The Czech Republic: Human Rights Defender, Yet No R2P Champion

ABSTRACT

The Czech Republic has a strong tradition of promoting human rights; starting in the 1990s it established itself as an active human rights defender, particularly in relation to priority countries such as North Korea, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, and Cuba. Human rights and their advancement are significant focal points in Czech foreign policy, both bilaterally and within multilateral organizations like the UN Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe with its Venice Commission. It is therefore interesting to examine the Czech position towards the responsibility to protect (R2P) and whether relevant policymakers actively promote R2P norms. Does the Czech Republic rank among R2P champions, which include small states like Costa Rica, Ghana, Rwanda, Denmark, and Slovenia? While the R2P concept may be considered a complement to traditional human rights norms, I argue that a narrow and selective human rights agenda clearly takes precedence among the Czech political elites. This was evident in the Czech response to the crisis in Myanmar. In 2017, despite international calls for a stronger response to the ongoing genocidal violence against the Rohingya, Czech foreign policy focused on the positive prospects of the democratization process and its policy of human rights promotion.

KEYWORDS:

• R2P
• human rights
• democratization
• Czech Republic
• Myanmar

Notes

2 Godfrey Baldacchino, 'Mainstreaming the study of small states and territories' [2018] 1(1) Small States and Territories <https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/bitstream/123456789/33138/1/Mainstreaming_the_study_of_small_states_and_territories.pdf> accessed 20 June 2022; Annika Björkdahl, ‘Ideas and Norms in Swedish Peace Policy’ [2013] 19(3) Swiss Political Science Review <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12046> accessed 27 June 2022.

3 For a review of the debate on R2P as a norm see Jennifer M. Welsh. ‘Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect’ [2019] 4 (1) Journal of Global Security Studies <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy045> accessed 8 January 2023.

4 See e.g. Hardeep S. Puri, ‘Human rights, mass atrocity prevention and the United Nations Security Council: The long road ahead’ [2017], UN Chronicle, 53:4, pp. 28–31; David Karp, ‘The responsibility to protect human rights and the RtoP: Prospective and retrospective responsibility’[2015] 7 (2), Global Responsibility to Protect, pp. 142–166; Kirsten Ainley, ‘From atrocity crimes to human rights: Expanding the focus of the Responsibility to Protect’ [2017] Global Responsibility to Protect, 9 (3), pp. 243–266; Hugh Breakey, ‘Protection norms and human rights: A rights-based analysis of the Responsibility to Protect and the protection of civilians in armed conflict’ [2012] 4 (3), Global Responsibility to Protect, pp. 309–33.

5 See e.g. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm - and Action’, [2009] 1 (1) Global Responsibility to Protect: 22-53; Charles T. Hunt, Cecilia Jacob and Adrian Gallagher, 'Progress, Problems, and Prospects: R2P 15 Years after the World Summit' [2020] 12 (4) Global Responsibility to Protect <https://doi.org/10.1163/1875-984X-01204002>, accessed 5 January 2023; Cristina G. Stefan, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Locating Norm Entrepreneurship' [2021] 35 (2) Ethics & International Affairs <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000216>, accessed 10 January 2023; Martin Mennecke ‘Denmark and the Implementation of R2P’. In Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, edited by Jacob Cecilia and Martin Mennecke, 37–60 (Oxon, New York: Routledge 2019); Jason Ralph, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the rise of China: lessons from Australia’s role as a ‘pragmatic’ norm entrepreneur’, [2017] 17 (1) International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irasia/lcw002>

6 See e.g. Patrick Quinton-Brown,. ‘Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and Its State Critics’, [2013] 5 (3) Global Responsibility to Protect <https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00503003>; Alan.Bloomfield, ‘Resisting the responsibility to protect’ [2016] in Norm Antipreneurs and the Politics of Resistance to Global Normative Change. New York: Routledge: 34-52;Jonas Claes,. ‘Protecting civilians from mass atrocities: Meeting the challenge of R2P rejectionism’ [2012] 4 (1) Global Responsibility to Protect <.https://doi.org/10.1163/187598412X619685; Phil Orchard, et al. ‘Russia and the R2P: Norm Entrepreneur, Anti-preneur, or Violator?’[2020] in Constructing the Responsibility to Protect, London: Routledge.

7 See e.g. Karen Smith, ‘South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: from champion to sceptic' [2016] 30(3) International Relations < https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659596>.

8 Annika Björkdahl, From Idea to Norm: Promoting Conflict Prevention (Lund: Lund University, 2002), 44-45.

9 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction', in T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds.) The power of human rights, international change and domestic change, pp. 1-38. New York: NS: Cambridge University Press, p. 5.

10 For a similar argument made in the context of EU's response to Myanmar see Eglantine Staunton and James Ralph,'The Responsibility to Protect norm cluster and the challenge of atrocity prevention: an analysis of the European Union’s strategy in Myanmar' [2020] 26 (3) European Journal of International Relations <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066119883001>.

11 See Simon Adams, ‘“If Not Now, When?”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights.' [2019] The Responsibility to Protect, the Fate of the Rohingya, and the Future of Human Rights. Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3319491>.

12 Cass Sunstein 'Social norms and social roles' [1996] 96 (4) Columbia Law Review <https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12456&context=journal_articles> Accessed 10 January 2023.

13 For a great and exhaustive review of existing debates on norm entrepreneurs see Carmen Wunderlich, Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs (Springer 2020).

14 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, Human Rights as Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009).

15 For an excellent overview of the key works in this discipline see Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, Small States in International Relations (University of Washington Press 2006) or Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel, 'Small states: concepts and theories' in Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel (eds.) Handbook on the Politics of Small States (Edward Elgar Publishing 2020).

16 Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 2003). See also Christine Ingebritsen, The Nordic States and European Unity (Cornell University Press 1998).

17 Jeffrey Checkel, 'The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory', [1998] 50(2) World Politics <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/constructive-turn-in-international-relations-theory/C8A438E2167D32A8B0917C3BE9D212C6> accessed 15 June 2022.

18 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics' [1992] 46(2) International Organization <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858> accessed 27 June 2022.

19 Baldur Thorhallsson, 'The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives' [2006] 28(1) Journal of European Integration <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07036330500480490> accessed 26 June 2022.

20 Douglas Brommesson, ‘“Nordicness” in Swedish foreign policy – from mid power internationalism to small state balancing?' [2018] 4(4-5) Global Affairs <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1516116> accessed 15 June 2022.

21 Anders Wivel, 'Forerunner, follower, exceptionalist or bridge builder? Mapping Nordicness in Danish foreign policy' [2018] 4(4-5) Global Affairs <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1557016> accessed 18 June 2022.

22 Baldur Thorhallsson, 'Nordicness as a shelter: the case of Iceland', [2018] 4(4-5) Global Affairs <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2018.1522507> accessed 18 June 2022.

23 Björkdahl (n.1), 324.

24 William C. Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira and Iver B. Neumann, 'Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking', [2018] 44 (3) Review of International Studies <https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2477311/Wohlforth%2Bet%2Bal%2B2017.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 20 June 2022.

25 See Liisi Adamson, 'Let Them Roar: Small States as Cyber Norm Entrepreneurs', [2019] 24(2) European Foreign Affairs Review <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/24.2/EERR2019014> accessed 20 June 2022.

26 Jack Corbett, Yi-chong Xu and Patrick Weller, 'Norm entrepreneurship and diffusion ‘from below’ in international organisations: How the competent performance of vulnerability generates benefits for small states', [2019] 45(4) Review of International Studies <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/abs/norm-entrepreneurship-and-diffusion-from-below-in-international-organisations-how-the-competent-performance-of-vulnerability-generates-benefits-for-small-states/B0CA4F13381D15244AB195C138D82C63>, accessed 27 July 2022. Scobie has studied Caribbean SIDS and their contribution to environmental global governance norms, in particular good governance based on accountability. See Michelle Scobie, 'Accountability in climate change governance and Caribbean SIDS', [2018] 20, Environment, Development and Sustainability <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-017-9909-9>, accessed 28 July 2022.

27 Payne reminds us of many empirical examples of small-state representatives whose advocacy on behalf of marginalized people has fallen on deaf ears and achieved very little—including, for instance, the failed diplomatic efforts of President Gayoom of the Maldives during the 1992 UN Earth Summit, or small West African states during the Doha round of WTO negotiations in 2008. See Anthony Payne, 'Afterword: Vulnerability as a Condition, Resilience as a Strategy' in Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.) Diplomacies of Small States (Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 280.

28 Cristina G. Stefan, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Locating Norm Entrepreneurship' [2021] 35 (2) Ethics & International Affairs <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000216>, accessed 10 January 2023.

29 Peyne argues that it was the shift in the perception of political elites in Iceland in the 1990s that allowed the state to become more self-confident in international politics and pursue an activist diplomacy. See Payne (n 12).

30 For more detailed discussion of the concept see Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect. The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press 2009); or Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution Press 2008).

31 United Nations General Assembly. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN doc. A/Res/60/1, September 16, 2005 <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf>, accessed 27 June 2022.

32 For further conceptualization and implementation of the R2P, see the reports of the UN Secretary General, especially Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect [2009] A/63/677; Report of the Secretary-General on Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect [2010] A/64/864; Report of the Secretary-General on The Responsibility To Protect: Timely and Decisive Response [2012] A/66/874-S/2012/578; Report of the Secretary-General on The Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention [2013] A/67/929-S/2013/399, Report of the Secretary-General on A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect [2015] A/69/981-S/2015/500.

33 There is also significant overlap with international criminal law, particularly with regards to accountability and the definition of the crimes themselves.

34 Jennifer Welsh, 'Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect', [2019] 4(1) Journal of Global Security Studies <https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/1/53/5347912>, accessed 10 August 2022.

35 Samuel Jarvis, 'The R2P and atrocity prevention: Contesting human rights as a threat to international peace and security', [2022] European Journal of International Security, online first <doi:10.1017/eis.2022.23> accessed 2 September 2022. See also Ekkehard Strauss, 'Linking human rights accountability and compliance with R2P implementation', in Cecilia Jacob and Martin Mennecke (eds.) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: A Future Agenda (Routledge 2019). See also The UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 'Key Documents' <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/key-documents.shtml> accessed 8 October 2022; and in particular the Report of the Secretary-General on The Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention [2013] A/67/929-S/2013/399, para 50.

36 Elisabeth Pramendorfer, 'The Role of the Human Rights Council in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', [2019] 12 (3) Global Responsibility to Protect <https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/12/3/article-p239_239.xml?ebody=abstract%2Fexcerpt>, accessed 10 September 2022.

37 Samuel Jarvis, 'The R2P and atrocity prevention: Contesting human rights as a threat to international peace and security', [2022] European Journal of International Security, online first <doi:10.1017/eis.2022.23> accessed 2 September 2022.

38 According to the Global Center for R2P (GCR2P), an 'R2P Focal Point is a senior official within a government who facilitates national mechanisms for atrocity prevention and promotes international cooperation by participating in the Global Network', for more information see GCR2P, 'Global Network of R2P Focal Points' <https://www.globalr2p.org/the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/> accessed 10 October 2022.

39 The Group of Friends serves as an informal platform for Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva to promote dialogue and encourage UN member states to advance R2P. For more information see GCR2P, 'Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect' <https://www.globalr2p.org/group-of-friends-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/> accessed 10 October 2022.

40 For a detailed study of Denmark's contribution to R2P implementation see Martin Mennecke, 'Denmark and the implementation of R2P', in Cecilia Jacob and Martin Mennecke (eds.) Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: A Future Agenda (Routledge 2019).

41 Based on a personal interview with a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted via Zoom, 14 September 2022.

42 See e.g. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 'The Responsibility to Protect' [2001].

43 Havel was a leading representative of the dissent movement, respected moral philosopher and visionary politician. Back in 1999, he supported the NATO intervention in Kosovo and argued it was an example of a just war based on a moral objective to protect Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing.

44 Statement at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly by H.E. Mr. Karel Schwarzenberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, New York, September 27, 2008.

45 Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. Mr. Martin Palouš on the Protection of Civilians at the United Nations Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 14 January 2009.

46 See for instance Doktrína R2P má předcházet zločinům proti lidskosti. OSN je rozpolcená v tom, kdy a jak ji uplatňovat [The R2P Doctrine should prevent crimes against humanity. The UN is devided on when and how it should be implemented], Lidové noviny, 4 August 2009, online: https://www.lidovky.cz/domov/jak-zabranit-genocide-resi-osn.A090804_000030_ln_noviny_sko?klic=232747&mes=090804_0.

47 Odpovědnost za ochranu aneb Bude svět schopen zabránit dalším genocidám? [Responsbility to Protect - Will the world be able to prevent other genocides?], Conference organized by the Institute of International Relations, Prague and the UN Information Center, Prague, 25 November 2008.

48 Charter 77 was a civil society initiative signed in 1977 by opponents of the Communist regime in the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

49 Lidská práva, mé téma z Charty [Human Rights, my topic from the Charter], Lidové noviny, 8 January 2007.

50 Based on a personal interview with a senior official at the MFA, conducted via Zoom on 10 September 2022.

51 See Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenge of North Korea, DLA Piper LLP, December 2008 (Commissioned by Former Czech Republic President Václav Havel, Elie Wiesel, and former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik).

52 In 2008 it was followed by an updated report, see Failure to Protect: A Call to the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea, DLA Piper LLP, October 2006 (Commissioned by Former Czech Republic President Václav Havel, Elie Wiesel, and former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik and Committee on Human Rights in North Korea).

53 For the discussion, see Jennifer Welsh, 'Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect', [2019] 4(1) Journal of Global Security Studies <https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/1/53/5347912>, accessed 10 August 2022; Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marco Tourinho, 'The Impact of the Libyan Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection', [2016] 30(1) Global Society <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029>, accessed 16 September 2022.

54 Based on personal interviews with three senior officials at the MFA, conducted via Zoom and phone calls on 15 May, 10 September, and 26 September 2022.

55 See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General on The Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention [2013] A/67/929-S/2013/399; and Report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention [2016] A/71/1016-S/2017/556.

56 See David Chandler, 'The R2P Is Dead, Long Live the R2P: The Successful Separation of Military Intervention from the Responsibility to Protect', [2015] 22(1) International Peacekeeping <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2014.992572>, accessed 13 September 2022.

57 Based on a personal interview with a senior official at the MFA conducted via phone, 15 May 2022.

58 Based on interviews with senior officials at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were responsible for the R2P, human rights, and UN agenda (conducted in May 2022 and September 2022 via phone calls and Zoom).

59 See Petr Válek, 'Legality versus Legitimacy and the Use of Force', in Russell Miller and Rebecca Bratspies (eds.), Progress in International Law (Brill 2008).

60 Ministerstvo zahraničí ČR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic], Informační materiál o pojmu a obsahu koncepce Odpovědnosti za ochranu [Information material about the term and content of the Responsibility to Protect concept], 2014.

61 Based on personal interview via phone conducted in September 2022.

62 Conception of Human Rights Promotion and Transition Politics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, September 2015.

63 See e.g. Nové pojetí lidských práv à la ministerstvo zahraničí [New approach to human rights according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs] by Katerina Safarikova, Lidové noviny, 17 October 2014.

64 Conception of Human Rights Promotion, 2015, p. 4.

65 Between 2006 and 2019, the Czech Republic was the main sponsor of 98 resolutions (e.g. on the Equal participation in political and public affairs) and co-sponsor of 429 resolutions.

66 See e.g 'The Czech Republic takes steering role at the Council', The Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva, 1 January 2014; or 'Active, visible and principled – the Czech Republic concludes its HRC membership', The Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva, 8 January 2015, online: https://www.mzv.cz/mission.geneva/en/human_rights/human_rights_council/active_visible_and_principled_the_czech.html.

67 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic addressed the Human Rights Council, The Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva, 5 March 2014, online: https://www.mzv.cz/mission.geneva/en/human_rights/human_-rights_council/minister_of_foreign_affairs_of_the_czech.html.

68 For more information see Universal Periodic Review, The Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations at Geneva, online: https://www.mzv.cz/mission.geneva/en/human_rights/universal_periodic_review/index.html

69 Based on a personal interview conducted via phone in May 2022.

70 Forum 2000 Opening Ceremony with Aung San Suu Kyi, Forum 2000, 15 September 2013, recording of the keynote speech available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MhaT82MdLo&ab_channel=Forum2000, accessed 10 August 2022.

71 'Myanmar - Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic on the Detention of Aung San Suu Kyi', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 5 June 2003, online: https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/issues_and_press/archive/statements/x2003/x2003_06_05_myanmar_statement_of_the_ministry_of.html.

72 Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group on the Situation in Burma/Myanmar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 26 October 2007.

73 For the full program of the event see 'Burma Alert: Action Needed Now', Public Seminar in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, November 6, 2007 online: https://euroburmaoffice.s3.amazonaws.com/filer_public/ea/ec/eaec514c-9055-4437-9f10-281232255886/pragueprogramme.pdf

74 Statement of the MFA on the General Elections in Myanmar/Burma, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 11 November 2015.

75 For the complete overview of projects financed from the Transition Programme see 'Barma' in Projekty transformační spolupráce ['Burma' in Projects in Transition Promotion Programme], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, online: https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/zahranicni_vztahy/lidska_prava/prioritni_zeme_a_projekty_transformacni/barma/index.html

76 Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on the situation in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, UN News, 29 November 2016.

77 Myanmar: “My world is finished”. Rohingya targeted in crimes against humanity in Myanmar, Amnesty International, 18 October 2017.

78 Opening Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council 36th session, 11 September 2017.

79 See e.g. Miroslav Nozina, Mynamar - Podoby ethnického konfliktu [Myanmar - the forms of ethnic conflict], 2015 Mezinarodni politika <https://www.iir.cz/myanmar-podoby-etnickeho-konfliktu> accessed 12 September 2022.

80 Intervention by the Czech Republic during the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council, Interactive Dialogue with the Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, Mr. Marzuki Darusman, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy and Mr. Christopher Dominic Sidoti, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 21 September 2017.

81 Czechia condemns the military coup in Myanmar, Tweet by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 1 February 2021 <https://twitter.com/mzvcr/status/1356166197033766912>, accessed 17 September 2022.

82 The statement was signed by the ambassadors, chargés d´affaires, and heads of mission from Australia, Canada, the Delegation of the EU, and European Union member states with presence in Myanmar: Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, as well as New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Joint Statement on Attacks on Civilians in Karen State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 24 December 2021.

83 See e.g. Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Human Rights Council, 46th Session, 22nd February 2021; Statement of the Czech Republic, 46th Session of the Human Rights Council, Item 4 - Interactive Dialogue with Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 11 March 2021.

84 Statement of the Czech Republic, 47th Session of the Human Rights Council, Item 4 - Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 6/7 July 2021.

85 Statement by the Czech Republic, 48th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Item 4 - Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, 22nd September 2021.

86 Czech Republic elected to the Human Rights Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 10 May 2022.

87 Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Jan Lipavsky, 49th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 1 March 2022.

88 Statement by the Czech Republic, 51st session of the Human Rights Council, Item 4 – General Debate, 26 September 2022.