Abstract
De facto states need external support to advance their national interests. Many of them depend on their patron’s assistance, thus becoming their clients. In turn, patronless de facto states derive certain benefits from engaging with various external actors. This study proposes including a new category of actors in this group, namely quasi-patrons, whose relations with de facto states resemble the patron—client relationship. This means that patronless de facto states can enjoy greater external support than the literature suggests. To illustrate the relationship between client de facto states and quasi-patrons, the case of Somaliland and Ethiopia is explored.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Scott Pegg and the anonymous reviewers for their support in improving this paper. The authors also want to thank the participants of the online workshop on quasi-patrons of de facto states, Deon Geldenhuys, Aram Rafaat, and Piotr Sosnowski, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).