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Research Articles

Obstacles and facilitators to intimate bystanders reporting violent extremism or targeted violence

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Pages 672-699 | Received 03 Mar 2023, Accepted 04 Oct 2023, Published online: 31 Oct 2023

ABSTRACT

The first people to suspect someone is planning an act of terrorism or violent extremism are often those closest to them. Encouraging friends or family to report an “intimate” preparing to perpetrate violence is a strategy for preventing violent extremist or targeted mass violence. We conducted qualitative-quantitative interviews with 123 diverse U.S. community members to understand what influences their decisions to report potential violent extremist or targeted mass violence. We used hypothetical scenarios adapted from studies in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Factors influencing reporting decisions include fears of causing harm to the potential violent actor, self, family, or relationships; not knowing when and how to report; mistrust of law enforcement; access to mental health services; and perceptions that law enforcement lacks prevention capabilities. White and non-White participants were concerned about law enforcement causing harm. Participants would contact professionals such as mental health before involving law enforcement and Black-identified participants significantly preferred reporting to non-law enforcement persons, most of whom are not trained in responding to targeted violence. However, participants would eventually involve law enforcement if the situation required. They preferred reporting in-person or by telephone versus on-line. We found no difference by the type of violent extremism or between ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated violence. This study informs intimate bystander reporting programmes in the U.S. To improve reporting, U.S. policymakers should attend to how factors like police violence shape intimate bystander reporting. Our socio-ecological model also situates intimate bystander reporting beside other population-based approaches to violence prevention.

Introduction

The first people to suspect or know about someone on the pathway towards targeted violence or terrorism are often those closest to them, such as their family members, friends, co-workers and classmates, referred to as “intimates”. In this article, we focus on those intimates who have some awareness or knowledge of a possible attack by a potential violent actor and we call them “intimate bystanders”, distinguishing them from other bystanders with no close relationship (Rowe, Citation2018). These intimate bystanders are well positioned to facilitate prevention efforts if there are known and trusted reporting pathways to law enforcement or other resources. However, there is little known about intimate bystanders’ relationship to the reporting process and what reporting about an “intimate” potential violent actor may mean to them. We studied U.S. community members’ perspectives on reporting to understand what is needed to help intimate bystanders share information on potential acts of targeted violence and violent extremism. This research seeks to improve public safety through strengthening intimate bystander reporting by changing the practices and resources of law enforcement and community-based services.

Background

Targeted violence, which is directed at specific individuals, groups or locations in order to inflict mass injury or death, includes violent extremism and also includes attacks that lack a clearly discernible political or ideological motivation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citation2020). Violent actors may make their intention known beforehand through “leakage” (Gill, Horgan, and Deckert Citation2014; Peterson et al., Citation2021; Vossekuil et al., Citation2002; Silver et al., Citation2018), defined as a potential violent actor intentionally or unintentionally communicating to a third party their intent to commit violence (Meloy & O’Toole, Citation2011). These third parties frequently include family members, friends, or co-workers, whom we term “intimate bystanders”. While intimate bystander reporting to the police or other authorities has averted public mass violence plots (Daniels et al. Citation2007; Sarteschi, Citation2016), reporting to law enforcement or other authorities appears to be more an exception than the rule (Madfis, Citation2013; Silver et al., Citation2018), leading for calls to improve intimate bystander reporting (Silver, Citation2020).

There are few empirical studies of intimate bystanders in the fields of violent extremism and targeted violence. Building on a previous study (Williams et al., Citation2015), Williams et al. (Citation2018) surveyed 1151 U.S. adults to study a theory of vicarious help seeking and interceding to prevent violence. When told to imagine “an illegal act that one of your peers might do, that could end up injuring other people ’’, willingness to suggest to the potential violent actor that they speak to a counsellor was related to the degree of closeness of the relationship and fears of damaging that relationship. When asked to imagine a friend who was “thinking about committing violence against someone else”, survey respondents preferred trying to get the friend to talk to a counsellor more than contacting the police. Lafree and colleagues examined four surveys fielded among the general public between 2012–2014 (LaFree et al., Citation2014). Although not focused on intimate bystanders, over 75% of the survey participants reported that they would call the police about someone “talking about planting explosives.”

Three other studies have empirically explored intimate bystander reporting in relation to ideologically motivated violence. Grossman’s et al. (Citation2015, Citation2018) qualitative study focused on Muslim persons in Australia included 16 Muslim community members. It concluded that five core domains influence reporting thresholds – psychological, informational, communication, support and trust, and education and outreach. Across these domains, the primary motivation for intimate bystanders to report loved ones was care and concern. However, intimate bystanders did not know how to report outside the national security hotline mechanism. Reporting to authorities was seen as a last resort if other ways of reaching the potential violent actor were unsuccessful. These findings informed the implementation of a community-focused support and information telephone and online service, Step Together (www.steptogether.nsw.gov.au).

Thomas, Grossman, Christmann and Miah's UK study (Citation2017, Citation2020)replicated the Australian study and expanded sampling to include community members from “marginalized White British majority communities”. A persistent allegation in relation to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) policy efforts internationally has been that they represent and operationalise the concept of “suspect communities”, particularly in relation to domestic Muslim communities. Originally coined by Hillyard (Citation1993) to describe the way Irish-origin communities living in Britain during the Northern Ireland Troubles were both surveilled and discriminated against under various “Prevention of Terrorism” Acts, this concept has since been applied to the UK’s Prevent Strategy (Pantazis and Pemberton, Citation2009) and its initial treatment of British Muslims as the key focus of Prevent’s efforts (Thomas, Citation2020). This assertion of the “suspect communities” thesis has been highly contested (Greer Citation2010) and significantly nuanced (P/CVE efforts in Britain are significantly staffed and operationalised by Muslims, see Ragazzi, Citation2016). Indeed, recent survey data (CREST Advisory Citation2020) shows that most British Muslims have not heard of the Prevent Strategy and that when it is described, they support its purpose, providing it is applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Increasingly, referrals of individuals at risk of radicalisation to Britain’s Prevent Strategy are from extreme right-wing or “mixed and unstable” ideological backgrounds (and so not from a Muslim background) (HMG, Citation2023). Despite these persistent allegations of a stigmatising state focus on British Muslim communities, the UK study found that British Muslim respondents would report concerns about a loved one to law enforcement, motivated both by care and concern for the intimate and public duty grounds identified in the Australian study. This reporting to police would often be the end point of a staged process, whereby intimate bystanders would first attempt to intercede with the potential violent actor, then draw on advice and guidance from friends and family, and often also draw on support from trusted practitioners or figures in their own community. These findings led to the establishment of a national police-led campaign and website, Act Early (www.actearly.uk).

The third study, conducted in Canada by Thompson et al. (Citation2022) replicated the design of the Australian and UK studies and produced similar findings in general to these previous studies. However, in Canada, community respondents emphasised the importance of mental health support for both the individuals being reported as well as those reporting, and a desire for legal advice on the rights of both reporters and those reported on.

The above studies support a belief that terrorism and targeted violence may be preventable and that prevention can begin before law enforcement and other agents of the criminal justice system become involved. The U.S. policy on preventing terrorism and targeted violence has evolved from solely a criminal justice framing to include more public health approaches that give greater emphasis to prevention of terrorism and targeted violence. Such an approach requires data and research to support future programmatic interventions that improve the identification of individuals at high-risk of carrying out acts of terrorism. Research and evidence-informed programmes are more likely to benefit criminal justice agencies and their communities.

Terrorism and targeted violence can occur in the workplace setting but the terrorism and targeted violence literature has generally not differentiated the setting of the violence. In the United States, public mass shooters are more likely to target school and workplace locations compared to mass shooters in other countries (Silva, Citation2023). Some workplace violence studies define it as acts where staff are physically attacked, threatened, harassed, or intimidated whether by clients, outsiders, or employees; other definitions limit it to acts “intended to cause physical harm” (Barling et al, Citation2009, p. 673). Studies comparing across occupations in the U.S. find more reporting of workplace violence in the healthcare, education, retail, public safety and justice industries (Piquero et al., Citation2013; Scalora et al., Citation2020) with workers in retail, public safety, and transportation (e.g. U.S. taxi drivers) at higher risk of fatal workplace violence (Castillo et al., Citation2021). While related to targeted violence when it is premeditated and aimed at a particular target, such as a group of staff or the organisation as a whole, it differs in scope since it may include non-life threatening violence or extreme acts such as mass shootings.

Ideologically inspired violence adds a layer of complexity when the targeted violence in the workplace is rooted in the perpetrator’s extremist beliefs. Studies on workplace violence do not generally connect to the terrorism and targeted violence literature. But the conceptual overlaps are considerable including workplace violence studies addressing risk factors (Mohd Hatta et al. Citation2023); threat assessment, and interventions (McNutt and Hughes, Citation2023; Kenny, Citation2010; Gillespie and Tamsukhin Citation2023). Individuals who commit targeted violence in the workplace may be motivated by a combination of personal grievances, workplace resentments, and extremist ideological beliefs making it difficult to ascribe a primary motive to the violence and categorise the violence as ideologically inspired violence or workplace violence. This makes connecting the research on targeted violence, extremist violence, and workplace violence all the more important.

Under Strategic Goal 2.1. of the U.S. National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism – “Strengthen Domestic Terrorism Prevention Resources and Services – the U.S. government aims to “make available resources and training regarding how to respond to behaviour threatening an act of domestic terrorism or targeted violence and, moreover, will work to boost public awareness of such resources” (U.S. National Security Council, Citation2021). While the studies discussed above suggest the potential key role played by intimate bystanders, there is still limited knowledge about what reporting an intimate means for community members in the United States, including their views, concerns, and preferences for reporting concerning behaviour before violence occurs. Without a fuller understanding of the barriers and challenges people in the U.S. face in sharing information as well as what motivates them to surmount these challenges, existing or new government reporting campaigns and programmes may fail to engage fully with members of those communities that are in the strongest position to help.

Purpose of the present study

Our study built on the aforementioned Australian and UK studies to understand the needs, concerns and processes of reporting by intimate bystanders in the U.S. in order to inform new, localised and contextually-sensitive understandings of and approaches to community reporting issues. It extends the prior studies with a larger, more demographically-diverse sample relevant to the U.S. It adds a focus on White supremacist movement-inspired terrorism, and – of particular relevance to the U.S. – non-ideologically motivated targeted workplace violence. We examined both ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated forms of public mass violence since the possibilities for terrorism and targeted violence prevention programmes – including behavioural threat assessment – may be either “ideologically agnostic” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citation2019; Silver, Citation2020) or ideologically novel, hybrid or unstable (Norris, Citation2020; Koehler, Citation2020). Indeed, there is no reason to believe that intimate bystanders have the knowledge, tools or information to distinguish; they suspect that someone close to them may be planning and preparing to kill many people and they are thinking about if and how to report them and prevent the attack.

Our research addresses three questions. First, what factors facilitate or impede intimate bystanders reporting those they are close to as potential violent actors? Second, what pathways do intimate bystanders favour when willing to share concerns and how do they prefer to report their concerns? Finally, are there differences in these preferences by demographic factors (race, age, gender) or by the type of targeted violence (ideologically-motivated versus non-ideologically motivated, targeted violence)?

Methods

We conducted mixed qualitative-quantitative interviews with community members living in Southern California and Illinois. These two regions were chosen for convenience since they are home to the U.S. investigators’ institutions. Participants were recruited through community-based, social service organisations, universities and colleges, religious or interfaith organisations, local stores (gun stores, fishing shops, groceries, barber shops), and affiliation clubs. We intentionally recruited a wide range of individuals with diverse religious, political, and racial/ethnic identities to capture a range of experiences and perspectives. All participants provided informed consent. Interviews, conducted over Zoom because of the COVID-19 pandemic, were recorded and transcribed with personal identifiers removed for confidentiality and anonymity. The study was approved by the institutional review board of the University of California Los Angeles (IRB #18–001938) serving as the institutional review board of record for the University of Illinois at Chicago.

We used the hypothetical scenario-based interview approach of the Australian (Grossman et al., Citation2015) and UK (Thomas et al., Citation2017) studies, adapting those scenarios to address U.S. conditions and creating an additional scenario on targeted workplace violence. Community members chose a scenario and were asked to respond to questions. White-identified participants were offered a choice between “Connor” and “Sam” scenarios, while participants who did not identify themselves as White were offered a choice between “Joseph” and “Sam.” Connor was a White supremacist targeting a nearby religious establishment. Joseph was a person of colour who had affiliated with a religious group, was reading extremist material that connected his own experiences of discrimination to the need for radical change in the USA, and was eager to use violence to motivate societal-level change. Sam was a disgruntled and aggrieved employee researching mass shootings online at his workplace. All three of the scenarios were based on male figures, in line with the preponderance of male actors committing violent extremist or targeted violence acts in the U.S (Gill et al. Citation2017; Capellan Citation2015). Interview questions included: What reasons might motivate you to share concerns about the person suspected of planning targeted violence with authorities? What information or support would help you decide whether to share your concerns with authorities? What factors might encourage or discourage you to share your concerns? How would you go about reporting currently? What are your preferences for people and agencies that you could approach to share your concerns? How would you prefer to make the report (e.g. telephone, face-to-face, website, mobile phone app)?

Interviews were conducted March to July 2021 with 123 participants. 62 identified as female and 61 identified as male. The average age was 31 years with a standard deviation of 13.5 years. 19 (15%) participants were Hispanic and 104 (85%) were non-Hispanic. Approximately 34% of participants were Asian, 29% were White, 17% were Black or African American, 2% were American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 1% were Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. 17% identified as “Other” race (including participants who identified as Hispanic, Mexican, Latinx, Bi-Racial, Middle Eastern, and Afghani). About 39% of participants identified as Christians, 19% as Muslims, 34% as non-practicing.

We analysed the data using a grounded theory approach which emphasises the generation of theory “grounded” in data that has been systematically collected (Glaser and Strauss Citation2009). De-identified transcripts were analysed using Dedoose software by the coding team (SocioCultural Research Consultants, Citation2018). First, inter-rater reliability was established to be above 0.90 between other researchers conducting coding on the Pooled Cohen’s Kappa scale where .90 indicates “very good agreement” (Hallgren, Citation2012). Discrepancies in coding were discussed among the coders and clarified to reach a 100% agreement in code applications. Then, research team members coded the transcripts using thematic analysis where themes were compared for their uniqueness and similarities across the transcripts. We used consensus building to develop the final structure of relationships among the themes.

We present our results beginning with identifying the factors that influence decisions to report a potential violent actor. In representing the findings which came from the analysis of the data, we draw upon prior models or Bronfenbrenner (Citation1992) and Dahlberg and Krug (Citation2002) as organisational tools. Next, we detail the pathways and multiple stages of intimate bystanders’ decision-making and possible actions and provide another model, the “START-V Model (STAges in Reporting of Targeted Violence)” to illustrate these results. Finally, we describe the results of our mixed quantitative-qualitative analysis regarding differences in reporting preferences by demographic groups and by type of targeted violence. In the results, we refer to the participants as intimate bystanders since that is the role they were asked to adopt as they responded to the scenario. Quotations are provided with their state of residence, age, self-described gender, race or ethnic identification, and religious affiliation.

Results

A socio-ecological model of intimate bystander reporting

Intimate bystanders identified multiple factors influencing their decisions to report a potential violent actor. We drew upon Bronfenbrenner’s (Citation1992) Ecological Systems Theory and Dahlberg and Krug’s (Citation2002) violence prevention models to help organise and represent our qualitative findings as the “Social-Ecological Model of Intimate Bystander Reporting for Targeted Violence Prevention” based on these factors (). The overall claim of the model is that the process of reporting by intimate bystanders is a dynamic interaction between individuals and their environmental context. The model describes factors at each of four different levels – individual, relationship, community, and societal. Intimate bystander reporting is affected by this complex range of influences and nested interactions. Our model recognises that factors can cross between multiple levels (hence, the dotted lines separating each layer of the model). They can also influence intimate bystander reporting differently, based on cumulative and intersectional experience. We describe the factors below.

Figure 1. Social-ecological model of intimate bystander reporting for targeted violence prevention.

Figure 1. Social-ecological model of intimate bystander reporting for targeted violence prevention.

Individual level factors

The Individual Level of the model identifies personal factors that influence intimate bystander reporting of persons at risk.

Fear of misjudgement

Intimate bystanders feared misjudging the credibility or severity of the threat and making an “incorrect” report as a result. As one said,

I wouldn’t make the decision to go to law enforcement just on my own, because, well, what if I’m wrong? Or they’re like, “Well, you have no evidence. He hasn’t done anything. Do you know he’s committed a crime?” -(California, 39, Male, Asian, Non-Practicing)

Knowledge of when to report

Intimate bystanders did not know or understand what behaviours or statements may precede violence and were not confident in their ability to identify a threshold for when reporting was necessary. This made many reluctant to contact law enforcement as a first choice. Intimate bystanders were also unsure about whether law enforcement would be receptive to a report about a plan, rather than about a crime that had already been committed.

If it’s still at the point where he doesn’t have any planning, there’s less urgency than maybe I’d consider looking up… And seeing if those groups could help him vent whatever he’s thinking, maybe help change [his] mindset. -(Illinois, 20, Male, Middle Eastern, Muslim)

Instead, they described taking steps to understand what they might be witnessing and what are the red flags that should definitely be reported to law enforcement. These steps included doing their own research and talking both with their own family members or close friends and with non-law enforcement professionals already known to them to seek advice.

Knowledge of how to report

Intimate bystanders were unsure about who to report to besides the police. Many were unsure of the best way to contact law enforcement, including whether they should call a non-emergency line or 911; whether any alternatives to police or law enforcement existed to handle this type of situation; and whether a hotline or an anonymous reporting option was available. Intimate bystanders said they would first conduct online research to learn about the reporting process and “what happens in the aftermath” (Illinois, 21, Female, Biracial Hispanic, Non-Practicing).

I think like a hotline that can, what’s it called, assess the severity of a concern. And then from there with the help of a professional in that field, then we can call law enforcement together or figure out what steps could be taken next. -(California, 34, Female, Latinx, Non-Practicing)

Desire for information, updates, and support. Most intimate bystanders said they would like follow-up from law enforcement after making a report. They wanted information about what happened to their report.

What happens next? What happens to that report? What happens to me? What happens to him? Where does that all go? I need to have an understanding of what’s the procedure, what’s the process. -(California, 52, Female, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Non-Practicing).

Many intimate bystanders explained that reporting on a friend or family member would be a tough decision, and they would like emotional support and counselling after making the report.

And I guess a follow up to counseling or having those resources provided for someone, because of course it could be a traumatic experience, or just kind of like a lot of emotions occurring. -(Illinois, 51, Female, Black or African American, Christian).

Some wanted follow-up so that they could track the entire process, the steps taken, and the outcome.

I think a follow-up would be very important,…to stay in the loop over, like what’s happening and kind of avoid having stress and anxiety about what’s happening. Like, did anything actually change? Like, was this case taken care of?. (Illinois, 20, Male, Hispanic, Christian)

Personal experiences with police violence

Intimate bystanders who had personally experienced, witnessed, or had close friends/relatives experience police harassment or violence were worried that calling the police would put themselves or the potential violent actor in harm’s way.

It would make me feel very afraid because I personally do not trust law enforcement or authorities, only because of my own personal experiences and my community’s personal experiences with law enforcement. It’s not a safe relationship. -(California, 25, Female, Black or African American, Muslim).

This is an individual-level experience of relationships to law enforcement that is further described in the Community-level and Society-level results.

Political views and values

Although we did not collect data on political affiliation, the research team noted distinct perspectives in the sample that seemed to align with U.S. national conversations at the time of the study. Within a few of the White-identified participants recruited from Chicago suburbs we detected a reluctance to ascribe violent intentions to hate-based groups. While these intimate bystanders recognised the importance of the community’s safety in cases of potential violence, they emphasised that it was important to not “paint with a broad brush and say, ‘Everyone who has these ideals, these political mindsets are dangerous and threats to local and national security.’” (Illinois, 21, Male, White, Agnostic). A concern for protecting “free speech” was more often mentioned by these White participants responding to the Connor scenario.

Gender, age, race, ethnicity

Overall, women rated their comfort sharing or reporting to any law enforcement or non-law enforcement entity higher than men. Men were slightly more likely to report directly to law enforcement while women said they would go to a church, faith-based group, or other community leader to share their concerns before reporting to law enforcement and were also more likely to seek support for themselves and the potential violent actor. Some women expressed feeling intimidated talking face-to-face with law enforcement. Non-White women felt that they would not be taken seriously because of a history of law enforcement mistreatment towards women of colour. We found no differences by age in reporting actions, pathways, modalities or other preferences. Racial and ethnic differences were quite strong in our study and appear in several of the factors below, including trust and mistrust of law enforcement, racism and discrimination, and police violence.

Emotions

Intimate bystanders must navigate complex emotional territory as an element of their decision making in reporting. Participants described a spectrum of emotions that included “sad”, “confused”, “stressed and anxious”, “in denial”, and “alarmed” when faced with the scenarios.

I would not be able to stop thinking about it and just be stressed out constantly over it. I feel like if this was somebody close to me, I could be in denial as well. Even with all the indications, I’d still probably have a hard time believing it. -(Illinois, 18, Male, South Asian, Muslim).

Relationship level factors

This level includes close, interpersonal relationships that influence the propensity to share concerns about or report a potential violent actor.

Care for the potential violent actor

Care and concern about the potential violent actor were the main motivations for deciding to report to law enforcement. This level of care also influenced how they would go about reporting. Intimate bystanders believed they had a better ability to assess the credibility and severity of the threat when the potential violent actor was closer to them, and in these cases they would often seek to intervene directly with this potential violent actor.

I would say, as I would… If it’s on a spectrum, how close I am to him, the closer I was to him… I’d be more reluctant to go to the authorities. So, for example, if I was really, really close with Sam, then I would probably do everything in my power to help him without going to the authorities first. -(Illinois, 18, Male, Hispanic or Latino, Catholic).

Their fears of how law enforcement would respond, their worry about unintended consequences, and their concerns about harming the existing close personal relationship, were amplified in such cases. Whenever the potential violent actor was viewed as close to them, participants preferred to first seek help from a mental health or other community professional since they were less likely to harm the potential violent actor.

Credibility of the threat

The majority of intimate bystanders wrestled with a crucial question – have the actions and statements by the potential violent actor reached the threshold of being a credible threat of injury to others? The intimate bystanders said they would seek out more information themselves and/or engage family and friends for support to understand and identify a credible threat. Once identified, participants overwhelmingly would report to law enforcement. Non-White intimate bystanders often held the concern that law enforcement should not be involved until the threat was too severe to be ignored due to the history of police violence and racial discrimination.

So I would try to do the transformative justice process, and then if that is not working and if things are escalating quicker and things like that, then I would be forced to contact the authorities, but the authorities would be the last people on the list of people to contact, just for safety reasons. -(California, 25, Female, Black or African American, Muslim)

Fear of harm to potential violent actor

Another related reason for intimate bystanders’ reluctance to report was concern that the potential violent actor was not a threat or had not committed an actual crime yet, and a report could harm them. Intimate bystanders worried that reporting would criminalise the potential violent actor “blowing the whistle too early…it could potentially ruin his life if he really didn’t mean it,” (California, 29, Female, Asian/Filipino, Catholic) or lead to harm to the potential violent actor at the hands of law enforcement.

And possibly when he’s mentally unstable and he’s confronted by law enforcement, that’s going to tend to end up in a shooting. -(Illinois, 18, Male, Hispanic, White, Catholic).

Fear of damaging relationships

Many intimate bystanders would feel reluctant to report for fear that it could damage their relationship with the potential violent actor.

I feel like that would ruin the friendship. I wouldn’t do that unless I really know he’s going to do something bad. -(Illinois, 19, Male, Hispanic, White, Catholic).

Fear of harm to self or family

One of the most frequently offered reasons for worry about reporting was fearing for one’s personal safety or the safety of their family if the potential violent actor found out who reported them and then retaliated.

I would worry for my safety, if he ever found out that I was the one who maybe said something and then like nothing happened on the end of the police, like would he retaliate on me? -(Illinois, 30, Female, White, Non-Practicing).

Some intimate bystanders stated that they would that trying to help could get them in trouble with law enforcement.

With the police or the legal authorities, you can’t rationalize anything. And they manipulate the questions, and you could wind up in trouble sometimes. -(Illinois 65, Male, White, Non-Practicing).

Fear of provoking the potential violent actor to harm others

A few intimate bystanders explained that they would be hesitant to report because the potential violent actor could find out they were being reported on, and that could catalyse them into acting sooner.

And I’m also concerned that if he finds out that I told authorities, or if he finds out that I told someone else, that he might just do it immediately, right after. -(Illinois, 18, Male, Middle Eastern, Muslim)

Family and friend support

When intimate bystanders expressed doubts and questions about the credibility of the threat, they often turned to their own family and friends to help them resolve these uncertainties.

Yeah, I definitely think having my friends and family, my wife, aware of this and like, “Hey, this is what I know, what should I do?” given the situation who can make sure that I’m not totally missing the point here. -(Illinois, 35, Male, White, Non-Practicing).

Friends and family were also a resource who could advise the intimate bystander on the best course of action and next steps. Some saw friends and family as persons to help intervene with the potential violent actor. On the other hand, some gave opposing opinions about consulting their family and friends. Drawing on family as a resource can become complex when the potential violent actor is themselves a family member. Also, family members may be too biased to give accurate guidance, they might be viewed as accomplices or liable, or they may overreact and cause the situation to spiral out of control.

Community level factors

The Community Level examines the real-world environments, such as neighbourhoods, in which individuals live and social relationships occur, and identifies the factors in these settings that are associated with intimate bystander reporting.

Responsibility to protect the community

Almost all participants understood that their role as an intimate bystander would be to protect the community from a potential violent attack and said that they would eventually involve law enforcement if they perceived the situation to be serious. However, they described a conflict between this responsibility to prevent harm to the broader community and their loyalty to the potential violent actor or fears of misjudgement or harm from reporting. For most intimate bystanders their sense of obligation to protect the community outweighed other qualms when they believed the threat to be credible and severe. Actively seeking information, seeking help from others in the community, or talking directly with the intimate were frequently deployed strategies to resolving this conflict.

I definitely think there’s a duty … if someone is going to harm themselves or someone else, you have to say something… if he’s just like, “no, I need to do this”, then, then I obviously need to put whatever friendship or relationship we have aside and inform the authorities to take action. -(California, 36, Female, Afghani, Muslim)

Participants who said they would not call the police under any circumstances primarily cited concerns around immigration and citizenship. One described worries about “citizen status” and concerns that “we’ll get deported because of our status” (California, 22, Male, Afghani, Muslim), preferring to talk with trusted figures in the community to try and resolve the situation. Another said they were “Really aware of people’s concerns about ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement)” and that if the potential violent actor was an immigrant, “I’m not going to get you deported for this. I just won’t.” -(California, 27, Female, Latinx, Non-Practicing)

Trust or mistrust of local law enforcement

Many intimate bystanders stated that their willingness to report to their local police would depend on their location and the reputation of the police in their city or town. Because of experiences and knowledge of local police violence and discrimination they were hesitant to ask police for help, fearing similar treatment.

I would have to be careful with what … With whom I get in contact with on the police force. -(Illinois, 59, Female, Black or African American, Baptist)

Muslim participants often mentioned that their community has felt targeted by law enforcement over the past 20 years (since 9/11), and that this criminalisation has led to a hesitancy to reach out to police due to fears of being labelled as a terrorist or terrorist-sympathiser. A few White-identified participants who were presented with the Connor scenario noted that they would have some concerns reporting a White supremacist to local police, because of the possibility that members of the police may be involved in or sympathetic to those ideologies. The FBI was seen as less likely to have been infiltrated by such groups.

Perceived capabilities of local law enforcement

Several intimate bystanders believed that local police were not capable of responding appropriately to a potential violent actor whose behaviour stemmed from a mental health condition. They were concerned that local police would misinterpret psychological symptoms as signs of aggression and respond with excessive force, increasing the chance of injury or death to the potential violent actor.

And sometimes people who are going through mental health episodes, they end up getting hurt or sometimes killed just because police aren’t properly trained always to deescalate those situations. -(Illinois, 21, Female, Hispanic Bi-Racial, Non-Practicing)

This also translated into scepticism regarding the preventative capacity of local law enforcement specific to these potential violent acts and if the police had the best interests of others in mind: “instead of helping them, I feel like they would ruin their [loved one’s] life” (California, 37, Female, White, Christian). Some intimate bystanders recalled situations where law enforcement had been warned of an impending attack and had not been able to stop it, and so they did not trust that reporting would prevent loss of life.

In a lot of experiences with this sort of violence, there were warnings given to the police that were not heeded. I would want to figure out who to call, because the local authorities, I just wouldn’t have confidence in, even the FBI, I’d be a little bit concerned. -(California, 47, Male, White, Agnostic)

Availability of trusted community professionals

Intimate bystanders described the need for community-based, non-law enforcement practitioners who are properly trained to assist. This could include mental health professionals, social service providers, school administrators, and faith-based leaders. “They should be trained enough and have enough knowledge of how to approach Connor and how to sit down and talk to him and just maybe meet him.” (Illinois, 73, Female, White, Christian) They would know “whether it would be to call police, or whether it would be that they need counseling.”(California, 43, Male, White, Jewish). Some intimate bystanders wanted support for themselves too: “I would want support before I make a decision just because I feel like that’s a very serious decision to make and one brain is not enough(Illinois, 21, Female, South Asian, Hindu).

Available reporting modalities

Some intimate bystanders reported that they would be hesitant to report unless available modalities allowed them to be anonymous. They were concerned that they may be linked to the potential violent actor in future investigations by law enforcement.

As a Muslim, if it were another Muslim, I would be concerned that they would somehow pull me into the issue -(California, 30, Female, Middle Eastern, Muslim).

Other concerns were a potential lawsuit against them or that there will be “a second investigation, they’ll ask me why I didn’t report earlier.” (California, 25, Male, Middle Eastern, Muslim). Another reason for anonymity was to ensure the intimate bystander’s safety. However, other intimate bystanders worried that police would not take an anonymous tip seriously. Anonymous reporting also did not allow for any follow-up if police needed additional information to pursue the tip, or if the reporter wanted to know the result of the report.

Access to mental health services

Intimate bystanders said mental health practitioners may be able to provide them with advice and guidance on how to proceed. They could also provide counselling to the potential violent actor, and they could make a formal report to law enforcement on the intimate bystander’s behalf if necessary.

I feel like they would be able to kind of get that information out of him and they also have the authority, they can report that as well if they see any indication of something. -(Illinois, 18, Male, South Asian, Muslim)

However, participants worried that connecting the potential violent actor with mental health support may be difficult, especially if the person did not consent to treatment. Other obstacles mentioned were administrative barriers, insurance problems, and the high costs of mental health care. Several participants were aware of the mandated reporter obligation of U.S.-trained mental health professionals, and this was usually seen as a benefit (i.e. the professional will decide, not me).

Societal level factors

This level looks at the factors at the macro-societal level, such as political and social policies, that help create a climate that encourages or inhibits intimate bystander reporting.

Racism and discrimination

Both White and Non-White intimate bystanders described how institutional racism and discrimination would influence their reporting. Non-White participants talked about their anticipation of experiencing discrimination during the reporting process. The specific fears expressed were of stereotypes these participants felt police may hold about people of their identity. For example, intimate bystanders who identified as Black discussed concerns that the police would see them as criminals or as untrustworthy. Intimate bystanders who identified as Latino discussed first-hand experiences of police responding aggressively, and how White-passing Latinos were treated better by police than those with darker skin. Muslim intimate bystanders often mentioned that their community has felt targeted by police and the FBI.

I’m a Muslim, and [if] I go to law enforcement speaking to them about this issue I feel like I’m raising a lot more attention about me than it would if I weren’t any of these, let’s say. I do think if I were stereotypically, let’s say a stereotypical White American male, I guess, and also I gave off the vibe that I’m a law-abiding citizen then I don’t think I would have as many concerns. -(California, 25, Male, Middle Eastern, Muslim)

Asian intimate bystanders and women worried that police would not take their report seriously, or that they would have to be extra pushy or insistent to be listened to. White intimate bystanders were concerned about violence to non-White persons at risk too.

Police violence

Closely tied to systemic racism and discrimination, but explicitly mentioned by both White and non-White intimate bystanders, is the long history of police violence against persons of colour in the U.S. Black and Latino participants spoke about this as a widespread societal problem that went beyond the private prejudices held by individual law enforcement officers but was also embedded in the system and reproduced in cultural and societal norms. White participants also expected police to respond more harshly to a person who is a racial minority.

I would say as a black person, it’s really hard maybe to talk to the police officers, mainly because they don’t really… They see us as a 25 year old black man…Maybe they will say that I’m just trying to set up my drug competitor and they won’t take this matter very seriously. I would say maybe my race would be the biggest problem when contacting the police officers. -(California, 25, Male, Black or African American, Christian)

Economic inequality and discrimination

Some intimate bystanders expressed the impression that minority neighbourhoods are treated differently by police, and that their physical location and community makeup would factor into their decision whether to contact law enforcement. Intimate bystanders felt that police would not respond with urgency if the report came from a low-income area, and also described these areas as more heavily policed; the police presence in low-income neighbourhoods was seen as primarily antagonistic, not supportive of community members or their safety concerns.

And depending on where you live, I think, depends on how they would respond, either with force or with understanding … In lower-income places, I would be very, very reluctant to report them to the cops, knowing how bad it can turn out for them and for the people surrounding them. -(California, 31, Female, Asian, Non-Practicing)

Availability of non-punitive justice remedies

Several intimate bystanders held the belief that law enforcement and the larger criminal justice system could coordinate various degrees of a response including mental health care and social service needs. They believed that law enforcement would and could provide access to non-punitive remedies. We only heard this opinion from White-identified intimate bystanders.

I can, if anything, delegate it to the police … . police are pretty overarching. If you report it there, it’s most likely going to get to where it needs to be, if that’s not them. -(Illinois, 18, Male, White, Catholic)

Lack of law enforcement focus on prevention

Many intimate bystanders stated that the potential violent attack might be preventable but they did not think the police were skilled in prevention. They were unsure whether this situation as presented would fall under the purview of law enforcement, and whether law enforcement would be receptive to a report about a plan rather than about a crime that had already been committed. Intimate bystanders stated that police involvement would be necessary if the situation progressed to a certain point where weapons were involved, violence was likely, and physical intervention may be required, but before that point was reached they would be much less equipped to intervene. Intimate bystanders identified law enforcement’s role as responding to crime once it had occurred.

They’re not trained for that, they’re trained to stop a robbery or something [who is] shooting them. -(Illinois, 20, Male, Hispanic, Catholic)

This was not seen as a failure on the part of existing police departments necessarily, but rather as a fact stemming from the role of police within US society. While intimate bystanders felt that the situations presented were preventable, they saw that this work could be done more effectively by mental health experts or multi-disciplinary teams rather than by police alone.

Pathways that intimate bystanders favor when willing to share concerns: the START-V model

The study findings showed that for intimate bystanders, reporting an intimate is never easy. Reporting involved questions of judging the validity and severity of the threat of violence. It also involved managing fears about potential harm that reporting could cause to themselves, the potential violent actor, or their relationship, alongside moral dilemmas that involve balancing the potential for harm to the potential violent actor with harm towards yourself, others, or the community. These concerns and fears complicated the reporting process for intimate bystanders, often causing them to struggle with their decisions and to feel unprepared for an encounter with the potential for targeted violence. In some circumstances they would directly contact law enforcement, but in most they would take other steps first which do not involve law enforcement. Importantly, they would eventually involve law enforcement if the situation were serious enough. One intimate bystander described the series of steps she would take as part of a “staged process”:

Initially, I would probably talk to Joseph first and foremost to get the severity of the situation. And then I would probably go to a friend or something, well, somebody I know is wanting to do something crazy. How should I handle this? Do I go to the authorities? I don’t know. I would look online, use online help and what to do if I have a friend who X, Y, and Z. And at that point, most people would probably tell me to go to the authorities anyway. -(Illinois, 21, Female, Black or African American, Non-Practicing)

To represent the pathways and multiple stages of intimate bystanders’ decision-making and possible actions, we developed the “START-V Model (STAges in Reporting of Targeted Violence)” (). The figure also identifies the key questions which intimate bystanders face at different stages of the process. Additionally, the figure shows how much of the intimate bystander’s decision-making and possible actions do not involve or depend upon consultation with law enforcement (contacting law enforcement is an outcome, not part of the deliberative process) and are either entirely self-directed or involve other community practitioners, many of whom are not trained in responding to targeted violence. The model consisting of five stages is summarised below.

Figure 2. START-V model (STAges in Reporting of Targeted Violence).

Figure 2. START-V model (STAges in Reporting of Targeted Violence).

Encounter with violence risk (Stage 1)

Intimate bystanders’ initial reactions were worry about the potential violent actor and believing that something needed to be done. However, to know what to do, they wanted to learn more about the nature of the risk and who they could turn to for help. For many intimate bystanders, there was a hesitancy to go to law enforcement unless the risk was considered highly serious and imminent. One intimate bystander stated: “If it’s an imminent threat, then I wouldn’t waste time at first. If there is time, then I would consult someone first.” (California, 36, Female, White, Latinx, Catholic)

Conduct on-line research (Stage 2a)

Most intimate bystanders said they would first do some research online. They wanted help on how to talk to someone planning to commit mass violence, to identify risk factors for violence, local resources such as violence prevention organisations or hotlines, expert advice, and other information that could help them clarify any uncertainty about the risk or what they should do. The most common method participants described was to Google search keywords related to the situation, such as “violence prevention” or “planning attack”. However, one man noted,

I’m a Muslim, and …I would be a lot less comfortable going online and discussing things, I would much, much prefer to speak in person to somebody about what steps I need to take because of this issue. I think it would raise too much attention with my background as it is. -(California, 25, Male, Middle Eastern, Muslim)

Talk with a family member or friend (Stage 2b)

Most intimate bystanders said they would talk informally with a trusted family member or friend, who could listen to the problem and provide guidance and support. Some participants said that they would want to talk with mutual friends of the potential violent actor, or his family members, to see if these people had also noticed any alarming signs in his recent behaviour.

I would definitely talk to other friends and my parents and siblings and be like, listen, this is happening. What should I do? -(Illinois, 19, Male, White, Catholic)

Talk directly with the potential violent actor (Stage 2c)

Many intimate bystanders wanted to talk directly with the intimate, either alone or together with a family member or mutual friend. Their aim was to talk them out of their plan or to get them the help they may need. Some intimate bystanders said this would also help to gauge how serious the person was regarding their plan, which would help them decide whether law enforcement involvement was necessary or not. They could gather further details about his plan (target, timing, location, motivation) that could potentially be shared during reporting. Others said this would be a good opportunity to leverage people who also cared about the person and to remind them of their support network, and the good things they have in life.

That’s why I wouldn’t go to the authorities first. I’d try and stop the situation first, try to get him to come to the realization. -(Illinois, 19, Male, White, Non-Practicing)

Engage a community practitioner (Stage 3)

Many intimate bystanders said they would talk to a community practitioner who may be able to help them weigh the risk and decide whether to contact law enforcement as well as gather guidance, emotional support, and to talk through their possible plan of action. The community practitioners considered included mental health professionals, faith leaders, social workers, staff at community-based organisations, and human resources staff. If an intervention was needed, they felt that a non-law enforcement practitioner, compared with law enforcement, would have greater compassion, resources, and ability to address the underlying cause of the person’s potential violence. One intimate bystander said a community practitioner can “help bring in a different opinion on what to do, a different suggestion on what to do and they can help(Illinois, 19, Male, Pakistani, Muslim). Some intimate bystanders wanted community practitioners to be the ones to contact law enforcement if that were necessary. However, many intimate bystanders did not know which community practitioner was best to involve and how to reach them. Some intimate bystanders said they would go to a mental health professional because they “have the authority, they can report that as well if they see any indication … [or] if somebody is going to be harmed then I know they’re allowed to report(Illinois, 18, Male, South Asian, Muslim). Still, even accessing mental health providers was difficult for many.

Give a report to law enforcement (Stage 4)

Intimate bystanders were willing to report to law enforcement, especially when the perceived threat was more serious and imminent, and when they had trust in the police. For them, the benefits of reporting to law enforcement outweighed the costs so they alerted law enforcement to the threat. It helped when they had an officer they already knew personally, if the officer was someone with advanced training in violence prevention or threat assessment, which reassured them that the officer would not over-react, or if the intimate bystander believed that law enforcement could connect the intimate with a therapist, social worker, or other support after assessing the situation and recognising his needs. Some intimate bystanders would contact law enforcement only after first talking with a family member or friend, the potential violent actor, or community practitioners.

I think I might try to, if it was someone I cared about, I’d tell them that maybe they should seek counseling or something like that since Sam has a history of mental illness and stuff. But if these problems persist and he wasn’t willing to go to counseling, and then he was still talking about all this mass shooting stuff, then I think I’d still have to report it. -(Illinois, 19, Male, Asian, Non-Practicing)

Many intimate bystanders worried that law enforcement involvement would make the situation worse rather than better by responding with excessive force, hastening a violent altercation, or responding with racial or cultural bias, or alternatively ignoring the report and allowing the threat to go unchecked.

Violence risk is mitigated (Stage 5)

Intimate bystanders reported that their intention was to do what they can to prevent violence from happening, without making matters worse. Many felt that once they reported to the police, they had handed-off the situation. Intimate bystanders were not certain how the situation would ultimately end if they did make a report, and whether law enforcement would take the potential violent actor into custody, just interview them, or take some other action. Some people hoped that they would be able to mitigate the violent threat by seeking help or support for the potential violent actor and avoid law enforcement involvement altogether. Others said they would take additional steps to ensure public safety in addition to making a police report, such as contacting the potential targets the potential violent actor was considering attacking, in case law enforcement was not able to stop the attack.

If you knew who the targets were, if it’s a, you said, a church or an organization like this … I might go and talk to those people quietly and grab them and say, “Look, there might be some organizations that are against your church or religion, whatever. Please be very careful.” -(Illinois, 65, Female, White, Catholic)

Are there differences in preferences by the type of targeted violence or by demographic factors?

Reporting modalities differences by targeted violence scenario

We looked at whether the intimate bystanders responded differently to the different scenarios in terms of their reporting process. We found that the participants did not respond differently or perceive a different level of credibility; a threat was a threat and it didn’t matter the motivation. Some differences were specific to the scenario in that several intimate bystanders said they would report to human resources or a supervisor in the same workplace scenario.

Demographic differences in reporting preferences

Participants were asked to give a numerical rating on a scale from 1–10 (1 being most comfortable, 10 being least comfortable) regarding their level of comfort “sharing concerns” about the scenario presented with different people or organisations. Overall, intimate bystanders of different gender, age, race, ethnicity, and religion agreed in their ranking of comfort for sharing concerns. Participants overall gave high ranks to relatives (mean ranking 4.1), friends (3.8), and mental health professionals (2.9). Participants who identified with any religion rated faith leaders significantly higher than those who did not (4.5 v. 6.3, t= −2.6927, p < 0.01), although as a group religious intimate bystanders still did not rate faith leaders as highly as they rated family, friends, and mental health practitioners. A minority of participants were just as comfortable with faith leaders as they were with family, friends, and mental health practitioners: 15/37 Christians (40%) and 7/21 Muslims (33%) ranked faith leaders a 1 or 2 out of 10. Qualitative findings showed that while many religious intimate bystanders were comfortable sharing their concerns with faith leaders, they did so to seek guidance and support and did not think making a formal report to a faith leader would be appropriate.

White-identified intimate bystanders were more comfortable sharing concerns with both police (3.6 v. 4.6, t = 1.8490, p < 0.05) and FBI (4.1 v. 6.0, t = 2.8141, p < 0.01) relative to the rest of the sample. Black-identified intimate bystanders were significantly more comfortable sharing concerns with non-law enforcement persons including mental health practitioners (1.3 vs 3.1, t = 2.4442, p < 0.01), teachers (4.2 vs 5.7, t = 2.1140, p < 0.01), faith leaders (2.7 vs 5.4, t = 2.8589, p < 0.01), and community leaders (4.2 vs 5.4, t = 1.8229, p < 0.05) compared to the rest of the sample.

How do intimate bystanders prefer to report their concerns?

Intimate bystanders ranked the telephone and in-person modalities as their first choices overall. As shown in he telephone was the most popular reporting option: 69/123 (56%) intimate bystanders ranked it as their first choice and 26/123 (21%) intimate bystanders ranked it as their second choice. In-person reporting was the second most preferred method: 66/123 (54%) intimate bystanders ranked it first and 21/123 (17%) ranked it second. Reporting by telephone was perceived as fast and facilitating anonymity with a preference for telephone reporting to local professionals, such as a mental health practitioners. Intimate bystanders who preferred to report in-person felt it conveyed the severity of the situation, indicating “whereas if you are doing it over the phone or online, you never really know how the other side is going to interpret what you are telling them.” (Illinois, 19, Male, White, Non-Practicing).

Figure 3. Preference for modalities for Reporting.

Figure 3. Preference for modalities for Reporting.

Far fewer endorsed a website or app as first or second choice (website first choice 21/123, 17%; website second choice 30/123, 24%; app first choice 19/123, 15%; app second choice 20/123, 16%). Participants feared that their report submitted via smartphone app, website, or email can “go unanswered by law enforcement” (California, 29, Female, White, Non-Practicing). Moreover, texting, mobile application, or secure websites may have character or content limitations preventing one to “talk about it in detail” or share as much as the reporter feels comfortable sharing (Illinois, 22, Male, Pakistani, Muslim).

I would probably be thinking, did they receive my concern? Did it go through? -(California, 34, Female, Latinx, Non-Practicing).

Those who did prefer websites or apps cited their ease of access in reporting and facilitation of anonymity and confidentiality. Similarly, because reporting online prevented one’s identity from being disclosed, it had the potential to reduce situations in which implicit bias or discrimination may change “opinions [of the report-taker or authorities] and change [their] advice to you in a way” (Illinois, 19, Male, Asian, Muslim). summarises the reasons given for these modality preferences.

Table 1. Reasons for preferred reporting modalities.

Discussion

We found similarities and critical differences in our U.S. sample from the Australian and U.K. studies. Consistent with the Australian and U.K. studies, care and concern about the potential violent actor and for the safety of the community motivated deciding to report. Furthermore, intimate bystanders face difficulties in assessing the proper threshold for reporting and may be troubled by concerns about misjudgement, often waiting for noticeable, concrete actions – such as naming a plan or date – to have occurred before reporting. They feel uncertain and confused about what reporting resources and choices are available to them and they approach decision-making and reporting in stages, which may delay reporting. Some intimate bystanders want follow-up from authorities on the progress and outcomes of their reporting and some want additional support and counselling.

Intimate bystander’s reporting decisions for ideologically motivated violence, such as terrorism, are indistinguishable from non-ideologically motivated violence, such as targeted workplace violence. Unlike the prior Australian and U.K. studies, intimate bystanders in the U.S. prefer a mixture of modes for reporting: 77% preferred telephone-based reporting (particularly locally-based telephone lines) and 71% preferred face-to-face reporting. These two modes offer intimate bystanders a way to receive feedback from the report taker about what they are doing and that their reporting is correct. Still, 41% prefer a website as their first or second choice, and 31% prefer an app as their first or second choice.

An important area of difference from prior studies concerns the influence that racial disparities and institutional racism have on reporting by intimate bystanders. While more commonly discussed by non-White intimate bystanders, even White intimate bystanders expressed concerns about law enforcement overreacting and doing harm, especially to Black people. While concerns about Islamophobia were a feature of the data in the Australian study, racism is not explicitly mentioned, for instance, in the Australia report. The U.K. study, largely researched with young British Muslim adults, found only limited evidence around anti-Muslim racism being a possible barrier to (Muslim) intimate bystander sharing of concerns and reporting (Thomas et al., Citation2017).

The primacy of this U.S. finding likely reflects a combination of the racially and ethnically diverse sample in our study, the prominence of institutional racism in the U.S., and the salience of police violence in the U.S. Non-Hispanic Black people and Hispanic people disproportionately suffer deaths from police violence, implicating systemic racism in policing (Sharara et al., Citation2021; Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk Citation2016). A recent report from Brian Jackson and colleagues concurs that “the concerns that communities have about the treatment of their members by law enforcement, along with perceptions of bias or fairness, and procedural justice or injustice will inevitably shape the implementation of terrorism prevention (Jackson et al., Citation2019).

Because of the important role played by social and community dimensions, we developed a four-level socio-ecological framework to better explain intimate bystander reporting in the U.S. This framework extends the Australian and U.K. studies as it claims that intimate bystander reporting should be viewed as more than an individual phenomenon (e.g. “should I help?”) and a set of community relations and resources. Reporting decisions and actions should also be viewed within the context of society and its policies (e.g. “Are the histories and institutions capable of being non-discriminatory and fair?”). No single factor can explain why some people or groups are more or less likely to report a potential violent actor. Instead, intimate bystander reporting is the outcome of interactions among many factors at the four levels. For example, fears that harm will come to the potential violent actor (Relationship level factors) may influence reporting mainly when they occur in combination with factors at the community level (Trust of Law Enforcement) and societal level (Police Violence, Racism and Discrimination). One key conclusion is that policymakers and practitioners wanting to improve reporting need to attend more closely to how institutional and societal factors, like police violence, shape intimate bystander reporting. The model also situates intimate bystander reporting beside other population-based approaches to violence prevention (Dahlberg and Krug Citation2002). This model serves as a framework for creating and evaluating future programmes and developing a research agenda.

To represent the multiple stages of intimate bystanders’ decision making and possible actions, we developed the “START-V Model (STAges in Reporting of Targeted Violence.” It shows how much of the intimate bystander’s decision making and possible actions do not involve or depend upon law enforcement and are either self-directed or involve community practitioners, many of whom are not trained in responding to targeted violence. It also identifies the key questions which intimate bystanders face at different stages of the process for which they expressed difficulty finding answers. One implication is to develop engaging and accessible web-based resources to help support and guide intimate bystanders in answering their questions and directing them to resources and remedies. Another implication is to better equip community practitioners with the tools for assessing and managing targeted violence.

This research has several limitations. We recruited a convenience sample of participants from the two regions in which the U.S. investigators work, so the results may not be generalisable across the country. Both regions are primarily urban and suburban with predominantly Democrat affiliated voters. Future studies should recruit from more rural and Republican affiliated regions since these contextual factors may influence perceptions about law enforcement, behavioural health, and reporting preferences. Our sample was younger and more Asian than the U.S. population. It is unclear if this matters for the research results since we found few differences along demographic lines. The similarities we found among demographic groups may reflect unmeasured factors such as experiences and values shared in a regional sample that would display more heterogeneity in a national sample. Future studies should also be conducted with national samples.

Also, the research was guided by the proposition that studying community members placed in the hypothetical position of an intimate bystander will assist the development of prevention strategies for targeted violence in the U.S. as it has in the U.K. and Australia. However, the attitudes and behavioural intentions of the intimate bystanders who were provided hypothetical scenarios may not accurately predict their responses in actual situations. The Connor scenario was only presented to participants who identified as White which may confound our finding of no differences by scenario. Also, since the majority of targeted violence in the U.S. is conducted by males we did not provide female scenarios to participants, so we cannot comment on how a potential violent actor’s gender influences reporting.

The rising and ideologically diversified threat of extremist violence in the U.S. and the on-going experience of targeted, mass violence in the U.S. makes understanding and addressing these matters urgent. We found that intimate bystanders will report to law enforcement if the violence risk is deemed serious enough, yet they face multiple barriers, and reporting to law enforcement is one of multiple possible actions for mitigating violence risk. By elucidating the socio-ecological context and decision-making process of intimate bystander reporting, this study informs new, contextually-sensitive approaches to intimate bystander reporting programmes and policies in the U.S. Any consideration of community reporting must reconcile with the broader concerns about police violence that minoritized communities experience.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available as public-use data files from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at (omitted to maintain anonymity).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the National Institute of Justice under grant number 2018-ZA-CX-0004.

Notes on contributors

David P. Eisenman

David P. Eisenman, MD, MS HS (ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4320-1331) is a Professor at the David Geffen School of Medicine and the Fielding School of Public Health at UCLA, where he directs the Center for Public Health and Disasters and co-directs the Center for Healthy Climate Solutions. His studies of disasters, climate change, violence, mental health, and public health have been funded by the National Institute of Justice, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. He is an Associate Natural Scientist at RAND and was previously the Preparedness Science Officer for the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health.

Stevan Weine

Stevan Weine, MD (ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4515-3065) is Professor of Psychiatry at the UIC College of Medicine and Director of Global Medicine and Director of the Center for Global Health. For 30 years, he has been conducting research both with refugees and migrants in the U.S. and in post-conflict countries, focused on mental health, health, and violence prevention. This work has been supported by multiple grants from the National Institute of Justice, National Institute of Mental Health, Department of Homeland Security, and other state, federal, and private funders. Weine is the 2020 recipient of the Abraham L. Halpern Humanitarian Award of the American Association for Social Psychiatry.

Paul Thomas

Paul Thomas, PhD (ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1264-2759) is a Professor of Youth and Policy and Associate Dean (Research) at the School of Education and Professional Development, University of Huddersfield, UK. Thomas’s research on how ground-level practitioners and communities have experienced violent extremism, racial tension and policies to prevent them has led to several books, such as ‘Responding to the Threat of Violent Extremism: Failing to Prevent’ articles in leading journals, and research funding from CREST/ESRC (UK), Public Safety Canada, the National Institute of Justice (USA) and UK regional/local government bodies. Thomas is a Scientific Expert for the EU Research and Innovation Programme, a member of the International Advisory Board for the AVERT network in Australia, and has given oral evidence on the Prevent counter-terrorism programme to the UK Parliament. Thomas is a qualified Youth and Community Worker, and prior to becoming an academic worked for a national youth work organisation and for the UK Government’s Commission for Racial Equality.

Michele Grossman

Michele Grossman, PhD (ORCID ID: 0000-0001-5603-7687) is a Professor of Cultural Studies and Research Chair in Diversity and Community Resilience at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia, where she is Director of the multi-institutional Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS) and the AVERT (Addressing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation to Terrorism) Research Network. Grossman’s studies on community engagement with and responses to terrorism and violent extremism events, prevention programmes and policies have been supported by funding from CREST-ESRC (UK), the EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program, the Australian Federal Police, Victoria Police, Australia’s Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee and Department of Home Affairs, National Institute of Justice (USA), Public Safety Canada and other agencies. She is Associate Editor for Terrorism and Political Violence, a Robert Schuman (Distinguished Scholar) Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, and a Visiting Professor at University of Huddersfield.

Natalie Porter

Natalie Porter (ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5866-6636) earned a BA in Neuroscience and Behavior from Barnard College and an MPH in Community Health Sciences at the Fielding School of Public Health, UCLA. She spent 5 years working with youth experiencing homelessness before returning to school, where she has focused on mental health and equity issues. She has conducted quantitative and qualitative research in smoking cessation, emotional regulation, speech perception, homelessness, violence prevention, childhood trauma prevention, health systems, and implementation science.

Nilpa D. Shah

Nilpa D. Shah, MPH (ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8199-7145) received an MPH from the UCLA Fielding School of Public Health. At UCLA, she focused on community violence and intimate partner violence prevention. Shah specialises in qualitative research and studying the impacts of sociocultural and biobehavioral determinants of health. She has conducted research in violence prevention, family caregiving, telehealth, and patient-provider decision-making. Her research interests include relationship of physical and mental health, prevention of chronic diseases, and health and social behaviour. LinkedIn:

Chloe Polutnik Smith

Chloe Polutnik Smith, MPH received an MPH with a global health concentration in the Community Health Sciences Division from the University of Illinois at Chicago. She works as a programme coordinator in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She has experience conducting research with refugees and migrant populations in the U.S. and in post-conflict countries, focused on mental health, health, and violence prevention. She has expertise in qualitative methodologies.

Zach Brahmbhatt

Zach Brahmbhatt earned a BA in political science from UIC and is an MD candidate at the University of Illinois College of Medicine as a part of the Global Medicine program. He currently works for the UIC Department of Psychiatry as a graduate student researcher, focusing his efforts on applying public health frameworks to the violence prevention space.

Michael Fernandes

Michael Fernandes is a pre-medical student at the University of Illinois at Chicago majoring in political science. He works as an undergraduate student researcher at the University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine in the Department of Psychiatry.

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