of cooperation, formalization, and institutionalization of modes of cooperation, and development of metrics to assess progress. However, the theoretical assumptions about strategic partnerships being goal-based rather than threat-based, and primarily revolving around functional areas of cooperation which are perceived as less threatening are not corroborated by the recent empirical evidence.

NATO’s partnerships with IP4 have been redefined precisely because of the changed threat perception from Russia, China, and their alignment in the so-called “no-limits partnership.”⁷¹ Following the same logic, it would be illusory to assert that the strengthening of the NATO-IP4 partnership would be seen as less provocative if it occurs in the context of functional cooperation. As previously discussed, the fields that were in the post-Cold War era seen as domains of international cooperation devoid of power contestation are these days being instrumentalized in the context of great power rivalry. Therefore, the strategic partnership literature needs to move beyond the old assumptions that these types of alignments are more palatable to potential adversaries given they do not carry explicit security commitments.

Conclusion

This article examined the evolution of NATO’s relations with the IP4 countries by placing it in the context of strategic partnerships literature. It had several theoretical and empirical objectives. It first revisited the partnership lifecycle framework by adding a distinct phase which could be described as “redefinition” following the evaluation phase. Relatedly, it critically interrogated the theoretical assumptions which treat strategic partnerships as solely goal-based and functional in nature by situating them in the present era of competitive multipolarity. Finally, it pointed out the qualitative differences between the contextual and institutional factors that informed the formation and implementation phases of NATO’s partnerships with the IP4 compared to the evaluation and redefinition phases.

Strategic partnerships have long been touted as a fundamental component of regional security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.⁷² There is no doubt that the web of intensifying and deepening relations between NATO and the IP4 countries, as well as those between individual NATO allies and their Indo-Pacific partners form a growingly important component in the regional security architecture of both theaters. The fact that both sides of these partnerships now see their respective partners as significant for their own defense and deterrence, rather than as interlocutors in pooling resources for the provision of security for third parties is a major change in the context of their evolution.

Successful cooperation between Indo-Pacific and European partners related to aiding Ukraine serves as a potential model for coordinated efforts between the two regions in handling contingencies within the Indo-Pacific. The IP4 largely share stances on the Russian continued war on Ukraine and their governments represent four of only six countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area to impose sanctions on Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis. Each nation has extended financial aid and non-lethal military support, channeling some of this assistance through NATO. The war in Ukraine has significantly heightened awareness in these countries about how events in Europe directly impact the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, it has raised fears across these countries about the security challenges stemming from the growing Sino-Russian relations.

All of this does not mean we will see the presence of NATO assets in the Indo-Pacific, just as it is not realistic to expect that the IP4’s future contributions to support Ukraine foreshadow a mainstay feature of the European security architecture. However, given that the current era of competitive multipolarity entails multi-domain contests, many of which require coordination among a larger group of countries to be effective, there is a clear case for cooperation which did not escape either NATO or the individual IP4 countries.

Moving forward, much will depend on the ambition from both sides to sustain the momentum of cooperation. There is a case for optimism which stems from the fact that the case for cooperation these days speaks more directly to the security interests of all parties involved than in the heydays of cooperative security. At the same time, there is a fear that as NATO’s focus remains firmly on its eastern frontline and Russia, the Alliance will ignore how China also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states. On the IP4 side, there are clear differences among the four partners as to their level of ambition to engage with NATO. Equally, there are varying attitudes among the partners about the utility of the IP4 grouping and a general recognition of differences between the partners which makes bilateral engagement with NATO a general preference. No doubt a lot will be gleaned about the new implementation phase from their statements, and more importantly, concrete examples of cooperation over the coming years.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Gorana Grgić

Dr. Gorana Grgić is a Senior Researcher with the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security team at the ETH Zürich’s Center for Security Studies. Gorana is also a non-resident Senior Lecturer in US Foreign Policy at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and an Expert Associate with the National Security College at the Australian National University. Her research interests include US and EU foreign policy, NATO, and the nexus between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.

Notes

^1. NATO, Strategic Concept, 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

^2. There is a vibrant debate among international relations scholars about the extent to which we are seeing a major change in the international system that resembles a transition to multipolarity. For some of the most prominent voices of dissent, see for instance, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power.” Foreign Affairs 102 (2023); Jo Inge Bekkevold, “No, the World Is Not Multipolar,” Foreign Policy September 22, 2023. Voices in favor of the view of growing multipolarity extend to literature as far back as early 2000s and include Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign power, regional integration and the sources of a stable multipolarity.” in The New World Order: Contrasting Theories. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000). 134–166, Adrian Hyde-Price, European security in the twenty-first century: the challenge of multipolarity. (Routledge, 2007), and Barry R. Posen, “Emerging multipolarity: why should we care?” Current history 108, no. 721 (2009): 347–352, to the more recent contributions by realist scholars such as David Blagden, “Global multipolarity, European security and implications for UK grand strategy: back to the future, once again.” International Affairs 91, no 2 (2015): 333–350 and Emma Ashford, “In Praise of Lesser Evils: Can Realism Repair Foreign Policy?” Foreign Affairs 101 (2022). Furthermore, strategic documents from across the IP4 states refer either explicitly to “major power competition and an emerging multipolar distribution of power” such as Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review, or Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy which asserts that “some nations, not sharing universal values, are making attempts to revise the existing international order (…) (t)hese moves challenge the existing international order, thereby intensifying geopolitical competitions in international relations” While this article might not concur with all of the theoretical assumptions or prescriptions these works and policy documents put forward, it agrees with the basic diagnosis that the post-Cold War unipolarity is a bygone makeup of the international system and the distribution of power these days coupled with intentions of revisionist powers make it appear most like a nascent multipolar setting.

^3. Thomas S. Wilkins, ”“Alignment,” not ‘alliance’–the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment.” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 53–76.

^4. Rajan Menon, The end of alliances (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007).

^5. Andriy Tyushka and Lucyna Czechowska. “Strategic partnerships, international politics and IR theory.” In States, international organizations and strategic partnerships, (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 8–43.

^6. Patricia A. Weitsman, Waging war: Alliances, coalitions, and institutions of interstate violence (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

^7. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. Security: A new framework for analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

^8. Thomas S. Wilkins, “Russo – Chinese strategic partnership: A new form of security cooperation?” Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 2 (2008): 358–383; Kliman, Daniel M. Promising partnerships: emerging and established powers in the 21st century. (GMF Emerging Powers Policy Forum, 2014).

^9. Prashanth Parameswaran, “Explaining US strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region: Origins, developments and prospects.” Contemporary Southeast Asia (2014); 265.

^10. Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances (New York: Routledge, 2010).

^11. Glenn Herald Snyder, Alliance politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

^12. Thomas S. Wilkins, “After a decade of strategic partnership: Japan and Australia ‘decentering’from the US alliance?” The Pacific Review 31, no. 4 (2018): 498–514; Zhongping Feng and Jing Huang. “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy.” European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (2014).

^13. Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira and Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira. “Introduction: The European Union’s strategic partnerships: Conceptual approaches, debates and experiences.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29, no. 1 (2016): 3–17; Tyushka and Czechowska, “Strategic partnerships, international politics and IR theory.”

^14. Tyushka and Czechowska, “Strategic partnerships, international politics and IR theory”

^15. Wilkins, “After a decade of strategic partnership: Japan and Australia ‘decentering’ from the US alliance?;” Andriy Tyushka, Lucyna Czechowska, Agata Domachowska, Karolina Gawron-Tabor, and Joanna Piechowiak-Lamparska. “States, international organizations and strategic partnerships: theorizing an ‘ideal model.’” In States, International Organizations and Strategic Partnerships (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), 44–79.

^16. Michael Reiterer, “The role of ‘strategic partnerships’ in the EU’s relations with Asia.” in The Palgrave handbook of EU-Asia relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2013), 75–89.

^17. Anna Michalski, ”‘Diplomacy in a Changing World Order: The Role of Strategic Partnerships.” UI Paper 10 (2019): 4–21.

^18. Jeffrey Wilson, “Diversifying Australia’s Indo-Pacific infrastructure diplomacy.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 2 (2019): 101–108; Tobias Gehrke, “EU open strategic autonomy and the trappings of geoeconomics.” European Foreign Affairs Review no. 27 (2022).

^19. Nadkarni, Strategic partnerships in Asia: Balancing without alliances 48.

^20. For instance, alternative approaches to study NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships include the growing study of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific such as William Tow, “The trilateral strategic dialogue, minilateralism, and Asia-Pacific order building.” US-Japan-Australia (2015): 23, Troy Lee-Brown, “Asia’s security triangles: Maritime minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.” East Asia 35, no 2 (2018): 163–176, William Tow, “Minilateral security’s relevance to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and prospects.” Contested Multilateralism 2.0 and Asian Security Dynamics (2020): 47–61. Furthermore, there is important work on the inter-theater cooperation that could also be useful such as Luis Simón, “Bridging US-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacif ic.” CSIS Briefs (2022) and Eric Kim et al. “NATO’s position and role in the Indo-Pacific.” Defence Studies 22, no 3 (2022): 510–515. Additionally, one might look at the relatively novel concepts such as “memberness” in Stephanie C. Hofmann et al. “Porous organizational boundaries and associated states: introducing memberness in international organizations.” European Journal of International Relations (2023).

^21. Lisa Aronsson and Brett Swaney, Priorities for NATO Partnerships in an Era of Strategic Competition. Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 40. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2022).

^22. Ian Hope, Projecting Stability: Elixir or Snake Oil? NDC Research Papers Series (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2018).

^23. Trine Flockhart, Cooperative security: NATO’s partnership policy in a changing world. No. 2014: 01. (DIIS Report, 2014); Rebecca R. Moore, “The purpose of NATO partnership: Sustaining liberal order beyond the Ukraine crisis.” NATO’s return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia and beyond (2017): 167–192; NATO, Partners, March 7, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm.

^24. Gorana Grgić. “Partners Across the Globe and NATO’s Strategic Concept.” in NDC Policy Brief 16 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2021).

^25. Aronsson and Swaney, Priorities for NATO Partnerships in an Era of Strategic Competition.

^26. Ibid.

^27. Sophie Arts and Steven Keil. “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships.” The German Marshall Fund of the United States (2021).

^28. Benjamin Schreer, “Beyond Afghanistan NATO’s Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.” NDC Research Papers Series no. 75, (Rome: NATO Defense College, April 2012).

^29. Aronsson and Swaney, Priorities for NATO Partnerships in an Era of Strategic Competition.

^30. NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept.

^31. Joe Burton, “NATO’s ‘global partners’ in Asia: shifting strategic narratives.” Asian Security 14, no. 1 (2018): 8–23.

^32. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier. “Global NATO.” Foreign Affairs (2006): 105–113.

^33. Benjamin Schreer, “As good as it gets?: Australia and NATO beyond Afghanistan.” In Cooperative security: NATO’s partnership policy in a changing world, (Danish Institute for International Studies, 2014), 99–110.

^34. Flockhart, Cooperative security: NATO’s partnership policy in a changing world.

^35. NATO, Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” (2010) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm

^36. NATO, Brussels Summit Communique. June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en

^37. Schreer, Beyond Afghanistan NATO’s Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.

^38. NATO, Relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, February 10, 2023, http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_183254.htm

^39. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

^40. Jason Blessing, Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, and Rakel Tiderman, eds. NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021).

^41. Rachelle Saad, “The Crisis in Ukraine: The Peculiarities of the Russian Perspective,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2014, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/the-crisis-in-ukraine-the-peculiarities-of-the-russian-perspective/

^42. Wrenn Yennie-Lindgren, “New dynamics in Japan – Russia energy relations 2011–2017.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 9, no. 2 (2018): 152–162.

^43. National security strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017–0905.pdf; National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

^44. Philippe Le Corre and Alain Sepulchre, China’s offensive in Europe. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press); Garlick, Jeremy. “China’s economic diplomacy in Central and Eastern Europe: A case of offensive mercantilism?” Europe-Asia Studies 71, no. 8 (2019): 1390–1414; Meijer, Hugo. Awakening to China’s Rise: European Foreign and Security Policies toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford University Press, 2022).

^45. La France et la Securité en Indo-Pacifique, (Paris: Ministère des Armées, 2018); Germany – Europe – Asia: shaping the 21st century together, (Berlin: German Federal Office, 2020); Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia (The Hague: Government of the Netherlands, 2020); Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2021).

^46. NATO, London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3–4 December 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

^47. NATO 2030: United for a New Era (Brussels: NATO, November 25, 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf; NATO, Brussels Summit Communique. June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en

^48. Liselotte Odgaard, “NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space.” The Washington Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2022): 167–183.

^49. NATO, Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Keio University. February 1, 2023. http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_211398.htm

^50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Security Strategy, December 16, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html

^51. Sangmi Cha, “South Korea’s arms sales double amid Russia’s war in Ukraine,” Bloomberg, December 9, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/09/asia-pacific/south-korea-arms-sales-double/

^52. Crisis Hub: Invasion of Ukraine by Russia, (Canberra: Australian Government – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2023), https://www.dfat.gov.au/crisis-hub/invasion-ukraine-russia

^53. NATO, 2022 Strategic Concept.

^54. NATO, Vilnius Summit Communique, press release, July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

^55. Rory Medcalf, “NATO shares in Australia’s China risk,” Australian Financial Review, 30 June 2022, https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/nato-s-globalised-strategy-20220628-p5axf0

^56. “Anthony Albanese says Australia was ‘economically coerced’ as NATO leaders condemn China,” SBS, 30 June 2022, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/nato-condemns-china-as-anthony-albanese-says-australia-was-economically-coerced/rp40zn0u6

^57. NATO, Relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

^58. Mirna Galic, Joe Burton, David Capie, Jean-Dominique Dulière, Stephan Frühling, Gorana Grgić, Yoko Iwama, Kwang-Jin Kim, Geunwook Lee, Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Philip Shetler-Jones, Luis Simón, Michito Tsuruoka, Report of the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific, United States Institute of Peace. February 2024.

^59. Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “China Brought NATO Closer Together,” War on the Rocks, February 5, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/china-brought-nato-closer-together/; Jonathan Holslag, “China, NATO, and the Pitfall of Empty Engagement,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2019): 137–150; “China’s place on the NATO agenda,” Strategic Comments 27, no.5 (2021): i-iii; Liselotte Odgaard, “NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space.” The Washington Quarterly 45, no 1 (2022): 167–183; Jeffrey H. Michaels, ”‘A very different kind of challenge’? NATO’s prioritization of China in historical perspective.” International Politics 59, no 6 (2022): 1045–1064; Sten Rynning, “NATO’s Struggle for a China Policy: Alliance, Alignment, or Abdication?.” Asian Affairs 53, no 3 (2022): 481–499.

^60. Andrew Gray and John Irish, “NATO leaders send mixed messages in Japan office controversy,” Reuters, July 12, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/issue-nato-japan-office-still-table-stoltenberg-2023-07-12/

^61. AAP, “Anthony Albanese says Australia was ‘economically coerced’ as NATO leaders condemn China,” SBS, June 30, 2022, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/nato-condemns-china-as-anthony-albanese-says-australia-was-economically-coerced/rp40zn0u6

^62. Rory Medcalf, “NATO shares in Australia’s China risk,” Australian Financial Review, June 30, 2022, https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/nato-s-globalised-strategy-20220628-p5axf0

^63. Mirna Galic, “Navigating by Sun and Compass Policy Brief Three: The Future of Japan-NATO Relations.” Japan Institute of International Affairs (2021).

^64. NATO, “Joint statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Yoshimasa Hayashi,” press release, April 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_213469.htm

^65. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Security Strategy.

^66. Bence Nemeth and Saeme Kim. “South Korea and NATO: from unlikely companions to key partners.” International Affairs, no. 2 (2024): 609–629.

^67. International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Indo-Pacific Powers and NATO: A conversation with the Ambassadors of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea,” event recording, November 15, 2022, https://www.iiss.org/events/2022/11/indo-pacific-powers-and-nato.

^68. Soo-hyang Choi, “South Korea plans to establish diplomatic mission to NATO in Brussels,” Reuters, June 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-plans-establish-diplomatic-mission-nato-brussels-2022-06-22/; Lee Haye-ah, “Yoon to agree to new partnership with NATO in second half of year,” Yonhap News Agency, June 28, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220628009051315; Yonhap News Agency, “PM says China’s opposition to Yoon’s attendance at NATO summit ‘lack of courtesy,’” June 29, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220629004400315; NATO, “Secretary General stresses value of NATO’s global partnerships in visit to Republic of Korea,” press release, January 29, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211270.htm?selectedLocale=en; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Our government’s decision on the Ukraine crisis,” press release, February 28, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372127&page=1

^69. Official Website of the New Zealand Government, “PM’s comments to NATO session,” press release, June 30, 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/pms-comments-nato-session; New Zealand Government, “Further humanitarian support to Ukraine for winter hardships,” press release, December 14, 2022, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/further-humanitarian-support-ukraine-winter-hardships;

^70. Nicholas Ross Smith and Bonnie Holster, “New Zealand’s ‘Maori foreign policy’ and China: a case of instrumental relationality?,” International Affairs (2023):1–19.

^71. “Factbox: Moscow-Beijing partnership has ‘no limits,’” Reuters, 4 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing-partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/

^72. H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall. “Asian strategic partnerships: New practices and regional security governance.” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 88.