Securitisation and spaces of terrorism in Kenya’s National Police Service counterterrorism discourse

ABSTRACT

The northeastern and coastal counties of Kenya are characterised by a high prevalence of terrorism and counterterrorism conducted by the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terror group and the country’s National Police Service, respectively. The National Police Service (NPS) is Kenya’s principal counterterrorism state agency. This article examines how the National Police Service online counterterrorism discourse constructs these two regions as spaces of terrorism. The article adopts the securitisation theory and a critical discourse analysis perspective to analyse the National Police Service discourse as speech acts hence securitising moves, The speech acts discursively construct the two regions as spaces of terrorism hence threats to physical and human security. The construction enables to the National Police Service to legitimise and implement urgent repressive counterterrorism measures. The conditions that facilitate the discursive construction of threats and acceptance of the speech acts are the marginalisation of the inhabitants and terrorism in the regions. The conclusion offers ways of mitigating the adverse effects of the NPS counterterrorism discourse.

KEYWORDS:

• Counterterrorism discourse, securitisation
• critical discourse analysis
• Kenya national police service
• spaces of terrorism

Introduction

The prevalence of terrorism in the northeastern and coastal counties of Kenya is a function of the marginalisation of inhabitants and subsequent operations of the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terror group. Al-Shabaab, adopts Islamism as an ideology to radicalise and recruit members from the regions. Its asymmetric warfare essentially targets state security actors. Kenya’s National Police Service (NPS) is the principal counterterrorism state agency in the country. Its repressive counterterrorism measures disproportionately target the regions’ inhabitants hence augmenting local-level community injustices and grievances conducive for radicalisation to violent extremism. Al-Shabaab’s asymmetric warfare therefore continues unabated in the regions despite the repressive counterterrorism operations. The NPS online counterterrorism discourse socially constructs the country’s coast and north-eastern counties as spaces of terrorism. The objective is to provide urgent solutions to the threats. The solutions offered are counterterrorism measures that often violate the rights of the regions’ inhabitants. This article examines how the National Police Service counterterrorism discourse constructs these two regions as spaces of terrorism so that it can legitimise its repressive counterterrorism measures in the regions. The article is divided into three sections. The first section examines the relationship between securitisation, critical discourse analysis and spaces of terrorism. It provides the appropriate framework derived from the securitisation theory and critical discourse to analyse the problem under investigation. The second section pays attention to the historical and contemporary factors that enhance the threat of terrorism in Kenya’s northeastern and coastal counties. The section provides the relevant socio-economic and political background information required to understand why the NPS counterterrorism discourse is able to construct the regions as spaces of terrorism. From a securitisation and critical discourse perspective, the third section analyses the NPS speech acts as securitising moves. It demonstrates how the speech acts, issued by an authorised speaker, discursively construct the two regions as spaces of terrorism so that the NPS can legitimise norm-violating counterterrorism measures in the regions. The conclusion offers ways of preventing the construction of the northeastern and coastal regions of Kenya as spaces of terrorism to enhance human security in Kenya.

Securitisation, critical discourse analysis and spaces of terrorism

Social constructivism emphasises that in politics, social norms constitute the identity of and regulate the behaviour of actors respectively. Agents and structures are therefore mutually constituted to explain the facts of existence of the political world. It therefore becomes essential to understand the constitution of things so as to be able to explain the behaviour of actors and also political outcomes. Discursive constructivism, a variant of social constructivism, derives its theoretical inspiration from linguistic approaches, and emphasises the power and domination inherent in language (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Wendt 19992019), Constructivist perspectives on terrorism within the mainstream field of terrorism studies have become more prominent with the rise of post-2001 period Critical Terrorism Studies (Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 2014; Spencer 2012). Critical Terrorism Studies challenges, critiques and is sceptical towards conventional knowledge about terrorism. It challenges dominant perspectives on terrorism provided by orthodox terrorism studies. As a broad approach, Critical Terrorism Studies comprises several ontological, methodological and ethical-normative issues. Its methods and approaches are drawn from several disciplines (Mwangi 2019).

The significance of the social constructivism perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies, which analyses terrorism and counterterrorism, is evident in its ontological and epistemological concerns (Jackson 2015). The ontological issues indicate that terrorism is best understood as a social construction (Turk 2004). Critical Terrorism Studies accepts that terrorism is basically a social fact rather than a violent fact. Its nature is not characteristic to the violent act itself but is “dependent upon context, circumstance, intention, and crucially, social, cultural, legal, and political processes of interpretation, categorization, and labelling” (Jackson 2010, 4). Terrorism is socially constructed to consciously manipulate perceptions aimed at promoting parochial interests (Turk 2004). While actual violence perpetuated by terrorists and terrorism exist, real-world experiences and meanings of terrorism and counterterrorism are socially constructed using different kinds of political and intellectual labels that are not permanent but products of their social milieu (Breidlid 2021; Jackson, Gunning, and Breen Smyth 2007). Ontologically, Critical Terrorism Studies, therefore, augments the inquiry of the discourses which produce “terrorism” as a distinctive study, the substantial concerns which generate and sustain these discourses and the actual political violence in the “real” world which has “terroristic” characteristics (Jackson 2005, 2008, 2010, 3–5; Jackson, Gunning, and Breen Smyth 2007, 17–18). Epistemologically, Critical Terrorism Studies fundamentally accepts that perfectly objective or neutral knowledge about terrorism is not possible, and there is always an ideological, ethical-political dimension to the research process. Since terrorism is socially constructed, there is a need to broaden the focus on terrorism research to include both state and non-state terrorism, counterterrorism, other forms of violence and non-violence and social context (Heath-Kelly 2018; Jackson 2010; Mwangi 2019; Stump and Dixit 2016). More importantly, since terrorism as a social fact is produced in discourse, research also needs to focus on the discourse by which the terrorist actor and his or her actions are constituted. This requires a shift of perspective in terrorism studies, from the terrorist to terrorism discourse (Hulsse and Spencer 2008). According to Hulsse and Spencer (2008), the “primary source of terrorism research must be the discourse in which the social construction of terrorism takes place, that is, the discourse that constitutes a particular group of people as “terrorists” (Hulsse and Spencer 2008, 571–578).

Much of the social constructivism research that pays attention to the power of discourse as an important characteristic of security analysis emanates from the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School (Balzacq 2005; Buzan and Waever 2009; Heath-Kelly 2018, Mwangi). The essential features of securitisation theory according to Ciuta (2009) are “that a) actors define security; b) actors construct security; c) security becomes ‘what actors make of it’ through securitising speech acts; d) the construction of security, and security itself, must be understood as a practice” (Ciuta 2009, 304). Securitisation theory examines the processes that produce an “intersubjective and socially constructed” security, whereby security or the logic of security is not actually constructed, but objectively defined. Only threats are socially constructed in the context of various issues being framed as existential threats (Ciuta 2009, 308). Threats, as constructions, are based on the way those constructing interpret their reality (Newell 2016). In the context of securitisation, security is recognised as a speech act. A speech act by a securitising actor constitutes an issue as an existential threat to the survival of a “referent object” and is accepted as such by the “audience” of the speech act (Leonard 2010, 235). Securitisation theory examines both the discursive construction of existential threats and how this construction creates a type of politics which allows actors to disregard established norms, rules or restraints (Bright 2012). The feeling of fear that stems from the perception that terrorism is a threat, in turn, influences individual and state behaviour. The state, therefore, introduces counterterrorism measures which further enhance individual perceptions that terrorism is a threat leading to a vicious circle of threat and response. Once the threat of terrorism is socially constructed, the counterterrorism measures aimed at dealing with it are also socially constructed through language (Spencer 2006). In this regard, an analysis of state counterterrorism discourse, as it relates to potential human rights violations, is essential on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The state’s counterterrorism discourse demonstrates that state security actors deliberately engage in efforts to legitimise and rationalise counterterrorism measures that violate established rules and norms (Pisoiu 2012).

The effectiveness of counterterrorism measures can be assessed by examining the discourse, which constructs the threat and the response. Discourse analysis is normally based on text, written or oral, by authorised or expert speakers and writers. Speech acts only enter the discourse if they are expressed by important people (Spencer 2006). In the context of securitisation, counterterrorism discourse, can be examined from a critical discourse analysis perspective. Critical discourse analysis examines the role of language in the construction of terrorism and counterterrorism. It refers to a wide range of different understandings of the word “discourse” and its methods of analysis. The variety of approaches are unified by a common interest that pays attention to the structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as manifested in language and assumes that discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned. Reality is constituted and accessed through discourse and language (El Shazly 2021; Ford 2017; Rothenberger, Muller, and Elmezeny 2018; Wyszomierski 2015). Discourse not only reproduces and reinforces power, but it also exposes it, rendering it fragile and susceptible to manipulation. Hence discourse can never be neutral. It expresses specific viewpoints or structures (El–Shazly 2021; Rothenberger, Muller, and Elmezeny 2018). The critical discourse analysis perspective is a persuasive way to understand how specific counterterrorism practices are legitimised and normalised through the production and reproduction of socio-political consensus. Discourse constructs terrorism and counterterrorism as social and security problems. The critical discourse analysis perspective analyses the establishment and maintenance of unequal power relations in terrorism and counterterrorism (Jusue 2022; Rothenberger, Muller, and Elmezeny 2018; Sjoen and Mattsson 2023; Suleiman 2023). Critical discourse analysis examines how strategies in texts are used to legitimise differences between social identities in counterterrorism discourse (Sjoen and Mattsson 2023). Text as discourse is important for the construction of identity, especially if discourse is considered a social practice in which identity manifests (Rothenberger, Muller, and Elmezeny 2018). As texts, news media sources control and disseminate specific forms of discourse. Critical discourse analysis examines the power to control public discourse and the subsequent social consequences of such control (Suleiman 2023; Wyszomierski 2015).

The securitisation theory is also an appropriate analytical framework for explaining the relationship between the construction of terrorism threats and spaces of terrorism. The intersection between security and normal space has increasingly shifted its attention from the “securitisation of space”, that is situations in which space is a political object and outcome of security discourse, to the “space of securitisation”, which expresses space as a discursive phenomenon and the constitutive subject of securitisation. Space is now conceptualised not only as a function of securitisation, but also an active element in remaking the dynamics of securitisation. The spatial-political examination contributes to a much broader understanding of the concept of spaces of terrorism in relation to politics, physical space, and security, especially counterterrorism (Ingram and Dodds 2009; Liu and Guan 2021).

The securitisation theory, however, has its shortcomings, especially in its focus on subjectivism and expert discourse. Subjectivism implies that the possibility for misinterpretation is present in the response to any given threat whereby threats could either be disregarded or regarded (Newell 2016). The securitisation theory lacks clarity on the extent to which the measures considered effective in the expert discourse transcend to the discourse of the ordinary person who is predominantly the target of terrorism, not the expert (Spencer 2006). Other criticisms of the securitisation theory include clarity issues on the definition of legitimacy, role of audience in the securitisation process, its inability to account for the gendered dimensions of security, and overly discourse-centric (Baker-Beall and Clark 2021; Floyd 2021; Jarvis 2023; Oleskar 2018; Soares 2022). Though the field of Critical Terrorism Studies has its ontological and epistemological shortcomings, its perspectives, and approaches such as social constructivism and securitisation, are, nonetheless, highly relevant frameworks that analyse the relevance of socially constructing terrorism and counterterrorism (Hulsse and Spencer 2008; Jackson et al. 2017; McGowan 2016). The utility of securitisation theory as an analytical framework is its understanding of security as a speech act. The theory provides an elaborate understanding of the way in which threats and threat discourses are produced, making it distinct in that it also allows potentially new interpretations of what security actually means (Ciuta 2009; Stritzel 2011, 2492). It is in the context of the foregoing arguments that this article adopts the securitisation theory and a critical discourse analysis perspective to analyse the NPS official online counterterrorism discourse and discursive practices that subjectively construct Kenya’s northeast and coastal counties as spaces of terrorism. The objective of the NPS is to depict the two regions as existential threats to physical and human security hence legitimise and implement repressive counterterrorism measures in the regions. The speech acts of the NPS form the core data and are examined as securitising moves.

Marginalisation and terrorism in northeastern and coastal counties of Kenya

In order to comprehend the NPS counterterrorism discourse and discursive practices that construct Kenya’s northeastern and coastal counties as spaces of terrorism, an examination of the socio-economic and political context that constitutes the discourse is essential. This section, therefore, examines the socio-economic and political conditions that facilitate the construction of the two regions as spaces of terrorism. These conditions are the marginalisation of inhabitants and terrorism, and they significantly facilitate public acceptance of NPS counterterrorism speech acts. The north-eastern and coastal counties of Kenya cover approximately 36% of the country’s territory. They contain slightly over 14% of Kenya’s population. The two regions comprise 79% of the country’s 11.2% Muslims. About 83% of the population of Kenya is Christian. The regions, which border Somalia, experience high levels of poverty, unemployment, conflict, and insecurity (Republic of Kenya 2019a, 2019b).

Socio-economic and political marginalisation

The marginalisation of the northeastern and coastal counties of Kenya is a product of the country’s colonial and postcolonial policies. During the colonial period, British authorities neglected Kenya’s vast semi-arid and arid north-eastern region, which was predominantly inhabited by Muslim ethnic Somali pastoralists. The colonial authorities favoured and prioritised development in the country’s natural resource endowed highlands areas that were largely populated by Christian farmers. Towards Kenya’s independence in 1963, the British authorities accorded the marginalised Somali inhabitants of the north-eastern region, the right to determine, by way of referendum, whether to remain part of Kenya or to join Somalia (Weitzberg 2016; Whittaker 2016). The region’s marginalised Somali inhabitants, who historically favoured Pan-Somali nationalism and a Greater Somalia opted to join Somalia. Kenya’s political leaders, who at the time embraced nationalism, rejected the outcome of the plebiscite. The leaders of the new postcolonial state, thereafter, supported a state-led protracted war against a Somalia-sponsored irredentist movement in the region. The war, known as the “Shifta War” of 1963 to 1967, and subsequent imposition of emergency rule in the country’s North Eastern Province (NEP) further eroded political trust between the Kenyan state and the Somali communities. Successive post-independence governments in Kenya continued to pursue policies which served to further impoverish the region and marginalise the inhabitants (Branch 2014; Weitzberg 2016; Whittaker 2017). Following the promulgation of Kenya’s new constitution of 2010 and the implementation of political devolution in the country, the northeastern province became the three counties of Garissa, Mandera and Wajir. The three counties continue to be among the most marginalised in the country (Kenya 2019).

The marginalisation of the coastal counties, their inhabitants, and subsequent claims for post-independence regional autonomy dates back to 1895 when the Sultan of Zanzibar claimed an inland “ten-mile strip” of Kenya leased by the British colonial authorities. The controversial historical political-administrative lease has provided opportunities for the diverse multicultural inhabitants of coastal counties to emphasise that greater autonomy will address the problems associated with regional socio-economic and political marginalisation. Like in the northeastern region, marginalisation and exclusion in the coastal region are also based on religion. In post-independence Kenya, the marginalisation of Muslims has been enhanced by several domestic and global factors such as constitutionalism and the Global War on Terror. Following the implementation of the 2010 constitution and enactment of political devolution, partly to address issues of marginalisation, the Coast Province was divided into six counties, namely Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mombasa, Taita-Taveta, and Tana River. The counties reflect the region’s historical and socio-cultural divisions (Brenan 2008; Deacon et al. 2017; Robertson 1961; Willis and Gona 2012).

Militancy and terrorism

The prevalence of conflict and insecurity in the northeastern and coastal counties of Kenya is a function of structural conditions emanating from historical and contemporary factors (H. Whittaker 2017). These counties have the characteristics of state fragility, which include the inability of the state to provide adequate basic security, and the prevalence of conflict and insecurity. Conflict and security incidences include localised resource-based conflict, human-wildlife conflict, banditry, cattle rustling, inter-communal conflict, and terrorism. The structural conditions of the regions provide favourable circumstances for radicalisation conducive to violent extremism, and consequently the implementation of repressive counter-terrorism measures, The vicious circle of threat and response provides more opportunities for Al-Shabaab to radicalise and recruit members (Badurdeen 2021; Botha 2014; Githigaro and Kabia 2022; Hansen, Lid, and Okwany 2019; Mwangi 2021, 2023a, 2023b; Ndzovu 2017; Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019; Wario 2021). Al-Shabaab’s activities in these regions date back to 2008. However, the terror group’s operations increased following Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia on 14 October 2011 (Ndzovu 2017). The intervention, conducted by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), initially as Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country), was launched following several Al-Shabaab violent activities in Kenya that occurred in the north-eastern and coastal regions (KDF 2014). Between 24 October 2011, and 29 December 2020, Kenya experienced about 710 Al-Shabaab attacks, of which over 80% took place in the north-eastern and coastal regions (Global Terrorism Data base 2022). Major attacks that have been conducted by Al-Shabaab in these regions since Kenya’s 2011 military intervention in Somalia include the Mpeketoni attacks of June 2014 in Lamu County, and Garissa University attack of April 2015 in Garissa County, in which 60 and 152 people died, respectively. On 5 January 2020, Al-Shabaab attacked Kenya Navy’s Manda Bay base in Lamu County, which is also used by the United States (US) military as a forward operating base and killed a US soldier and two US contractors. The group also destroyed a US surveillance plane (Asaka 2023; Blanchard 2020; Mwangi 2021).

Al-Shabaab’s methods of operation in the north-eastern and coastal counties include, occupying remote villages and mosques for several hours while preaching jihad, and intimidating or killing state officials. It also targets state security actors and assassinates community elders and religious leaders perceived as supporters of counterterrorism measures. The group’s asymmetric warfare continues unabated despite the repressive counterterrorism operations in the regions (Githigaro and Kabia 2022; Musau 2018; Mwangi 2021; Oando and Achieng’ 2021). Repressive counterterrorism functions in Kenya are divided among the three branches of the NPS. These branches are the Kenya Police Service, which includes the paramilitary General Service Unit; Traffic Police; regional, county, and local police; the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, which includes the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Bomb Disposal Unit, and Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit; and the Administration Police (AP) that includes the Border Police Unit. The National Intelligence Service and elements of the KDF also have counterterrorism responsibilities (US 2023).

Public perceptions of such security threats and security operations in the northeastern and coastal counties are well documented in academic and policy literature. Various studies on public perceptions regarding security threats indicate that Kenyans in general perceive the regions as hotspots of terrorism and threats to both physical and human security (Amnesty International 2014; Botha 2014; Haki Africa 2016; HRW, Human Rights Watch 2016; Lind, Mutahi, and Oosterom 2017; Speckhard and Shajkovci 2019). More significantly, the studies indicate that whereas many of the inhabitants of these regions do not support state-led counterterrorism operations due to their repressive nature, most Kenyans from other regions of the country support the operations because of their negative perceptions about the two regions (Buchanan-Clarke and Lekalake 2015; Muibu and Cubukcu 2023). Such studies are, arguably, an indicator that the speech acts produced by the NPS are accepted by their intended audience. Having outlined the facilitating conditions, the next section pays attention to the counterterrorism discourse and how it discursively constructs the north-eastern and coastal counties as spaces of terrorism.

Constructing spaces of terrorism in Kenya’s national police service counterterrorism discourse

The widely held contending accounts of reality held by state security actors in Kenya on the nature, frequency, and socio-political objectives of Al-Shabaab attacks in the northeastern and coastal counties, provides the basis upon which to construct the regions as spaces of terrorism. From a securitisation and critical discourse analysis perspective, this section examines Kenya’s NPS online counterterrorism discourse. As the principal counterterrorism state agency, the NPS is examined as a securitising actor in the analysis of its official online counterterrorism press releases in Kenya. The nine press releases analysed, as speech acts, are purposively sampled. The statements are normally released by the Inspector General of the Police (IGP) on behalf of the NPS. Contextually, the nine selected press statements focus on Al-Shabaab incidences in Kenya’s northeastern and coastal counties. The statements, which cover a five-year period, were released between 21 December 2015, and 7 January 2020. This is a period that witnessed a sharp increase and decline of Al-Shabaab‘s attacks in Kenya. The increase was the result of the 2014 military intervention in Somalia. Consequently, enhanced counterterrorism measures conducted by the NPS reduced the attacks (Mwangi 2021). The online press statements chronologically analysed are: Makka Bus Attack Prime Suspects (Mwangi 2015); Press Release (2016); Attack on Central Police Station (2016); Police Arrest a Key Islamic State Agent (2017); Terrorist Attack at Fino Police Station and AP Camp (2018); Security Operation along the Border in Mandera (2018); Wanted Persons: Suspects in Connection with abduction of Italian Volunteer Identified (2018); Thwarting of a Terror Attack by Mandera Residents (Mwangi and Mwangi 2019); and Press Release on Saretho (2020). The speech acts are examined as securitising moves to demonstrate how counterterrorism practices are legitimised. The analysis pays attention to two key elements. First, it examines the way the language practice of the NPS discourse is regulated by a discursive security order hence socially constructs existential threats to security in the regions. The language of security discourse is evident in all the statements. Second, the way that the speech acts provide and legitimise counterterrorism measures as urgent solutions to such existential threats. Excerpts from the statements support the arguments raised.

Makka bus attack prime suspects

This statement refers to a fatal bus attack conducted by Al-Shabaab on 21 December 2015, in Kenya’s northeastern county of Mandera. The attackers targeted Christian passengers. The fatalities would have been higher were it not for the Kenyan Muslims in the bus who protected Christian passengers when Al-Shabaab ordered all passengers to separate themselves along religious lines (British Broadcasting Corporation 2015; NPS 2015). The IGP immediately released a statement titled Makka Bus Attack Prime Suspects. Territory as an existential threat is discursively constructed in the following excerpt:

On 21^st December 2015, a Makka Bus was attacked by terrorists who waylaid it between Elwak and Kotulo. Following this attack, Police investigations and intelligence have zeroed in on four key masterminds of the heinous act. The four key suspects are: 1) … from Elwak, 2) … from Wajir, 3) … from Wajir and 4) … from Wajir … investigations have established that the four are working closely with fugitives … Al-Shabaab leaders currently operating in Somalia.

… The National Police Service once again wishes to express gratitude to the courageous passengers who displayed sense of patriotism and cohesiveness when they protected their fellow Kenyans during the attack. We therefore appeal to the members of public to continue showing solidarity in the fight against Terrorism and other organized crimes. We also ask members of the public to provide information that will lead to the arrest of these prime suspects together with their collaborators. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2015)

The labelling of an existential threat requiring critical action or extraordinary measures begins by depicting Mandera and Wajir counties and the transport industry, manifested by the bus attack, as referent objects. The statement portrays the bus attack as brutal through the epithet “heinous”, which resulted in the death of two people. All suspects involved in the attack are from the northeastern counties of Kenya and are depicted as “working closely with fugitives” and “operatives” who are Al-Shabaab leaders (NPS 2015a). Religious communities are depicted as a referent object. The statement indicates that the attack was an existential threat to both Christians and Muslims pointing out that fatalities would have been higher were it not for the Muslims in the bus who protected Christian passengers. Of significance is the acknowledgement and credit that was given to the Muslim passengers. The NPS described the Muslim passengers as “courageous passengers who displayed a sense of patriotism and cohesiveness when they protected their fellow Kenyans during the attack”. It further lauded the move by the Muslim passengers as one of “solidarity in the fight against Terrorism and other organized crimes” (NPS 2015a). This is also significant as Al-Shabaab makes use of Islamism to legitimise the use of violence and fuel sectarian strife in Kenya. This religious dimension is further supported by depiction of three out of the four suspects as Madrasa teachers. Madrasas are Islamic religious schools.

This statement portrays Al-Shabaab attacks as an existential threat to physical and human security in the northeastern counties, particularly to owners and users of the transport sector and Christians who are targeted. By lauding the courageous actions of the Muslim passengers, the NPS is also able to justify and legitimise counterterrorism measures (NPS 2015a). The language of security discourse, as a discursive order, is evident in the use of specific security words and phrases such as “bus attacked by terrorists”, “investigations and intelligence”, “key masterminds”, “heinous act”, “collaborators”, “fugitives”, “Al-Shabaab leaders”, and “the fight against Terrorism”. The discourse depicts the transport industry, religious community, and Mandera and Wajir counties as referent objects so that the solutions to Al-Shabaab threats are counterterrorism measures.

Press release

This statement that was released by the NPS on 10 June 2016, pays attention to the significance of the Holy Month of Ramadhan as well as Kenya’s borderlands in the preservation of peace and security in the country. The religious and spatial securitisation emerges in the following excerpts:

On behalf of the National Police Service, I take this opportunity to wish our Muslim brothers and sisters Ramadhan Kareem as they observe this Holy Month. Ramadhan … is a period in which our Muslim brothers and sisters re-dedicate themselves to the Faith, through prayer and goodwill to their neighbors. However, the tranquillity that ought to come with the Holy Month is at times desecrated by terror groups to commit atrocities on innocent civilians … terror attacks have previously been witnessed in the country during this period. We therefore call upon all Kenyans to exercise extra vigilance and report any suspicious activities and/or elements to security agencies for action … The Police … are continuously monitoring Al-Shabaab activities across the border in Somalia and their attempts to infiltrate our country Kenya, with the intentions to commit atrocities … we have witnessed sporadic attempts to stage terror attacks in Mandera and Wajir counties that have been repulsed. This signals a determination by the enemy to conduct attacks in Kenya, in retaliation for the several losses suffered at the hands of AMISOM forces in Somalia.

The areas, particularly along the Kenya-Somalia border, are at higher risk for such attacks. The attacks may be carried out by Al-Shabaab terrorists of Kenyan origin who have been trained in Somalia … Some may have managed to sneak into other towns such as Mombasa, Malindi and Nairobi, hence PSV operators, hotel and Inn keepers as well as those who maintain public buildings are equally requested to exercise extra vigilance.

The terrorists may masquerade as herders looking for pasture or refugees in their effort to infiltrate into the country. As such, we call upon all citizens, more so, communities who reside within these border regions … to be on the lookout for such individuals and to promptly inform the security agencies. As part of our effort to secure our country, Police … have so far arrested four people who were behind the recent killings of three community elders … Investigations have revealed that the culprits were members of Al-Shabaab. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2016b)

The statement begins by describing the Holy Month of Ramadhan as a sacred period for Muslims, and portraying Muslims as members of the Kenyan family through the references “brothers” and ‘sisters. It then moves to portray them as trustworthy by noting the devotion and goodwill that they exhibit during Ramadhan. The statement, however, indicates that this sacred period and its tranquillity is at times desecrated by terror groups. Al-Shabaab, which professes to embrace Islamism as an ideology, is depicted as desecrating a period in which Muslims re-dedicate themselves to the Islamic Faith thus a religious threat. This image distinguishes Muslims in general from terrorists, who have no value for peace and life. The relationship between religion and violence is once again implied, though in the context of intra-religious rather than inter-religious violence. The NPS statement constructs the inherent contradictions of Al-Shabaab’s Islamism with the aim of describing it as organisation that makes use of religion purely for criminal reasons rather than for political or theological objectives. The religious dimension of the statement is also evident when it also labels Al-Shabaab terrorists as the “the enemy” given that their attacks in Kenya are a “retaliation for the several losses suffered at the hands of AMISOM forces in Somalia” (NPS 2016b). The peace enforcement African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was largely responsible for countering Al-Shabaab’s threat in Somalia and the region. The terror group has labelled AMISOM as an occupation force and apostate. AMISOM acquired a new mandate under the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1 April 2022 (ATMIS 2023; Mwangi 2015).

Regarding borderlands, the statement repeatedly refers to the Kenya–Somalia border and its adjacent spaces in Kenya as territories where Al-Shabaab thrives. The terror group’s survival strategies are portrayed as recurrent attacks, masquerading as local pastoralist communities or Somali refugees, and the assassination of community elders. These elders are held in high esteem as agents of local-level conflict management. Al-Shabaab is thus depicted as an existential threat to the inhabitants of the northeastern regions particularly borderland communities, pastoral communities, community elders and refugees. Several studies demonstrate that Somali refugees residing in refugee camps located in the northeastern parts of Kenya, are often constructed as abetting terrorism thus existential threats to national security (Musau 2018; Mwangi 2019, Mwangi and Mwangi 2019).

The text also indicates four measures that the NPS has taken to protect Kenyans from the threats. First is the continuous monitoring of “Al-Shabaab activities across the border in Somalia and their attempts to infiltrate our country Kenya” (emphases added) (NPS 2016b). Second, disruption through arrests. Third, deterring through investigations. Four requesting “all Kenyans to exercise extra vigilance and report any suspicious activities and/or elements to security agencies for action” (emphases added) (NPS 2016b). These measures imply that Al-Shabaab attacks are existential threats, hence the need for vigilant counterterrorism measures. Several security-related words and phrases are used in the statement depicting the language of security discourse. These include, “tranquillity”, “desecrated by terror groups”, “terror attacks”, “extra vigilance”, “Al-Shabaab activities”, “infiltrate” and “retaliation”. The referent objects include Mandera, Wajir, Mombasa, and Kilifi counties, the Kenya–Somalia border, the hospitality and transport industry, public buildings. They also include the inhabitants of these spaces especially religious, borderland, and pastoral communities as well as community elders and refugees. The statement proposes counterterrorism measures.

Attack at central police station – Mombasa

This statement refers to a terrorist attack on a police station that occurred on 11 September 2016, in Kenya’s coastal county of Mombasa. The attack had both commemorative and gender significance as it occurred on 11 September and was entirely conducted by women. The NPS statement is titled Attack at Central Police Station – Mombasa (NPS 2016a). Gender and spatial securitisation are evident in the excerpts below:

Today, 11th September 2016 … three women attempted to attack Central Police Station in Mombasa under the guise of reporting a crime.

Immediately they entered the Station, one attempted to stab an officer while the other threw a petrol bomb in a bid to cause a fire, as the third one attempted to escape. Officers on duty acted quickly and gunned down all the three. One of the female attackers was wearing a suicide vest that did not detonate due to the quick action by the Police Officers.

The Station was cordoned off and the bomb experts sent to the scene to ensure that there were no other threats. In the commotion, two Officers were injured … .

… . investigations into the incident revealed the attackers as … and … . who hails from Kibokoni, Mombasa County.

Further investigations led to a thorough search at the residence of … at Kibokoni, Mombasa where three other suspected accomplices were found and arrested. The three suspected accomplices were established to be Somali refugees … are now in custody, assisting the Police with investigations.

We wish to commend the brave action taken by the officers today in foiling the attack. Operations are ongoing to identify and arrest all those who may have been involved in the planning and execution of this attack.

We also call upon members of the public to forward any information that will aid the investigations and subsequent arrest of all those responsible for this attack …. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2016a)

The opening phrase “Today, 11 September 2016” (NPS 2016a) indicates that attacks on the police station may have been commemorative of the 9/11 attack that occurred in the US. The statement factors in the gender dimension in terrorism, when three women are portrayed as attempting to attack a police station in Mombasa using methods like those used by terrorists, particularly, suicide vests and petrol bombs. The women are all killed by the police. Two of the attackers are identified as Kenyan citizens from Mombasa County. Their accomplices are identified as Somali refugees. Hence, the terrorist attack is depicted as an existential threat to Mombasa County, police stations, women and refugees. The identification of the attackers and accomplices’ origins, the description of the attack, and the identification of the place of attack, all provide the basis on which the NPS discourse constructs spaces of terrorism. Mombasa is often described as a hotspot of radicalisation that leads to violent extremism. Al-Shabaab’s military strategy entails, among others, frequently using suicide bombers to target security personnel and installations such as the police and police stations (Mwangi 2021). The NPS statement also adds a gender dimension to counterterrorism.

This text also indicates the soft and hard counterterrorism measures that the NPS has taken to protect Kenyans from terrorist threats. They include security operations that adopt the use of force and measures that employ non-coercive methods, such as community policing. Kenyans are called upon to “forward any information that will aid the investigations and subsequent arrest of all those responsible for this attack” (NPS 2016a). The NPS is depicted as fulfilling its counterterrorism mandate by working with the public to ensure that Kenya is safe and secure. The NPS “thanks members of the public for the continued cooperation with the security agencies in ensuring the safety and security of our Country” (NPS 2016a). As in other IGP statements, it is construed so that the public will cooperate with the NPS in counterterrorism efforts. not only as part of their civic duty but also out of the fear of the threat of terrorism. Words and phrases peculiar to security discourse are also adopted in this statement. The words and phrases include, “an attack on Central Police Station”, “petrol bomb”, “suicide vest”, “detonate”, and “suspected accomplices.” Territorial spaces, security installations and social communities are depicted as referent objects. These include, Mombasa country and police station, women, and refugees. The solutions to the threats are counterterrorism measures.

Police arrest a key Islamic state agent

This statement refers to the arrest of a most wanted terrorist suspect that occurred in Kenya’s coastal county of Kilifi on 27 March 2017. The NPS statement released following the attack is titled Police Arrest a Key Islamic Agent. (NPS 2017) The NPS emphasised that the individual had links with the Islamic State (ISIS), Al-Shabaab, and was also involved in human smuggling and terrorism financing. The individual’s involvement in transnational terrorism and organised crime is depicted in the excerpts below:

The National Police Service working in conjunction with other Security agencies have arrested a most wanted terrorist suspect, one … Ali … involved in human smuggling and terrorism financing. The suspect has links with ISIS and Al-Shabaab terror groups and the Magafe Human smuggling network in Libya. The suspect was nabbed together with his accomplices; … Mukhtar and … Yusuf … in Malindi during a joint operation carried out by the security agencies …

… Ali was born in Mogadishu, Somalia. He came to Kenya … under the pretext of being a tourist. He later moved to South Africa, Sudan and finally Tripoli in Libya where he was recruited to join ISIS. He came back to Kenya … where he became a key agent of ISIS and the Magafe human smuggling and financial facilitation network in the Country.

Ali, famously referred to as, the “trusted one” in the extensive Magafe network, played a key role in facilitating the travel of recruits from Kenya and Somalia to join ISIS in Libya as well as facilitating illegal immigrants to enter Europe via Libya. He facilitated the transfer of money linked to an IS network that traversed several countries including South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Dubai and Libya … .

The money was facilitation commission he was to be paid after safely delivering recruits and illegal immigrants to their destinations.

Ali and Mukhtar house recruits and illegal immigrants in lodges within Eastleigh, Malindi and other areas before facilitating their travel to Libya, Syria and Europe.

Mukhtar, who is a businessman and landlord in Watamu is also an ISIS facilitator. He uses his houses to accommodate the terrorists and recruits who are waiting to be smuggled to Libya to join ISIS. Yusuf, also has links with ISIS and Al-Shabaab agents in Libya and Somalia.

… This current multi agency security operation is part of sustained efforts to ensure the safety and security of all Kenyans.

The National Police Service therefore is appealing to all Kenyans and urge parents to report any disappearance of any of their family members to nearest Police station, Directorate of Criminal Investigation office, Chiefs or assistance Chief offices or any security agency office or officer.

Meanwhile, we thank the members of public for their continued support in giving information to security agencies which has enabled the Country to enjoy the relative calm. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2017)

The statement begins with the depiction of the key Islamic State agent as a most wanted person who engages in transnational terrorism and organised crime. The involvement in transnational organised crime includes terrorism financing and human smuggling, respectively. The individual is portrayed as having links with the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab terror groups and that he first arrived in Kenya in 2010 “under the pretext of being a tourist” (NPS 2017). He is also depicted as being part of the Magafe human smuggling network in Libya. The Magafe participate in transnational organised crime along the Libya–Sudan border. They exhort ransom from kidnapped migrants. The term “Magafe” is used by Somalis, mostly to refer to individual traffickers and their debt-collectors, militias, and corrupt border control officials operating across the route, though the term is most often used in relation to groups operating on the Libya–Sudan border (GIATOC 2017). The key Islamic State agent and his accomplices were arrested in Malindi in the coastal region of Kenya. His human smuggling and terrorism financing activities are discussed in the context of fragile states such as Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria, states which are also hotspots of terrorism. The agent’s accomplices also have links with the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab and facilitate terrorism in Kenya’s coastal region. Their human smuggling and illegal financial activities are partly conducted in Watamu, a tourist coastal town, and in Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali residential area in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city. Eastleigh is an area that has been depicted by the state as a hotspot of terrorism and has also been subjected to several norm-violating state counterterrorism measures (Amnesty International 2014).

The statement designates both Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State as existential threats to the coastal counties of Kenya and their inhabitants and to the tourism industry, including to tourists and to migration. The referent objects are, therefore, Kilifi County, tourism and migration. Hence the solutions are, like in other NPS statements, both soft and hard counterterrorism measures. These include multi agency security operations as part of sustained efforts to ensure the safety and security of all Kenyans. Other measures include requesting Kenyans to report the disappearance of any of their family members to state security agencies and officials, such as “the Directorate of Criminal Investigation office, Chiefs or assistance Chief offices or any security agency office or officer” (NPS 2017). The text attempts to get Kenyans to do this by complementing the public for their positive role in the war on terror. The NPS does so by thanking “the members of public for their continued support in giving information to security agencies which has enabled the Country to enjoy the relative calm” (NPS 2017). In this statement, security specific words and phrases include, “Islamic State”, key agent of ISIS’, “Al-Shabaab”, “terrorist”, “human smuggling”, “Magafe human smuggling network”, “illegal immigrants”, and “terrorism financing”. The solutions to the threats are counterterrorism measures.

Terrorist attack at Fino Police station and AP camp

The NPS statement titled Terrorist Attack at Fino Police Station and AP Camp was released following fatal Al-Shabaab attacks that targeted security installations police stations, camps, and telecommunication infrastructure in Kenya’s northeastern county of Mandera on 2 March 2018. The fatality of the attacks is outlined in the excerpts below:

Today at about 2:00 am, more than 100 suspected Alshabaab terrorists attacked Fino Police Station and AP camp in Mandera County, resulting in a fierce exchange of fire between the terrorists and our officers.

In the firefight, unknown number of the terrorists are believed to have been killed while others sustained serious injuries. Four of our gallant officers and one National Police Reservist sadly lost their lives. The attackers managed to set ablaze one of the camps and destroyed a nearby Safaricom Communication mast rendering the area out of GSM reach.

The attackers had earlier planted IED’S along the road leading to the camps which slowed down movement of officers from nearby camps to support the officers under attack in Fino.

We have since identified the leader of the group that carried out the attack … who fled with others after the attack to Somalia, and we are hot on their trail.

We once again call upon all Kenyans to be vigilant and report any movement by suspicious persons along the Kenya/Somalia border to the Police or any security agency … for immediate action. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2018b)

The statement begins by noting the intensity of violence and the fatalities that occurred because of the attack committed by Al-Shabaab. The attack as stipulated occurred in Mandera County, which borders Somalia. The intensity of the violence is described in words that demonstrate the characteristics of terrorism such as more than 100 terrorists, fierce exchange of fire, terrorists and our officers and firefight. The attacks are depicted as existential threats to the NPS as they target a police station and camp. The attacks are also portrayed as existential threats to telecommunications and road infrastructure. Emphasis on the critical role of infrastructure is evident when the statement explains that officers from nearby camps could not readily assist their colleagues under attack because the terrorists had “planted IED’S along the road leading to the camps” (NPS 2018b). The Kenya–Somalia borderlands are also portrayed as spaces that facilitate the movement of terrorists and other suspicious persons. The solutions to the existential threats, as in other NPS statements, are both soft and hard counterterrorism measure. The statement calls upon Kenyans to be “vigilant and report any movement by suspicious persons along the Kenya/Somalia border to the Police or any security agency … for immediate action” (emphasis added) (NPS 2018b). The language of security discourse is evident in the use of peculiar security-related words and phrases include “Al-Shabaab”, “terrorists”, “firefight”, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)”, “security agency”, and “vigilance”. The referent objects include security infrastructure, territorial spaces such as police station and camp, telecommunications infrastructure, roads, Mandera County and the Kenya–Somalia border. The solutions to the threats are both soft and hard counter terrorism measures.

Security operation along the border in Mandera

This statement refers to an attack conducted by Al-Shabaab, which targeted a high school in Mandera County on 13 October 2018. Two teachers were killed by the attackers. The NPS statement released was titled Security Operation along the Border in Mandera (NPS 2018a. The adverse impact upon the borderlands, their critical infrastructure and inhabitants is indicated in the excerpts below:

Following the recent unfortunate incident in which two Kenyan teachers were murdered by suspected Al Shabaab sympathizers at Arabia High School, we have intensified our operations in the area to bring the perpetrators of the act to justice. Our operations have established that one … a Somali national from neighbouring area of Damasa was behind the heinous act … Security agencies are also on alert for any possible attack by the militants targeting security installations and any other soft targets along the border between Mandera and Elwak. This follows the latest development across the border … in which the militants have been converging close to the Kenyan border. The buildup has been evident in areas of Hola, Dura, Jidahaley, Juma and IIkabere.

… Our officers are on high alert monitoring their movements so as to counter any attempts by these criminals to cross over to our country to cause fear and despondence. Meanwhile we wish to call upon members of the public particularly those living along the border to remain vigilant and report any suspicious movement by individuals or groups to any nearest security personnel. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2018a)

This statement pays attention to borderland spaces, in particular, Mandera County, which borders Somalia. The construction of spaces of terrorism begins in the wording of the first sentence of the statement. The emotive words used such as unfortunate incidents, Kenyan teachers, murdered, Al-Shabaab sympathisers, and High School are meant to describe the adverse nature of the attack. This is done by labelling the murderers suspected Al Shabaab sympathisers’, identifying the prime suspect as a Somali national from neighbouring area of Damasa’, and emphasising that the act was “heinous” (NPS 2018a). The emotive words emphasise that the Kenyan high school teachers were violently killed by a Somali national. Hence, Al-Shabaab’s terrorism conducted in the regions is depicted as xenophobic and as an existential threat to the education sector as manifested in the attacks targeting the high school and teachers. Insecurity in the north-eastern region has adversely affected the education sector since Al-Shabaab began attacking schools and killing teachers. Most of the teachers targeted in the attacks hail from other regions of Kenya. They also are often Christians. Al-Shabaab’s objective is to force all non-Muslims, considered outsiders, out of the north-eastern region. Al-Shabaab also deploys Somali nationalism and xenophobia as strategies to acquire local-level legitimacy (International Crisis Group 2020; Mwangi 2012).

The terror group is also portrayed as an existential threat to security installations and soft targets located in the borderlands particularly between Mandera and Elwark. The attacks are depicted to be a result of the military build-up of the Somali-based terror group along the Kenya-Somalia border. By portraying the borderlands as spaces of terrorism, the NPS objectives are to persuade members of the public to be wary of such spaces and thus legitimise counterterrorism measures. This is evident when the statement indicates that the country’s security “officers are on high alert … so as to counter any attempts by these criminals to cross over to our country to cause fear and despondence” (NPS 2018a). The issue of public vigilance, as part of counterterrorism measures, in the northeastern county is once again raised by the NPS. Security-related words and phrases used in this statement like “Al-Shabaab sympathizers”, “perpetrators of the act”, “heinous act”, “security agencies”, “militants targeting security installations”, “high alert”, “fear and despondence” are common in security discourse. The statement depicts Mandera County, learning institutions, security installations, and borderlands as referent objects in order to legitimise counterterrorism measures.

Wanted persons: suspects in connection with abduction of Italian volunteer identified

On 24 November 2018, Al-Shabaab kidnapped an Italian volunteer working at a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) based in Kilifi County. As a follow up, the NPS released a statement whose title was Wanted Persons: Suspects in Connection with abduction of Italian Volunteer Identified (NPS 2018c). Threats to foreign nationals working in civil society organisations based in the coastal county is depicted in the excerpt below:

The National Police Service wishes to inform the public that following extensive investigations into the abduction of Sylvia Constanca, a volunteer at Milele Africa, and NGO based in Chakama, Kilifi County, we have established that the following persons whose images are attached could have been in the commission of the crime. They are … a cash reward of Sh. One million will be offered to anyone with information leading to the arrest of the suspects … We appeal to the area residents particularly herders to support the multi-agency teams engaged in the operation with information that may lead to the rescue of the lady and arrest of the suspects.

Public safety and security is our collective responsibility. Let us all work together towards this endeavour. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2018c)

The construction of existential threats and spaces of terrorism begins with the information that an Italian volunteer working at an NGO based in Kilifi County in Kenya’s coastal region has been abducted. Kidnapping is classified as a violent crime. A key characteristic of Al-Shabaab’s method of operation, like that of many other violent non-state actors, is kidnapping for ransom (Mwangi 2021). The area, nationality and occupation of the person, a civil society organisation, and the nature of the violent attack are described vividly. The NPS discourse indicates that the incident was the kidnapping of a foreign national who is a volunteer at a non-state entity, which is a soft target. The kidnapping occurred in an area prone to terrorist attacks. The relationship among all these factors, namely kidnapping, foreign national, and NGO worker, bears salient features of terrorism. By doing so, the NPS statement depicts Al-Shabaab’s terrorism as an existential threat to NGOs, foreign nationals, and Kilifi County. The statement also appeals to area residents particularly herders, given their mobility, to assist the police and other security agents with information that may lead to the rescue of the abducted person. Al-Shabaab’s kidnappings of foreign nationals in the north-eastern and coastal regions are one of the factors that prompted Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia in 2011 (KDF 2014). As part of counterterrorism measures, the NPS offers a cash reward of about US$100,000 to anyone who provides information that would lead to the arrest of the perpetrators of the crime. This statement, like many others analysed, emphasises that public safety and security is a collective responsibility in Kenya. In this statement, words and phrases associated with security include, “abduction”, “commission of the crime”, “arrest of the suspects”, and “public safety and security”. The referent objects include civil society organisations, foreign nationals, and Kilifi County. Like in other statements, the objective is to legitimise counterterrorism measures.

Thwarting of a terror attack by Mandera residents

This statement refers to an attempted Al-Shabaab attack that occurred on 22 July 2019, in Mandera County. It also indicates the implications of the attack upon the region’s security and economic development. The statement was titled Thwarting of a Terror Attack by Mandera Residents (NPS 2019). The nature of the terror attack and its implications for regional security and development are depicted in the excerpts below:

The National Police Service is alive to the fact that terrorism remains a threat to our country’s security and economic development. In the Northern Frontier counties, remnant militia have occasionally staged cowardly attacks targeting innocent wananchi and installations as a means of causing fear and panic among the area residents. Their main aim seems to sabotage the many development activities being undertaken by the National and County governments in the area, given that such development projects would frustrate their pet narrative of marginalisation and underdevelopment.

On July 22, 2019, in Mandera County, security officers in collaboration with members of the public thwarted an attempt by Al Shabaab insurgents who had planned to attack eight workers at an upcoming dispensary construction site at Kotula in the County. The eight non local workers had their lives saved by the gallant acts of locals and swift action by security officers. Regrettably, one local member of the public was injured … as security agencies mounted an attack forcing the militia to escape into Somalia.

The National Police Service mandate is to provide a secure arid safe environment for development activities to thrive in all parts of the country. Attacks on educational and health facilities, business enterprises, road construction activities, communication infrastructure among others, will be met by the full force of the law. The deliberate creation of chaos in order to justify more chaos will be resisted with proportionate force.

We wish to take this opportunity to sincerely thank residents of Kotula for their acts of bravery … We also thank all Kenyans who have been sharing information with our security agencies. Wananchi are advised to continue remaining alert and report any suspicious people or activities to the nearest security agency. (emphasis added)

(NPS 2019)

The NPS is very explicit that terrorism is a threat to Kenya’s security and economic development in the north-eastern counties that border Somalia. This particularly applies to the construction sector, which is key to the development of critical infrastructure in the region. Al-Shabaab’s attacks are depicted as an existential threat to security and development projects so that the state undertakes to counter the historical and the terror group’s narrative that the counties are marginalised and underdeveloped. This is evident in the statement’s phrase “pet narrative of marginalisation and underdevelopment” (NPS 2019). The attacks are also portrayed as existential threats to harmonious inter-communal relations. By describing the attacks on non-local construction workers, the NPS statement supports the view, articulated in academic and policy literature, that the terror group deploys Somali nationalism and xenophobia as one of its strategies to gain local-level legitimacy (Mwangi 2012).

It is in the context of the existential threats that the NPS statement prescribes both hard and soft counterterrorism measures. Hard measures that adopt the use of force are meant to disrupt and deter attacks on educational and health facilities, business enterprises, road construction activities, and other critical infrastructure. Soft measures aim at gaining public trust in an effort to enhance and legitimise community policing in the northeastern regions of Kenya. The language of security discourse is evident in the use of specific security words and phrases such as “threats of terrorism”, “remnant militia”, “cowardly attacks”, “fear and panic”, “sabotage”, “marginalisation and underdevelopment”, “gallant acts”, “swift action”, and “chaos”. The referent objects include economic development, northeastern counties, Mandera County, security installations, development projects, health facilities and non-local construction workers. The attacks are an existential threat to peace and regional development particularly in the health and construction sectors.

Press release on Saretho attack

This statement pays attention to a fatal Al-Shabaab attack that occurred on 7 January 2020, in Garissa County. The attack targeted a telecommunications mast. Lives lost included that of a small child and a teacher. The NPS statement released was titled Press Release on Saretho Attack (NPS 2020). The impact of the attack is described in the excerpts below:

The National Police Service wishes to inform the public that this morning at around 2.30 am, at Saretho Centre, 25 Km from Daadab in Garissa County, police officers on patrol thwarted an Al Shabaab attack and managed to neutralize two of the attackers and recovered two AK 47 assault rifles, Improvised Explosive Device (1ED) making materials and other crude weapons.

The criminal gang had targeted the nearby Telecommunication mast and in the process 4 innocent lives were lost including that of a teacher and a small child before our team that was on border patrol responded and contained the situation.

Security agencies have been mobilized and are pursuing the rest of the attackers (emphasis added.

(NPS 2020)

This statement describes the heinous Al-Shabaab attack that occurred at around 2.30 am and 52 km from Dadaab in Garissa County. Dadaab houses the largest refugee camp in the world, with most refugees being from Somalia. The attack is thwarted by the police who neutralise two of the terrorists. The severity of the attack and police action is further described with the recovery of an assortment of lethal weapons and IED making material. These are weapons commonly used by terror groups. The attack is depicted as an existential threat to children and critical infrastructure. Given that teaching is an integral component of education, the death of a teacher indicates that the attack is also an existential threat to the education sector. It is in the context of the severity of the attack and its existential threats that the NPS prescribes hard counterterrorism measures as the word “neutralise” suggests. Words and phrases characteristic of security discourse include “police patrol”, “Al-Shabaab attack”, “neutralised attackers”, “AK47 assault rifles”, “Improvised Explosive Device (IED) making materials”, and ‘crude weapons. Garissa County, telecommunications infrastructure, borderlands and their inhabitants particularly teachers, children and borderland communities are depicted as referent objects.

Conclusion

The contents of official NPS counterterrorism discourses discursively portray the scale of violence, referent objects, intended audience, authorised speaker and security language used. The scale of violence is the north-eastern and coastal regions, the targeted audience of the discourse is members of the public, and the IGP, as an authorised speaker of Kenya’s principal counterterrorism agency, is an integral component of the securitisation process. The statements depict Al-Shabaab’s use of violence as brutal and heinous, which is commensurate with terrorism violence. The objective of the NPS discourse is to construct the north-eastern and coastal regions as spaces of terrorism hence legitimise counterterrorism measures. Violence and insecurity in the two regions are institutionalised because of historical and contemporary socio-economic and political reasons. Hence the phenomenal violence and insecurity of the regions is well known by Kenyans. Various studies conducted in Kenya on public perceptions of security in these regions, indicate that Kenyans in general perceive the regions as hotspots of terrorism and are suspicious of the region’s residents. More significantly the studies indicate that whereas most of the residents of these regions do not support the state-led counterterrorism operations, a majority of Kenyans from other regions of the country support the repressive measures.

Counterterrorism discourse produced by state actors is often not credible or trustworthy as it often blurs the distinction between the normative and empirical aspects of security. Hence, the discourse can be used to justify the violation of human rights. Such discourse is best countered by non-state actors. The discourse of non-state actors is often informal and adopts a human face that normally takes into account the injustices, grievances and social norms of those directly and indirectly affected by such repressive operations. By doing so, non-state can delegitimise the perception that certain regions of the country are spaces of terrorism hence existential threats to national security. This can mitigate counterterrorism human rights violations in such regions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2304925

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Centre for Conflict Management, College of Arts & Social Sciences, University of Rwanda. His research interests and publications are in the areas of governance, conflict, and security in eastern and southern Africa, with a focus on state fragility, democratisation, radicalisation, counterterrorism, envionmental security and human security. He is also Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences. Pwani University, Kenya and has also taught at the National University of Lesotho and University of Nairobi.

Catherine Waithera Mwangi

Catherine Waithera Mwangi holds a PhD in Literature in English from the National University of Lesotho, and MA in Communication from Daystar University and a BA in English and History from the University of Eastern Africa, Baraton Kenya. She is a Lecturer in the Department of Languages, Linguistics and Literature at Pwani University, Kenya. Her research interests include political rhetoric, discourse and identity, rhetoric theory, social constructivism, Critical Discourse Analysis, sociology of literature and African American literature.