Crimes on the edge? Criminal activities and the crime-terror nexus in the Kenyan peripheries of the Indian Ocean

ABSTRACT

Maritime security threats in the East African coastal peripheries are greatly interwoven with local crimes, economies, and socio-political lifestyles. How crimes are viewed, defined, and categorised as legal and illegal by the locals elucidates how the crime-terrorism nexus is contextualised in specific localities along the coastal seafronts. Often, financial-motivated crimes have the potential to go hand in hand with ideologically driven terrorist activities, where both syndicates operate discreetly in these communities. Based on an ethnographic study in Kenya, this article interrogates the local meanings and understandings of criminal activities in peripheral societies to determine how local crimes intersect with terrorism-related activities. The crisscrossing modus operandi of criminal syndicates and terrorist networks provides each other with safe havens, secrecy in operations, and a vulnerable base of supporters in environments where state-citizen relationships are deteriorating.

KEYWORDS:

• Crime-terror nexus
• criminal activities
• coastal peripheries
• organised crimes
• terrorism
• maritime security

Introduction

One day, I asked Derick about his daily life as a fisherman in Ngombeni.¹ Derick² said that he had no complaints apart from catching fewer fish during the high tide seasons. His dreams of education became scattered as he played truancy at school. As he grew up with his father and his uncle, he gained skills as a fisherman. He worked for his uncle. Together, they went fishing and sold the fish during the evenings at the market. This was his normal daily routine. However, during subsequent discussions on local livelihoods, Derick mentioned that their boats were hired for ferrying people and goods. The boat was his livelihood and he explained, ‘as long as your boat gave you something [money] we did not ponder on the reason for why it was used … Some rented boats end with illegal activities and the boat owners may not be aware of it’.³

These were common statements echoed by most fishermen and village members about how their boats were used. For many, it was ‘ordinary’ that the boat was used or hired for a variety of activities other than fishing.⁴ ‘Ordinary’ was a normal reflection of their daily routines to earn extra income but could also be inappropriately used within organised crime encompassing fishing and other livelihoods in the coastal peripheries. Apart from boats, other livelihoods, such as boda boda (motorbikes for transport), were often linked to different international and local crime syndicates. These modes of transport and livelihoods, combined with the unique coastal landscape of caves, fissures, cliffs, sand dunes, and deep waters, aided the techniques of organised crime, affecting coastal and maritime security in the East Africa region.

Globally, organised crime takes various forms, including drug and human trafficking, weapons and human smuggling, illegal fishing, maritime piracy, money laundering, and corruption. These profit-driven crimes, in the East African context, divert government revenue to the underground economyor shadow blue economy, where economic transactions deemed illegal operate in the coastal communities. The crimes have the potential to endanger the lives of those who are exploited in their perpetration (UNODC, 2011). In countries threatened by terrorism, terrorist networks exploit existing local crime syndicates in coastal peripheries for their modus operandi (Lucas et al., 2020). In the East African region, studies have highlighted this nexus regarding piracy, human trafficking, illegal drugs, and weapons being trafficked or smuggled in conjunction with terrorism (Jacobsen & Hoy-Carrasco, 2018). The crime-terror nexus explains how crime syndicates or terrorist organisations exploit each other’s networks or modus operandi to achieve their objectives (Phillips & Schiele, 2023). In Kenya, it is alleged that terrorist networks such as Al-Shabaab coordinate with local and transnational crime syndicates to carry out their activities (Daghar et al., 2022). Since the early 2000s, Kenya has grappled with the transnational terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab, which has exacerbated the insecurity environment in the country. Al-Shabaab originates from Somalia, with its expansion of recruitment drives and tactics in the East and the Horn of Africa.

Most of the data on criminal activities and their convergence claim (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013) within the crime-terror nexus emanated from law enforcement cases and media records. Nevertheless, there is minimal understanding of the micro-level, where local individuals and communities intersect in their definition of what they mean by crimes or terrorism activities. The crime-terror nexus in the coastal periphery establishes the convergence claims of the different intersections between smugglers, traffickers, cartel operatives, criminal or juvenile gang members, and extremists or terrorists. The few cases that come to the public domain often represent the existing hidden lives involved in crimes, highlighting the need for an ethnographic approach to explore these criminal activities within the local context (Vigh & Sausdal, 2018).

This study does not intend to sensationalise the few individuals involved in crime or claim that all coastal peripheral communities or their livelihoods are spaces for criminal activities. The notion here is that an effective understanding of the purported convergence of criminal activities and the terror nexus requires a theoretical and ethnographic engagement with its social, cultural, economic, political, and other community dimensions. The lack of this interconnection makes intended policy measures difficult to implement. Studies need to be able to map the emerging interconnections between local crimes, organised crimes, and the crime-terror nexus in a way that people and social institutions understand, interpret, and deduce ideas concerning such interconnections. The following section of the article looks at the theoretical framing of the intersections between terrorism and organised crime. The third section is followed by a description of the methodology employed in the study. The fourth section comprises the analysis of local crimes and their links to terrorist networks to explore the evolving nexus in the studied localities. Concluding, the analysis looks at ways in which crimes, criminalities, and terrorist activities could be better studied and mitigated with local community participation.

Organized crimes, maritime security, and the crime-terror nexus

Criminal groups and terrorist networks tend to operate in areas where there is poor governance or a lack of effective law enforcement (Phillips & Schiele, 2023). Often, the possibility that the two groups converge in their operations is described as the crime-terror nexus. The crime-terror nexus is a continuum where, on one end, you have organised crime groups and, on the other end, you have terrorist networks assisting each other in their operations. The continuum reveals that the two ends move towards each other and converge during their modus operandi to fulfil their objectives (Makarenko, 2004). Shelley et al. (2005) describe the crime-terror nexus as a model, contending that movement across the continuum is possible to reach their objectives. To understand the crime-terror nexus, Kenney (2008) posited that instead of asking why terrorists, insurgencies, or organised criminal groups arise in certain contexts, we need to probe beyond to understand the underlying structures and conditions that make economically motivated organised crime groups develop political interests. Similarly, reflect on why politically motivated terrorists or insurgency groups develop economic strategies. This type of analysis provides an understanding of the evolution of criminal and terrorist organisations and the gradual evolution of their structures over time.

The crime-terror nexus in the coastal peripheries often becomes difficult as the phenomenon intersects with maritime crimes. Maritime crimes, organised crimes at sea, or blue crimes (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020) is not a recent phenomenon. These crimes attribute to organised crimes, which are highly centralised enterprises operating at the transnational, national, or local levels with the purpose of engaging in illegal activities for profit. (UNODC, 2022). Reports on maritime security highlight criminal syndicates operating in the fisheries sector as often engaging in forms of human and illegal goods trafficking using fishing vessels (Murphy, 2010).

Often termed ‘ghost ships’, these unknown ships are reported to have docked in different seaports with illegal immigrants or illicit goods (Deutshe, 2015). Drugs, arms, and human trafficking attributed to the fishing industry and its associated economy distress vulnerable coastal communities. Smugglers and traffickers’ networks exist in localities where fishing vessels are used to trade illicit weapons, humans, cocaine, or illicit goods to meet local and regional demands. Transnational cartels and networks are known to cooperate with local criminal groups or form their own local proxy criminal groups, contributing to a rise in local and national violent crimes, bringing illicit drugs to coastal communities, and fuelling local criminal activities (Felbab-Brown, 2022).

Maritime organised crimes faulters in its contextual definitions and lacks a clear definition (Bueger, 2015). First, it is the difficulty of situating maritime organised crimes within the maritime territorial scope, which extends to littoral as well as coastal villages, in understanding maritime crimes. Maritime organised crimes cannot be defined without understanding the coastal and littoral dynamics where operations are planned and carried out (UNODC, 2020). Second, the term maritime organised crimes becomes further complicated due to the intersections of petty crimes and organised crimes in both the maritime and coastal environments. Often, petty crimes are part of a larger organised criminal syndicate, which may be overlooked due to the lack of substantive evidence on the interconnection as well as the covert nature of the organised crime’s operational tactics. However, states differ in how they formulate transnational crimes such as illegal fishing (Vrancken, Witbooi & Glazewski, 2019). Third is the need to focus more attention on how different types of crimes intersect and their synergies in understanding maritime organised crimes (Chapsos & Hamilton, 2018).

Much research on the crime-terror nexus in maritime and coastal security has centred on weapons, humans, or illegal drug smuggling or trafficking. For example, during the Sri Lankan war (1980s–2009), it was documented that foreign fishing vessels owned by Indian fishermen paved the way for the terrorist organisation (Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam, LTTE) to exploit the context to smuggle weapons, explosives, and humans. The LTTE carried out illegal activities with the help of the coastal fishing populations in both Sri Lanka and India (Goonetilleke & Colombage, 2016). A major impediment to prevention by the Sri Lanka Navy was the inability to distinguish Sea Tigers from the local fishermen (Suryanarayan, 2005).

Similarly, research has centred on illegal drug trafficking networks financing terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Maritime drug smuggling is pivotal in funding insurgents in Mozambique (Pirio et al., 2019). Northern Mozambique is a conduit location for the Afghan opium trade before the drugs are transported to Europe and elsewhere (Brewster, 2021). Further, piracy has marked the crime-terror nexus in the East African region. In Somalia, the existence of weak governance structures, a decrease in the domestic catch of fish due to increased illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing by foreign fishing vessels, and the resultant poverty in the local coastal communities influence local fishermen to engage in piracy networks. Piracy has cushioned Al-Shabaab’s activities in Somalia. While motives differ between piracy and terrorist networks, profits from piracy have funded terrorist activity, and the two groups have become entangled in the sphere of criminal activities (Farquhar, 2017; Weldemichael, 2019).

The linkages between peripheral coastal communities and maritime threats often make these communities ‘victims’ and sometimes ‘perpetrators’ influencing the threat phenomenon. In countries where terrorist threats are evident, the crime-terror nexus further defines these threats in the coastal peripheries (Lycan et al., 2020). Interestingly, the crime-terror nexus is less explored in the coastal peripheral towns and the seafronts globally. The crime-terror phenomenon is complex and difficult to distinguish, whether on land or at sea. The symbiotic relationship between organised crime and terrorist organisations has become indistinguishable due to the difficulties associated with the investigations as well as the presence of different types of terrorist groups and organised crime. The evolving relationship between terrorism and crime poses a significant challenge as the activities and milieus of terrorists and criminals increasingly overlap and reinforce each other (Paul & Acheson, 2019). Terrorist and criminal networks often converge in their operations, recruitment patterns, and resonance with local cultural behaviours and thrive on each other’s social networks (Basra & Neumann, 2016).

Methodology, the researched and the coastal peripheries

Ethnographic research on criminalities allows one to understand the social realities of criminal offenders and their activities by immersing oneself in the same social space as the researched participants (Sandberg & Copes, 2012). This case study addresses the question of how the crime-terror nexus on the coastal peripheries can be studied from an ethnographical perspective. This question intersects with the seemingly complicated areas of knowledge production. The role of ethnography in the study of hidden populations and covert mafia-style operations is viewed in terms of the accessibility of the studied populations. Often, this field is envisaged as an exotic, dangerous place where one has to gain access through trust, learn, assess, and also get out again from such spaces (Edwards, 2002).

Acknowledging ethical concerns in researching marginalised communities is important. Throughout history, researching crimes among powerless groups in the margins has often been a concern compared to crimes of the powerful – the elites and the crimes of powerful business interests of the state (Tombs & Whyte, 2010). Crimes in the margins or peripheral communities intersect with the globalisation of crimes where local, state, and international intersect. This is often true in crimes such as drug and arms trafficking, human smuggling, and terrorism. With this concern in mind, it is important to acknowledge that this research⁵ was being conducted on a population perceived as marginalised in the periphery and that proactive steps were taken to ensure that the participants’ views and experiences of the world were truthfully represented, giving them a voice (Becker, 1967). A ‘reflexive’ approach was used by the researcher to conduct the research process, where the respondents’ views of social reality were incorporated into the findings of the research.

Individuals were purposively selected based on their knowledge and experience of the phenomenon studied. Inclusive criteria included local leadership in the communities, such as village elders, chiefs, and youth and women leaders. Others include those affected or associated with the phenomenon, such as local village members, fishermen, boda boda riders, Beach Management Units (BMUs),⁶ local businessmen, Al-Shabaab returnees,⁷ and their family members. Altogether, 62 interviews were conducted. Field visits to six specified localities were conducted. These were spaces highlighted by community members deemed for illegal activities, mainly referred to as border transit points as well as points known for docking ships. Local discussions with village members also added rich insights to the study. Being a female researcher based in the coastal region of Kenya with a long history of being with the coastal communities for more than 10 years provided ample opportunities to select relevant local gatekeepers for the study. Prior to the field work, the researcher and the research assistants conducted a series of 11 interviews via gatekeepers such as village elders, NGO personnel, and youth leaders. This enabled the researcher to pre-test the questions as well as identify participants for in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Depending on the participant’s language fluency, both English and Swahili were used by the researcher and the research assistant during the interview.

The initial discussions facilitated the researcher’s ability to identify selected areas deemed hotspots for different forms of criminality, such as smuggling and human trafficking, in Kenya. Eleven (11) towns were selected in the coastal region, which spanned across three counties, namely Kwale, Kilifi, and Lamu. In Kwale, three coastal towns were studied: Vanga, Majoreni, and Shimoni. In Kilifi, the coastal towns included Mambrui and Ngomeni. In Lamu, the coastal towns included Lamu, Kiunga, Siyu, Faza, Kizingitini, and Ndau. The study was conducted during the January – December 2022 period.

Some participants were interviewed once, while others were interviewed more than once due to the nature of the study and the time needed to build trust with the participants. A few caveats are worth mentioning. This is mainly because criminal activities remain covert and are confined to a few individuals or groups. Second, very few individuals talk about this phenomenon due to fear and intimidation. Third, accessing these hidden populations is difficult, and trust building often takes time in these communities due to suspicion and prevailing crackdowns from law enforcement personnel. Accessibility and safety were key concerns in locations such as Lamu County, where field visits were minimised and confined to discussions at shorelines only. The local research assistant played a pivotal role in conducting the interviews in Lamu.

There were a few commonalities among the sea towns studied. First, the areas were identified as populations that faced complex constellations of structural vulnerabilities such as poverty, exposure to violence and drug use, a lack of educational and employment opportunities, and low health care access. Most of the community members relied on fishing as their main source of livelihood, apart from other economic activities linked to the sea and land. Second, the areas studied were in close proximity to borders, such as Kiunga (Lamu) to Somalia and Vanga (Kwale) to Zanzibar and Tanzania. Most of these locations were known as conduit points for Al-Shabaab and ISIS activities such as terrorist recruitment, harbouring, and logistic support for extremists. Hence, these areas had strong trade ties with these border towns. Third, social, cultural, and relational ties were also prevalent due to intermarriages, friendships, and relationships between communities in these border towns. Historical linkages were evident due to close relationships between certain ethnicities, such as the Diego, Pemba, and Swahili, in the border areas of these coastal towns in Kwale and Tanzania.

Characteristics of the participants

Out of the total sample size (62), 51, representing 82%, were males; the remaining 11, representing 18%, were females. Thirty-one of the participants (50%) fell within the age range of 21–30 years. 8% of the participants from the various communities fell below the age of 20. 19% of the participants fell within the age range of 31–40, and 11% of the participants were in the 41–50-year age range. 3% were over 51 years old. The study targeted people mainly within the age range of 18–40. The reason being that our preliminary interaction with the people in the communities revealed that individuals within this age range were active in their livelihoods and would provide us with greater insights on the study. The majority of those interviewed were fishermen, with their main source of livelihood linked to fishing. Some of the participants were involved in selling fish in the market (55%). This also included five women. 20% were involved with the boda boda (motorbike taxi) transportation services; 11% were from the Beach Management Units (BMUs); 3% were involved in small-scale businesses; 3% were law enforcers; and 8% were working as tourist guides, beach operators, and matatu operators.

Out of the 62 participants from the various communities, 23 (37%) have attained primary education, 19 (31%) have secondary education, and 14 (23%) have been schooled up to tertiary level. Nine (9%) did not have any schooling. The 37% who ended their education at the primary level reported that they stopped schooling due to financial constraints. The study also looked at the number of years individuals had lived in their respective communities. It was necessary to strategically select people who had strong affiliations and had lived in the communities for a long time to understand the local evolving dynamics of livelihoods and change. The majority of the participants in the study have lived in their community for over ten years (65%). Others have lived in the location for between five and ten years (27%) and some for less than five years (8%). Therefore, the majority of the participants have lived in the communities long enough to provide insights to the researcher and elicit relevant information.

Traversing the crime-terror nexus in the coastal peripheries of Kenya

Since the 1980s, transnational terrorist attacks have marked Kenya’s security landscape. Particularly, the attack by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the Norfolk Hotel, owned by Jews in Nairobi, became a pivotal point for anti-Jewish sentiments. In 1998, Kenya became a crucial hub for terrorist attacks when Al-Qaeda bombed the United States embassy in Nairobi, killing over 200 people and injuring thousands more. This was followed by attacks such as the Kikambala Hotel in Mombasa in 2002 and the anti-aircraft missile fired in an attempt at the downing of an Israeli chartered passenger jet at Moi International Airport in 2002. After 2011, Kenya also experienced an increase in the number of attacks led by Al-Shabaab, a militant group based in Somalia. These include the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the Mpeketoni attacks in 2014, the Garissa University attack in 2015, the DUSIT complex attack in 2019, and the Camp Simba attack aimed at a US military base in Manda Bay, Lamu, in 2020 (Lopez, 2022). This was followed by subsequent terror attacks in Lamu since 2021, attacks at the Lamu-Garissa Road in 2023 (Ombati, 2023), among other attacks in the country, particularly in the northeast of Kenya.

The unclear nature of crimes and their intersections with terrorism makes it difficult to distinguish the phenomenon in the coastal peripheries of Kenya. However, few accounts have highlighted the crime-terror convergence in Kenya (Daghar, Okumo & Simon Daghar, 2021; Petricht 2019). Lamu, a location researched in this study, has been marked for the past two decades for terrorist activities. Being in the Indian Ocean, the islets in Lamu (Pate, Manda, and Lamu) have been a focus for security for Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab activities (Mwangi, 2022). Hamad (2016) provided an exclusive account of how Al-Qaeda used boats to transport explosives, which were later assembled to bomb the U.S.A. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 2008. With the evolution of the Al-Shabaab, sea ports such as Kismayu, Merca, and Baraawe are seen to be active in the trafficking of arms and combatants. The Al-Shabaab uses boats to move fighters and in their recruitment efforts between Kenya and Somalia (Jacobsen & Høy-Carrasco, 2018). Recently, studies revealed the use of vessels to move explosives, supplies, and combatants by the two terrorist organisations, Al-Shabaab and Ansar al-Sunna wal Jammah/ASWJ (Ras & Lycan 2020). In a study on Al-Shabaab recruitment of women and girls in Kenya, the author highlights recruitment to the Al-Shabaab network via sea routes via trafficking (Badurdeen, 2020).

The Lamu islets have become a safe haven or conduit for terrorist activities such as the abduction of western tourists from Kiwayu Island in 2011 (Nyagah et al., 2017). The Faza Island hosted the slain Al-Qaeda mastermind from Comoros, Fazul Abdalla Mohamed, who lived on the Island and invested in the community by uplifting local fishing livelihoods using his fishing company. Fazul also used his fishing company and his local football club to recruit militants for Somalia (Beja, 2015).

Coastal towns in Kenya such as Vanga, Shimoni, and Lunga Lunga have been placed under the constant watch of law enforcement authorities, mainly the Kenya Coast Guard, who are on the lookout for criminals and militants who may want to return via the Indian Ocean. The recent peak of surveillance comes after a series of attempts by the security agencies to thwart an attack in Mombasa in August 2021. Increased vigilance on the porous borders via the sea meant increasing patrolling the borders of Kenya and Tanzania and the sea routes where criminals and militants made their way into Kenya from Tanzania, Mozambique, and Somalia. The media report, ‘Security agencies put Keya-Tanzania border on terror watch list’, highlighted that the Kenyan authorities believed that ‘terror suspects with Kenyan roots could be fleeing the Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado, where an Islamist insurgency is gaining strength, to return to Kenya’ (Cece, 2011).

Factors facilitating the crime-terror nexus in the coastal peripheries

Crimes intersected with local livelihoods, thereby narrowing the line between legal and illegal activities. This makes it important to assess what locals define as crimes in their communities (Polizzi, 2015; Wikstrom & Samson, 2006). During the fieldwork, most participants clearly distinguished criminal activities as unlawful or illegal. Nevertheless, some participants navigated their answers to reflect on specific criminal activities as part of their livelihood or a ‘livelihood option’. Charo, a fisherman from Vanga, explained that once his boat was hired, he was not interested in what the boat was used for. Fishermen who owned boats hired their boats and collected their dues in the evenings or after one or two rides. Those who hired the boats try to maximise their profits by ferrying passengers and goods in these boats to earn an extra income apart from their fishing. Sometimes, criminal groups used these boats to ferry their people or illicit goods. Boat owners were interested in their dues and rarely wanted to know what the hired fisherman or boatmen did or what their passengers were doing. Boat owners like Charo hardly considered themselves engaging in criminal activities or being part of a larger crime syndicate, as they were not aware of what the boat was used for. For Charo, the boat was his means of livelihood; hence, he felt that it was not criminal because he did not know what the boat would be used for, as he stated, ‘I am poor and have mouths to feed; everyone here does it [hire boats], so it is more like a norm’.⁸

The thin line between the ‘legal’ and the ‘illegal’ in livelihoods (Van de Bunt et al. 2014) did reflect the narrative on how some people viewed human smuggling or those involved with the trade. What was considered illegal or criminal by the state was justified under the milieu of livelihood, which benefited some local communities. Ahmed, a boda boda operator from Majoreni, explained that human smuggling, while considered ‘illegal’, has been a livelihood option for many local community members who strive to make ends meet in his community. In communities where many young people are school dropouts and unemployed, these individuals face the crisis of looking after their families. The lack of opportunities in the local neighbourhoods and the impact of COVID-19 on the fish trade pushed young men to engage more in these illegal livelihood options and become part of crime syndicates. According to Ahmed, most Boda Boda transporters [motorbike transporters] are involved in these crimes [trafficking goods and smuggling people]. This enables a Boda transporter to earn 1000 Kenyan shillings [USD 10] for one migrant to be smuggled from one place to another. This becomes a lucrative livelihood option for a transporter who has to pay 300 shillings [3 USD] for the bike per day for the owner, as bikes are hired and rarely owned by the transporter. Often, the balance of the earnings is used to fuel the bike, and the rest is used to feed himself and his family.⁹ Understanding the lives of young people and their poverty-stricken households becomes crucial to understanding the local organised crime networks (Polizzi, 2015).

Survival was linked to what some locals defined as ‘illegal’ or ‘criminal’ activities (Rufo, 2019). In areas like Ngomeni, Ndau, and Mbwajumwali, where the youth had very few options, these organised crime syndicates gave them their means of livelihood and survival. Hemed was born and raised in Kiunga. He did not go to school and had no ambition. He wanted a job to survive and to look after his family. He started fishing and later was able to work with his friend as a fisherman. Later, he was able to own a boat. He was involved in doing petty illegal work such as carrying illegal things [illegal drugs] and smuggling people while legally engaged as a fisherman. Everyone knew him as a fisherman, and he was well networked in the community. According to him, survival was important. First, there was the need to feed the family. Then there is the need to understand the turf and survive. If Hemed did not comply, his life and those who lived with him may be unsafe.¹⁰

The key issue seems to be the scale of how illegal activities generate money in the local economy (Beckert & Wehinger, 2012). On a local level, illegal money created people like Hemed – drug peddlers, traffickers, smugglers, and recruiters – who were viewed by some local community members as a survival method. Most of them have gone through what they perceived as structural violence, being marginalised by the state in their peripheries, hence perpetuating violence from generation to generation in a vicious cycle of inequality, poverty, and lack of opportunities (Tilly, 2005). Hemed embodies this finding, as he comes from an area with many people active in the world of crime. He is keenly aware of the fate of those involved in illicit activities, both from the legal implications under the police as well as the stringent punishments by the extremist networks if he absconds. Criminals like Hemed balanced their legal activities with illegal activities as they knew their fates were likely to go to prison. Whenever money circulation increases in illegal economies, more jobs are created in their drug, arms, bribery, fraud, and smuggling businesses among those involved in the local communities. As a result, more opportunities arise to employ others like Hemed, who believe criminal activities are the only way out for their survival and better livelihoods as they have no access to the formal labour market.¹¹

People like Hemed then support their children with money they make from illegal activities, mainly by dealing with trafficking, smuggling, or engaging with terrorist networks. Then they channel these monies to help their legal businesses, such as fishing or running kiosks, uplifting their families and communities in underdeveloped regions. Businesses and businessmen thrive in these criminal activities as they run these syndicates, proving local youth to be foot soldiers in conducting their illegal businesses. These businessmen may often be prominent businessmen or politicians in the area, having control over their spheres of influence and assisting local families and communities.¹² Hence, illegal businesses are almost always associated with legal enterprises, not only because of the need to launder money but also to sustain the cycle of criminal activities. The resulting boundary between legal and illegal therefore creates, on the one hand, big business people and, on the other hand, petty criminals (Reiman & Leighton, 2012) and major criminal factions, whether it’s organised crime syndicates or terrorist activities.

Crisscrossing between organized crimes and terrorism

While piracy and human trafficking are key concerns in maritime security on the East African coast, participants highlighted how organised crimes are connected with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Moreto et al. 2020). Participants paraphrased crimes along the IUU fishing (n = 51) to explain how different illegal methods such as detonations, poison fishing (using types of chemicals that are poisonous to the fish but have fewer effects on humans) were used.¹³ Lack of skills and technology in fishing further impedes local fishermen’s livelihoods compared to foreign fishermen with better fishing technologies and shipping vessels.¹⁴ To navigate these adversities, the local fishermen engaged in illegal fishing methods as it was their only source of livelihood. Few hustle themselves into criminal networks of trafficking or ferrying illegal goods or passengers [smuggling migrants or combatants].¹⁵

Smuggling of contraband goods (n = 42) was mentioned as illegal but described as ‘normal’ due to the demand for these goods in the local communities and the major towns. Major contraband items smuggled by boatmen across the sea included sugar, cooking oil, soap, and rice to the coastal towns in Kenya.¹⁶ Hamid, a youth from Majoreni, explained that the demand for cheaper food items is increasing due to the increased costs of household commodities in Kenya. This prompts individuals to bring these goods from Tanzania. Hence, when contraband goods are brought to our ports, ‘we do not make it an issue. It’s illegal, but it puts food on our tables’.¹⁷There is a thin line between legal and illegal activities in these communities, especially when the illegality of crime is associated with their livelihoods. Illegal is not the same as criminal. Although these two terms seem similar as used by the locals, people often use them interchangeably. Not every illegal activity is a criminal activity, while, on the other hand, every activity that is deemed a criminal activity is always an illegal activity.

Smuggling of illegal drugs or narcotics (n = 38) was also mentioned as a crime, and some locals were involved in transporting Miraa [Khat, an illegal drug] to Tanzania. Locals explained that these illegal goods were loaded into boats and concealed using newspaper wrappers, clothes, shoes, or inside detergent buckets.¹⁸ Drugs and the transport of weapons (n = 12), mainly small arms, happened in their localities clandestinely. Most cases came to be known by the locals only when incidents came to the limelight, such as when they were seized by law enforcement officials or during police interrogations.¹⁹ In Mambrui, a coastal town in Kilifi County, small weapons are accessible as they are transported via the sea. It was alleged that these came from Somalia to facilitate gangs.²⁰ In localities in Lamu, participants explained how drugs and weapons get transported from one location to another via fishermen and boat riders. Fishermen and boat riders may engage in transporting illegal items along with their fish for money. Sometimes, illegal items are carried unknowingly when boat riders ferry passengers from one island to another. The lack of scrutiny by boat riders of their passengers and their goods is easily exploited by criminals.²¹

Human smuggling was mentioned as a crime in all the locations studied (n = 22). Jacobsen and Hoy-Carrasco (2018) describe how revenue from drug and migrant smuggling funds both Al-Shabaab and ASWJ on the East African coast. Most of the migrants who went via these southern migration routes were Somalians, Ethiopians, and a few Eritreans who made their way along these sea routes, taking the risks involved to reach their destinations in South Africa or Europe (Barasa & Fernandez, 2015).²² Lamu is in a pivotal location to enable local and foreign migrants to make their way to Yemen and the Middle East with the prospect of finding jobs. These routes are exploited by human traffickers and smugglers, who also transport Al-Shabaab combatants. Differentiating migrants from combatants is not an easy task for boat riders, whose only task is to take migrants from one point to another associated with the larger crime syndicate.²³

Migrants for the southern route (enroute to Mozambique or South Africa) make their way using boats from Kenyan shores to the next stop, such as Tanzania or Zanzibar. The fishermen or boat riders transport these migrants from one point to another. A trip may range from 3000–20000 Kenyan shillings [30–200 USD] per person based on the distance and negotiations for the ride.²⁴ From each point, a new boat rider or the local boda boda [motorbike transporters] or small car transporters are involved to take them to their next destination via sea or land routes. Often the migrants are transported to Taru, Majoreni, Kinango, Lunga Lunga [in Kenya], and then all the way to Darussalam, Baga Moyo [in Tanzania].²⁵ Mostly, it is youth who are involved in carrying these migrants, as most boda boda transporters are run by youth who are school dropouts making a living from this trade. Each transport trip from one town to another may range from 1000–5000 Kenyan shillings [10–50 USD] per person.²⁶

Crime and terrorist networks thrived on the availability of unemployed youth

Unemployed youth with scanty opportunities finds solace in illegitimate economies (Bajada & Schneider, 2009). Drug abuse, drug peddling, and juvenile and criminal gangs become available options for children and youth. Often, drugs such as cocaine, mira, mugokha, or bang are effortlessly accessible in the studied locations. These localities have their own dynamics of control over their trade. Young kids at the age of seven or eight are tangled in drug peddling and drug use. School dropouts become a conducive group for gang recruitment. Women or elderly women are used to conceal illegal drugs in their homes or in small kiosks [shops] to mitigate surveillance.²⁷ Local gangs call themselves the ‘men of the town’ as they take control of these towns. Armed gangs protect drug or weapon cartels and those who buy and sell these products. A local businessman from Kizingithi explained how weapons are sold and young boys are recruited to the Al-Shabaab in the locality.

‘You only need to know the right person, who will direct you to the right member in the gangs. He will assist you in acquiring drugs or weapons. This is the same strategy for recruitment. These gangs help the Al-Shabaab recruiters recruit youth from this place. No one talks to the police. If you are seen talking, they will kill you. You may find many in this locality adhering to extremist values. They would rather die for the cause than give information to the police.²⁸

Youth disappearances marked some of the villages along the coast. The local term ‘being sold’ was a term used for boys or girls who were trafficked or involuntarily²⁹ recruited into the Al-Shabaab (Badurdeen, 2020; 2021).³⁰ Masud, a native from Lamu, explained the plight of his friend, who disappeared in 2021. According to Masud, his friend was ‘sold’ to a woman in Faza, where he remained at her house. Later, he was handed over to two other men. They later handed him over again to a group en route to Somalia. After days of travelling with these men, Noor met other boys who also joined him. In the end, all of them ended up in the camps and went through Al-Shabaab training. Noor’s expertise as a boat rider made him engage in transporting people from Kizingitini to Ndau. Since he is never in one place, his parents have never been able to trace him. The parents believed that the reason Noor cannot return is because he fears the group [Al-Shabaab]’.³¹

Locals aided or had a ‘no care’ attitude on local crime networks

Illegal boats or ships (also referred to by the locals as unknown boats) frequented coastal ports or waters. A few locals facilitated the movement of goods and passengers via these unknown boats. On the high seas, rarely do these boats or ships operate within regulations or have their AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponders switched on for fear of detection and surveillance.³² Amidst passengers going for business or local visits, the local participants were also aware that some individuals were smuggled in as migrants or trafficked to join the Al-Shabaab. Most fishermen and the community were aware of the people who travelled back and forth in the waters, but there were not much the fishermen could do as human smuggling was quite normalised in some of their localities as locals revealed a ‘no care attitude’ to this practice and some feared the crime networks.³³

Families are employed by crime networks to conduct their clandestine activities (EUCPN, 2020). In Majoreni, some participants mentioned family members being involved in human trafficking networks strengthening the role of kinship and informal trust in crime networks (Zaitch, 2002). The son or the father may bring the individual using boda bodas [motorbike transport] to the next point or may give space in their houses for days till they are taken by their boats to the next destination. The women in the houses catered to their daily sustenance needs until the day the migrants could travel.³⁴ In areas such as Kizingitini, families played roles in harbouring Al-Shabaab or gang members, their weapons, and assisting them to travel from one place to another until they completed their activities.³⁵ Local homes were used as guest houses to host smuggled or trafficked individuals as well as terrorists (Kazungu, 2018). Abdul, a native from Faza, explained how some of the local houses or guest houses in Faza and Kiunga were instrumental in hosting criminals [traffickers, smugglers, and terrorists]. Specific Swahili houses were known as homes for criminal networks. House spacing can be given for days, weeks, or months until the completion of their activities. Some house owners were aware of the network, while some guesthouse owners were unaware of the tenants as these individuals just rented out their premises’.³⁶

Fear and intimidation became the foundations of these criminal syndicates (Lane & Meeker, 2003). The ‘no care’ attitude of locals towards clandestine activities was tied to the fear involved in associating with these networks. Ali, a boda boda transporter, explained that locals feared these crimes and terrorist networks as the operations often engaged violence. Some local fishermen and businessmen were involved and played a key role in facilitating local smuggling chains, asserting their own circles of control.³⁷ These locals who were involved in these networks varied in their positioning in the smuggler-trafficker networks. Some were facilitators for planning, while others were just involved in local logistic support. Some of those involved in carrying out meagre jobs of logistic support did not even know the complete syndicate; ‘it’s a matter of what you are expected to do and not to question back. You are paid for your work. They have their own code of conduct to which to adhere’.³⁸

Fear was used by the crime-terror networks to intimidate community members or specific individuals into supporting or contributing to their activities. The culture of intimidation inculcated by these syndicates prevents locals from reporting. Razak, a fisherman living in Lamu, explained how locals who had reported on gangs or Al-Shabaab had been threatened, and some had even lost their lives: ‘either they disappear or they end dead. We mind our business for our own safety. Nor will anyone trust the police here.³⁹ Lack of trust in the police culminated in histories of police violence, which limits reporting (Boateng, 2018). Delayed responses by the police in some localities further complicated the trust in law enforcement personnel.⁴⁰

Deteriorating state-citizen relationship

Crime and terror networks thrive in areas of deteriorating state-citizen relationships and ungoverned spaces (Rabasa et al., 2007). As explored in the study, these localities include areas where the state has little presence and resources to maintain security over the porous border (Winter, 2019), hence being often represented by the control of gangs, shadow economies, corruption, and local conflicts. In locations where the state is seen as unfair in terms of local development or the existence of perceived marginalisation by the state, locals consider involvement with non-state violent actors as a means to revenge or fight the state (Nyagah et al., 2017). The state was viewed as unjust in implementing laws where rich businesses were favoured with regard to those laws (Reiman & Leighton, 2012). Faiz, a fisherman from Vanga, describes laws as only aimed at the poor fishermen, such as illegal fishing or exclusive fishing areas; when these laws were broken, they were penalised. However, according to Faiz, the rich fishermen found their way through the corrupt state system.⁴¹ Therefore, marginalised local contexts provide home bases for terrorist groups within emerging symbiotic relationships between local crime groups and terrorist networks operating within the local peripheral communities (Shelley et al., 2005).

Organised crimes and terrorist networks tend to flourish where local law enforcement standards are low and they cannot successfully police communities due to an existing trust deficit between the state apparatus and community members (Okwany, 2023). For some participants, the high rates of bribery and corruption with law enforcement personnel were seen as the main culprits for the deteriorating police-community relationships (Hope, 2018). The high rates of bribery and corruption impeded some of the fishermen and boda boda riders from earning a decent living. As the need for bribes increases, corruption increases in a context where locals need to find ways to manoeuvre around the laws and engage in illicit activities, often paving the way for criminal syndicates to operate in the localities.⁴²

Tactical convergence between criminal groups and terrorist networks

The relationship between criminality and terrorism is scanty amidst the existence of environments conducive to criminal activities. The modus operandi of criminal and terrorist networks is confined to a few individuals and groups, and access to those associated with or knowledgeable about these networks is challenging. The interrelationship between terrorism and organised crime in Kenya is widely debated. However, studies show that terrorist groups use existing avenues of illicit and licit activities to strengthen their modus operandi (Daghar, 2021, Petricht, 2019). Thematically, tactical convergence between the two organisations can be defined as sharing spaces and techniques during operations, as well as financial and political convergence in organisational motives.

Sharing spaces and tactics during operations

Terrorists’ activities tend to go along with crimes that are associated with street-level criminal groups in specific localities in the coastal region of Kenya. Studies point out that street gangs, in their cafeteria-style offences with rare specialisation on one particular offence, are unattractive partners for both organised crime and terrorist networks (Curry et al., 2014). However, in gang-prone localities, these groups interact in shared spaces and pool their skills (Morselli, 2009). Locals explained a thriving environment for trafficking drugs and Al-Shabaab recruitment with a high rate of gang activity in localities such as Mambrui, Faza, Kiunga, Mbwajumwali, and Majoreni. Often, when Al-Shabaab activities were evident, locals or the media highlighted them as ‘just an activity of a local criminal gang’.⁴³ Specific localities like Ndau and Kiwayuu [Lamu] are infamously known for criminal gangs and Al-Shabaab recruitment. Locals stated that ‘most wanted’ criminals or gangs come and hide in these towns. These areas do have Al-Shabaab sympathisers and provide safe havens for recruiters, traffickers, and smugglers alike. Community members explained how they are unable to distinguish street youth gangs and their involvement in criminalities:

“There are many different gangs here. Some are criminals, and some are just young men threatening village members. Al-Shabaab members are not easy to identify in this village, as they are also referred to as ‘criminals’ or ‘thugs’. You do not know who is who until you find a youth disappearing or is on the watchlist of the police. It is then that we know their involvement and their crimes’.⁴⁴

Drug trafficking networks also used Al-Shabaab tactics to strengthen their operations. For example, in Kiunga, local crime groups distributed threatening leaflets signed ‘Al-Shabaab’ to keep people away from specific localities to enable them to carry out their activities. Locals in these panic-stricken environments refrained from going outside their homes. Later, community members felt that these leaflets had nothing to do with Al-Shabaab; however, they did not want to take the risk because these localities were known to harbour Al-Shabaab members. Hence, the Al-Shabaab name was used by criminals and juvenile gangs for their operations.⁴⁵

Similarly, Al-Shabaab members often hid in local criminal gangs to seek protection from the police. This was also true in the case of Al-Shabaab returnees, who, when disillusioned, may abscond from the organisation and seek refuge in crime groups (Blume, 2019). For some members who had a background of being with criminal groups, coming back meant reuniting with their old gang members (ICSR, 2016). In Kwale, criminal gangs increased with the Al-Shabaab returnees coming back from Somalia (Ahmed, 2019). There is also the context of legal offences. For some returnees, getting caught for criminal offences was considered less stressful than getting caught as an Al-Shabaab member, where terrorism charges may apply.⁴⁶

As community acceptance towards returnees was low, the returnees had to find ‘home’ with local gangs or crime groups. To navigate police surveillance, the crime groups provided a safe haven as well as enabled engaging in illicit trade activities as a livelihood option.⁴⁷Criminal gangs and the Al-Shabaab networks saw the police as their common enemy. The two syndicates join together to attack the police or the local administrators, such as the area chief and the subchief (Ochieng, 2020). A reformed gang member from Kizingitini explained his experiences with his gang and the Al-Shabaab relationship in providing each other safe havens as follows:

‘Here people consume drugs and peddle drugs as well. I was part of a gang in Kizingitini. Gangs provide us with safety and opportunities to survive. We had our own maskani in Mbwajumwali [Kizingitini]. Mostly, we were involved in petty crimes and used to raid villages in Tchundwa, Siyuu, Nyambogi, and Shanga. In 2020, a police officer was killed in Tchundwa by gangs. There was an intense crackdown on gangs. Most of my friends fled to Somalia for safety. From 2020 to 2021, we remained with the Al-Shabaab and came back, but we could not stay in our villages. After some time, my villagers accepted me, as they knew I had reformed after the death of my mother.⁴⁸

Headhunting the right individual in the crime-terror linkage

The crime and terrorist networks are dependent on skilled individuals to carry out their specific tasks (Badurdeen, 2021; Sahgal & Zeuthen, 2020). Networks are dependent on transporting members or goods from one place to another or assisting their tactical operations. For example, a woman leader described the case of a young man named ‘Noor’, who was known to be a criminal in the locality, during the fieldwork. According to her, Noor’s involvement with criminal gangs and knowledge of navigating around local police structures due to his previous drug peddling skills probably strengthened his use for the terrorist network.⁴⁹ Therefore, it was seen that individuals who have prior knowledge of local surveillance and have the ability to navigate surveillance and use deceptive strategies are vital for tactical operations. Criminal syndicates recruited local fishermen for their knowledge and expertise of the seas and maritime landscapes, such as mangrove shelters or local patrols for surveillance. For example, in Vanga and Majoreni, mangrove shelters are mostly used by the smugglers, which provide spaces and ample time for changing boats, staying over, hiding goods or people, and also for boat fuelling.⁵⁰

Involved in these crimes are those skilled in the use of their fishing vessels to transport illegal goods, the use of ports to dock, and navigation skills to remain undetected by law enforcement surveillance. Local fishermen switch off their lights at night until they finish loading. Once unloaded, the lights on their ships will be switched on. This prevents surveillance by the maritime police or the Navy. Similarly, goods hidden under the boats or beneath the fish are not visible during patrolling. Ships and boats pass these surveillance points due to the knowledge of fishermen in the local community. Illegal drugs and weapons make their way despite highly patrolled sea routes. Even smuggled people hide under goods to bypass surveillance. Those involved know their way in and out of the seas and shores.⁵¹ Often, individuals on the network knew one another, and they spoke in their own words and phrases to bypass surveillance. Often, smuggled or trafficked individuals or things were referred to as ‘boxes’. It was a common term used by fishermen to describe cooler boxes used to store fish.⁵² Most criminal convergence settings took place at night or during high tide seasons, averting surveillance. Most people risked their lives in these illicit undertakings to bypass surveillance at night and during high tide seasons.⁵³

Convergence on finance or political motives

Organised criminal gangs often converge with terrorist networks in their financial and political motives to reach their objectives (Makarenko, 2004). Criminal gangs are either absorbed into the Al-Shabaab network or vice versa, for profit motives. The criminal gang’s connectedness with the Al-Shabaab may involve money for drug use, weapons, protection from the police, and even maintaining power in their localities. In some localities, most of the criminal gangs involved with drug peddling were considered to be highly involved with local Al-Shabaab networks. These local criminal gangs needed the money to maintain their drug use behaviour; hence, they became a pivotal group as foot soldiers for both the criminal gangs and Al-Shabaab in these peripheral communities. Human and drug trafficker networks further enabled Al-Shabaab combatants to travel back and forth using their members expertise in local navigation skills.⁵⁴ In Malindi, locals explained how young boys disappeared by sea or land to be later known as being recruited by the Al-Shabaab. According to them, local financiers funded the boys to be transported from one location to another until they reached Somalia.⁵⁵

In Lamu, narratives pointed out the prevailing politically affiliated land deals shaping the crime-terror nexus in gang-controlled areas. During the Mpeketoni (a town in Lamu) attack, which killed 48 individuals (Anderson, 2014), local narratives explained the convergence of local and external gangs and their association with local politicians. The politics of land due to rival ethnicities between ‘local inhabitants’ and ‘outsiders’ occupying land became a factor in the horrendous attack. However, local Al-Shabaab networks were alleged to have carried out the attack, aided by local elites, politicians, and their affiliates.⁵⁶

Local elite financiers became pivotal in the crime-terror nexus in the coastal region. Financiers were rich businessmen, well integrated into the community with their abilities for social projects such as building local schools and mosques, as well as providing welfare opportunities for community members. It was stated that these financiers funded local gangs, political campaigns, and terrorist networks.⁵⁷Others explained that these financiers were engaged in drug and human trafficking networks⁵⁸ and some acted as conduits for money flows (Wasike, 2020) between these networks.⁵⁹Despite some community members knowing about the financier-crime relationships, they rarely reported them due to fear or the benefits they received from the financiers. Financiers also became the link to politicians, as they had the ability to fund political campaigns as well as enable gangs to provide politicians with protection during campaigns. In return, local politicians may succumb to the temptation to assist financiers with support during arrests or raids.⁶⁰

These syndicates of organised criminality and terrorist networks funded by elite financiers have the ability to collude with the state’s white-collar criminals, wherein lawyers, accountants, and bankers have the ability to cover them up and launder their profits. These white-collar professionals drive the local and regional black markets, enabling the survival of the syndicates (Covlea, 2016). However, at the helm of those indicted for crimes are the foot soldiers, the local drug peddler, the fisherman, or the boat rider, whose roles amount to a faction of the syndicate. Therefore, disrupting the miniature supply change rarely halts the syndicate, as those arrested are immediately replaced. The state and law enforcement need to thrive to disrupt the unaddressed multitier network, focused specifically at the leadership and management levels of white-collar criminals.

Finally, and most important, is to understand the motives of those involved in criminal activities and how they are involved with terrorist networks or vice versa. Motives change with the needs of the individual and the criminal syndicate. Political and religious ideologies influence the Al-Shabaab network. Similarly, the motive of many organised criminal networks is profit-making. These syndicates operate on the margins, where individuals thrive on changing the existing status quo. Therefore, criminals could contribute to wielding money and power for local members, who later would want to influence political change. Such individuals may tend to support extremist or terrorist networks. Shelley et al. (2005) concluded in their study that although the motives of terrorists and organised criminals are seemingly different, the links that separate such groups are growing increasingly complex, such that the separation of motives is no longer explicit.

Concluding remarks

Coastal communities manifested the normalisation of crimes when crimes tangled with their livelihoods. Locals justified themselves as being unaware of their involvement in crime, while others justified the normalisation of crimes as an output of complex factors in their localities such as persistent poverty and inequality, political violence, and structural violence embedded in historical grievances tied to cycles of underdevelopment in the peripheral communities. The presence of disgruntled youth and drug abuse facilitates a conducive base for organised crime groups and terrorist networks to recruit and operate. Lack of opportunities for young men and women coupled with the desire for material things, peer pressure, fashion, and sophisticated lifestyles with the conquest for social mobility causes motives for delinquency for quick money.

In the coastal peripheries of Kenya, the crime-terror nexus may be strengthened via intimidation strategies rather than alliances alone. In specific environments, such as the coastal peripheries, where the state apparatus seems too far away to intervene, juvenile or criminal gangs can be forcefully recruited into Al-Shabaab via intimidation tactics. Often, Al-Shabaab’s survival is linked to the local expertise of criminal gangs. Criminal gang members could be co-opted voluntarily or via intimidation methods. Therefore, further research is needed to explore the different motives and operational tactics of the two groups to better understand the maritime crime-terror nexus in Kenya.

Fuelled by intimidation and fear, the two syndicates operate in coastal peripheries where communities face pressure to comply for their survival. Efforts made by law enforcement to curtail maritime crimes and terrorist activities in the localities were evident but limited due to the existentially complex modus operandi of the different syndicates. Therefore, mitigation efforts necessitate knowledge of the socio-cultural, political, and economic factors of the localities so that law enforcers can play their role without deteriorating the already existing trust deficit between community members and the police.

Raising awareness about the recruitment of members and the modus operandi of organised crime and terrorist syndicates in peripheral communities has potential for mitigation and prevention. Often, locals are entrapped in the syndicate due to existential vulnerabilities. Once entrapped, the members are unable to move out of these criminal networks. Hence, knowledge of the modus operandi may enable individuals to be cautious of the syndicates. Knowledge building needs to be furthered on reporting mechanisms so that locals will know where and when to report such crimes. Lack of knowledge on reporting procedures and the mistrust of the police prevent locals from bringing out information, which could potentially strengthen the local intelligence gathering apparatuses (Zeuthen et al., 2022). Efforts to strengthen and increase patrolling, specifically along the coast and in the maritime sector, are an emerging need to mitigate maritime crime-terror interactions in Kenya.

Scrutinising the motives of the criminal gangs and terrorist networks sheds different perspectives on similarities and differences. The common principle in the crime-terror nexus is that terrorist and criminal groups are linked via methods but rarely based on similar motives. However, the prolonged coexistence of friendship between the two syndicates may evolve to influence similar motives in the long run. This may be due to sustaining operational tactics in the same localities where politics can be used to instrumentalise policies to deter criminality, which can affect both syndicates. Hence, incorporating a crime analysis lens to understand the motives and tactics of the two groups can elucidate the crime-terror convergence.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Ngombeni is a coastal town in Malindi, Kilifi County, Kenya.

2. All names are pseudonyms used in this study.

3. Interview with fisherman (A21), Ngombeni, Kilifi, July 2022.

4. Interview with Beach Management Unit personnel (A15), Shimoni, Kwale, January 2022.

5. The findings emanated from a larger project on recruitment dynamics for the Al-Shabaab under the research permit, NACOSTI/P/19/248.

6. In Kenya, beach management units were established for each fish landing station by the director in accordance with the provisions of the Fisheries Act, focusing on the strengthening of the management of fish landing sites.

7. Al-Shabaab is a designated terrorist organisation originating from Somalia with transnational links in many East African countries. Al-Shabaab returnees are those who have gone from Kenya to Somalia and are returning to Kenya.

8. Interview with fisherman (A3), Vanga, January 2022.

9. Interview with boda boda transporter (A16), Majoreni, January 2022.

10. Interview with fisherman (A47), Kiunga, June 2022.

11. Interview 2 with Village Elder (A2), Vanga, January 2022.

12. Interview with woman leader, (A30) Ngomeni, May 2022; and Interview with Religious leader, Vanga, January 2022.

13. Interview with Fisherman (21), Shimoni, Kwale, January 2022.

14. Interview with village elder (A5) Vanga, January 2022.

15. Interview with fishermen, (A4) Vanga, January 2022.

16. Interview with village elder (A6), Vanga, January 2022.

17. Interview with youth leader (A13), Majoreni, January 2022.

18. Interview with BMU personnel (A24), Shimoni, January 2022.

19. Interview with woman leader (A48), Lamu, July 2022.

20. Interview with religious leader (A35), Mambrui, April 2022.

21. Interview with boat rider (A57), Kiunga, June 2022.

22. Interview with youth leader (A37), Mambrui, April 2022.

23. Interview with woman leader (A43), Kiunga, June 2022.

24. Interview with fisherman, (A4), Vanga, January 2022.

25. Interview with fisherman, (A4), Vanga, January 2022.

26. Interview with boda-boda motorbike transporter (A1), Majoreni, January 2022.

27. Interview with youth (A59), Kizingithini, July 2022.

28. Interview with youth (A59), Kizingithini, July 2022.

29. Interview with fisherman, (A44), Lamu, June 2022.

30. Voluntary recruitment to terrorist recruitment involved the willingness to join the network due to intrinsic or extrinsic factors. Involuntary recruitment referred to those who were forced to join the network via deceptive practices or trafficked into the network. For a detailed understanding see: Badurdeen, F. A. (Badurdeen, 2020). ; Women who volunteer: a relative autonomy perspective in Al-Shabaab female recruitment in Kenya. Critical Studies on Terrorism. DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2020.1810993

31. Interview with boat rider (A45), Lamu, June 2022.

32. Interview with BMU personnel (A22), Shimoni, January 2022.

33. Interview with boat rider (A50), Lamu, August 2022.

34. Interview with village elder (A16), Majoreni, Kwale, January 2022.

35. Interview with fisherman (A44), Lamu, June 2022.

36. Interview with businessman (A58), Faza, July 2022.

37. Interview with Boda Boda rider (A12), Mambrui, May 2022.

38. Interview with youth (A58), Kiunga, July 2022.

39. Interview with fisherman (A44), Lamu, June 2022.

40. Interview with woman leader (A43), Lamu, June 2022.

41. Interview with fisherman, (A7) Vanga, Kwale, January 2022.

42. Interview with fisherman, (A23) Majoreni, Kwale, January 2022.

43. Interview with women leader (A56), Faza, July 2022.

44. Interview with businessman (A58), Faza, July 2022.

45. Interview with Religious Leader, Kiunga (A42), June 2022.

46. Interview with NGO Personnel, Lamu (A50), June 2022.

47. Interview with youth leader, Faza (A59), June 2022.

48. Interview with reformed gang member (A48), Kizingithini, July 2022.

49. Interview with boat rider (A45), Lamu, June 2022.

50. Interview with fisherman, (A7) Vanga, Kwale, January 2022.

51. Interview with youth leader, (A18) Majoreni, Kwale, January 2022.

52. Interview with fisherman, (A23) Majoreni, Kwale, January 2022.

53. Interview with fisherman, (A23) Majoreni, Kwale, January 2022.

54. Interview with fisherman, (A44), Lamu, June 2022.

55. Interview with youth leader, (A37), Mambrui, April 2022.

56. Interview with NGO Personnel, Lamu (A50), June 2022.

57. Interview with NGO Personnel, Lamu (A50), June 2022.

58. Interview with fisherman, (A7) Vanga, Kwale, January 2022.

59. Interview with youth leader, (A37), Mambrui, April 2022.

60. Interview with women leader, (A36), Malindi, April 2022.