https://orcid.org/0009-0001-9445-8375
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ABSTRACT
Insufficient scholarly attention has been given to how UN human rights treaty bodies can induce states to implement concluding observations (COBs). This is because previous studies tend to underestimate the treaty bodies as weak, and instead focus on domestic factors. A case study of the Japanese implementation of treaty bodies’ COBs, however, reveals that domestic mobilization does not always succeed in changing government policies because of Japanese authorities’ inadequate understanding of international human rights law in areas such as gender equality and the prohibition of hate speech. Exploring treaty bodies’ role in inducing such states’ implementation of COBs is therefore crucial. To tackle this, this paper applies the theory of Goodman and Jinks, and reveals that the treaty bodies’ design is aimed primarily at persuading rather than acculturating states. If acculturation is incorporated into their design, it follows that treaty bodies should coordinate with the Human Rights Council, and that the Human Rights Council should follow up COBs in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Because ‘enforcement’ of COBs by the UPR could undermine treaty bodies’ work, this paper suggests a modest solution: that the UPR should cover the concerns expressed in COBs.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research I conducted during a three-month visit to the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. I would like to thank all the people who I met in the Centre, and in particular Professor Gentian Zyberi, who kindly welcomed me as a visiting scholar and provided valuable feedback on my draft.
Disclosure statement
The author reports there are no competing interests to declare.
Notes
1 Markus G Schmidt, ‘Follow-up Procedures to Individual Complaints and Periodic State Reporting Mechanism’ Gudmundur Alfredsson and others (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (Martinus Nijhoff 2001), 201.
2 Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2013).
3 Gráinne de Búrca, Reframing Human Rights in a Turbulent Era (Oxford University Press 2021), 12.
4 Xinyuan Dai, ‘The “Compliance Gap” and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions’ in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (eds) (n 2) 95-96.
5 de Búrca (n 3) 186.
6 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law (Oxford University Press 2013). Among various other studies, the book The Power of Human Rights edited by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink delves into the factors that allow international human rights norms to bring about domestic political change and puts forth the ‘spiral model’. See Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press 1999). However, as pointed out by Goodman and Jinks, the book’s objective is not to present the design of mechanisms.
7 Damian Etone, ‘Theoretical Challenges to Understanding the Potential Impact of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism: Revisiting Theoretical Approaches to State Human Rights Compliance’ (2019) 18 Journal of Human Rights 36.
8 Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The (In)Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Treaty Body Recommendations’ (2015) 33 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 194, 215-221.
9 Ibid., 218-220; Consette D Creamer and Beth A Simmons, ‘The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review of Women’s Rights’ (2018) 81 Law and Contemporary Problems 31, 60-70.
10 Michael Lane, ‘The Universal Periodic Review: A Catalyst for Domestic Mobilisation’ (2022) 40 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 507.
11 For example, more than 70 shadow reports were submitted to the Human Rights Committee’s review of the seventh periodic report of Japan. See OHCHR, ‘CCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 136 Session (10 Oct 2022 – 04 Nov 2022)’ <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=2575&Lang=en> accessed 21 November 2023.
12 Krommendijk (n 8); Creamer and Simmons (n 9).
13 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 22.
14 Ibid., 24.
15 Ibid., 24-25.
16 Ibid., 26.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 27-28.
19 Ibid., 41-52.
20 Ibid., 28-32.
21 Membership sanctions refer to the revocation or suspension of rights and privileges for parties to a treaty. See Abram Chayes and Antonia H Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press 1995), 68-87.
22 This section is based on the following literature: Tadaatsu Mori, ‘The Current Practice of Making and Applying International Agreements in Japan’ in Curtis A Bradley (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford University Press 2019), 191-204; Hiromichi Matsuda, ‘International Law in Japanese Courts’ in ibid., 537-547.
23 Yuji Iwasawa, International Law, Human Rights, and Japanese Law: The Impact of International Law on Japanese Law (Oxford University Press 1998), 28-29.
24 Supreme Court, Judgment, 4 June 2008, 62 Minshu [Supreme Court Reports (civil cases)] 1367.
25 Supreme Court, Judgment, 4 September 2013, 67 Minshu [Supreme Court Reports (civil cases)] 1320.
26 Tamitomo Saito, ‘Tyakusyutsushi de nai ko no hōteisōzokubun o sadameru kokunaihōki no ikenkettei: kokusaihō no tachiba kara [Judgment on the Unconstitutionality of Inheritance Law for Children Born out of Wedlock: From the Perspective of International Law’ (2017) 20 Shin Hanrei Watch [Recent Jurisprudence Watch] 319, 320-321 (in Japanese).
27 Hajime Yamamoto, ‘Transnational to domestic no aida de yureru saikōsai [The Oscillation of the Supreme Court of Japan Between Transnational and Domestic Law]’ (2016) 1096 Hōritsu Jihō [Law Journal] 1, 3 (in Japanese).
28 Iwasawa (n 23) 294-298; Koji Teraya, ‘Japan: Implementation of International Human Rights by Japanese Courts’ in Stefan Kadelbach, Thilo Rensmann and Eva Rieter (eds), Judging International Human Rights: Courts of General Jurisdiction as Human Rights Courts (Springer 2019), 518-519.
29 Matsuda (n 22) 541.
30 Ibid., 541-542.
31 Ministry of Justice of Japan, ‘On the Current Number of Applicants in the Bar Exam in 2022’ (30 March 2022) <https://www.moj.go.jp/content/001363967.pdf> accessed 21 November 2023.
32 Teraya (n 28) 517-518.
33 In 1994, constitutional scholar Yokota explained that most Japanese constitutional textbooks set out to touch upon ‘international human rights’ but disregarded them in interpreting the provisions of human rights in the Constitution. Koichi Yokota, ‘Kokusai jinken to nihon koku kenpō: Kokusai jinken hōgaku to kenpōgaku no kakyō- [International Human Rights and the Japanese Constitution: Bridge Between International Human Rights Scholarship and Constitutional Scholarship]’ (1994) 5 Human Rights International 7 (in Japanese). According to Sogabe, this explanation remains valid. Masahiro Sogabe, ‘Jinkenhō toiu hassō [Idea of Human Rights Law]’ (2020) 482 Hōgaku kyōshitsu [Magazine for Law Students] 72 (in Japanese).
34 Japan, ‘Seventh Periodic Report Submitted by Japan’ (28 April 2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/JPN/7, para 3.
35 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Japan’ (3 November 2022) UN Doc CCPR/C/JPN/CO/7, para 4.
36 Masahiko Asada, ‘Jinken bun’ya ni okeru kokunai hōsei no kokusaika: hōteki keishikisyugi to minimalism no kokuhuku ni mukete [Internationalization of National Legislation in the Sphere of Human Rights: For Overcoming Legal Formalism and Minimalism]’ (2002) 1232 Jurist 79 (in Japanese).
37 Ibid., 81.
38 Iwasawa (n 23) 294-295.
39 For recent COBs, see CERD, ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Tenth to Eleventh Periodic Reports of Japan’ (26 September 2018) UN Doc CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11, paras 13-14.
40 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Japan’ (20 August 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6, para 12.
41 Ibid.
42 For the analysis of the effect of the incident on the social movement leading to the regulation of hate speech, see Ayako Hatano, ‘Can Strategic Human Rights Litigation Complement Social Movements? A Case Study of the Movement against Racism and Hate Speech in Japan’ in Myungkoo Kang and others (eds), Hate Speech in Asia and Europe: Beyond Hate and Fear (Routledge 2020), 152-190.
43 District Court of Kyoto, Judgment, 7 October 2013, reproduced in (2014) 2208 Hanrei Jiho [Law Cases Reports] 74.
44 Osaka High Court, Judgment, 8 July 2014, reproduced in (2014) 2232 Hanrei Jiho [Law Cases Reports] 34.
45 Takamatsu High Court, Judgment, 25 April 2016, available at Westlaw Japan (2016WLJPCA04256002).
46 On the political dynamics leading to the enactment of this Act, see Naoto Higuchi, ‘When Hate Becomes Illegal: Legislation Processes of the Anti-hate Speech Law in Japan’ in Kang and others (eds) (n 42) 112-126.
47 Hatano (n 42) 166.
48 (2016) 8 ‘Record of the Proceedings of the upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs’ 8.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 ‘Record of the Proceedings of the upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs’ (n 48) 2.
52 (2016) 10 ‘Record of the Proceedings of the upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs’ 26.
53 Ibid.
54 Ayako Hatano, ‘Hate Speech and International Law: The Internalization of International Human Rights in Japan’ in Shinji Higaki and Yuji Nasu (eds), Hate Speech in Japan: The Possibility of a Non-Regulatory Approach (Cambridge University Press 2021), 58-103.
55 Human Rights Committee (n 35) paras 12-13.
56 CEDAW, ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ Twenty-eighth Session (13-31 January 2003) and Twenty-ninth Session (30 June-18 July 2003), GAOR, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No 38 (A/58/38), paras 371-372; CEDAW, ‘Concluding Observations of the Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (7 August 2009) UN Doc CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6, paras 17-18; CEDAW, ‘Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Japan’ (10 March 2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/7-8, paras 12-13.
57 Ibid.
58 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 28’ (29 March 2000) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, para 25.
59 Human Rights Committee (n 40) para 8.
60 Ministry of Justice of Japan, ‘On the System to Allow Couples a Choice of Surnames’ <https://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji36.html> accessed 21 November 2023.
61 Supreme Court, Judgment, 16 December 2015, 69 (2016) Minshu [Supreme Court Reports (civil cases)] 2586.
62 Tachikawa Branch of Tokyo District Court, Judgment, 14 November 2019, reproduced in (2020) 2450-2450 Hanrei Jiho [Law Cases Reports] 85.
63 Supreme Court, Judgment, 23 June 2021, reproduced in (2022) 2501 Hanrei Jiho [Law Cases Reports] 3.
64 Dissenting Opinion of Judges Miyazaki and Uga, in ibid.
65 Human Rights Committee (n 35) para 15.
66 Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law, ‘Final Report: Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law’ (2016) 77 International Law Association Reports of Conferences 996, 1012.
67 Constitutional lawyers in Japan bluntly said, ‘human rights treaties and treaty bodies are thought as mysterious' and 'the self-identity of Japanese constitutional lawyers is a supporter of democracy in Japan and may contravene with the universality of human rights.’ ‘kenpōgaku to kokusaihōgaku tono taiwa ni mukete (kōhen) [Towards Dialogue Between Constitutional Law and International Law (Second Part)]’ (2015) 1090 Hōritsu Jihō [Law Journal] 65, 66-67 (in Japanese).
68 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 157.
69 Ibid., 114-115. See also Chayes and Chayes (n 21) 126.
70 Gerald L Neuman, ‘Giving Meaning and Effect to Human Rights: The Contributions of Human Rights Committee Members’ in Daniel Moeckli, Helen Keller and Corina Heri (eds), The Human Rights Covenants at 50: Their Past, Present, and Future (Oxford University Press 2018), 34.
71 Krommendijk (n 8) 203. Heyns and Viljoen argue that the lack of precision of the observations is a cause of lack of implementation. Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, ‘The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 483, 511.
72 Chayes and Chayes (n 21) 229-230.
73 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 127.
74 For example, Norway interacted with civil society in preparing its seventh periodic report. Norway, ‘Seventh Periodic Report of Norway’ (28 September 2017) UN Doc CCPR/C/NOR/7, para 3.
75 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 1995), 32-33.
76 Guzman also argues that the reputational consequences are most severe when the obligation is clear and the violation unambiguous. Andrew T Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1823, 1863.
77 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 117-118.
78 Ibid., 118-119.
79 Ibid.
80 Helen Keller and Leena Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and Their Legitimacy’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press 2012) 125, 142-148.
81 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, para 36.
82 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 36’ (3 September 2019) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, para 26.
83 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 130.
84 Chayes and Chayes (n 21) 230.
85 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 129-130.
86 Keller and Grover (n 80) 125.
87 UN, ‘UN Web TV’ <https://media.un.org/en/webtv> accessed 21 November 2023.
88 Cosette D Creamer and Beth A Simmons, ‘The Proof Is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights Treaties’ (2019) 114 American Journal of International Law 1, 24-25.
89 Ibid., 36-40; Krommendijk (n 8) 220.
90 Ministry of Justice of Japan (n 60).
91 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 136-165.
92 See counter-reports of civil society in Japan. Human Rights Now, ‘Submission by Human Rights Now to the UN Human Rights Committee in Advance of the Examination of the State Party Report for Japan at the 136th Session’ September 2022, 5-6.
93 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 164.
94 Natalie Alkiviadou, Jacob Mchangama and Raghav Mendiratta, Global Handbook on Hate Speech Laws (Justitia 2020).
95 United States of America, ‘Fifth Periodic Report Submitted by the United States of America’ (11 November 2021) UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/5, para 99; National Human Rights Commission of Korea ‘Report on Hate Speech’ (October 2019), 40-41.
96 Stefan Kadelbach, ‘The Human Rights Committee - Challenges and Prospects for Enhanced Effectiveness and Integration: A Comment’ (2022) 14 Journal of Human Rights Practice 44, 47.
97 Goodman and Jinks (n 6) 88.
98 Guzman (n 76) 1862.
99 This is due to a word limit set by a UNGA resolution which intended to rationalize treaty bodies’ work. UNGA, ‘Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System’ (21 April 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/268, para. 4.
100 Human Rights Committee, ‘Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee’ (4 January 2021) UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.12, Rule 70(2). For example, 16 States whose initial report is overdue were named in 2019. Human Rights Committee ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee’ 123rd session (2-27 July 2018), 124th session (8 October-2 November 2018), 125th session (4-29 March 2019), GAOR, Seventy-fourth Session Supplement No 40 (A/74/40), 16-17.
101 International Labour Conference, ‘Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards’ ILC.110/Record No. 4A/P.I, para 217.
102 Human Rights Council, ‘United Nations Human Rights Council: Institution-building’ (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, Annex, para 3(f).
103 Anja Seibert-Fohr and Christine Weniger, ‘Compliance Monitoring under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ in Rainer Grote, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi and Davide Paris (eds), Research Handbook on Compliance in International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar 2021), 446.
104 Kaoru Obata, ‘Overview of a Half-century of International Covenants on Human Rights: Inter-state Cooperation as the Original Infrastructure and Autonomous Institutionalization’ (2016) 59 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 1, 12.
105 Heather Collister, ‘Rituals and Implementation in the Universal Periodic Review and the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (Cambridge University Press 2014), 111.
106 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Russian Federation’ (8 July 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/24/14, para 141.
107 Human Rights Council (n 102), para 32.
108 Eric Tistounet, The UN Human Rights Council: A Practical Anatomy (Edward Elgar 2020), 11.
109 UNGA, ‘Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights’ (13 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/280, Annex, para 23.
110 UNGA, ‘Report of the Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies on Their Twenty-sixth Meeting’ (11 August 2014) UN Doc A/69/285, para 73.
111 Olivier de Frouville, ‘Building a Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights: The Way Forward’ in M Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia 2011) 254.
112 Ibid., 264.
113 Nigel S Rodley, ‘UN Treaty Bodies and the Human Rights Council’ in Keller and Ulfstein (eds) (n 80) 330.
114 International Service for Human Rights ‘UN Treaty Body Strengthening: What Strategy Ahead of the 2020 Review’ (September 2017) <https://ishr.ch/sites/default/files/files/ISHR_TB_Report_A4_Eng6-change-%20w%20comments%20(1)(1).pdf> accessed 21 November 2023, paras 29-30.
115 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Japan’ (4 January 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/15, paras 161.128, 161.150, 161.151.
116 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Japan’ (30 May 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/44, para 60(4); Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Japan’ (14 December 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/22/14, para 147.42; Human Rights Council (n 115), para 161.58.
117 Human Rights Council (n 116), UN Doc A/HRC/22/14, para 147.37. It is also to be noted that Japan ‘partially accept[ed] to follow up’ the recommendation. Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – Japan – Addendum: Views on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Voluntary Commitments and Replies Presented by the State Under Review’ (8 March 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/14/Add.1, 4.
118 (2016) 16 ‘Record of the Proceedings of the upper House Committee on Judicial Affairs’ 14. Emphasis is added by the author.
119 The Government of Japan, ‘Mid-term Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the Recommendations Issued at the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review’ (January 2017) <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000225031.pdf> accessed 21 November 2023, 10.
120 The Government of Japan, ‘Third UPR Review of Japan, Statement by Government Representative Okamura’ (14 November 2017), <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000308016.pdf> accessed 21 November 2023, 4.
121 (2008) 5 ‘Record of the Proceedings of the upper House Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems’ 3.
122 Valentina Carraro, ‘The United Nations Treaty Bodies and Universal Periodic Review: Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization?’ (2017) 39 Human Rights Quarterly 943, 968.
123 David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein, ‘The Human Rights Committee: Monitoring States Parties Reports’ (2015) 45 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 133, 143.
124 UNGA, ‘Report on the Process of the Consideration of the State of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System’ (17 November 2020) UN Doc A/75/601, paras 43, 46.
125 Valentina Carraro, ‘The More The Better? The Complementarity of United Nations Institutions in the Fight Against Torture’ (2022) 40 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 354, 374.