The Silence of the Roman Catholic Church on the Ukraine War

Abstract

In the face of war, not only state actors, but also religious actors react and engage in international politics. When studying religious narratives of war, what is not said can be more revealing than what is said. Such is the case when analyzing the Roman Catholic Church’s narrative since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. A striking pattern of silence emerges which arguably has serious implications for upholding international law. Both in an international political (Holy See at the United Nations) as well as a transnational religious context (Pope Francis I addressing followers) the Roman Catholic Church has remained silent on Russia’s aggression and breach of international law.

Keywords:

• Catholic Church
• war
• silence
• United Nations
• Ukraine War
• Pope
• Holy See

One year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Vatican News published an article with the title “One year of war in Ukraine: Pope Francis’ sorrow and tireless appeals for peace” (Vatican News 2023). The article details every prayer, speech, and act of solidarity the Pope has performed since February 2022. It also lists a number of activities pursued by other representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, suggesting the Ukraine War was taking center-stage in terms of time, energy, and resources invested by the Catholic Church. Yet, when looking more closely at the words and deeds of the Pope and other representatives, what is not said reveals more than what is being said.

This essay tackles the contradiction between the Catholic Church presenting itself as a “peacemaker” (Vatican News 2023) or expressing the hope that the “United Nations will ever remain the supreme forum of peace and justice” (Pope John Paul II 1979), and failing to live up to either of these two maxims in the face of war. While examining the Catholic Church¹ in the Ukraine War in two different contexts—the international political and the transnational religious—a pattern of silence emerges when it comes to strengthening or even upholding international law. After briefly reviewing the role of the Catholic Church at the United Nations and its understanding of international institutions and international law, I present examples and discuss the silence of the Catholic Church in the international political and transnational religious context, respectively.

The Roman Catholic Church and the United Nations

“(N)ever again war, never again war! It is peace, peace, that has to guide the destiny of the nations of all mankind!” was Pope Paul VI’s appeal when addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in October 1965 (Pope Paul VI 1965). He was the first of so far five Roman Catholic popes to speak before the UN. Owing to the Lateran Treaty of 1929, the Roman Catholic Church is also recognized as a subject of international law and is a permanent observer at the United Nations.² Admitted to the UN in 1964 as the Holy See, it identifies a clear overlap of the four pillars of the United Nations with the “four main pillars of Catholic Social Teaching: the prevention of war and the promotion of peace; the protection and advance of human dignity and rights; human development; and helping nations to keep their word and honor international treaties and law” (Holy See 2018). The self-perception of the Roman Catholic Church regarding its position in this institution is that of having “practically symbolic temporal sovereignty” (Paul VI 1965) as opposed to “states, which are communities in the political and temporal sense” (Pope John Paul II 1979). Despite, or possibly because of, its high regard for this international institution, the commendation for the UN has waned since the beginning of the Ukraine War, with Pope Francis (2022a) lamenting “the impotence of the Organizations of the United Nations.” An observation reiterated in even stronger terms by Archbishop Caccia representing the Holy See at the United Nations, speaking of a “significant dysfunction present in this organization’s security architecture and that of the entire multilateral system” (Holy See 2023). What, then, is the Catholic Church doing in light of this purported weakening of international institutions and the ongoing Ukraine War?

The Roman Catholic Church’s Silence During the Ukraine War

In this context, I understand silence to be either a rhetorical absence of an issue (non-mentioning) or the physical absence of a representative (non-presence). Given the apparent centrality, relevance, and urgency of the Ukraine War as indicated by the Vatican News article mentioned above, the Pope’s absence in crucial moments and places becomes all the more glaring. Since the beginning of the war and following a video call with the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill in March 2022, Pope Francis repeatedly announced that he would meet with the Patriarch. Pope Francis also called upon him as well as the other patriarchs of the Christian-Orthodox churches to act as peacemakers (Vatican News 2022). The two planned in-person meetings between the religious leaders did not, however, take place. And even though Pope Francis also repeatedly expressed his wish to visit Ukraine, such a visit was postponed for various reasons provided by the Vatican, rather than the Ukrainian government. However, during a visit to Italy, President Zelensky came to the Vatican to meet Pope Francis.

At this point, I do not intend to be “silent” on meetings which have been taking place between the Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church, marked for example by Metropolitan Antonij meeting with the Pope in August 2022 or Cardinal Zuppi meeting with the Patriarch in June 2023. However, these meetings underline the non-presence of top-level representatives of the respective churches. Pope Francis has also not spoken in front of the United Nations since the beginning of the war. Considering the Catholic Church’s self-perception as a peacemaker and its high regard of the United Nations, I argue that this absence in these central contexts can be interpreted as a silence, at least creating an ambiguity as to whether the issue is as urgent and existential as it is rhetorically pronounced to be.

The International Political Context

Absence and non-mentioning become more nuanced when studying the Catholic Church’s language. On February 23, 2022, the eve of the Russian full-scale invasion, the Holy See addressed the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) plenary meeting on the agenda point, “The situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.” Russia is not mentioned once in this address (Holy See 2022a). The same applies to the speech delivered by Cardinal Pietro Parolin at the central opening of the 77th UNGA session (Holy See 2022b). Russia is neither identified as aggressor nor mentioned in any of the speeches held by the Holy See at the United Nations that are in any way related to the Ukraine War. In other words, the Catholic Church refuses to identify the aggressor in the Ukraine War, a pattern which coincides with that of the Russian Orthodox Church (see DECR 2023). The Catholic Church as represented by the Holy See is by no means silent on the topic of war itself, speaking of the “inhumanity of modern warfare” and the story of “the innocent in Ukraine”; of a “heinous war”; of “parents forced to bury their sons and daughters”; of “martyrdom of aggression”; and of “crime against God and man himself” (Holy See 2023). Yet, Russia does not feature in these speeches. Instead, it is referred to or circumscribed by using phrases such as “threatening winds continue to blow in the steppes of Eastern Europe” (Holy See 2022a) or simply “nuclear state” (Holy See 2022b). The root of war stems “from within the human heart corrupted by sin” (Holy See 2023).

The Transnational Religious Context

This pattern of silence on identifying Russia as aggressor and stating that Russia is in violation of international law can also be observed in the context of Pope Francis in his role as a transnational religious leader, speaking prayers, giving blessings, calling for solidarity. As is the case of the Holy See in the international political context, the Pope himself also does not condemn or even identify Russia as aggressor, though he clearly names the ongoing war and the atrocities being committed.³ This pattern can be observed from early on after the invasion, for example, after the Angelus prayer held on 6 March 2022, when Pope Francis spoke of “not merely a military operation, but a war, which sows death, destruction and misery” (Pope Francis 2022a). He implored “that the armed attacks cease and that negotiation—and common sense—prevail. And that international law be respected once again!” (Pope Francis 2022a). He failed to mention who is conducting the attacks and whom he is imploring to stop. The same goes for his words after the Angelus prayer one week later on March 13, 2022 in reaction to the Russian siege of Mariupol, “In the name of God, I ask you: stop this massacre!” (Pope Francis 2022b). He did not state whom he was asking.

This pattern continued, for example in a letter he addressed to the population of the Ukraine, marking nine months after the invasion. While he observed that “(y)our cities have been hammered by bombs” and spoke of “women who were victims of violence;” and of “this great flood of evil and pain” (Pope Francis 2022c), he did not mention who is to be held responsible. The pattern continues, be it in the speech held by Pope Francis on the occasion of the World Day of Peace in January 2023 (Vatican 2023) or most recently in the prayers and addresses he held at the World Youth Day in Lisbon, addressing 1.5 million young listeners from around the world (Pope Francis 2023). Neither condemning nor even mentioning the aggressor was a point also followed up upon by the New York Times (2023) after speaking with young, disappointed participants.

Conclusion

By oscillating whether or not to visit Ukraine, by not clearly naming Russia as the aggressor of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, by speaking of institutional failings rather than the laws that are in place and could be upheld, the Catholic Church creates ambiguity as to its interpretation of international law and it yields to those violating it. This is in stark contrast to the words that Pope Benedict XVI (2008) directed to the UN: “It is indifference or failure to intervene that do the real damage.”

The silence of the Roman Catholic Church can be understood as a challenge to international law. By failing to name Russia as aggressor, it contributes to ambiguity as to the role of Russia in the war. In other words, “silences can work to create ambiguity” (Guillaume and Schweiger 2019, 101).

On a (transnational religious) reading, this ambiguity could be understood as helping to keep channels of dialogue open among different churches, not only between the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Pope consistently seeks to uphold and strengthen “unity” among various Christian churches, bridging divides for example among the Orthodox Churches, but also appealing for inter-religious cooperation (see Holy See Press Office 2023; Vatican 2022).

In a far more critical reading, though, this silence can be interpreted as a yielding to the violator of international law, thereby allowing for international law to erode. As Guillaume and Schweiger notes (2019, 103): “To be part of the international community is understood to be about accepting certain rules.” This silence, while perhaps allowing for a continuation of inter-religious dialogue, contributes to a weakening of the international community. In keeping with its own stated commitments to the international community and international law, the Catholic Church should be expected to uphold these rules or at least strengthen the United Nations in doing so.

Acknowledgments

Funding was provided by the Max Planck Society and the AIA NRW.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Katharina McLarren

Katharina McLarren, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg as well as a visiting fellow at the AIA NRW, Bonn. In her research she focuses on religion in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. She is also interested in diplomacy studies and is one of the editors of the recently published Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Thought and Practice in the Digital Age.

Notes

1 Roman Catholic Church, Catholic Church, and Holy See are used interchangeably here, as the argument is that the Roman Catholic Church enjoys actorness in international politics and in this context is understood as one actor, though the de jure status is briefly discussed later.

2 For a concise description of the Holy See’s status in international law, see for example Barbato (2013) and Germelmann (2009).

3 There is one single case I have come across so far in which Pope Francis explicitly mentions the Russian president. However, this is neither in a meeting nor a letter directly addressed to Putin, but rather in place of his Angelus prayer, held on October 2, 2022. What is more, of the two sentences in which he calls for peace, one is aimed at Putin and the other at Zelensky (see Pope Francis 2022d).