Practising the practice. Towards a theory of practising in physical education from a Bildung-theoretical perspective

ABSTRACT

Background

In the international sport pedagogical discourse, practising is a marginal research topic. Nevertheless, it should be considered as an elementary component of PE. To fill this gap, we discuss the international discourse against the background of Bildung-theoretical work on practising in German-language educational studies and sport pedagogy.

Theoretical approach

The article is based on a phenomenologically informed perspective on Gestalt, lived-body and practising. We use a hermeneutical-phenomenological approach that focuses on the meaningful and embodied processes in the experience of practising. In the tradition of a theory of Bildung, both, systematic, e.g. semantic and theoretical analyses, as well as didactical and methodological perspectives for practising, are developed.

Purpose

An alternative view on practising is developed which, contrary to conventional perspectives on automatisation, memorisation and optimisation of motor skills, focuses on the meaningful and formative (bildend) experiences in practising. We argue that in practising, two meaningful and embodied processes arise: repetition and not knowing-how. Both are identified as productive and creative potentials. We argue that in practising not only skills can be improved but also abilities and attitudes can be developed and transformed. Moreover, in practising the relation to oneself and to the world is challenged and possibly changed. In practising as a process of Bildung, a subjectivation takes place: It’s about becoming a self. To make this clear, three aspects of a theory of practising in sport pedagogical research are highlighted: First, the differences to psychological theories are worked out. This is done in the context of a critical reconstruction of international and German-speaking research in PE. For this reason, a semantical and conceptual differentiation is proposed by distinguishing practice, exercise and training from practising. While exercise and training as outcome-oriented and technological terms strongly aim at automatisation and optimisation, practising is based on embodied experiences that give meaning and aresubjectively and holistically experienced. Second, the particularities and specific characteristics, as well as the productive potentials of practising, are carried out from both a philosophical and a pedagogical perspective. Based on teaching examples, the theoretical and phenomenological foundations of the lived body (Leib) in practising as well as the moments of repetition and negativity are elaborated. Third, the redefinition of the term and concept of practising opens up significant educational and didactic possibilities but also challenges for sport pedagogy.

Conclusion

A theory of practising should not be reduced to psychological models, but should also not stop at philosophical thoughts. If practising is systematically related to pedagogical contexts, then not only the characteristics in the experience of practising, such as negativity and repetition but also the specific actions and settings must be included. Practising as a social and educational activity, therefore, requires a reflection on the premises and goals of pedagogical actions. A didactics of practising is necessary, which is carried out in the last chapter.

KEYWORDS:

• Practising
• embodiment
• sport pedagogy
• phenomenology
• exercise

1. Introduction

In the international pedagogical discourse, practising is still a marginal research topic. However, it has recently received increased attention. Philosophical and sociological publications with wide circulation have contributed to this, such as the book on craftsmanship by Sennett (2009) or the bestseller by Sloterdijk (2014). Expertise research has also discovered and investigated practising as a deliberate practice technique (Keith and Ericsson 2007; Ericsson 2020). Practising is also a topic in music pedagogy (Dyndahl and Nielsen 2017), Didactics of Mathematics and language learning didactics (Küster 2020). Especially in physical education (PE), practising is attributed a high value as well (Giese and Brinkmann 2021; Aggerholm et al. 2018; Lindgren and Barker 2019). But often it is still technologically reduced to automation, memorisation and optimisation of motor skills.

In continental pedagogical approaches to practising, it is assumed that in the activity of practising a connection to subjectivity and thus to the self-relationship of the practising person arises (Bollnow 1978). A change or transformation of this relation to oneself and to others is determined as a process of Bildung (Koller 2012). In recent years, the concept of Bildung has also been increasingly noted in the English-speaking world (Pinar 2011; Horlacher 201 6; Friesen and Kenklies 2022; Biesta 2022). Bildung is distinguished from outcome- and competence-oriented or psychological conceptions of learning. To put it very succinctly, Bildung means a lifelong process of work of the self at being a self which includes self-cultivation, self-formation and self-care. The concept of Bildung goes back to the ancient concept of paideia. The term education can be distinguished from this. Education means supporting or summoning to self-activity (Benner 2020) or to engage in their own practising and learning (Brinkmann and Türstig 2023). It is thus an activity of the educators that eventually aims at making experiences of Bildung possible for the students (Biesta 2022, 35).

Unlike the practice of education, Bildung is closely connected with the experience of an interruption, an irritation or even a crisis. Experiences of Bildung make it possible to experience oneself and others in the world differently, to see and behave in a different way. Bildung implies a redirection of attention (Benner 2020, 15–20), which includes a conversion (Greek: periagoge) and thus a re-learning (Umlernen) and a re-practising (Brinkmann 2021). In the German-speaking discourse these aspects, like failure, irritation and not-knowing-how are called – in the tradition of Buck (2019) – negative experiences. But they are highly positive and productive! Bildung thus does not mean continuous adaptation or development, but a possibly uncomfortable experience in which the relationship to oneself and to the world is challenged and changed.

In the following, we relate these perspectives from a theory of Bildung to practising. We will argue that practising is not only practising something (a skill) but always also practising the self in the sense of subjectivation. Negative experiences make practising an exhausting and challenging activity for the practitioner that requires patience, endurance, concentration and a tolerance for mistakes. Thus, in some respects, the person itself is challenged. In this regard, practising is worked in a first-person perspective. It is about how I exist as a subject of my practices and my life (Sloterdijk 2014; Brinkmann 2021). In practising the practice not only a skill or a technique is practised, but also an ability with which this skill is performed and an attitude with which this activity is carried out.

Practising is therefore both a practical and a mental, a bodily and an ethical activity of subjectivation. Practising as something that you do is always based on the body. While in sports the corporal aspects are emphasised, memorisation practices, practices of reflection or practices in Zen, such as yoga, are focused on the mental dimensions. Properly considered, the whole person is practised in practising. In other words: In practising a subjectivation takes place (Biesta 2022, 45–47). The hypothesis we want to derive in this paper as the basis of a Bildung-theoretical legitimisation of practising in PE is that practising is a practice in which a skill (e.g. setting in volleyball or the slice in tennis), an ability (e.g. concentration, mindfulness) and an attitude or a stance (e.g. tolerance of mistakes, composure) can be developed – through repetition.

In the cultivation of abilities and skills, the person gives himself or herself a form and is formed. This formation as care (lat.: cura) and cultivation (lat.: cultura) has a long occidental tradition (Brinkmann 2021). The formatio in practising concerns the relationship of the practising person to him/herself, to others, and to the world. But this cultivation is not a continuous development. In practising both take place at the same time: a continuous and a discontinuous experience, a formation and a transformation. Moreover, in the repetitive activity of practising, creative and transformative potentials are more strongly appreciated. Thus, a specifically existential perspective on practising becomes possible insofar as negative experiences are identified as a basic and creative moment of practising. It is precisely in these negative, subjectivating experiences of not knowing how, disappointment, irritation, mistake and failure that the productive and creative potentials of practising manifest themselves (Brinkmann 2021; Giese and Brinkmann 2021).

The focus of this contribution is theoretical and methodological. We argue for a theory of practising as a meaningful, productive and educational practice. We will draw on examples from sports pedagogy to underpin our arguments. The examples are taken from relevant literature in German-language sport pedagogy. They serve to illustrate our line of thought. In the following sections, we first present the international and German-speaking state of research.¹ We argue that approaches focusing on automatisation, memorisation and optimisation of motor skills cannot take productive aspects of practising into account. For this reason, we propose a semantical and conceptual differentiation by distinguishing practice, exercise and training from practising. While practice, exercise and training as outcome-oriented and technological terms strongly aim at automatisation and optimisation, practising is, as we will show, a meaning giving, subjective and embodied processes, which is holistically experienced (2). In the following, we discuss a phenomenological approach to Gestalt-theory, implicit knowing and embodiment in order to develop the theoretical and methodological foundations of practising (3). The moments of repetition and negativity, which we identify as two characteristic experiences in practising, are elaborated in section 4 as productive foundations of practising. Finally, the phenomenological and Bildung-theoretical insights are connected with educational (Erziehung) and didactical considerations. In the last chapter, we present methodological and didactic possibilities in the sense of a ‘didactics of practising’. In this, we see a central desideratum in sport pedagogy and didactics.²

2. Practising – a desideratum in the international and German sport pedagogical discourse

The English word to practise (with an ‘s’ and not with a ‘c’ as in the widespread practice theory or deliberate practice approaches) is not very common in PE and sport pedagogy. Like the German word ‘Üben’, it denotes a specific, repetitive activity directed towards knowing how to do something (Können). It is also found in the Greek word áskēsis and in the Latin words exerzitium or meditation, each with a different emphasis. Different words are used for this activity: Exercise, training, practice, sometimes practising (Brinkmann 2021; Vlieghe 2017). In the following, we will show that the use of different terms in scientific discourse is due to different paradigms of reference. Hence, we propose to distinguish practising from practicing, training and exercising conceptually and theoretically. In the following, we will trace the differentiation between technological and optimising training on the one hand and subjectivating and embodied practising on the other hand in the international and in the German-language discourse of sports pedagogy and illustrate it with examples.

In the international discourse of sports pedagogy, e.g. Aggerholm et al. (2018) explicitly use the term practising. They present a proposal for mapping contemporary approaches and models in international sport pedagogy from a sport philosophical perspective. Following on Sloterdijk’s ‘treatise on “the practising life” (das übende Leben)’, they come to the far-reaching conclusion ‘that the form of human activity related to practising is not well represented in the existing orientations and models’ (Aggerholm et al. 2018, 206). We follow this assessment. Since a consistent theory of practising has not yet been done in international sport pedagogy, a further Bildung-theoretical clarification of the concept, taking into account German-language discourses, seems possible and useful. In addition to existing approaches, e.g. from Aggerholm (2015, 52) or Baker et al. (2018) this clarification is intended to focus on didactics and on the consequences that follow from our theory of practising for PE in general.

Productive links to our undertaking can be found in particular in the discussions within the Nordic countries, where approaches related to Bildung have a long and strong tradition in PE (Aggerholm and Giese 2022; Larsson 2021). Of particular note are approaches in the context of Gestalt-theory and phenomenology (Standal, 2020) that explicitly distance themselves from perspectives of Motor Programming and Information-Processing and their inherent psychological and technological theories of learning (Barker et al. 2017). In the international discourse about motor education, these behaviourist and intellectualist theories are strongly linked to the dominant leitmotif of primally fostering sport performance in PE, that stays in contrast to the ideal of Bildung (Quennerstedt 2019).

The German-speaking sport pedagogy (and respectively the curriculum for compulsory school lessons in German-speaking countries) is based on a dual mission (Doppelauftrag). It promotes the mandatory idea of learning in and through sport, aiming both at students’ personal development and at the development of sport-specific competencies. Nevertheless, the side of sport-specific competence development focuses on the technological and optimising aspect (Giese et al. 2022). This is because research in PE is mostly based on psychological and technological learning theories and commonly ignore a Bildung-theoretical perspective of movement education in PE, which Barker et al. (2017) were also able to illustrate for the international context. Because of these reference theories, we therefore use in our translation of the German-speaking literature the terms practicing (with a ‘c’), exercise and training to make the different epistemologies visible – and focus on the term practice – if the technological and optimising aspect is focused.³ Practicing, exercising and training have a long and powerful tradition in German-speaking sport pedagogy. In the nineteenth century, Guts-Muths identifies practicing as a significant activity in sport (Wiemeyer and Wollny 2017, 278). In the twentieth century, practicing was considered as the main method of PE (Trogsch 1961). However, even if today there is no homogeneous theory, there is agreement that ‘the sense of exercising and the incentive to practice in PE […] lies primarily in the mastering of sporting skills’ (Ehni 1985, 21). These approaches are in line with the tradition of the influential definition by Stiehler (1966, 134), who identifies ‘repetition, perfection, consciousness, and purposefulness’ as the essential characteristics of practice, exercise and training in PE. He describes practicing as ‘the most important practical activity of students’ (135). At that time, Stiehler headed the Institute for Theory and Methodology of PE at the German University of Physical Culture in Leipzig (GDR). He presents a systematisation of the basic forms of practice (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. The basic forms of practising according to Stiehler (1966, 148).

This systematisation shows until today a great closeness to pertinent definitions in the German-speaking exercise and training science (Schnabel, Harre, and Krug 2014, 291), which in the GDR ‘temporarily (1960s) had the status of a “mother science” for sport pedagogy’ (Hummel 2013, 116). The few theoretical considerations are in the tradition of an East-German training and exercise science and focus one-sidedly on the acquisition of motor skills.

The critical stocktaking in international and German-speaking sport pedagogy shows that practicing, exercising and training are mostly seen as the storage and automatisation of knowledge or (motor) rules without taking productive and creative aspects into account. This image coincides with traditional notions of practice, where dullness, drill and discipline play a role.

Figure 2 shows a more recent example from German sport pedagogy. Here, too, practicing is focussed on isolated, decontextualised elements such as arm position without a ball or on exercises with a ball but without a game action, etc. Such approaches are attributed to the ‘technological position’ (Scherer 2001, 3) in German-speaking sport pedagogy, favoured mainly by behaviourist, cognitivist and intellectualist models based on the epistemological foundation of information, concept or rule. We now want to highlight the differences between these technologically oriented examples and the Bildung-theoretical approach to practising (with an ‘s’) that we mentioned above. Practicing (with a ‘c’) and exercising in such a conceptualisation is not able to appreciate important aspects in the experiencing of practising, such as negative experiences. They cannot reflect the meaning of doing something repeatedly. Repetition, in these concepts, remains a mindless drill or dull automation. But sport is more than an adaptation to existing standards and their enhancement and optimisation. In a Bildung-theoretical perspective, sport can be understood as a socially significant area of movement culture that contains ‘forms, stylizations, and aestheticizations’ (Laging and Kuhn 2018, 4). For the acquisition of movements, forms of movement and their stylisation, practising is a central part of PE.

Figure 2. Setting in Volleyball according to Meyndt et al. (2003, 46).

3. Phenomenological approaches to the lived body (Leib) and Gestalt in practising

In the following, we discuss the theoretical foundations in the context of Gestalt-theory and phenomenology. Phenomenology developed a decided and precise theory of the lived body and bodily movements. Gestalt-theory follows on from this and combines the theory of the body and movement with psychological research. Important parts of German PE (Scherer and Bietz 2013) and the phenomenologically oriented educational studies (Brinkmann and Friesen 2018) focus on the meaning making and the embodied experiences in practising. The critical examination of empiricist and cognitivist conceptions of perception and learning already led to an emphasis on holistic experience in Gestalt psychology in the 1920s and 1930s. Lived body, Gestalt, body-schema and embodiment are in this sense anthropological foundations of practising. They will be identified in the following as the conceptual basis of a sport pedagogy that aims at shaping, cultivating and stylising movements.

The concept of Gestalt, already alluded to in the previous chapter, describes the fact that it is the relation and the meaning of individual perceptions and experiences to each other that is important. If this is changed, the ‘structure of behaviour’ (Merleau-Ponty 1976) also changes. In a Gestalt-perception, part and whole stand in a relation of correspondence. Consequently, ‘practising […] is exercising, in the broadest sense, of a structure, not the consolidation of a connection’ (Koffka 1921, quoted from Weise 1932, 191). In practising motorically complex actions, ‘a “movement melody” gradually develops, which does not consist of independent parts, but forms a structured whole’ (Koffka 1921). Repetitive practising through the formation of structure can therefore only be implemented in an authentic Gestalt-situation. Not individual isolated movements, but the meaningful context or horizon of a situation forms the structure of the movement and the practising situation.

The practised movement is based on ‘tacit knowing’, i.e. on the non-explicability of Gestalt-perception (Bietz and Scherer 2017, 76). Motor movements are intentionally directed towards something.⁴ Polanyi (2016) in this context, distinguishes between focal and subsidiary awareness. In acting, the central consciousness (distal term) is anticipatorily directed towards the forethought of an action, while the supporting consciousness (proximal term) acts implicitly. However, the relation between functional action and distal focussing is not linear due to the intentional structure of consciousness. Either one acts functionally-instrumentally in the first-person mode, paying attention away from the body and perception towards something else (distal). Or one pays focal-conscious attention to perception and recognition (proximal) in the mode of the third person. But then, one can no longer act functionally.

We can only hammer a nail if we focus our attention on the nail (distal term), not on the hammer (proximal term) (Polanyi 2016). If we would focus on the proximal term (details, information, first person), we would not be able to explicate it and we would fail in our action. Explicit, regular knowledge in the sense of a knowing-that can therefore even be an obstacle to ability and performance. In action and thus also in practising, implicit knowing-how as practical ability is primary, while verbally explicit and formalised knowing-that is secondary (Neuweg 1999).

The theory of tacit knowing is based on a phenomenology of the lived body. Merleau-Ponty focuses in his work ‘Phenomenology of Perception’ (Merleau-Ponty 1966) on the dynamic and practical aspects of the lived body. Motor movements are connected to perception in an elementary way. As embodied and intentional acts, they are primordially embedded in the Gestalt-space of meaning and significance. The unity of the body is established in the activity. The ‘intentional threads’ join together in movement to form an ‘intentional arc’ of implicit knowing-how. Then, in the concrete situation of movement, the body schema ‘emerges’ as a ‘system’ (Merleau-Ponty 1966, 71) in the overall Gestalt of the lived body. According to this, knowledge is first and foremost incorporated or practised ability.

In this sense, repetitions do not lead to the ‘sedimentation’ of the execution determinants of partial motor movements. Rather, meaning is generated and ‘incorporated’. It is only through repetition and targeted repetition that habits, sedimentations and habitualisations (Buck 2019) become what they are: embodied, moved and moving dispositions of perception, movement and thinking in the social world.

The theoretical insights of Gestalt-theory and phenomenology of the lived body make it possible to see both, the practitioner and the situation, holistically. Meaningful perception of ‘Gestalt’ (Gestaltwahrnehmung) implies that the isolated detail of a movement must be brought into the context of the situation. This is the ‘space of orientation’ and the ‘space of time’ (Merleau-Ponty 1976). Instead of isolated and technological training, a perspective on the situation as a meaningful, embodied and ‘authentic’ situation opens up. The specific task to be practised must require that isolated movements be reinserted into the movement sequence. The isolation of the individual elements of a movement should therefore correspond with a recomposition. Practising in this sense is an isolating and composing as well as an analysing and synthesising practice (Brinkmann 2021). In this context, both limitation of the situation and simplification of the movement as well as limitation of the perception and the content-related, material scope of the exercises are prerequisites for successful practising. This can be demonstrated in a third example.

This example from school tennis shows how this connection can be established as an authentic practising situation (Hasper 2009). First of all, ball control is practised. This is done in small courts with larger and/or softer balls and shorter tennis rackets. These adaptations allow for easier ball control. Target zones are laid out in the centre of each court, focusing balls in the middle of the court. Long runs, which make it difficult to find a favourable position to the ball, are thus avoided. The net is raised to slow down play (see Figure 3). The overall goal is to initiate long rallies in order to realise the highest possible number of authentic ball contacts. Thus, it is not isolated skills that are practised, but the ability to play in simplified but authentic situations of orientation and time (Merleau-Ponty 1976).

Figure 3. Practising Tennis in simplified but authentic situations according to Hasper (2009).

4. Productive foundations of practising

In the following, we would like to take up the aspects discussed so far and highlight the productive and creative potential of practising in more detail. For this purpose, on the basis of the theoretical foundations of the lived body (Leib) on Gestalt, tacit knowing and body schema as central characteristics of practising will be examined more closely from a perspective of Bildung-theory.

4.1. Repetition: creativity in practising

We would like to illustrate the creative potential of repetition in practising with a fourth example. It is about a lesson sequence from Scherer (2001) on teaching javelin throwing. Scherer insists on maintaining the overall movement as a whole. It should be practised with simplified javelin equipment. In this unit, throwing is done from the beginning in three steps, whereby the contexts of the throwing are varied. In addition to methodical javelin, bamboo sticks, rubber sticks or other flying objects are also used. In order to generate authentic throwing experiences that make it possible to independently assess the quality of different throwing techniques, and which also offer a high motivational aspect, javelins are also thrown at targets at different distances. From the point of view of practising theory (Übungstheorie), this example shows that in and with repeating something and someone changes, because variations of contexts and objects are systematically implemented. Meaningful repetition is not a simple repetition of pieces of information or isolated facts, nor is it a proceduralisation of previously memorised cognitive rules. The repetition of the past means a return of skills, abilities and habits on the one hand.

On the other hand, in repetition of the same experience, knowledge or habit does not return identically. Repetition is a ‘return of an unidentical as an identical’ (Waldenfels 2001, 7). Therefore, in a repetition of and as a movement, variation and creativity are possible (Brinkmann 2021). In this way, not only skills can be improved but also abilities and attitudes can be developed and - perhaps more significantly - abilities, skills and habits can be changed. And moreover, in practising the practitioner himself or herself also changes. That’s why the relation to oneself (to the previous experiences, skills, knowledge, habits), as well as the relation to the social, cultural and natural world, is formed and transformed. This process can be identified as a process of Bildung (Biesta 2022) as it is also appreciated in international sport education research for example by Quennerstedt (2019, 616).

4.2. Negativity: potentials of practising

Practising takes place when one does not yet ‘know’, when one does not yet have a skill or ability, when one fails and tries again, when the ‘will to form is broken by the resistance of the world’ (Giese 2008, 175). Practising and repetition are based on a not-knowing-how, which has to be partially overcome through practice. That is why practising is a strenuous and demanding activity, that requires endurance, self-conquest and tolerance for mistakes.

Negative experiences, however, not only arise in the embodied experience of not-knowing-how, but also in unlearning (Verlernen) or unpractising (Verüben): If one does not practise for a while, there is a partial loss or forgetting, which in turn requires renewed practising. But the practised movement is not forgotten completely. This is when movements that have already been skilful have to be reshaped, for example when skiers change to new skis and ‘the practising is focused on the improvement and differentiation of […] previous movement and action patterns’ (Scherer and Bietz 2013, 151). In special practising variations with focus on negative experiences previously developed, schematised and habitualized types of movement must then be re-practised (Umüben). All in all, it can be summarised that negative experiences are elementary for practising. Basically, they cannot be cancelled or overcome. Regarding our examples it is worth to mention that negative experiences are experienced meaningfully in the first-person perspective. As subjective experiences, they are not visible (Buck 2019). This is why they are not directly represented in our examples. However, a number of relations to them can be clarified, which we present in this section.

In General Pedagogy, these negative experiences are increasingly the focus of research: irritations, disappointments, failures and mistakes are seen as important moments (Benner 2020) of learning and practising. In the sociology of sport, the question of the relationship between learning and habitus in the context of ‘practices of subjectivation’ and ‘habitus transformations’ comes into view. There, specific irritations of the ‘natural belief in the world’ in the horizon of the ‘doxa’ (Bourdieu 1990) are investigated (Alkemeyer 2006, 126, 136). In educational studies, negativity is not meant in the common sense as something bad, annoying or dangerous. Buck (2019) shows in his profound study on ‘Learning and Experience’, that the negative experience rather emerges in a ‘turning experience back on itself’, i.e. in an ‘experience about experience’ (48).

The motivation for this (self-)reflexive turn is experiences of irritation, disappointments and crises (Buck 2019). The negative experience can then give rise to a reflexive process. In the view of a theory of Bildung, negative experiences are – very positive – preconditions for learning and practising. Bildung as a process of subjectivation is not possible without negative experiences in which the self of the practitioner is challenged. As it is mentioned above, in this experience of transformation (Koller 2012) a redirection of attention (Benner 2020), re-learning (Umlernen), or re-practising (Umüben) (Brinkmann 2021) can happen. In practising as re-practising, the embodied formation is transformed – a change of body schema and habitus becomes possible (Brinkmann 2021).

In sport, the focus is on movements, their shaping, stylisation and aestheticization. This happens by deliberately placing an obstacle in the way ‘so that it has the purpose of functioning as a means of enabling this specific form of movement execution’ (Volkamer 1984, 196). In this respect, negative experiences are of central interest, especially for sport pedagogy, because people stage such experiences in sport arbitrarily, in the form of ‘obstacles, problems, or conflicts that are solved predominantly by physical means’ (Volkamer 1984). Once they have mastered them, they construct new, even more demanding challenges.

This poses a major didactical challenge for pedagogues. It consists of carefully and purposefully designed irritations, disappointments and mistakes in the teaching process and confronts the learners with their not-knowing-how. If the negative experience becomes too apparent, a break may occur in the repetition. Further practising can become impossible. The person practising breaks off and gives up. The didactical challenge is that the practice is to be connected to the students’ horizon of experience to avoid excessive demands (Giese 2008, 232). Negative experiences should therefore be used ‘tactfully’ and with consideration for the individual situations of the practising persons (van Manen 2015).

5. Towards a didactics of practising

So far, we have tried to argue that a theory of practising should not be reduced to psychological models, but should also not stop at philosophical thoughts. If practising is systematically related to pedagogical contexts, then not only the characteristics in the experience of practising, such as negativity and repetition but also the specific actions and settings must be included which is internationally linked to Quennerstedt’s (2019) idea on ‘focusing on the E in PE’.

The Bildung-theoretical reflections can be connected to reflections on education. While Bildung refers to experiences in the first-person perspective, to the process of subjectivation and becoming a self, education (Erziehung) is, in the German discourse, seen as a social action of supporting or summoning to self-activity or to engage in their own practising and learning (Brinkmann and Türstig 2023). Education is an activity of the educators that aims at making Bildung possible for the students (Biesta 2022, 35). Practising as an educational activity, therefore, requires a reflection on the methodologies and goals. A didactics of practising is necessary (see note 3). We have shown above that it is inappropriate to give rules, terms, schemes or scripts and have them performed or proceduralised in training. This is because not every skill and movement can be translated into rules. The practitioner cannot explicitly say how he or she proceeds. He or she acts embodied, implicitly and Gestalt-orientated, e.g. when keeping balance on a bicycle, playing volleyball or tennis. Although the cognitive rule ‘describes how to do it, it cannot be used to learn how to do it’ (Neuweg 1999, 120). Therefore, knowing-how cannot be represented exclusively in terms of rules, laws or schemes. There are no explicit rules for learning setting in volleyball or any other motor skill.

This problem of explication simultaneously leads to a problem of instruction: embodied motor skills cannot be learned from rules. It can only be developed by doing and practising. The wrong idea is therefore to deduce skill and practice from the theoretically modelled description of cognitive competence. Then, rules and plans are taught because researchers have ‘previously introduced (them) for merely theoretical purposes in order to reconstruct already existing knowing-how’ (Neuweg 1999, 112). But, it is not rules that ensure future ability, but rather a situational understanding of the lived body that expresses itself in a ‘Gestalt’ (Koffka), a ‘body schema’ (Merleau-Ponty) or in ‘tacit knowing’ (Polanyi). The inventiveness of the lived body, its creative adaptations and reactions in situations are thus not trained or exercised, but practised as experiences. Practising a skill (Einüben) and practising an ability (Ausüben) belong together by practising on oneself, including the existential, negative experiences of transformation and re-practising.

If one wants to encourage students to practising meaningfully and successfully in sport, the following three aspects can offer didactic orientation (Brinkmann 2021):

1. The prerequisites for meaningful and formative practising are both the limitation of the situation and the isolation of the movements as well as the limitation of the perception and the limitation of the scope of the content. The decisive factor is the meaningful and authentic connection of the isolated part to the whole of the movement and the situation (Koffka 1921). Only then is it possible to meaningfully vary individual elements. The variation of the isolated elements ensures an individualised, deepened and meaningful practising. It is important that the focus is not on the result and the optimisation of skills, but on the process of practising. Then it becomes easier to take into account the individual experiences of the students. The example of tennis above illustrates that Gestalt as a whole of the movement is maintained in the exercise, but complexity is reduced, for example, by a smaller court, target zones, higher net, etc. These simplifications can be varied further, for instance by varying the sequence and composition of the elements within the repetition. So it is not isolated movements that are practised, but the ability to play tennis in simplified but authentic situations. In this way, new connections are established in each case. Using new references to unknown movements, a transfer to other areas can also take place. Further didactic means for variation in repetition are attention-shifting and contrast formation. Through specific tasks, a redirection of attention (Benner 2020) can be achieved. The self-perception in the movement can be directed to different parts of the whole movement. By creating contrasts – such as shot putting with and without body rotation – the perception can be directed to different performance parameters of the movement.

2. In repetition, transfer processes in practising become relevant. The intended reactualisation of prior knowledge and prior ability in repetition can be combined with the claim of something new and unfamiliar. In all the examples we have given, previous experiences are taken up in the repetition. But in particular, the tennis example shows that simplification and variation are used intentionally in the repetition. At first, simple movement sequences are used and then extended in the repetitions to what is not mastered: the balls and rackets are made smaller, the playing field is enlarged, the net is lowered, etc. Such tasks are challenging both, the teachers, because they have to determine the scope of the transfer in terms of content, didactics and methodology and assess it in the planning, and the students because they are confronted with negative experiences. The meta-theoretical thematisation of such tasks in the classroom can itself be part of a process of Bildung.

3. Mistakes, irritations, disturbances and disappointments can be used as productive and creative elements in practising. The didactic means for this is the purposeful presentation of negative experiences. Perhaps the tennis teacher could use a student’s mistakes as positive occasions for more in-depth and concentrated practising. However, the practising person should not be ashamed or frustrated nor should he or she be tired or bored by automating repetition. The art of practising is to find the balance between under- and over-demanding and not to shame or endanger the students. This is a great challenge to the professionalism of the teachers, who must not rely on well-meant recipes or method modules, but above all on their experience and their ‘pedagogical tact’ (van Manen 2015).

4. By taking these aspects into consideration, it can be made possible that not only a skill or ability is exercised, but also that existing experiences and attitudes are re-practised and thus changed. Practising can thus lead to an experience of Bildung and re-learning – through repetition.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

We acknowledge support by the Open Access Publication Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.

Notes

1 We refer in large part to the German-language discourse. Quotations or paraphrases have been translated into English.

2 The root of the term didactics goes back to the Greek and originally means showing. It deals with the arrangement of education and learning opportunities as well as the formulation and justification of certain learning goals. It is based on the idea of a didactic triangle that opens up an interactive relation between teacher, learner and subject matter or world. This relation makes it clear that teaching cannot be technicalised, i.e. that learning does not directly result from teaching. Rather, education and learning can be made possible and stimulated through an art of mediation (this is also how didactics can be translated) (Friesen and Kenklies 2022; Biesta 2022).

3 It should be mentioned that translating the German-language terms into English is very difficult due to the different epistemological frames of reference and internationally different cultural backgrounds. At the same time, we would like to point out that in German there is no conceptual distinction between ‘practicing’ and ‘practising’, but the term ‘Üben’ is used for both approaches.

4 Intentionality is, in the phenomenological tradition, the term for the basic structure of consciousness, always being conscious of something. This means that action is always directed towards or related to something (a person, an object, a perception or a thought) in a horizon of meaning. It is therefore not in a box or a dungeon, but it is in the world already.