Abstract
The anti-colonial interpretation of the right to self-determination has affected the minorities’ autonomy struggles in China and Nepal. The Tibetans in China and the Madheshis in Nepal urge their governments to recognise their self-determination through autonomy. However, the Chinese and Nepalese governments interpret self-determination as the right to independence and hesitate to provide autonomy. Against this background, this paper examines the following question: How has the anti-colonial interpretation of self-determination determined the response of the Nepalese and Chinese governments to ethnic autonomy? It argues that the anti-colonial interpretation has encouraged the Chinese and Nepalese governments to consider autonomy as the other name for self-determination that has independence as its goal. This perception leads these Asian governments to reject ethnic autonomy. These governments thus i) question the sincerity of nationalist movements, ii) refuse the ethnonational narratives of identities and belongingness, and iii) provide limited autonomy.
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Notes
1 The Madheshis are a heterogenous group of people who live in the Tarai region and speak Maithali, Bhojpuri, Hindi, Bengali, Urdu, Awadi, and other languages. The Madheshi population has four groups: Indigenous Tharus, Hindu caste people, businessmen of Indian origin, and Muslims. Among them, Tharus and Tarai Muslims consider themselves distinct from the Madheshis and do not support Madheshi autonomy.
2 The Tibetans are a diverse group of peoples, who live both inside and outside China. Inside China, they live in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunan provinces. After the failed nationalist uprising of 1959, around 80,000 Tibetans fled to India with the Dalai Lama, who established the exiled government known as Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamshala India, and advanced nationalist movements from abroad. This paper has examined the exiled Tibetans’ perspectives to understand the state’s response to ethnic demands.
3 Jiahua, Bohua, Jiarong, Siwei, and Dan are Chinese delegates at the GA.
4 All Tibetans do not agree with the Dalai Lama’s proposal for autonomy and self-government. Some Tibetans still believe that the negotiation between China and Tibet should be based on independence. Despite the heterogeneity of voices, autonomy has stayed as an official demand.
5 The Chinese government interprets its domination over Tibet as liberation, and the Tibetans interpret that domination as invasion.
6 In the present demarcation, Kham is in Tibet Autonomous Region, and Amdo and Utsang are the parts of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuwan provinces.
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Hari Har Jnawali
Hari Har Jnawali has a Ph.D. in global governance, with a specialization in global justice and human rights from the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo. Dr. Jnawali is particularly interested in examining the states' responses to minorities' demand for autonomy and self-determination within states' borders. He has published several papers on topics such as international human rights regimes, Indigenous rights, federalism and regional autonomy. Currently, he is working on a project that examines how all South Asian countries are using population transfer as a strategy to weaken the minorities' claims to self-determination.