RAF planes that won the Battle of Britain were built on German machinery: How Jewish refugee engineer, Ludwig Loewy, was crucial to the war effort

Abstract

Ludwig Loewy was a Jewish engineer who left Nazi Germany in 1936 to set up an engineering firm in London as a refugee. Britain was rearming, and a new generation of aircraft was being developed based on light alloy construction. The new Loewy Engineering Company had the expertise to supply presses and rolling mills required for alloy fabrication, which were otherwise supplied from Germany at a time of growing tension. The new firm also built a giant tube press for steel for the Admiralty. Loewy’s new company grew rapidly in London, helped by a workforce of refugee engineers and managers and ‘many thousands’ of machinery drawings from Germany. Loewy became a technical advisor to the British Government’s production programme for aircraft until his death in 1942. Back in Germany, Loewy’s former firm, Schloemann in Düsseldorf, was Aryanised after his departure. Schloemann continued to supply equipment into the UK until the outbreak of war and went on to help the German and Italian war effort. Ludwig was dispossessed of his major share in the Company, and the history of Schloemann was rewritten. Ludwig Loewy’s rapid assimilation owed much to earlier contacts with the UK engineering and metals establishment, his expertise in a sector that was growing rapidly and short of skills, customers who needed his technology, and his own personal energy and drive. The Government welcomed his contribution to aircraft and warship production at a time of break-neck rearmament. Ludwig Loewy’s experience supports the view that German-speaking refugee engineers were readily accepted in the UK from 1933 to 1945.

Keywords:

• hydraulic press
• extrusion press
• rolling mill
• draw-bench
• aluminium
• duralumin
• magnesium alloys
• Loewy Engineering
• Schloemann
• rearmament
• Royal Air Force
• Admiralty

Introduction: from Nazi-Germany to Britain rearming

Many companies have their creation myth, but Loewy Engineering is compelling. As the story was told 45 years ago, Ludwig Loewy worked for Schloemann, the rolling mill builder in Düsseldorf during the 1930s.¹ Fearing persecution as a Jew in Nazi Germany, he fled to Switzerland with a set of Schloemann press drawings and then flew to England and asked for British Government support to establish a machinery company that would help with rearmament.

This folk myth about Ludwig Loewy’s hasty departure from Germany is a narrative of triumph over adversity, distorted with retelling. The true story is far stronger. The British prewar rearmament programme relied on German machinery and production knowledge in light alloys needed to build warplanes. Ludwig Loewy’s expertise in this crucial technology was an outstanding gift to the British war effort.

Ludwig Loewy moved to London in 1936 along with key engineers from Schloemann, which he part owned. They established Loewy Engineering Ltd. and won contracts within a month. The new firm was immediately involved with rearmament and aircraft production and played a key wartime role. Knowledge of presses needed for aircraft parts, combined with social contacts, helped the company win orders in the UK at a time of rearmament when the steel and nonferrous metals industries were investing heavily. The history of the Loewy Engineering company is briefly traced following Ludwig Loewy’s death in 1942.

Loewy’s previous firm, Schloemann of Düsseldorf, continued selling equipment in the UK until the outbreak of war. Ludwig Loewy was locked in to his old firm as a shareholder until he was forced to sell in 1939, effectively for nothing. Loewy and Schloemann sold the same equipment as rivals.

Among the issues raised by this case study are the tremendous pace of technical change in aircraft design during the 1930s and the consequent need for a new aluminium alloy industry, the UK’s dependence on Germany for machinery for these new alloy factories, and the technical and commercial drive of Ludwig Loewy who transferred crucial know-how from Germany to Britain in extraordinary circumstances as he and his colleagues fled persecution by the Nazis. This was technology transfer with a vengeance.

Ludwig Loewy’s early career at Schloemann AG

Details of Ludwig Loewy’s early life vary across sources. It is clear that Ludwig was born into a Jewish family on 1 March 1887 in Becov nad Teplou, a village in Czechoslovakia about 40 miles north-west of Prague, which had a small Jewish community of longstanding.² He was one of nine children. His brother, Erwin, was born there 10 years later, in 1897. Ludwig was to remain a Czech citizen until 1942, when he became a British citizen in March, just before his death in October of that same year (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Ludwig Loewy: Copy of a portrait of Ludwig Loewy painted by the Jewish artist Max Westfeld. The artist was based in Düsseldorf until he got out to London in 1939 and then went on to Nashville, USA, where he was known as Max Westfield. (copyright unknown; original painting in Whitaker Laboratory, Lehigh University, dated 1943).

Ludwig Loewy graduated from the Technische Hochschule in Vienna, Austria, in 1912.³ He is said to have taken various jobs after graduation, including a stint with rolling mill builder Maschinenfabrik Sack GmbH in Düsseldorf, Germany, which had a reputation for section mills and plate mills for rolling steel.⁴ We know that Ludwig Loewy moved to work with Eduard Schloemann GmbH, a builder of metal forming machinery in Düsseldorf, perhaps in 1913, or more likely 1914.⁵

The engineering firm Eduard Schloemann was set up in 1901 as a trading company, mostly dealing in electrical equipment, and became a successful designer of hydraulic controls. After supplying equipment for the German effort in the First World War, including 100 shell presses, Schloemann was to diversify into hydraulic machinery and rolling mills.⁶

Ludwig Loewy rose quickly to Chief Engineer and Technical Manager at Schloemann in 1915.⁷ He developed their range of hydraulic machinery in collaboration with the German mechanical engineering firm MAN, which was later to become a subsidiary of GHH.⁸ Essentially, Schloemann designed press equipment for shaping steel and nonferrous metals and won orders from metal manufacturers. The engineering shops at MAN made components for the presses from Schloemann drawings. Schloemann assembled these parts and installed and commissioned the machinery at the customer’s plant. Ludwig Loewy also directed Schloemann’s subsequent diversification into rolling mills for steel and aluminium, where they worked with another German machinery builder from late 1928 onwards, Haniel and Lueg, another GHH subsidiary.

Ludwig Loewy became a Director of Schloemann in 1920 when the firm became a joint stock company. Loewy was then in his early thirties. Again sources differ, but he acquired a 50% share in the newly incorporated Schloemann AG. It seems his business partner Paul Multhaupt, Eduard Schloemann’s son-in-law, diverted funds from the company to the emergent but indigent Nazi Party. Following accusations of embezzlement, Multhaupt sold both his shareholding and some of the bearer shares assigned to Ludwig Loewy kept in the company safe. After many machinations, all these shares ended up with the GHH Group. By then, GHH also had full control over MAN and Haniel and Lueg. Multhaupt’s subsequent legal exclusion from Schloemann in 1931 left Ludwig Loewy in charge, but with a minority ownership of, perhaps, 45%, although other sources suggest 50%.⁹

Ludwig Loewy’s export drive

The German home market for capital equipment was depressed after the First World War. Ludwig Loewy was both a gifted engineer and a dedicated salesman. Ludwig travelled widely seeking export contracts for Schloemann rolling mills and hydraulic presses as the firm sought to diversify away from a subdued home market.¹⁰ He energetically toured Japan and the USA in 1926, setting up a Schloemann office in Pittsburgh in 1927. He won a sequence of orders for brass and copper forming equipment in 1926 from American Brass in Detroit; Bridgeport Brass in Bridgeport; Chase Co. in Waterbury; Mueller Brass in Port Huron, Michigan; a press for Foster-Wheeler and a three high rolling mill for Phelps Dodge Copper in New York; and a Tube press for Wolverine Tube Co. in Detroit.¹¹ These orders were for copper-forming equipment as the aluminium industry in the USA had barely developed during the 1920s. There was a hiatus in sales in America during the recession years before Schloemann’s market recovered strongly during the mid-1930s, helped by orders from Alcoa for large extrusion presses and a rolling mill—this time for the emerging aluminium industry.

After success in the USA, Loewy turned his attention to the Soviet Union, which was industrialising using Western equipment.¹² Schloemann won orders for a rolling mill complex for the first stage of a new steelworks at Novokuznetsk in south-western Siberia.¹³ Apart from a standard blooming mill supplied by their German competitor, Demag, the whole rolling complex was supplied by Schloemann. The Schloemann mills were imported and installed at the site during the early 1930s. Schloemann built a rail mill, a 24-inch section mill, a 70-inch wide plate mill, and two merchant mills for rods, bars, light sections, and shapes. So, Ludwig’s early experience in rolling mill design at Sack paid off. This large order avoided some of the usual problems attendant upon supplying the Soviet Union during the 1930s as the initial phase of site development was supervised by E.P. Everhard of Freyn Engineering Corporation of Chicago between 1929 and December 1932. It is said that Schloemann made ‘exceptionally high profits’ from rolling mill building during this time.¹⁴

The RAF of the Battle of Britain was built on German machinery

Schloemann turned their attention to the British market in 1931.¹⁵ To appreciate the importance of Schloemann as a machinery supplier to Britain during the 1930s and to understand Ludwig Loewy’s significance to the British Government as a refugee, it is important to explain four striking features of UK rearmament during the 1930s.

The first fact is the astonishing growth in aircraft building in the UK over the decade 1934 to 1944. Output rose 100-fold.¹⁶ Secondly, aircraft technology changed radically during the 1930s from fabric-covered wooden bi-planes to monoplanes made of aluminium and magnesium alloys with powerful engines and retractable undercarriages. This required a new supply industry devoted to fabricating light alloys. Thirdly, this new light metals sector relied on specialised machines imported from Germany right up until the outbreak of war. Fourthly, the UK rearmament programme drew on German specifications and manufacturing practices for airframe production. So, the RAF of the Battle of Britain was built on German machinery and know-how.

Aircraft design and aluminium alloys—a complete new basic industry

The British Government devoted a huge effort to rearmament from 1934 onwards, especially aircraft production.¹⁷ Initial efforts were hampered by constraints on factory space and skills and the need to finalise new designs of aircraft. There were strong initiatives to create aircraft building capacity. Twelve new shadow factories were set up for aircraft production, mainly run by car manufacturers with experience in mass production. These were started in 1936 and mostly in production by 1938.¹⁸ At the same time, existing aircraft building capacity was expanded, often via government-financed factory extensions. Other aircraft production facilities were dispersed to new locations deemed more remote from the risk of bombing. Firms making civil aircraft were diverted to military production. Exports were curtailed. This rapid expansion of aircraft production and ordnance was both government-directed and funded.¹⁹ Employment in aircraft manufacturing rose from perhaps 35,000 in 1934 to an average of 1.6 million in 1944—a 45-fold increase in 10 years.²⁰ An index of aircraft production increased 100-fold over the same period.

One example illustrates the urgency and extent of this expansion programme. Rolls-Royce built a greenfield factory for Merlin engines at Crewe, which was planned, built, and equipped in just 12 months at the cost of £1½ million.²¹ The turf was cut on 6 July 1938, and the first Merlin engine was on the test bench by May 1939. This modern factory was owned by the Government but developed and operated by Rolls-Royce. This was in addition to the existing plant at Derby, while other Merlin factories were developed in Glasgow and Trafford Park, Manchester, and later the USA.

During the mid-1930s, British aircraft designers started to appreciate the versatility and high strength-to-weight ratio of aluminium-based alloys. They began to build fast monoplane fighters and bombers, helped by a new generation of aeroengines. Military aircraft demanded light but strong components.²² A complete ‘new basic industry’ emerged to supply the necessary aluminium and magnesium alloy components for aircraft production.²³

As a result of fast technical progress in aircraft design, most planes switched to light alloy airframes—, so called “stressed skin design” during the 1930s.²⁴ Here, the aluminium alloy skin is in tension on the airframe. This helps resist distortion of the airframe in flight. Compression is localised, and tension is distributed across the body of the airframe or wing. The Bristol Type 130 Bombay, which flew in June 1935, was the first British all-metal bomber, although it was glacially slow to reach production.²⁵ The Spitfire is perhaps the best-known all-stressed skin monoplane of this era, while the Hurricane had stressed skin wings from 1939.²⁶

Metal propellers, notably variable pitch propellers with forged magnesium alloy blades, replaced natural wood propellers during the late 1930s (though propellers soon moved on to aluminium alloys or to compressed wood veneers.) Engine parts were increasingly made of cast aluminium alloys, with upset forged aluminium being used for components such as pistons and propeller shank ends. Merlin engines required forged and machined aluminium alloy parts—pistons, for example. Extruded aluminium parts were used for structural components of airframes, such as wing spars, including tapered extrusions. These required accurate and powerful extrusion presses and dies.²⁷ The exterior skins of these aircraft were fabricated from rolled aluminium ‘alclad’ alloy sheets, which were often deftly formed to fit double curves in the shape of the aircraft.²⁸

Pure aluminium has little strength by itself. The focus was on aluminium alloys. Duralumin, an alloy of aluminium, copper, and magnesium, with some iron and silicon, was of German origin.²⁹ Duralumin was widely used for aircraft components because it was easy to form but strengthened through precipitation hardening after heat treatment. These high-strength alloys were used for propellers (replacing earlier magnesium alloys) and airframe structures. Aluminium Y-alloy containing copper, nickel, and magnesium was widely used for aeroengine components, such as connecting rods and pistons.³⁰ New component suppliers were mobilised, such as the Blaenavon Company in South Wales and Lloyd Cars in Grimsby, to supply forged and machined aluminium components for aeroengines (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Trial assembly of a Loewy forging press for making alloy pistons for aircraft engines. This 1000-ton vertical press is probably destined for Lloyd Cars, Grimsby, a wartime subcontractor to Rolls-Royce. (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.11.06.01).

A complete ‘new basic industry’ of light alloy manufacture was required to form these aircraft components in Britain. As early as the mid-1930s, it was clear that there was a shortage of fabricating capacity for light alloys needed for the aircraft industry.³¹ There was heavy demand for new machinery such as extrusion presses, forging presses, rolling mills, draw benches, and stretching equipment needed to shape and modify the metallurgy of these new light materials.

In particular, there was an urgent need to acquire extrusion presses used for structural components of the new aircraft designs.³² Cast aluminium has a granular structure. Extrusion orientates the metal into a fine-grain structure, which imparts strength and is ideal for further rolling and forging. Hot rolling of ingots was used up until the mid-1930s to process aluminium at works such as Warrington and Banbury, but many of the newer aluminium and magnesium alloys were best processed by extrusion. An extrusion press also shapes the cast metal, for instance, transforming a heated billet of solidified metal into a component such as a wing beam, tube, or bar for wire drawing.

The half-dozen or so UK manufacturing firms in the nonferrous metals industry—the Aluminium Corporation, British Aluminium, High Duty Alloys, James Booth, Northern Aluminium, Birmid, and Reynolds—were private enterprises acting as subcontract suppliers to the government-sponsored airframe and engine sector. New entrants were attracted to the sector in the late 1930s, including ICI Metals, while existing firms, such as Birmed, built new factories on greenfield sites. The sector was highly profitable—controversially so—and firms were willing to invest in new machinery, despite its short potential lifespan if rearmament had not maintained its momentum.³³

German machinery underpins the British war effort

Much of the machinery for this new light alloy fabrication sector came from Germany, especially extrusion presses, whose supply was dominated by Schloemann, although Eumuco of Leverkusen and Hydraulik of Duisburg were local competitors.³⁴ German machinery builders had a poor reputation in the inter-war years as suppliers of cheap counterfeit machine tools plagiarised from US designs.³⁵ Low-price ‘knock-offs’ helped German machine tool firms win almost half the world market by 1937.³⁶ However, nonferrous rolling mills and extrusion presses are one exception where German firms made technical innovations in machinery design and practice.

That much of this equipment for forming light alloys and novel shaping techniques came from Germany is hardly surprising. By 1938, Germany was the world’s leading aluminium producer, with over a quarter of the total global output of the metal. ³⁷ All the more remarkable because Germany produced a mere 35,000 tonnes in 1930. German dominance of the global industry was the inspiration for Richard Reynolds to develop his fast-growing aluminium company in the USA. The British Aluminium House journal reported with statistical hyperbole:³⁸

‘Mr. Reynolds set out to Europe in late 1938 to find additional suppliers. While in Europe, he was amazed to find that Hitler’s Germany (which had no metal for sale) was already producing twice as much aluminium as the United States, Britain, and France combined. Realizing that Hitler was preparing for an aluminium Luftwaffe and that America’s aluminium production was utterly inadequate to meet this threat, R.S. Reynolds, Sr., returned home to urge that U.S. primary production be multiplied immediately.’

British dependence on German machinery can be illustrated with many examples, none of which feature in the postwar official histories of the British war effort.

Northern Aluminium’s Banbury works began production in November 1931 as a rolling mill processing aluminium blocks imported from Canada (Figure 3). Following rapid expansion and a shift to 24-hour working, ‘The Ally’ became the largest supplier of aluminium components for aircraft in the UK by the outbreak of war in 1939.³⁹ The Banbury firm expanded from 150 employees when it was set up to 4,134 of whom 30% were women, at the peak of the war.

Figure 3. ‘A new basic industry’: the first bay of Northern Aluminium’s Banbury plant opened in 1931 on a rural sheep pasture, equipped with machinery from Germany. It expanded dramatically with rearmament. (Glasgow, UGD347/28/3/2). Many similar greenfield light alloy plants were developed around Britain during the late 1930s.

The initial focus at Banbury was sheet metal production using rolling mills. The original hot rolling mill came from Achenbach Buschhütten in Germany, a builder of aluminium mills located near Siegen. But rearmament prompted Northern Aluminium to set up an extrusion department at Banbury in 1935 to produce shapes and structural components for aircraft with a new 2,000 ton extrusion press. The company had early experience in extrusion at their West Bromwich Works from 1928 with a small 750-ton press, which was also transferred to Banbury in 1935.⁴⁰

Again, the new Woodgate Works of Birmetals, a subsidiary of Birmid Industries, was built in 1937 and began operation in early 1938 in open countryside at Quinton outside Birmingham to make light metal alloys.⁴¹ It was essentially equipped by German firms. Among the many items supplied from Germany were a Schloemann extrusion press and an Eumuco press also made in Germany. The rolling mills included two high hot rolling mills for slabs and a range of sheet finishing mills, all supplied by Achenbach Buschhütten. There was also a Schmitz cold-rolling mill and a Walrich roll grinder, while the heating furnace was of German design from Siemens-Schuckertwerke in Berlin.⁴²

The production of variable pitch propellers at the new Rotol Airscrews Company works set up by Rolls-Royce and the Bristol Aeroplane Company in Gloucester started in 1939. This new plant depended upon supplies from their subcontractor, High Duty Alloys at Slough, to produce blade blanks.⁴³ High Duty Alloys used a 3,000-ton hydraulic press made by Schloemann to shape the blade blanks (as did their opposite number, Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke in Frankfurt) (Figure 4).⁴⁴

Figure 4. A 3000-ton pressure four-column hydraulic press at High Duty Alloys Ltd, Slough, making propeller blade blanks. The Schloemann press was one of many items of German equipment supplied to the British light alloy industry before WW2. (From Aircraft Production April 1939, figure 22, British Library copyright).

The reliance of the British rearmament programme on German machine tools was widely recognised at the time.⁴⁵As Aircraft Engineering said, ‘Germany has found in this country a ready market for the manufacture of airframes.’ ⁴⁶ An editorial in the journal Aircraft Production headed ‘German tools’ commented on the outbreak of war in September 1939:

‘One of the obvious results of this situation will be the cessation of supplies of tools and equipment from Germany. These supplies had attained large proportions, as shown by the growing import figures for German machine tools. The value in 1936 was just under one million sterling. In 1938, it had risen to £1,355,000, and for the 6 months ended June 1939, it was £827,645.’⁴⁷

Imports of German equipment were maintained right up until the outbreak of war in 1939. The Warrington Guardian highlighted the contribution of British Aluminium’s Bank Quay Works to the war effort:

‘Two of the strip rolling mills which were completed only a week or two before the outbreak of war were at that time among the widest mills in existence for the preparation of aluminium sheets.’⁴⁸

The newspaper omitted to mention these two 63½-inch wide reversing mills were supplied by Schmitz of Germany, who had been a longstanding supplier to Bank Quay Works along with Sundwiger Eisenhütte since the aluminium rolling mill complex was established at Warrington in 1913.⁴⁹

For some, the brinkmanship was too close. Two extrusion presses supplied by Loewy’s former company, Schloemann, were almost complete at Northern Aluminium Banbury when war broke out in September 1939. The German technicians installing them were interned.⁵⁰

Learning from German plane builders

The British aircraft industry closely monitored German production practices. German manufacturing techniques were widely reported by British and German authors in the UK technical press. During the early 1930s, the engineering journals followed developments in France, but by the mid-1930s, the emphasis switched to German leadership in aircraft production. On 16 March 1935, Germany unilaterally cancelled restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty on the German aircraft industry. Hitler announced the aim of reestablishing German Air Sovereignty. The build-up of the Luftwaffe was exposed. Alongside this rapid expansion programme came a torrent of technical information on new developments in aircraft construction in Germany. The Spanish Civil War demonstrated Luftwaffe air power using stressed skin monoplanes.

Taking two of many examples, Junkers at Dessau developed resistance spot welding of aluminium alloys just prior to the outbreak of war as an alternative to flush riveting. This was described in detail in the UK technical journal Aircraft Production in 1938 by a German engineer.⁵¹ While lacking sufficient detail to allow replication, it clearly showed the direction of travel being pioneered in Germany. An extraordinarily detailed paper to the Royal Aeronautical Society running over 60 pages discussed every aspect of German riveting practice.⁵² By the late 1930s, many issues of the UK-based aircraft trade journals contained a couple of articles on German aircraft manufacturing practice. These continued to be published after the war had broken out.⁵³ No doubt, the trade journals welcomed editorial material from Germany as they were unable to discuss the latest developments in UK aircraft for security reasons.

German practice was influential. George Dowty, the entrepreneurial founder of the undercarriage firm, was a frequent visitor to Germany. He came across Buna synthetic rubber on a visit to Heidelberg and then set up a factory in the UK to produce synthetic rubber seals. He saw castings in magnesium alloys at the Elektronmetall Company (as it was then known) of Cannstatt, near Stuttgart, and adopted the material for the forks of tail wheel units as a result.⁵⁴

German practice continued to be influential even after the war had begun. An investment proposal by the north London firm Specialloid Ltd in August 1940 to make aircraft engine components from aluminium Y alloy using extrusion and upset forging to make pistons stressed the need to keep up with well-documented manufacturing practice by the enemy firm, Mahle of Stuttgart. Mahle ‘had the largest output in Germany of aluminium alloy pistons for internal combustion engines.’ ⁵⁵ The investment application includes evidence from shot-down aircraft, German wartime technical reports obtained by espionage, and the advice of Loewy engineers who helped build hydraulic presses at the German plant in Stuttgart while working for Schloemann.

So, German machinery and know-how dominated the rapidly expanding and critical aluminium fabrication sector as aircraft production grew in both Britain and Germany. Against this background, Ludwig Loewy arrived in Britain from Germany.

Ludwig Loewy flees to Britain and sets up Loewy Engineering in London

Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany in January 1933 and went on to consolidate his hold on power. As a ‘Jewish firm’, Schloemann faced discrimination. During the early phases of ‘Aryanisation’ in Germany, there was pressure from the State and the Nazi Party to remove Jewish managers from firms. The aim was to remove Jews from positions of influence right across the economy.⁵⁶ Ludwig Loewy felt personally vulnerable. Britain was a major market for Schloemann’s technology. Britain was rearming fast. It made much sense for Ludwig Loewy to flee to Britain.

Ludwig Loewy had ‘anticipated affinity with Britain’.⁵⁷ One formal link was Ludwig’s election as a member of the Institute of Metals, the British professional body for metal manufacturers and equipment builders, in 1929.⁵⁸ He joined alongside his colleague Hugo Lorant, who fled to Britain with Ludwig Loewy in 1936.

Facing growing discrimination, Ludwig Loewy left Düsseldorf for London early in 1936, along with several dedicated employees from the commercial department of Schloemann and a number of designers.⁵⁹ Loewy brought Konrad Guttenstein as Commercial Manager and Hugo Lorant as an experienced hydraulics engineer. Loewy, Guttenstein, and Lorant were founding directors of the Loewy Engineering Company on 1 April 1936.⁶⁰ In addition to the three directors and administrative staff, the firm had 30 designers and engineers by the end of 1936, many recruited locally from temporary staff working for Foster-Wheeler the process plant contractor at nearby Aldwych House.⁶¹ By December 1938, 62 employees signed a round-robin letter of thanks to the Directors for their Christmas gifts to staff.⁶²

Ludwig Loewy’s move to the UK seems to have been carefully planned.⁶³ Ludwig Loewy set up Loewy Engineering Company in Ingersoll House, at 9 Kingsway, London WC2, on 1 April 1936. This area of London was a cluster of steel and engineering companies and government offices. The Technical Department of the Directorate of Production in the Air Ministry was based at Aldwych, next door, until the end of 1938.⁶⁴ Northern Aluminium was at Bush House, Aldwych. Among others, the consulting engineers and contractors, the International Construction Company Ltd., were located just along the road at 56 Kingsway. The steel company Richard Thomas and Baldwins, who were just about to embark on a huge expansion at Ebbw Vale, were in Shell-Mex House, just 5 minutes’ walk away along the Strand. The influential steel consultant H.A. Brassert was a 25-minute walk away in Granite House, Cannon Street. This was an ideal location for a new engineering design company seeking orders for metals equipment for making steel and aluminium products.

Others fleeing the Nazis joined Loewy Engineering in London. A hydraulics engineer from Schloemann, E. Haffner, was sent to commission a plant in Belgium but travelled on to London and joined Loewy.⁶⁵ Haffner later became managing director of Loewy’s Hydraulic Press Division. Dr. Reichl, a rolling mill specialist, also joined.⁶⁶ Ludwig Loewy actively recruited draughtsmen from Vitkovice Iron and Steel Works at Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, including E.R. Henschker in 1937.⁶⁷ Ludwig was joined by two of his brothers, Siegmund and Alfred Loewy, who found administrative roles at the firm.

The business model of Loewy Engineering was ‘Schloemann in exile’. The new firm set out to produce engineering designs for presses and rolling mills, sell these solutions to customers, procure the machinery from subcontractors, and assemble and commission the resulting plant at the customer’s site. It is reliably said that ‘many thousands’ of Schloemann drawings found their way to Loewy Engineering in London.⁶⁸ The new firm brought not only a wealth of machinery designs but also brought tacit knowledge on issues vital to users, such as the correct temperatures for extrusion of individual alloys, selection and preparation of dies, and the best production techniques for awkward products such as tubes. The combination of key staff, a stock of engineering drawings, and design leadership meant the intellectual property of Schloemann AG was replicated at Loewy Engineering in near totality. This was a gift for the UK at a key moment.

Loewy engineering’s order book

Taken overall, London was a ‘safe launching pad’ for an entrepreneurial Jewish engineer with knowledge of important technology, workaholic energy, and extensive personal contacts in the UK.⁶⁹ Within 1 month, the firm had won two orders.⁷⁰

The first order was from Northern Aluminium, at Banbury—for a small 750 ton vertical press to make duralumin pistons for aeroengines. Northern Aluminium was an existing Schloemann customer and, indeed, continued buying from Schloemann as well as Loewy up until the outbreak of war. Loewy Engineering developed a custom of giving code names to each order. The Northern Aluminium press worth £2,080 was aptly called ‘PREMIER’.

The second order for Loewy Engineering ‘YORCOP’ was from Yorkshire Copper Company for a horizontal tube extrusion press and the associated hydraulic accumulators. Yorkshire Copper Company was owned by ICI Metals. In 1936, The Rt.Hon. Lord Melchett—a champion of Jewish affairs—was a Director of ICI.⁷¹ ICI went on to purchase large amounts of Loewy equipment, notably for the Mond Nickel Company at Thornliebank in Glasgow and ICI Metals at Kynoch in Birmingham.

Loewy also won orders from James Booth for a couple of four-column presses in October 1936, one of which exerted a 12,000-ton force and was ideal for shaping propeller blade blanks. This press was fittingly named ‘GIANT’ in the Loewy office and was worth £58,000.

CHECO—the Heavy Tube Department at Chesterfield

The breakthrough prestige contract for Ludwig Loewy’s new firm in Britain was the Chesterfield Tube plant—dubbed ‘CHECO’ in the Loewy drawing office. The order was signed just 8 months after Ludwig Loewy arrived in London. This contract shows just how far and how fast Ludwig Loewy was embraced by the British establishment.

This ‘Heavy Tube Department’ at Chesterfield Tube Company Ltd. was intended to manufacture heavy seamless steel tubes up to 20 tons in weight. The plant was motivated by the Admiralty’s demands. The Royal Navy was dangerously reliant upon foreign sources for heavy calibre pierced and drawn tubes, for instance, for warship boilers and condensers. The plant was sanctioned by Tube Investments, the owners of Chesterfield Tube, at the end of October 1936 with an initial budget of £250,000, which was soon to prove optimistic as coal measures were found below the site of the new building.⁷² Loewy Engineering were awarded their order for equipment in November 1936.⁷³

The Chesterfield contract included the world’s largest draw bench of its time, weighing 340 tons, with a 32-foot, 10-inch draw.⁷⁴ The Heavy Tube Department was formally inaugurated on 8 December 1938 by the First Lord of the Admiralty and leader of the House of Lords, Lord Stanhope, with Ludwig Loewy acting as a guide and honoured guest at the splendid lunch (Figure 5).⁷⁵ The event was given newspaper coverage in the Times under the headline ‘Meeting the Demands of British Industry and Defence’ (Figure 6).⁷⁶ The BBC sent Richard Dimbleby to report on the opening, and British Movietone News was present.

Figure 5. Ludwig Loewy, far right, was a VIP guest at the opening of the Heavy Tube Department at the Chesterfield Tube Company in December 1938. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, is partly hidden behind Ludwig’s right shoulder. The man with the extended hand is Sir William Talbot, Chairman of Chesterfield Tube (Photograph by Mr. J. O. Cannam. Chesterfield, CT39).

Figure 6. A giant four-column hydraulic press for piercing steel ‘billets’ prior to drawing into tubes. Designed by Loewy Engineering and supplied to Chesterfield Tube Company’s Heavy Tube Department to make items such as boiler plant for the Admiralty. (Advertisement 7 December 1938, Lehigh SC MS 0078.09.01, the photographer probably Mr. J. O. Cannam).

The Heavy Tube Department was a complex order, including a huge four-column vertical piercing press used to form a circular tube blank and a drawbench for elongating the blank into a long tube. The piercing and drawing machinery, plus the associated air-hydraulic accumulators, were worth some £113,380 in total, all designed by Loewy Engineering.⁷⁷

This raises an obvious question: why did Chesterfield Tube Company turn to Loewy Engineering for a huge and militarily sensitive contract just a few months after they were established in London?

The answer is to be found in Ludwig Loewy’s previous association with Chesterfield Tube Company when he was still in Germany. In October 1931, Chesterfield Tube ordered a 1,500-ton extrusion press from Schloemann to make stainless steel tubes up to 5 inches in diameter. The plant was ready for trials by July 1932.⁷⁸ This was a pioneering innovation since a press was being used for stainless steel extrusion for perhaps the first time anywhere in the world (Figure 7). It was to prove central to the supply of stainless tubes to the aircraft industry. Implementation of this innovative scheme required considerable technical support and knowledge from Schloemann to overcome obstacles to extruding steel.⁷⁹ Steel requires very high temperatures for extrusion. Lubrication is critical. Die wear is a problem, and the piercing tools are prone to damage from the heat. Given the success of this innovation, it was only natural that Chesterfield Tube turned to their familiar partner, Schloemann’s former Chief Engineer, Ludwig Loewy, for their huge rearmament expansion. All part of Loewy’s ‘prior affinity’ with Britain. Extrusion of stainless steel shows that Loewy was not only selling innovative press designs but also the know-how to operate them.

Figure 7. ‘Making stainless hollows’: a glass slide showing the extrusion of closed-end cylinders at the Chesterfield Tube Company. Ludwig Loewy helped overcome commissioning difficulties with stainless tube extrusion at Chesterfield, thereby establishing an affinity with Britain. Success meant the newly formed Ludwig Loewy Engineering was a natural candidate for subsequent capital schemes at the same works. (Attributed to Mr. J.O. Cannam, Chesterfield, CT38).

The Shotton contract

Although Loewy is best known as a supplier of presses for nonferrous metals, the new firm also won orders for equipment for steel rolling mills, including Britton Ferry in South Wales. ⁸⁰ The heftier weights and higher temperatures of steel rolling meant more engineering effort and higher value contracts than aluminium.

A large order was placed with Loewy by the steelmaker John Summers and Sons at Shotton in 1937. This contract offers an insight into the difficulties of purchasing engineering equipment during the run-up to the Second World War. It highlights the shortage of engineering skills which helped Loewy’s firm to grow rapidly. It also gave Loewy procurement headaches.

Loewy Engineering’s order from John Summers & Sons at Hawarden, Cheshire, formed part of the steelmaker’s project to build a new continuous wide hot strip mill at Shotton, announced on 6 August 1937. ⁸¹ The ‘noble machinery’ for the strip mill came directly from the Mesta Machine Company of Pittsburgh, but the complete project was a mixture of US mechanical and furnace equipment and know-how and UK-based civil engineering, construction, and electrical engineering.

Loewy Engineering’s share of the Shotton project was slab mill equipment. A slabbing mill rolls cast steel ingots into flat slabs ready for finishing on a wide hot strip mill. The slabbing mill at Shotton was built on the foundations of a previous mill. The new slabbing mill stand came from America, along with four of the eight soaking pits for heating the ingots prior to hot rolling. During this rearmament period, there was a long lead time on electric motors. Orders for the run-out table and motors on the slabbing mill were placed long before the main contract with Mesta for the slabbing mill stand was finalised. So, Loewy received an order for the 50 motors for exit side delivery tables of the slabbing mill as early as 30 October 1937, worth £7,400.⁸² At the same time, they were given a major order for the upcut slab shear and associated manipulators, which cropped the ends of the slabs to prepare them for further rolling, plus the mill approach table and delivery tables, and the slab discharging gear, which all came to £91,265. With total orders close to £100,000, Loewy Engineering was responsible for a quarter of the engineering work for the new slabbing mill.

John Summers & Sons Ltd. was placing considerable faith in a new engineering company. Neville Rollason of John Summers was in charge of the Shotton wide strip mill project. Perhaps he was canny, sensed the desperation of the Loewy Engineering Company to build up a reference list for rolling mill equipment, and knew of Ludwig Loewy’s personal reputation when he managed projects at Schloemann in Germany and decided to take a punt on the new firm.⁸³

Loewy were also offering an innovative design of a roller table. Photos show they used individual squirrel cage motors, which have no connection between the fixed and moving parts (Figure 8). So, the robust outer cage and stator were fixed to the edge of the run-out table, and the iron/copper rotor was directly coupled to each roller with its outer end running on a bearing. This was a simple solution that obviated any gearing and conveniently ran on alternating current, so a motor-generating set was not required for the slabbing mill. Loewy Engineering faced great difficulties in procuring these motors.⁸⁴

Figure 8. Loewy slab shear and run-out table motors on the slabbing mill at John Summers & Sons, Shotton, commissioned in 1940. The rotors of the squirrel cage motors are coupled directly to individual rollers. (Shotton Records Centre, Tata Steel.).

Ludwig Loewy had the advantage that there was a shortage of engineering capacity at a time of rearmament. Richard Summers wrote:

‘It will no doubt be remembered that 1937 was a year of great activity, and we found considerable difficulty in obtaining draughtsmen. We also had many long and difficult struggles in getting satisfactory prices and dates of delivery, as all machinery builders were fully occupied.’⁸⁵

This background of shortage doubtless encouraged John Summers and Sons to use the services of Loewy Engineering, who had built up a strong team of refugee engineers and local women draughtsmen.

Although Loewy Engineering derived much revenue from the Shotton slabbing mill contract, commissioned in 1940, and other steel contracts such as Briton Ferry in South Wales, rolling mill investment faded in the UK steel industry with the outbreak of war. The emphasis was on using existing mills efficiently without further capital spending.⁸⁶ Instead, there were shadow factories to be built to fabricate light alloys for the bomber programme.

Wartime and the move to Poole

Three and a half years after they set up in London, Loewy Engineering was faced with the outbreak of war and the threat of bombing. The Director of Material Production at the Air Ministry asked Ludwig Loewy to ‘consider the possibility of decentralising your Company from London. Your work is so important’ as soon as 9 September 1939.⁸⁷ Loewy moved the Engineering Company’s operations and some 80 staff from central London to Branksome Grange, a large detached house in its own grounds in Lindsay Road, Branksome Park, Poole in Dorset at the end of September 1939 (Figure 9).⁸⁸ Although the firm was to remain in Poole after the Second World War, it is apparent that Ludwig Loewy had second thoughts due to the restrictions placed on his employees, threatening to move the firm back to London in July 1940 to be ‘less hampered by alien restrictions.’⁸⁹

Figure 9. Wartime Evacuation: Loewy Engineering staff outside Branksome Grange, Poole, in 1941 (Dorset History Centre, D-2636/2/170). Over a fifth of the 86 staff here are women.

Loewy’s overall contribution to the Allied war effort

Loewy Engineering’s major contribution to rearmament was their design expertise and production knowledge, especially in building presses for shaping nonferrous metals. These were central to aircraft production and ordnance manufacture. Loewy Engineering designed, procured, and commissioned a huge amount of key machinery, given that it was a small, new firm.

Loewy Engineering enjoyed fast growth in sales from a standing start, not only in the UK, but also exports to France, Poland, the USA, and the Soviet Union. The firm started on the seventh floor of Ingersoll House in London but soon spread to the sixth floor and occupied part of the first floor prior to evacuation. By the outbreak of war in 1939, Loewy Engineering had supplied 32 horizontal presses, eight vertical presses needed for the upset forging of aeroengine pistons, and 31 air-hydraulic accumulator installations in just over 3 years, in addition to its rolling mill business for steel and aluminium.⁹⁰ Some of these items were for export to the empire and allied states—including a tube press to Poland in February 1939, though not all of them reached their intended destination. Two horizontal tube presses and a vertical press went to Russia before the war broke out. Ludwig Loewy had experience dealing with Soviet purchasing organisations from his Schloemann days.

Loewy Engineering was instrumental in the delayed rebuilding of the French aircraft sector, sending eight horizontal presses and various rolling mills. Erwin Loewy, one of Ludwig’s younger brothers who worked alongside him as Commercial Director at Schloemann in Düsseldorf, had moved to France to sell Loewy equipment.⁹¹ Loewy was to nurse losses on these contracts when the Germans invaded. Erwin then fled to the USA, where he built up the Loewy Hydropress Company during the war.

Once war broke out, Loewy Engineering turned its hand to a wide variety of equipment. By the time of Ludwig Loewy’s death in 1942, the firm had supplied 107 extrusion presses of various sizes and 59 presses for shells and cartridge cases, among many other items (Table 1). Loewy Engineering played a key role in equipping shadow factories to make aluminium alloy extrusions for the bomber programme, notably the High Duty Alloy Plant at Distington, Cumberland, with three Loewy extrusion presses. By 1943, this greenfield plant produced 3,000 tons of light alloy castings, 1,600 tons of extrusions, and, among many finished items, 2,000 propeller blades and one million general components a month.⁹² Visit reports show that Loewy Engineering had close technical connections with many suppliers in the aircraft industry.⁹³

Table 1 INSTALLATIONS SUPPLIED BY LOEWY ENGINEERING CO., LTD., 1936–1942.

Number	Type
11	6600 and 5500 ton extrusion presses
22	3800 and 3300 ton extrusion presses
74	Extrusion presses of 1650–2750 tons
2	12,000 ton die forging presses for propeller blades
1	5000 ton Piercing press for steel and drawing press for tube manufacture
2	1000 ton Piston presses for aluminium alloys
5	Upsetting presses
21	Automatic shell forging presses, combined piercing and drawing in one unit
38	Cartridge case press installations
4	2500 ton and 1500 ton Lead cable sheathing presses
10	Hydraulic stretchers for aluminium sheet
8	Hydraulic Stretchers for aluminium bars with detwisters, etc.
1	Complete rolling mill installation for aluminium sheet
1	Complete propeller blade forging plant
1	28" Billet mill for steel
1	Blooming mill for steel
35	Automatic sheet rolling mills
2	Three-high mills for aluminium and magnesium
Plus a large number of smaller mills and auxiliary equipment such as shears, levellers, slitters, straighteners, roller tables, and wheel mills

Source: derived from Lehigh, SC MS 0078.09.01. Imperial ton.

Ludwig’s contribution is summed up by an investment proposal prepared by Specialloid Ltd, a manufacturer of pistons for aeroengines located at Friern Park, North Finchley, in London. In awed tones, it says of Ludwig Loewy:

‘In this connection, perhaps not only Specialloid Limited as a Company, but the country is fortunate in having at their disposal the services of the designer responsible for the main German plants, already recognised by the leading Aluminium Companies in this country, and we believe by the Ministry of Aircraft Production, as being an expert without approach in this particular field.’⁹⁴

Loewy Engineering continued after Ludwig’s death in 1942 under family ownership (Figure 10). Konrad Guttenstein, who helped found the company in 1936, took over as Chairman. The company focussed on hydraulic equipment and rolling mills, acquiring its own factories in Yeovil in 1946 in a joint venture and later built its own factory in Poole. Loewy moved to architect-designed offices in Wallisdown Road, Poole, in 1954. The Loewy family sold The Loewy Engineering Company in 1960 to Tube Investments, who later merged them with the rolling mill builder W.H.A. Robertson. In turn, the new company was acquired by their Sheffield-based competitor, Davy-United, in 1968 to form Davy-Loewy.

Figure 10. Loewy Engineering continued supplying extrusion presses after Ludwig’s death in 1942. A Loewy extrusion press for aircraft components at High Duty Alloys, Distington, Cumberland. (Glasgow, UGD347/24/1).

Why was Britain so supportive of Ludwig Loewy?

Ludwig Loewy arrived in the UK in 1936 as a refugee at a time when the country relied on German machinery for the production and fabrication of light alloys. Many of these German machines were supplied by the company he had directed and still part-owned, Schloemann AG. Ludwig Loewy was a gift for the British Government. Ludwig was embraced as an alternative supplier of equipment, as someone with expertise in light alloy production, and as an engineer with comprehensive knowledge of aircraft manufacturing trends worldwide precisely when this expertise was desperately needed for British rearmament.

Ludwig Loewy was accorded VIP treatment. When the prestigious Heavy Tube Department was opened at the Chesterfield Tube Company by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, on 8 December 1938, Ludwig was centre stage in the proceedings.⁹⁵ He was appointed a technical advisor to Lord Beaverbrook, who was his staunch champion at the pinnacle of the establishment.⁹⁶ Ludwig became a naturalised British citizen on 2 March 1942.⁹⁷ When he was ill with stomach cancer, he was offered an RAF ambulance flight across the Atlantic to convalesce in America. When he died on Saturday 10 October 1942, some 80 telegrams of sympathy were received from MPs and officials at the Loewy Engineering office before the weekend was out.

The precise thinking behind the British Government’s response to Ludwig Loewy’s arrival is embargoed in the National Archives under the 100-year rule until 2045.⁹⁸ Was Ludwig ‘encouraged’ to emigrate to Britain, for example? Some things are clear. Unlike some of his fellow Jewish industrialists, he was not interned as an enemy alien in 1940. On the contrary, despite being an alien, he had a travel pass to all areas of the country.⁹⁹ He was extremely successful in getting his staff released from internment, helped by Beaverbrook’s enthusiasm for releasing internees for aircraft production.¹⁰⁰ Beaverbrook stoutly defended Loewy against MI5 concerns over his employees.¹⁰¹

Taking an instrumental approach fits the facts but ignores the context, personality, technical skills, and commercial drive of the man.¹⁰² It ignores the extreme circumstances in which Ludwig Loewy abandoned his firm in Düsseldorf and arrived in Britain replete with know-how and drawings crucial to the British war effort. It ignores the personality that helped him to transition from a refugee surrounded by suspicion to a key figure in the military-industrial complex at the heart of the war effort in Britain. But, it offers a simple hypothesis of why Ludwig Loewy was made so welcome in Britain, which is hard to refute on current evidence.

The Aryanisation of Schloemann

Ludwig Loewy initially suggested continuing collaboration between Schloemann, his former firm, and Loewy Engineering in London. An informal agreement with GHH anticipated that Loewy would represent Schloemann overseas and that he would return regularly to supervise work in Düsseldorf.

‘In April 1936, Ludwig Loewy went to London but returned to Germany shortly after in accordance with their agreement to return and supervise operations. Immediately upon his arrival, he was advised by a friend that the Gestapo was after him, so he stayed only 30 minutes and the same day was back in London with nothing but a suitcase and ten marks.’¹⁰³

Payment from GHH to run the overseas offices of Schloemann was not forthcoming. Schloemann informed clients that the Loewys had left the firm, and the Gestapo charged Ludwig Loewy in his absence with theft of the firm’s manufacturing know-how and drawings.

Ludwig Loewy was forced to relinquish his share of Schloemann AG after his departure from Düsseldorf. This was not straightforward. At the time of his departure, Ludwig Loewy owned 45% of Schloemann AG. Some 27.5% of the remaining shares were owned by MAN of Nuremburg, who fabricated Schloemann’s press designs, and GHH the other 27.5%. So there were just three shareholders, although MAN/GHH acted in concert since MAN was, by then, owned by GHH. In view of the Gestapo arrest warrant, Ludwig Loewy did not attend the General Meeting of Schloemann shareholders in Oberhausen on 7 January 1937. He sent his Attorney, Victor Niemeyer, instead.

In the absence of any agreement, Ludwig Loewy invoked a clause in the Pool Contract and offered his share in Schloemann for sale. A drawn-out negotiation and litigation followed over the sale of shares, lasting into the war years. Loewy’s Jewish status was inimical to his negotiating position. From 1937, there was an emphasis on the regime acquiring the assets of Jewish businesses. From 1938, Jews were required to pay a confiscatory tax rate, and their monies would go into a ‘blocked account’ essentially to be appropriated.

Ludwig Loewy’s shares were lodged with Hirschland & Co., a Jewish Bank in Essen. GHH obtained an order forcing the bank to hand over Loewy’s shares to Deutsche Bank in return for a nominal payment of 1,287,593 Reich Marks, which was put into a blocked account for Ludwig Loewy.¹⁰⁴ His whole investment in Schloemann was effectively confiscated.

Rewriting history and Schloemann’s war effort

After his departure, Ludwig Loewy was—quite literally—written out of history at Schloemann.¹⁰⁵ A new history was fabricated. Ironically, the firm’s success was attributed entirely to Paul Multhaupt, Eduard Schloemann’s son-in-law, who had left the firm in 1931 under a cloud, having embezzled money, allegedly to fund the nascent Nazi party.

As a result of Aryanisation, the firm came into the hands of GHH, who retained control after the war until Schloemann merged with Siemag AG in 1973, when GHH retained 51% ownership but ceded 50% control to the Weiss family, who owned the balance of shares in the combined firm.¹⁰⁶

During the war, Schloemann supported the Nazi war effort. Major orders included a rolling mill for Reichswerke Hermann Goering at Salzgitter.¹⁰⁷ A huge blooming mill erected at the Cornigliano steelworks in Genoa was subsequently dismantled, only to be intercepted by Allied troops on its way back to Germany.¹⁰⁸ The Schloemann mill was finally installed at Genoa after the war as part of the strip mill scheme funded by American Marshall Aid. Many German light alloy plants were equipped with Schloemann presses, including a giant press at Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Frankfurt, one of the most important nonferrous metal plants of the Nazi war effort.¹⁰⁹

Senior management of the firm was open about Ludwig Loewy’s role in the history of Schloemann 35 years after the war ended. ¹¹⁰ Now, the history of the firm is abbreviated on the company website, where the story ends in 1921.¹¹¹

Conclusions

Ludwig Loewy’s background as a German industrialist and his transition to a UK-based entrepreneur and godsend to UK rearmament before World War 2 has been outlined. As a Jewish engineer, Loewy faced discrimination, marginalisation, and victimisation at Schloemann, the company he part-owned and managed as Director and Chief Engineer in Düsseldorf. Ludwig Loewy established professional links with the UK from the 1920s onwards. During the 1930s, equipment from his firm, Schloemann, and other German machinery builders was central to the UK rearmament effort.

Ludwig Loewy’s move to London brought an immediate flow of orders to his new firm, Loewy Engineering. This included prestige orders for rearmament, a large number of items for the rapidly growing aluminium alloy fabrication industry, and big individual contracts for steel rolling equipment. By the time of Ludwig Loewy’s death in 1942, his firm had contributed an extraordinarily wide range of equipment to Britain’s war effort.

The foundation and rapid growth of Loewy Engineering in Britain from 1936 onwards raises many issues. We take an instrumental approach, stressing the potential contribution of Ludwig Loewy as a refugee from the UK Government’s point of view. Britain needed Ludwig Loewy’s expertise. Ludwig’s move to Britain was fostered by the UK establishment. His favourable experience confirms Mock’s view that the emigration of some 800 to 1000 German-speaking engineers to exile in Britain over the period 1933–1945 was broadly successful as they could readily work in their established profession.¹¹² The Loewy story also shows the way in which Aryanisation in Germany led to the rewriting of recent history to fit the Nazi narrative. At the same time, the German contribution to UK rearmament passes unremarked in the British Official Histories of the Second World War.

Archive sources

Chesterfield, Derbyshire County Council, Local Studies Library, Chesterfield, (items CT1-CT42).

Dorset Archives at Dorchester, Dorset Council, (series D-2636).

Glasgow, Business History Archive on British Alcan, Archives and Special Collections, University of Glasgow Library, Thurso Street, Glasgow, (catalogue no. UGD347).

Lehigh, Records of Ludwig and Erwin Loewy held by Special Collections, Linderman Library, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, (call No: SC-MS-0078).

Shotton Records Centre, Tata Steel, Shotton Works, Deeside, Flintshire.

The National Archives, Kew, London.

Warrington Archives, Culture Warrington, Warrington, Cheshire (holdings on British Aluminium).

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Deborah Jaffé and Anna Nyburg, who encouraged my interest in this topic. Brigitte Loewy Linz was an invaluable source of information and comment. Advice was given by Bob Bowden, Clive Ellam, Ian Hoose, Philip Lawlor, Ian Livingstone, Mick Steeper, Bill Summers, and Professor Wojciech Misiolek. I am grateful to Dr. Hilary Potter for expert translation work.

Archivists provided welcome help including Dawn Laight and Holly Froggatt at Chesterfield Local Studies Library; Matthew Allen and Becky Sheldon at Derbyshire County Council; Anna Wreyford and Luke Dady at Dorset History Centre; Shotton Records Centre of Tata Steel, especially former manager Rolf Holthöfer; Anna Murphy, at Lincs Inspire in Grimsby; Ally McConnell at Gloucestershire Archives; Peter Elliott at the RAF Museum and Philip Jeffs at Warrington Archives. Particular thanks to Alex Japha at Lehigh University Archives, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, who made everything possible during COVID.

Earlier versions of this paper were improved by comments at the Newcomen Society Manchester, Bristol, and Newcastle and the Royal Aeronautical Society, Brough. Two expert referees corrected technical errors and gave wise advice. The author is responsible for all remaining errors.

Disclosure statement

The author provided consultancy advice and management training to Davy-Loewy in Poole between 1985 and 1995.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jonathan Aylen

Dr Aylen is a recent President of the Newcomen Society and Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research within Alliance Manchester Business School at the University of Manchester. He has researched technologies, including missile guidance systems and Britain’s early atomic bombs. He has also written on innovation in rolling mill technology and on revolutionary computer use at British Rail.

Notes

1 An introduction to Ludwig Loewy is provided by Ian Livingstone, ‘Ludwig Loewy—The Story of a Czech Jew who escaped Nazi Germany’ at https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/dorset-history-centre-blog/2021/05/03 [accessed January 24, 2022].

2 See International Jewish Cemetery Project, ‘Becov Nad Teplou: Karlovy Vary, Bohemia’, http://iajgscemetery.org/eastern-europe/czech-republic/becov-nad-teplou, [accessed March 21, 2022]. We use the anglicised spelling Ludwig Loewy he himself adopted, rather than his original name Ludvik Löwy. Other surnames mis-spelt in post-war accounts have been corrected in line with pre-war company records.

3 Ludwig Loewy’s Institute of Metals Obituary in 1942 says he attended the ‘Technical School in Vienna’. Other sources suggest the University of Vienna. There is no evidence the University of Vienna had a Faculty of Engineering at the time. We conclude he attended the Technische Hochschule in Vienna. See ‘Obituary: Ludwig Loewy, Dipl. Ing,’ Journal of Institute of Metals, 68 (1942), 420

4 Maschinenfabrik Sack GmbH was set up in Düsseldorf in May 1899 by a young Hugo Sack. It established a reputation for building section mills and plate mill. See Sack Since 1899, Düsseldorf: Sack GmbH, 1979

5 There is conflicting evidence as to when Ludwig Loewy joined Schloemann. Both Wolfgang Mock, Technische Intelligenz im Exil. Vertreibung und Emigration deutschsprachiger Ingenieurne nach Grossbritannien, 1933 bis 1945, Düsseldorf: Verlag des Vereins deutscher Ingenieure, 1986, p. 87 and Walter Schwarzrock, ‘Ludwig Loewy—1887 to October 1942: His Activities in Düsseldorf from 1914-1936’, typescript (Dorset History Centre, ref. D-2636/1/1, no date, but circa 1988) had access to Schloemann business records and they both suggest a date of 1914. Lt. Col. W. T. Clark, ‘Information obtained during visit to England, 7 November 1942 to 7 December 1942’, typescript report, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.09.01) suggests 1913, but this manuscript is cavalier with other facts. Schwarzrock suggests Paul Multhaupt, an engineer who had earlier moved to Schloemann from Sack and married one of Eduard Schloemann’s daughter’s encouraged Ludwig Loewy to make the move from Sack.

6 Roger Boyes, ‘Schloemann-Siemag: Expansion abroad pays off’, Financial Times, 27 November 1979.

7 Schwarzrock, ‘Ludwig Loewy’ op.cit., p. 2; Mock, op.cit., pp. 87–88.

8 GHH, or Gutehoffnungshütte, can be traced back to at least 1782 and subsequent merger with even older companies in 1808. The firm diversified into machinery and railway equipment, then iron ore and coal mines and subsequently steelmaking. During the 20th century, they were leading process plant contractors for ironmaking and steelmaking equipment as well as heavy engineering. GHH acquired a majority share in Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (MAN) in 1921.

9 This murky episode cannot have endeared Ludwig Loewy to the Nazi Party. It is omitted from most accounts of Schloemann, but revealed by Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), Economics Division, Decartelization Branch, 18 October 1947, Memorandum to File, Subject: Aryanization of Schloemann A. G., Duesseldorf by G.H.H. (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.20.01). This document states that Loewy and Multhaupt initially each had 50% of the shares in the company in 1924. After being banned from Schloemann, Multhaupt obtained 55% of the shares from the company safe which he sold to Demag, and thence to GHH and MAN. Paul Multhaupt committed suicide in January 1933. Family sources suggest Ludwig Loewy was left with 45% of the shares, but a wartime legal document claims 50% ownership, see ‘3 March 1941 Memorandum in Sachen Schloemann A. G., Düsseldorf’ (Lehigh SC MS 0078.20.01 in German).

10 The Institute of Metals, ‘Obituary: Ludwig Loewy’ op.cit. reports his enthusiastic sales activities.

11 Schloemann AG, Düsseldorf, ‘Aufstellung der in Amerika schwebenden Projekts’, typescript reference list, dated 16 August 1935, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.09.02). Bridgeport remained loyal to Ludwig Loewy after his departure from Schloemann, ordering a large horizontal tube press and associated air/hydraulic accumulator from Loewy Engineering in London in March 1938 for $117,500 (£23,500).

12 For example, Jonathan Aylen, ‘Stalinism, autarchy, espionage and Marshall Aid: How US strip mill technology came to Europe’, The International Journal for the History of Engineering & Technology, 89 (2019), 92–121.

13 Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930 to 1945, Vol. 2, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press at Stanford University, 1971), pp. 77–79; E.P. Everhard, ‘Kuznetsk Steel Plant in U.S.S.R’, Blast Furnace and Steel Plant, 20/12 (1932) 889–893.

14 See Schwarzrock, ‘Ludwig Loewy’ op.cit., p. 3 on high profits in the rolling mill business. The Soviet’s had a habit of paying in gold.

15 We do not have a reference list for Schloemann equipment supplied to Britain during the inter-war period. As we discuss below, an early contract was an extrusion press for stainless steel installed at Chesterfield.

16 Data on aircraft production is sparse for the rearmament period. Using data on financial appropriations for the RAF, we can infer that an index of aircraft production weighted by man hours and aircraft weight stood at 17 in 1934, 18 in 1935, and averaged 1774 at its peak during 1944. Derived from Central Statistical Office, The Statistical Digest of the War, London: HMSO and Longman Green and Co., 1951, table 7.24.

17 M. M. Postan, British War Production, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), for HMSO, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, p. 15; J. V. Connolly, ‘Aircraft Production’, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 70 (1966), 214–230; Brian Brinkworth, ‘On the Planning of British Aircraft Production for the Second World War and Reference to James Connolly’, Journal of Aeronautical History Papers, Paper 2018/09 (2018), 233–299.

18 Thurstan James, ‘Getting Going at the Shadow Factories’, The Aeroplane, 53 (1937), 529–539. Also Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production 1935–1941 (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

19 David Edgerton, Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2012), ch. 7.

20 Aircraft industry employment figures are sketchy for the inter-war years and differ across sources, so these are broad estimates from The Statistical Digest of the War op.cit. table 19. Ritchie op.cit., table 26 suggests 27,000 worked at the main contractors for airframes and aeroengines in 1935 and perhaps 35,000 across the whole industry in that year (p. 256).

21 Aircraft Production, ‘A Modern Engine factory’, Aircraft Production, 1 (1939), 381–383; C. G. Grey, ‘Quantity Plus Quality’, The Aeroplane, 57 (1939), 119–125.

22 A. J. Murphy, ‘Materials in Aircraft Structures’, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 70/661 (1966), 114–119.

23 William Hornby, War Production, Factories and Plant, London: Longmans, Green and Co. for HMSO, History of the Second World War; United Kingdom Civil Series, 1958, pp. 279–284. A new industry also emerged in the USA. As Erwin Loewy said of America: ‘After World War 1, the light metal industry was for all practical purposes non-existent’, manuscript of talk, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.07.07, p. 114.)

24 F. R. C. Smith, ‘Some Aspects of the Mechanical Properties, Uses and Manipulation of Aluminium Alloys’, The Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 43 (1939), 1–18; J. R. Handforth, ‘Modern Aluminium Alloys: A Survey of the Materials to Various Specifications Available for Use’, Aircraft Engineering, 11/3 (1939), 101–106; ‘Stressed-skin Construction: A Summary of the Striking Progress Made in a Few Years’, Aircraft Engineering, 10/107 (1938), 2–3.

25 Communication with Clive Ellam, 2022. Also C. Ellam, ‘The British Heavy Bomber Aeroplane’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 68 (1996/7), 53–83.

26 ‘Quantity production of the Spitfire 1: Notes on the System Adopted by Vickers-Armstrong Ltd.’, Aircraft Engineering, 11/4 (1939), 167–180; But not the early Hurricane: ‘Series Construction of the Hurricane 1’, Aircraft Engineering, 11/2 (1939), 61–71.

27 F. R. C. Smith, ‘Some aspects . .’ op.cit. On extrusion see: C. E. Pearson, The Extrusion of Metals (London: Chapman & Hall, 1944) and Ernst Müller, Hydraulic Extrusion Presses: Presses Used for The Production of Tubes, Solid Rods, Hollow Sections, Wire, and Cable Sheathing in Nonferrous Metals (Berlin: Springer, 1961) and Alfred Von Zeerleder, The Technology of Aluminium and its Light Alloys, Slough, Bucks.: High Duty Alloys Ltd., translated from the 3rd edn, 1948. On the importance of extrusion to the war effort see Hornby, op.cit., pp. 279–284.

28 This was one area of British machinery innovation. John Shaw and Sons of Salford, Lancashire specialised in hydraulic presses for shaping light alloy parts using a variety of moulding techniques, including rubber pad presses. (Communication from Clive Ellam). Also see ‘A large British press: economies in production effected by use of rubber press technique’, Aircraft Production, 2/5 (1940), 141–2 on the contribution of Fielding and Platt of Gloucester.

29 M. M. Postan, D. Hay and J.D. Scott, Design and Development of Weapons (London: Longmans, Green and Co. for HMSO, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, 1964), p. 105. The authors got carried away when they claim: ‘Perhaps even greater advances were made in the field of aluminium alloy. Duralumin was found particularly suitable in cast and forged forms, being ten times lighter and nearly 100% stronger than the usual crank case of aluminium alloy’. They surely meant 10% lighter.

On the development of Duralumin, its early use by Junkers and resistance to its adoption in the UK and USA see: John D. Anderson, The Airplane: A History of its Technology (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2002) pp. 174–179 and Hugo Junkers, ‘Metal aeroplane construction’, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 27 (1923), 406–449. The paper by Professor Junkers is printed without the usual audience discussion which is said to have dismissed his ideas—as ‘junk’. Nevertheless, James Booth, of Kitts Green in Birmingham became the first UK based supplier of Duralumin and British Aluminium a convert see: George Mortimer, Wrought Alloys of Aluminium in Aircraft (London: The British Aluminium Company Ltd., publication 327), 1929.

30 Postan et al., ibid., p. 105. On Y alloys see Smith, 1939 op.cit. For a modern comparison of the various alloys see: T. Ouissi, G. Collaveri, P. Sciau, J-M. Olivier and M. Brunet, ‘Comparison of aluminum alloys from aircraft of four nations involved in the WWII conflict using multiscale analyses and archival study’, Heritage 2 (2019), 2784–2801.

31 On capacity shortage in light metals see Official Civil Histories, Raw Materials Aluminium and Aluminium Alloys 1939–1945, Narrative by Official Historian Miss M. E. Jenkins, circa 1950, especially p. 48 and pp. 60–68 on extrusion presses as a bottleneck (The National Archives, CAB 102/187).

32 ‘The use of extruded sections in aircraft construction, at any rate as far as primary structures are concerned, has grown very rapidly, reflecting the speed with which aircraft designers have realised the value of their versatility’, F. R. C. Smith, op.cit., speaking in 1938.

33 William Ashworth, Contracts and Finance, London: Longmans, Green and Co. for HMSO, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series, War Production Series, 1953, ‘The industry had, however, expanded at a tremendous rate in the years immediately before the war and there is little doubt that greatly increased turnover had resulted in extravagant profits.’ (p. 171).

34 The situation in the USA was no different. Erwin Loewy claimed every extrusion press in the USA came from Germany until the late 1930s when American firms began to produce designs under licence. Erwin Loewy, Speech, 6 April 1944, typescript (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.07.07), p. 6.

35 Ralf Richter and Jochen Streb, ‘Catching-up and falling behind: knowledge spillover from American to German machine toolmakers’, Journal of Economic History, 71/4 (2011), 1006–1031.

36 Hornby op.cit. p. 324 shows Germany accounted for 48.3% of world trade in machine tools by 1937.

37 According to Christopher J. Schmitz, World Non-Ferrous Metal Production and Prices, 1700–1976 (London: Frank Cass), 1979, German primary production in 1938 was 165,600 tonnes, rising to a peak of 250,100 by 1943. In contrast, the USA made only 129,000 tonnes in 1938, but far exceeded this by 1943, making 834,400 tonnes. These figures exclude a large secondary production in the USA, for which statistics are not available for Germany. Including the secondary market, the output for Germany was perhaps 185,000 tonnes and the USA 165,100 in 1938. The aluminium was to make Luftwaffe aircraft.

38 ‘Reynolds: The Story of an American Industrial Giant’, The BA News, 12/4 (1959), 3–8.

39 The plant was important to the war effort, making a third of UK alloy sheet and extrusions. During World War II, it was camouflaged and protected by its own anti-aircraft battery. A decoy factory of plywood built by technicians from Elstree film studies was set up 2 miles north at Hardwick Hill as a diversion. This replica was accurately bombed in daylight by the Luftwaffe on 3 October 1940, while production at Banbury continued unimpeded. Richard Hartree, ‘The Banbury Aluminium Works, 1929-2009’, Cake and Cockhorse, 20/1 (2015), 2–30. Also see E. Ashley, ‘Activities of Northern Aluminium Company Ltd. West Bromwich, Banbury and Adderbury, 1927 to 1946’, Typescript December 1946. (Glasgow, UGD347/28/3/1).

40 ‘Alcan in Banbury, a brief history’. Notes written for a brochure to celebrate 50 years of Banbury Works. p.2, typescript. c.1981. (Glasgow, UGD347/21/46/25) and Ashley, ibid.

41 ‘Light alloys in production: a description of one of the newest factories in Great Britain’, Aircraft Engineering, 10/117 (1938), 359–361; ‘Modern light-metal manufacture’, Aircraft Production, 1/4 (1939), 121–125.

42 Walzmaschinenfabrik August Schmitz GmbH had been building rolling mills for nonferrous and precious metals since 1835.

43 ‘Producing Rotol airscrews’, Aircraft Production, 1/6 (1939), 208–214. Rotol bought some German equipment for their new factory at Staverton in Gloucestershire. See B. Stait, ROTOL: The History of An Airscrew Company 1937–1960 (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1990), p. 32.

44 High Duty Alloys played a key role in developing aluminium alloys which included nickel, such as the Y-alloys. See A.J. Murphy, op.cit.

45 Glossed over in the Official History, see Hornby, op.cit., pp. 310–317.

46 W.G. Hunt, ‘Machines for Airframe Production’, Aircraft Engineering, 10 (1938), 287–289.

47 Editorial: ‘German Tools’, Aircraft Production, 1/12 (1939), 405.

48 ‘British Aluminium, 11th special article’, Warrington Guardian, 26 May 1945.

49 British Aluminium Report Redundant Rolling Mill Plant for Disposal at Warrington Bank Quay Works, Warrington, Lancs by The British Aluminium Company Ltd., London, England March 1968, p. 10 (Glasgow, UGD347/21/40/32). Schmitz were still advertising their rolling mills to a UK market in the trade journal Light Metals during 1939, see the May and July issues.

50 Hartree, op.cit., p. 10.

51 Ing. W. Borstel, ‘Spot Welding: Methods and Conditions Observed in a Pioneer German Factory’, Aircraft Production, 1/1 (1938), 31–33. For an unduly confident view on the state of the art in Britain see: Northern Aluminium, The Welding and Riveting of Aluminium, 2nd edn (London: Northern Aluminium Co. Ltd, 1938), Neither source appreciate the high amps necessary, the need for tip cleanliness and tip cooling, the weakness of aluminium welds against shear forces, the ready migration of heat affected zones towards stressed areas, and so on. See Resistance Welding Manual, 4th edn (Philadelphia: Resistance Welder Manufacturers’ Association, 1989), chs.2 and 11.

52 Dr.-Ing. Wilhelm Pleines, ‘Riveting Methods and Rivet Equipment Used in the German Light Metal Aeroplane Construction’, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 42 (1938), 761–815, including 20 pages of written answers to British questions posed to the German author.

53 The October 1939 issue of Aircraft Engineering, vol. 11, no. 128 published after war broke out is called: ‘The German Way: an issue devoted largely to enemy methods and techniques’, saying:

‘. . it will clearly be helpful to British and Allied designers and production managers if we continue the practice, which we have already developed in peacetime, of providing them with as much information as possible on the work of their opposite numbers in Germany. It has always been agreed that the Germans are clever technicians capable of displaying considerable ingenuity, more particularly in details of production. Their methods have, therefore, always been worth studying.’ p. 373.

54 George Dowty, In His Own Words: The Autobiography of Sir George Dowty, ed. By Ally McConnell (Gloucester: Hobnob Press, 2020). Elektron Metall GmbH was reorganised in January 1938 and became known as Mahle-Kommandit Gesellschaft, see Light Metals, 1/2 (1938), 61. Roy Feddon and Bert Newport of Rotol visited Germany in summer 1938 to glean information on propeller materials, see Stait op.cit., p. 18.

55 Specialloid Ltd, ‘British Aero Engine piston production’. August 1940 Typescript, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.11.06). British intelligence derived from analysis of crashed Luftwaffe aircraft and from German technical reports was very thorough. On the performance of Mahle see B.I.O.S. Final Report No.693, The Investigation of the Light Alloy Forging Industry in Germany, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, London: HMSO, 1950, Reported by J. H. Swain, J. Loew, L. W. T. Smith, V. H. Faulkner on behalf of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

56 Harold James, The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property (Cambridge U.P., 2001) ch. 5 on aryanisation.

57 Peter Pulzer, ‘Foreigners: The immigrant in Britain’ in Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-speaking Jews in the United Kingdom, ed. by Werner E. Mosse (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1991), pp. 3–9, see p.8. Ludwig Loewy’s niece suggests ‘Ludwig had already left Germany in the fall of 1933’, settling in London (personal communication with Brigitte Linz, 9 February 2023).

58 The Autumn Annual Meeting of the Institute of Metals took place in Düsseldorf, Germany in 1929 from 9 to 15 September. This may have prompted Loewy’s membership application. Loewy and Lorant were elected to the Institute of Metals on 7 November 1929. See ‘Members Elected on November 7, 1929: Löwy, Ludwig, Dipl.-Ing …Düsseldorf, Germany’; also elected at the same time: ‘Lorant, Hugo … Düsseldorf, Germany’ Journal of the Institute of Metals, 43/1 (1930), 19.

59 Mock, op.cit., p. 88.

60 Alex Wilson, ‘The Loewy Engineering story: talk to the forum—28 Sept 1988’ typescript, p. 2 on the three founder directors (Dorset History Centre, ref. D-2636/1/1).

61 Those recruited by this route included their first draughtsman Fred Radford, and a female draughtsman Peggy Dormer, who was to stay with Loewy for at least 30 years. ‘Mr. Lorant would tell Mr. Clure ‘More English staff required’—he would then go round the corner and have a chat with his Foster-Wheeler friends …’ Alex Wilson, ibid., p. 3.

62 ‘London, 22 December 1938, To: The Directors of the Loewy Engineering Co. Ltd.’, acknowledgement by staff of gifts received. (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.19.02).

63 Ludwig Loewy sought support from Henry Ludwig Mond, 2nd Baron Melchett, a well-connected politician and corporate manager. See letter dated 13 February 1936 from Ludwig Loewy (c.o. Metropole Hotel, London) to Lord Melchett (ICI House, London), handwritten in English, about establishing a company in England, written on Schloemann letterhead (Lehigh University, SC MS 0078.30.03.) Mond was a fellow member of the Institute of Metals, see ‘Annual Autumn Meeting, report on Members Elected on 4 July 1929: Mond, the Hon. Henry Ludwig, M. P… London,’ The Journal of the Institute of Metals, 42/2 (1929), 7.

ICI gave Loewy Engineering an order within a month of the Company’s foundation in London. ICI also announced its move into aluminium production for aircraft use in 27 January 1937 and went on to develop their Kynoch Works in Birmingham which was to be equipped with a Loewy 5000 ton press, three high rolling mills and sheet mills. See ‘A New Source of Supply’ Aeroplane, 52/1340 (1937) 124.

64 Editorial: ‘Speeding Up Production’, Aircraft Production, 1/3 (1939), 77.

65 Wilson, op.cit., p. 4.

66 Dr. R. U. Reichl’s move is described by Clark, op.cit., see p. 2.

67 Daughter of E. R. Henschker, ‘A Christian Family Saved Twice by a Jew’, 2005 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/78/a3683478.shtml [accessed 11 October 2007, now deleted], with corrections. E. R. Henschker went on to became Technical Director of Loewy Engineering until 1964. See https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/E._R._Henschker [accessed 25 January 2022).

68 Schwarzrock, op.cit., p. 6.

69 Rebecca Kobrin, ‘Introduction: The Chosen People in the Chosen Land: The Jewish Encounter with American Capitalism’, in Chosen Capital: the Jewish Encounter with American Capitalism, ed. by R. Kobrin (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012), p. 3.

70 R. Lustig, ‘re. list of orders received in England’, 25 October 1941 from R. Lustig, Montreal, to A. B. Cudebec, New York, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.03.06.) This reference list covers presses, not rolling mills. Also see Wilson, op.cit., p. 5.

71 It is likely that ICI Metal’s enthusiasm for the extrusion of copper tubes derived from their strong market position in the supply of ammunition for shotguns, rifles, and handguns. Only later did the firm move into rolled light alloys and then extruded sections and tubes. See 1936 Tenth Annual Report of the Directors of Imperial Chemical Industries Limited to the Members, Submitted to the Members at the Tenth Ordinary General Meeting to be held on Thursday 29 April 1937 and successive reports.

Not all of the aircraft industry would have been so welcoming. C. G. Grey, the opinionated Editor of the weekly Aeroplane trade magazine, was openly antisemitic. His frequent and prolific editorials were fiercely anti-communist, pro-Hitler, strongly pro-Franco, casually racist, and opposed to Britain’s foreign policy. For an editor of a technical journal, he also had peculiar views on the emerging aircraft technology of the day. On the right-wing, bias of the UK Aircraft Industry in general see David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: Militarism, Modernity and Machines, revised edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2013), pp. 90–92.

72 29 October 1936, p. 215, ‘Authority No.247 from Tube Investments Ltd. For capital expenditure for a new Heavy Tube Plant, provisional value £250,000’, Chesterfield Tube Co. Ltd 1906-August 1962. Schedule of Appointments and Acquisitions Extracted from Board Meeting Minutes. Typescript (Derbyshire County Council Chesterfield Library, CT42).

73 Order, Lustig, op.cit. There is evidence that Ludwig Loewy received a consultancy fee of £5,000 in December 1936, perhaps to help with the overall planning of the scheme. See ibid. 18 December 1936, p. 223, ‘Payment of £5,000 to Loewy Engineering Limited on account of Professional services.’

74 Clark, op.cit., p. 3 on the size of the drawbench. Clark points out ‘building of this type of machinery was practically a monopoly of Germany’.

75 Some Recollections of the Chesterfield Tube Company Ltd. Presented by the Management Committee to the Chairman, William Brown, CBE, JP, 31 March 1964 (Chesterfield Library, CT39). The First Lord of the Admiralty was the political head of the Royal Navy. Lord Stanhope took on this role in October 1938 but was replaced by Winston Churchill in 1939.

76 ‘Meeting the demands of British industry and defence’, The Times, 7 December 1938, pp. 29–32.

77 Lustig, 1941, op.cit.

78 ‘23 October 1931, p. 77. Requisition for (Schloemann) extrusion press to be drawn’ and ‘1 July 1932, p. 84. Extrusion press ready for trials’, in Chesterfield Tube Co. Ltd op.cit.

79 ‘For some time after the extrusion art had been accepted as a commercial part of the nonferrous field, no further progress with other alloys seemed likely. However, Ludwig Loewy continued to persist in the study and research for application in the field of stainless steel and nickel alloys. Finally, small presses, designed especially for this purpose, were developed and tried out in Great Britain. New problems immediately presented themselves. It was found that extrusion temperatures for these metals were around 2000 °F. or higher. Moreover, it was found that the width of the temperature band where these metals would flow was very narrow. This meant that heating must be carefully controlled and the speed of extrusion must be very high.’ Erwin Loewy, 6 April 1944, pp. 7–8, typescript of speech, (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.07.07). Erwin Loewy was dissembling over the precise temperature, which would have been a trade secret at the time. We are indebted to Ian Hoose for advice on stainless steel extrusion.

80 Worth £42,404/14s/2d, handwritten note ‘Briton Ferry, summary of orders’ (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.19.02).

81 Jonathan Aylen, ‘Construction of the Shotton Wide Strip Mill’, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 78/1 (2008), 57–85.

82 John Summers & Sons, File labelled ‘Strip Mill’ including Strip Mill Construction, revised estimate 28 February 1940. The Loewy Orders are under Group Codes 9 and 12. (Shotton Records Centre, Tata Steel, Group Secretary Code 425, Consignment 36, box 6, Location 4747).

83 I am grateful to William Summers for discussion, 15 January 2022.

84 On the difficulties of procuring electric motors for Shotton and earlier contracts, see the extensive correspondence between Ludwig Loewy and various European contacts in Lehigh, SC MS 0078.30.03 passim.

85 Richard Summers, The New Mill 1940 (London: Jonathan Cape privately published for Chester: John Summers & Sons Ltd., Hawarden Bridge Steel Works, Shotton, 1940), p. 18.

86 Loewy’s competitor in building steel rolling mills, Davy-United, were asked to shift their business to shell forging presses and brass mills for cartridge cases when the war broke out. There were to be many rolling mill orders for steel, but not until the war had ended. See Ewan Hewitt, ‘The transfer of rolling mill technology from the USA to Europe: the relationship of Davy with United Engineering’, Ribbon of Fire: How Europe adopted and developed US strip mill technology (1920–2000), eds. by Jonathan Aylen and Ruggero Ranieri (Perugia: Pendragon and Fondazione Ranieri di Sorbello, 2012), pp. 331–350.

87 Letter to Ludwig Loewy from Air Ministry, Dept. ZA, 9 September 1939 (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.21.09).

88 Livingstone, op.cit.

89 Letter from Ministry of Aircraft Production, London, dated 20 July 1940 to Mr. Loewy (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.19.02). Beaverbrook complained Loewy wanted to move the firm to Canada.

90 Lustig op.cit.

91 Erwin Loewy deserves a paper to himself. See ‘The Loewy Institute dedication: speech by Brigitte Loewy Linz’, Resolve Magazine, vol. 2, 2016 at https://engineering.lehigh.edu/research/resolve/volume-2-2016/did-you-know-loewy-institute [accessed 23 November 2022].

92 High Duty Alloys Ltd., Souvenir corporate brochure 1940-1965: 25 Years of Our Extrusion Division at Distington Works (Workington: HDA, 1965) (Glasgow, UGD347/24/1).

93 Sequence of visit reports with British companies regarding propeller blade manufacture (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.11.07).

94 Specialloid Ltd., ‘British aero engine piston production’. August 1940, typescript (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.11.06). For the precise manufacturing process see: Bristol piston stampings produced in aluminium alloy by High Duty Alloys Ltd., Slough, Royal Aircraft Factory, 1939 (TNA, AVIA 6/7819).

95 See Some Recollections, op.cit.

96 A. B. Cudebec, ‘Memorandum concerning background of Ludwig Loewy, President The Loewy Engineering Co. Ltd.’, London, 26 February 1941. typescript initialled ‘A.B.C.’ (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.21.09). ‘Major Albert Cudebec was the representative of the Loewy Engineering Company in America’. (Brigitte Linz, personal communication, 12 February 2023). A huge American press was named ‘Major’ in his honour after World War 2.

97 ‘Naturalization’, The London Gazette, 21 April 1942, p. 1746. This official source gives a slightly later date than the Certificate in the National Archives (TNA, HO 334/160/17007).

98 ‘LOEWY, Ludwig aka LOWY aka LOWY, Ludvik: Austrian and Czechoslovakian’, 1 Jan 1934–31 Dec 1944, (TNA, HO 382/384), marked closed until 1 January 2045.

99 Dated 8 June 1940. Reproduced in Livingstone op.cit. It may have helped that Ludwig Loewy retained his Czech citizenship as the Czechs were not adversaries of the UK.

100 See Daughter of E. R. Henschker, op.cit. Also Letter from Ministry of Aircraft Production, London, 13 July 1940 to Mr. Loewy saying the Home Office were releasing Messrs Haffner, Hachenburg, and Wutscher. (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.19.02).

101 Nigel West, ed., The Guy Liddell Diaries, Volume 1: 1939–1942: MI5’s Director of Counter-Espionage in World War II (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), pp. 90–92 is entertaining and implies Beaverbrook and Loewy met regularly. This story of the Minister of Aircraft Production’s staunch support for Loewy is repeated in other sources on Beaverbrook.

102 Bill Williams, ‘Refugees and Eccles Cakes: Refugee Industrialists in the Manchester Region, 1933–45’, Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society, (2007-8), 1–22.

103 Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) Economics Division, Decartelization Branch, 18 October 1947, ‘MEMORANDUM TO FILE, SUBJECT: Aryanization of Schloemann A. G., Duesseldorf by G.H.H.’, p. 3. (Lehigh, SC MS 0078-20-0). We do not know Ludwig’s movements that day. A day trip from London to Düsseldorf would have been possible with a leisurely 10 o’clock departure by Deutsche Lufthansa on flight 455 from London Croydon to Cologne, arriving at 12.20, a swift car journey on the new Opladen Bypass into Düsseldorf, only to turn around and suffer an apprehensive wait for a return flight back from Cologne at 5 pm, getting into Croydon for 7.50. See ‘Deutsche Lufthansa Summer Timetable, 19 April–3 October 1936’, p. 4 at http://timetableimages.com/ttimages/complete/complete.htm#Europe [accessed 26 August 2022].

104 This account is based upon the Office of Military Government for Germany, ibid. p. 5. Schwarzrock op.cit. says Loewy was forced to surrender his shares under a court injunction for a value of 8 million Reichsmark, although the payment into his bank was immediately blocked in September 1939. We find no other evidence for this figure. In any event, the bank itself, Hirschland & Co., being a Jewish bank, was largely expropriated by Deutsche Bank, see James, op.cit., pp. 77–81, and then traded under the name Jacob Burkhardt & Co. A completely different figure of 1,287,593.43 Reichsmark is reported by Erwin Loewy, Notes (Lehigh SC MS 0078.20.01, dated 15 October 1947 in German). Despite the outbreak of war in September 1939, litigation over the value of these shares continued until at least March 1941 (sic) see ‘3 March 1941 Memorandum in Sachen Schloemann A. G., Düsseldorf’ (Lehigh SC MS 0078.20.01 in German.) This legal note suggests Ludwig Loewy owned 50% of Schloemann.

105 Schloemann Aktiengesellschaft, Düsseldorf, illustrated brochure issued April 1940 (Lehigh, SC MS 0078.20.01 in German). ‘Before joining the Schloemann Corporation, Paul Multhaupt, a young engineer, had been working at a machine works similar to our own. The experience he brought with him, his drive, his ability to quickly grasp new possibilities together with his judicious execution of the tasks before him, and his skillful staff selection, he was able to transform the company successfully from one that was originally devoted exclusively to trade into one that became talented in the technical field as well.’ Perhaps, Ludwig Loewy’s name was simply replaced by Paul Multhaupt? We are grateful to Dr. Hilary Potter for the translation of this document.

106 Jonathan Aylen, Interview with Dr. Joachim Garnjost and Dr. Ing. Wolfgang Rohde, Schloemann-Siemag AG, Düsseldorf, 17 September 1980.

107 H. A. Brassert and Co. London, Set of drawings of Reichswerke A. G. Hermann-Goering Works, Eisenhuttenwerk Braunschweig, London: Granite House, Cannon Street, 1 June 1939 (Shotton Records Centre, Tata Steel, Search Room).

108 Luciano Frezza, ‘Italian Wide Strip Mills’, eds. by Jonathan Aylen and Ruggero Ranieri op.cit., pp. 217–231.

109 See B.I.O.S. Final Report No.693 op.cit.

110 Loewy’s story was commonplace throughout the European rolling mill industry 35 years after the war had ended. Schloemann’s senior managers were open about Ludwig Loewy’s role in 1980. Dr. Garnjost and Dr. Rohde joked that Schloemann had been responsible for setting up the British metallurgical plant industry, which was enjoying much success at the time. A similar story was told by Eric Earnshaw and John Robertshaw during a meeting at Davy-Loewy in Sheffield on 17 March 1978.

111 The ‘Schloemann: Engineering in Düsseldorf’ component of the current SMS website excludes any significant history after 1921. https://www.sms-group.com/company/our-heritage [accessed 17 November 2022].

112 Wofgang Mock, ‘Engineers from Germany in Exile in Britain, 1933–1945’, pp. 347–360 in Second Chance: op.cit., p. 347.