Determinants of Individual Support for International Criminal Tribunals

ABSTRACT

This article explores the determinants of individual support for international criminal tribunals using extensive survey data from the Balkans. The surveys were conducted in 2003–2004, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was issuing its final indictments. The article identifies five broad explanations for individual attitudes towards international criminal tribunals: individual proximity, partisan motivations, confidence extrapolation, legal values, and identity-based narratives. The empirical analysis shows that individual attitudes towards ICTY were strongly shaped by partisan motivations, predispositions towards international bodies such as the EU, and ethnonationalism.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to the editors of Ethnopolitics, two anonymous reviewers, Ezgi Yildiz, and Maria Victoria Pérez-Ríos for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data Availability Statement

The data applied in the analysis in this article are based on ‘South East European Social Survey Project—2003–2004’. The survey was financed by Research Council of Norway. The data are provided by Albert Simkus, and prepared and made available by NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data. https://doi.org/10.18712/NSD-NSD1930-V2.

Supplemental Data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2023.2176585.

Notes

1 As Arzt (2006, p. 236) notes, by 2006 there were seven different international criminal tribunals.

2 There is also a separate body of literature on local responses to international tribunals that focuses on how regional organizations, state actors, political elites, and norm entrepreneurs accept or contest them (see for example Chaudoin, 2016; Mills & Bloomfield, 2018; Iommi, 2020; Klarin, 2009; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2004).

3 The questions about ICTY were not included in the SEESSP survey fielded in Albania.

4 Aguilar et al. (2011, p. 1402) argue that individuals have different views about transitional justice ‘depending on their self-placement on the ideological axis’. See also Chapman and Chaudoin (2020).

5 The data applied in the analysis in this article are based on ‘South East European Social Survey Project – 2003–2004’. The survey was funded by the Western Balkan program of the Research Council of Norway. The data are provided by Albert Simkus, and prepared and made available by NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research Data. https://doi.org/10.18712/NSD-NSD1930-V2.

6 Locality size is coded as an ordinal variable following the coding in SEEESP survey. The categories range from one (‘just a small place for a family farm or a few other people’) to eight (‘capital of the country, republic or entity).

7 Personal loss is coded as a dummy variable with 0 = No and 1 = Yes. This coding of victimization is in line with other studies that have used the same survey data (see for example Dyrstad, 2013).

8 Specifically, I used the survey question ‘Did you actively fight in the war in this country?’ Possible responses are 1 = Yes, 0 = No. Those who did not answer were removed from the analysis.

9 In Kosovo, this includes support for PDK, AAK, and LKÇK. In Croatia, support for HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) and Samostalna Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SSDS). In Macedonia, support for Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). In Montenegro, support for the coalition DPS-SDP-GP, led by Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), which was in power during the Yugoslav wars. In Serbia, this includes support for Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian Radical Party (SRS), and the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ).

10 More specifically, sample B of the survey, which includes the dependent variable, did not include questions about attitudes towards the UN.

11 Cronbach’s alpha is 0.79, factor loadings range from 0.68 to 0.75, and the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.71.

12 Cronbach’s alpha is 0.77, factor loadings range from 0.56 to 0.77, and the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.75.

13 The variable EDUCATION is an ordinal variable indicating respondents’ highest educational degree completed: Elementary School (1); Secondary school degree (2); Third level school (3); High education to Doctoral degree (4). Meernik (2015, p. 584) finds that education is positively associated with support for ICTY.

14 Although over time even Kosovo Albanians would organize numerous demonstrations showing dissatisfaction with ICTY (Kelmendi & Skendaj, 2022).

15 In 2007, 69 percent of Kosovo Albanians were partially or very satisfied with the work of ICTY, whereas in 2012 this figure rose to 82 percent. On the other hand, 57 percent of Kosovo Serbs were not satisfied with the work of ICTY in 2007, and this figure rose to 87 percent in 2012 (Milanović, 2016, p. 240). The questions gauging attitudes towards ICTY were not the same, however, thus the comparisons between the surveys and countries should be made with caution.

16 It is important to note, however, that in Croatia ethnic Serbs are more likely to strongly support ICTY efforts than the majority ethnic Croats.

17 The only exception to this is Montenegro, where the political party in power during the war (DPS) had split, and the reformed DPS was in favour of cooperating with ICTY. Indeed, DPS argued that Serbia’s failure to cooperate with ICTY, and its negative impact on Serbia and Montenegro’s integration with the EU, was one of the reasons for pursuing Montenegro’s independence (Kelmendi & Pedraza, 2022, pp. 522–523). Therefore, the positive association between support for DPS and positive attitudes towards ICTY is also consistent with the political partisanship hypothesis.

18 As Ford (2013, pp. 70–71) notes, however, ‘the larger number of Serbian accused and the longer sentences of Serbian accused are justified by the fact that Serbs committed both the largest number of crimes and the most serious crimes’. In addition, ‘the overwhelming academic consensus is that the state of Serbia and the Milosevic regime are to blame for the war onset and the majority of atrocities committed’ (Subotic, 2011, p. 163).

19 The conviction rates for Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians would end up being significantly lower (Ford, 2013, p. 94).

20 I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. ICTY gave a total of 118 judgments between 1996 and 2017. Only 46 of the ICTY judgments were given by the end of March, 2004, when the SEESSP survey was completed.

21 For a similar argument, see Warren et al. (2017).