Sport policy reforms in Chile: the tension between ‘doers’ and ‘thinkers’

ABSTRACT

This study considers the reforms of Chile’s state sport structures from 2001 to 2022. Drawing upon institutional frameworks, the purpose of this article is to analyse the emerging rules, practices and narratives from these reforms. This study employed a qualitative approach, with data gathered from document analysis and semi-structured interviews with six policymakers/bureaucrats from the Ministry of Sport (MINDEP) and National Institute of Sport (IND). Data was analysed through thematic coding of available texts (e.g. policies, government documentation, media sources and interview transcripts) via MAXQDA 2022 qualitative analysis software. The findings highlight that incommensurate rules, practices and narratives may be the impetus for institutional change. Rules connected with New Public Management (NPM) and the creation of the National Institute of Sport (Law 19.712 of 2001) conflicted with the discretionary practices of previous institutional arrangements. Subsequent legislation created a (rule-based) dichotomy between ‘thinkers’ (MINDEP) and ‘doers’ (IND), which has been influenced by the practice of politically based appointments into the IND. While informants suggested that the system’s parochialism and incapacity render change unlikely in the future, there is nevertheless evidence of change emanating from the combination of broken rules (in the form of scandals), incommensurate practices and contemporary narratives about the need to engage with communities.

KEYWORDS:

• Sport policy
• institutional reform
• Chile
• new public management
• governance

Introduction

State sport institutions can influence the policy process and the behaviour of public officials (Bergsgard et al. 2007, Grix 2010, Bravo and Silva 2014, Pliscoff-Varas 2017). As such, there has been a growing interest in examining changes within state sport structures and their broader impact on civil servants’ lived experiences (Numerato 2009) and sport policy processes (Wilson 1994, Pickup 1996, Skille 2009, Geeraert 2023). For example, Houlihan and Green (2009) concluded that the modernisation reforms implemented in Sport England and UK Sport resulted in narrowed objectives and oversimplification of the sport policy field. Similarly, examining Czech regional public sport policies, Numerato (2009) noted that sport policy changes were constrained by structural arrangements, the networks between actors and a strict adherence to rules amongst public officials. In the case of Chile, Bravo and Silva (2014) noted that past changes to the sport institutional arrangements affected how policy was funded, promoted and delivered by the public sector. These approaches to micro and macro aspects of sport institutional life, open new doors to understand sport policy making and their consequences.

In a recent review, Grix et al. (2018) maintain that researchers should continue to fuse concepts from policy and organisational domains to expand the scope of institutional and organisational approaches around sport. As an example of this fusion, Fahlén and Stenling (2019) build upon constructivist and incrementalist concepts to identify the interrelated ‘seeds’ of institutional change within Swedish sports clubs. This work captures key advances around institutional theory, particularly as it regards the mutually constitutive nature of actors and decision processes. Notably, Fahlén and Stenling’s (2019) advice for understanding the interrelated nature of institutional change lies in investigating organisations with ‘reciprocal relationships’ (p. 281), because ‘the talk, text, and actions of one organization are the institutional context of another organization’ (p. 281).

In this light, Chile’s state sport regime can provide useful insights because it has, in the last few decades, become subject to a new institutional order, characterised by the replacement of ‘old’ agencies and the establishment of new ones. In 2013, President Sebastián Piñera promulgated Law 20.686 to create the country’s first Ministry of Sport (MINDEP). At its inception, Cecilia Pérez (General Secretariat Minister) promised that these reforms would mark the beginning of a new era for Chilean sport (UPI 2013, Aug 19). Currently, the Ministry of Sport (MINDEP) and the National Institute of Sport (IND) are the central government agencies that (respectively) steer the policy course and execute the state’s diverse national sport programmes. While MINDEP is the political arm of the government in relation to sport, the IND’s mandate is to allocate resources and implement MINDEP’s initiatives (BCN 2023). This ‘politics-administration’ dichotomy has been advanced by reformers elsewhere as a design to ensure accountability, under the belief that elected officials (e.g. Government Ministers) should set policy and neutral bureaucrats should carry it out (Poocharoen 2012). Whether this differentiation is desirable (or even possible) remains a persistent question of political administrative theory and one we cannot hope to address here. However, in the context of Chile’s contemporary state sport structures, it is this kind of entanglement that shapes policy processes and the behaviour of agents (González‐Bustamante 2020).

In this regard, institutional approaches are attuned to uncovering: 1) the taken-for-granted accounts underpinning policy making (Heclo 2008, 2) the shared values and meaning between members of the institution (see also Peters 2012, p. 19); and 3) the relationship and interaction between micro (agency) and macro (institutional) aspects of policy-making (March and Olsen 1989). Institutions are thus important to understand because ‘they embed historical experience into rules, routines, and forms that persist beyond the historical moment and condition’ (March and Olsen 1989, p. 167). Adopting a similar outlook, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) posit that political institutions comprise the interaction or ‘melding’ of practices, rules and narratives, and as such, institutions are never complete but rather a constant work in progress. This study thus seeks to trace the historical and contemporary basis for such institutional incompleteness and continuing work.

Purpose

The purpose of this article is twofold. The first aim is to offer a contemporary analysis of Chile’s national-level sport policy structures between 2001 and 2022. There have been a number of reforms since Bravo and Silva’s (2014) review of Chilean sport policy and it is important to contextualise these changes alongside the advancement of New Public Management (NPM) and national efforts to modernise the public sector. Our second related aim is to investigate the effects of state reforms from the perspectives of policy-making officials. Drawing from Lowndes and Roberts (2013) framework of institutional constraints, we ask: What have been the interrelated rules, practices and narratives within the reforms? How have these reform rules, practices and narratives converged or diverged and with what effects? What has been the legacy of these reforms? As Lowndes and Roberts (2013) point out, trying to ‘reconstruct’ how these rules, practices and narratives combine, can help to explain not only why change occurs when these do not ‘align’ but also how gaps and fissures can lead (or not) to institutional change. To answer these questions, the study draws from qualitative data collected through documents and semi-structured interviews with former and current officials of the Ministry of Sport (MINDEP) and National Institute of Sport (IND).

The study’s significance relates to the advancement of political institutional analysis in relation to sport and particularly with respect to middle-income state sport systems like Chile’s. Indeed, the relevance of institutions is not just important for understanding of Chilean sport policy, but to any research that seeks a ‘deep’ analytical approach to explain why and how sport systems develop. For example, from a neo-institutional perspective, Strittmatter (2016) explored the Lillehammer Youth Olympic Games and discovered that hosting the games entailed the presence of strong practices and narratives that together, served as a legitimising force to justify the event bid. In Chile, it is plausible that programmes and initiatives such as the Escuelas Deportivas Integrales/Crecer en Movimiento (Integral Sporting Schools/Grow with Movement) or hosting Sport Mega Events (SMEs) have a similar origin: an institutionally derived ‘need’ to support external political interests, rather than a need to develop internal, bureaucratic planning practices. In a similar way, Lehtonen (2017) explored the Finnish reforms of sport organisations that sought to replace their decentralised structures. This study found that instead of acting towards the benefit of their members, sport organisations responded according to the influence of political actors such as government ministers, who pursued their own ideological agenda (via narratives) and aimed to influence policy, funding decisions and political statements (through rules and practices). In other words, sport organisations in Finland were subject to a confluence of institutional constraints that ultimately shaped both policy outcomes and individual behaviour. In this way, the challenge for contemporary sport institutional approaches is to connect the complex interactions between actors and structures, the power relationships entangled therein and the lived experiences that emerge from the policy-making process (Numerato 2009, Stenling and Fahlén 2021).

Theoretical framework

In general terms, institutional theory is concerned with how social choices are shaped, mediated and channelled by an institutional environment, consisting of programme or rule systems (Wooten 2017). Hence, institutions are understood as the ‘collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations’ (March and Olsen 1989, p. 160). Adopting a similar perspective, Lowndes and Roberts (2013) typology of institutional constraints, explains how individual behaviour vis a vis formal structures, rules and narratives may facilitate or constrain the prospects of institutional change (Peters 2012).

Rules: formal and written

In Lowndes and Roberts (2013) typology, rules are the formal and written standards or clauses that restrict what agents can or cannot do. For instance, a government’s budgetary process operates as a set of rules insofar as it determines the procedures that agents have to follow, and how expenditures can be justified. Rules thus prescribe the appropriate course of action (e.g. follow procedures), tell actors where to look (e.g. strategic plans), who to report to (i.e. authorities or head of departments), and most importantly, how to make sense of the traditional way of doing things (i.e. meeting outputs) (see also March and Olsen 2011). As such, exploring how ‘rules in use’ (Ostrom 2007, 2011) determine agents’ behaviour and decision-making and/or the degree to which rules are followed and executed (Olsen 2006) can illuminate the trajectory of institutional change.

Practices: informal and demonstrated

Practices are the actions and patterns of behaviour that help crystallise the institution (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Practices are ‘demonstrated through conduct … and signal to actors what behaviours are approved or disapproved of in a particular setting’ (Blanco et al. 2022). Such obligations can be either positive (e.g. being transparent) or negative (e.g. engaging clientelism) (March and Olsen 1989, Lowndes and Roberts 2013), but all contribute to the continuation or disruption of the institution.

In this regard, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) note that since Chile’s transition to democracy, presidents have enjoyed substantial informal arrangements and power-sharing practices.¹ Importantly, these political practices can (mis)match formal legal prescriptions (Olsen 2006, Lowndes and Roberts 2013) and, like formal rule-like measures, skew the direction of the policy process and influence policy-makers’ decisions. In this way, practices are the demonstrative by-product of institutional routines (Lowndes and Roberts 2013), and might, for the purpose of this research, help to contextualise and explore Chile’s state sport system.

Narratives: semi-formal and spoken

Alongside rules and practices, institutional narratives or stories are the spoken scripts that symbolically give meaning to behaviour. Narratives are key in organising, processing and conveying information, as well as agents’ beliefs, actions and how they give meaning to social life (Jones and McBeth 2010). The reason for this is that narratives are emotionally bounded (Kleres 2011) through policymakers and bureaucrats lived experiences affecting both the policymaking process (Cairney 2016) and the prospects of institutional change. Hence, as Lowndes and Roberts (2013) point out, narratives not only condition how to do things but also provide the why or the justification for action, which can directly affect the rules in place. Storylines, for example, connecting national identity/pride with mega-events, might be used to justify government actions and spending (Jones and McBeth 2010, Lowndes and Roberts 2013, Bravo et al. 2018). Yet narratives are not only the ‘grand’ conceptions legitimising policy; they are also the foundations of the public administration environment. Thus, while wider narratives are in circulation, so too are smaller such stories around the need for ‘best practices’, efficiency, or risk avoidance.

Theoretical limitations and critiques

Institutional theory is not immune to concerns and critiques (see Alvesson and Spicer 2019). For instance, Houlihan (2005) highlights that while institutional theory is valuable in connecting actors’ behaviour with the structures they operate within, it falls short when it comes to explaining policy dynamics and change. Similarly, Schmidt (2015) points out that institutional theory tends to be overly deterministic, lacking in microfoundational explanations, and unable to adequately account for meaningful change. In other words, critics argue that institutional theory often portrays actors as mere products of their cultural surroundings (Robertson et al., 2021).

It is for this reason that Lowndes and Roberts’s (2013) theory of institutional change was adopted. It acknowledges these criticisms and provides insights into institutional change, agent behaviour, and the internal and external forces that shape institutions. The theory does so via the integration (or melding) of rules, practices, and narratives (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). As such, this study can help to elucidate important aspects that shape and constrain Chilean sport policy.

Context

The Chilean state has variously used sport as a tool to prepare for war (see Marín 2007, Bravo et al. 2013), to pursue educational goals (Bravo et al. 2013), or to achieve economic and social objectives through mega events (Bravo et al. 2018). However, Augusto Pinochet’s coup d’état in 1973 and the impact that the return of democracy had over sport are significant milestones. As Cejudo (2015) points out, the Pinochet dictatorship embarked on a long-standing attack on the public sector which led to an inefficient, demoralised and underpaid administration. With respect to sport, it was not until democracy was restored in 1990, and under the presidency of Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) that sport reforms began (Bravo and Silva 2014). The subsequent period (1990–2000) could be characterised as ‘preparing Chile for modernity’ (see also Pliscoff 2009, p. 74) with many interventions aimed at fighting corruption and the misuse of resources, improving public services, and reorganising state institutions (Cejudo 2015). Lago’s administration continued with New Public Management (NPM) reforms first introduced in the mid-1990s with the intention to modernise and professionalise the state’s public administration and operations (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, Pliscoff-Varas 2017, Pliscoff 2021). According to Pliscoff-Varas (2017), the Chilean public administration saw notable milestones: 1) the installation of a system to assess and control management in 2001, 2) and a System of High Public Management in 2003, which together aimed to reinforce the role of public managers and the pursuit of explicit performance measurement and control (see also Egaña and Pliscoff 2020).

In line with these NPM reforms and the modernisation of the public sector, the government passed Law 19.712 in 2001. The new legislation created the National Institute of Sport (IND) and thus further removed some of the institutional legacies of the dictatorship such as the General Directorate Sport and Recreation (DIGEDER) that resided within the Ministry of Defence. This law was passed in an attempt to lift sport from its ‘abandonment’ and ‘create the conditions for stronger relations between the public sector and the interested parties’ (Bravo and Silva 2014, p. 133).

In the decade since the creation of the Ministry of Sport (2013), there is evidence of both continuity and change. In terms of continuity, programmes to promote sport and physical activity in schools, such as Escuelas Deportivas Integrales/Crecer en Movimiento (Integral Sporting Schools/Grow with Movement), have been renamed and continued despite alternating political parties in power. Likewise, funding to municipalities and national sport organisations is distributed in much the same way, using similar operational procedures and under a relatively unchanged bureaucracy. By way of change, however, governments have demonstrated significant interest in hosting sport mega-events (SMEs) (see also Bravo et al. 2018). President Sebastian Piñera’s second government (2018–2022) prioritised an agenda of sporting infrastructure much more ambitious than what has been seen in the past (see also Hall 2006, Boardley 2013). For instance, the Centros Elige Vivir Sano (Choose to Live Healthy Centres) gained momentum under narratives surrounding the ‘personal responsibility’ of the population and its need for appropriate motivation (see Clave 2018, Aug 24). Also, with the 2023 Santiago Pan American Games, and the bid to host the FIFA World Cup with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, Piñera’s administration has arguably demonstrated similar aspirations to previous administrations yet inspired by different motives (Houlihan 2012, Bravo et al. 2018, Graeff 2019).²

Against the above background, the present study is also located in the shadow of significant events (see Figure 1). On the 18^th of October 2019 Chile saw the biggest social unrest since the return of democracy. Millions of Chileans protested against a perceived unfair economic model, and a dysfunctional and inefficient public administration (Egaña and Pliscoff 2020), demanding attention to the real needs and demands of the people (Phillips 2019, Oct 21). This unrest triggered an agreement to begin reforms on Chile’s constitution, that for many, still represents a legacy of the dictatorship. If approved, the role of sport in society would have been made explicit as a constitutional right, effectively changing how sport would be interpreted by the State. However, the proposed new constitution was ultimately rejected in a national referendum on 4 September 2022. Today, the process continues under a new constitutional council which was elected to rewrite the constitution for future discussion (Phillips 2023, 8 May).

Figure 1. State sport institution development.

Methods

Qualitative methods can contribute to exploring the interplay between the institutional dynamics and socially constructed interactions of the policy process (Skinner et al. 2020). In public institutions, this is relevant because for the political actor, finding and reconstructing the appropriate narratives is a dominant form of agency (Fischer 2003). Researchers thus have a duty to act as a ‘human instrument’ to observe and interpret settings (Skinner et al. 2020) and maintain ‘empathic neutrality’ (Patton 1990, p. 55) while accepting the lived experiences of agency, imbued within language, literature and behaviour (see also Crotty 1998). Since the institutional context has a predominant role in shaping agency behaviour, an interpretive and reflexive approach allows one to ‘lift’ important and explanatory elements present in the policy-making process (Skinner et al. 2020). Furthermore, this study utilises important documents such as laws (e.g. BCN 2023), news (e.g. Campos 2013, IND 2019) and parliamentary communications (e.g. Senado 2013). These documents serve as valuable tools to bridge the gap between the specific context under investigation and the theoretically derived themes (rules, practices, and narratives).

Sample and selection criteria

This study used purposive sampling to select participants that, through their subjective lived experiences, inner world (Nohl 2010), and interaction within a defined and specific institutional context (Sturgis 2016, Daniel and Harland 2017, Skinner et al. 2020), could illuminate the research questions (Patton 2002). To this end, the participants were selected (Skinner et al. 2020) to ensure diverse interests and experiences were represented such as: current or past public officials (from diverse hierarchical levels and political backgrounds) of the Ministry of Sport and National Institute of Sport. Participants represented a diverse range of departments and levels of hierarchy from the MINDEP and IND, with some starting their public service during the DIGEDER period. The participants’ organisational backgrounds are presented in Table 1. From a pool of 15 possible informants contacted via ‘personal communications’, five participants were formally contacted in the first instance (with one additional sourced via snowball sampling (Dworkin 2012, Daniel and Harland 2017), totalling n = 6). Importantly, the participants’ close and active involvement in the policy-making process were key to obtain data saturation (Charmaz 2006) and securing a representative and reliable data for analysis.

Table 1. Participants organisational backgrounds.

Participants	Organisational background
Senior Policy Officer #1	DIGEDER, IND and MINDEP
Senior Policy Officer #2	DIGEDER, IND and MINDEP
Senior Policy Officer #3	IND
Senior Policy Officer #4	MINDEP
Senior Policy Officer #5	DIGEDER, IND and MINDEP
Senior Policy Officer #6	IND

This study used semi-structured interviews guided by a pre-defined set of open-ended questions. Interviews thus allowed for the exploration of interviewees’ knowledge and experiences (Skinner et al. 2020), while also permitting flexibility in the sequence and construction of questions if needed (Fielding and Thomas 2016, Skinner et al. 2020). The interviews were conducted online and ranged between 60 and 100 minutes. Verbatim transcripts were developed and refined, with qualitative analysis software (MAXQDA) subsequently used to depict the codes and themes (see below).

Data analysis techniques

This study used Braun and Clarke’s (2006, p. 87) phases of thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2014, Clarke et al. 2015), most notably to: a) generate initial codes – ideas or topics such as specific narratives (e.g. frustration with short-term planning), b) search for [new] themes by collating initial stories into broader themes (e.g. bureaucratic conflict), and c) review the themes to make sure the codes connect with the theoretically derived themes (rules, practices and narratives).

The process of coding served to familiarise and depict the general ideas present in the transcripts (Daniel and Harland 2017). Following this, however, it was necessary to identify ‘how similar codes are united to form certain categories, and how themes can be derived from codes’ (Daniel and Harland 2017, p. 106). Hence, we attempted to connect codes (e.g. law changes) with themes (i.e. bureaucratic conflict) to shed light on the impact that institutional constraints (other rules, practices and narratives) might have over individual behaviour and decision-making. In this way, rules, practices and narratives became an explanatory element for both sport policy in Chile and institutional literature. However, it did not suffice to simply point out the themes that have been identified with quotations (Bryman 2016); rather, the key was to connect them across the data (Braun and Clarke 2006) for a proper identification of patterns of meaning (Daniel and Harland 2017). After extracting the codes within the data (e.g. Law 19.712; ‘shortermism’; frustration), a thematic analysis was used to uncover the significance of themes across the data and in that way, establish coherent and logical connections (Braun and Clarke 2006). These inductive codes are subsequently presented under the main (deductive) themes encompassing rules, practices and narratives.

Findings and analysis

Rules

Rules represent the formal and written clauses, laws, standards and regulations (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) that shape actors interests and identities (March and Olsen 1989). Political actors behave in accordance with these rules (March and Olsen 2009), and it is this kind of power that gives institutions predictability, consistency and order (Olsen 2007).

As a collection of rules, Chile’s New Public Management (NPM) reforms from mid-1990s and early 2000s set in motion a period of profound institutional change. One of the key reforms was the creation of the Directorate of Budgets (DIBUD) in the Ministry of Finance, which subsequently introduced managerial techniques, such as performance-based remuneration and public institution performance measurements (Pliscoff 2009). DIBUD marked a substantive change because pre-2001, the General Directorate for Sport and Recreation (DIGEDER) within the Ministry of Defence, faced little accountability in relation to its resources. According to Senior Policy Officer #5, DIGEDER: ‘ … would buy flights or sporting equipment very discretionally … so there was a lot of doubts in the way these resources were given, a lot of clientelism’. Clientelism in this sense refers to the political-party-oriented direct or indirect support or arrangement of procedures as the result of vague rules (González-Bustamante et al. 2016, Siavelis et al. 2022).³ However, with the public sector’s modernisation, new rules such as KPIs and evaluations changed how the state sport institution would operate. Law 19.712 (2001) accordingly replaced the DIGEDER with the National Institute of Sport (IND), a new organisation embedded within the Ministry General Secretariat of Government.

The data suggest that these reforms had two implications. The first is that reforms increased accountability towards political principals. The rise of indicators, evaluations and bureaucratic procedures now allowed the Ministry of Social Development to ‘filter’ programmes to assure their alignment with a ‘social problem’ (Senior Policy Officer #3) and government objectives (Senior Policy Officer #5). Secondly, the new managerial techniques, combined with the transfer of DIGEDER officials into the new IND, accentuated frictions and conflicts. In joining the IND, DIGEDER officials carried their former practices into the new setting, but lost their capacity to act discretionally (i.e. without strict accountability measures). As one official reported:

The change of paradigm that the institution went through created resentment towards those who, like me, were arriving. We were seen as outsiders that were going to tell them how to do things but we were just going to implement a law and generate a public policy. (Senior Policy Officer #5)

Hence, over time, Law 19.712 (2001) put into contact the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ ways of doing things. In 2013, however, the enactment of Law 20.686 promised to improve the sporting culture of the country (Campos 2013, Aug 19) and elevate the importance of state sport (Senado 2013, Aug 19). The new law created the Ministry of Sport (MINDEP) and relegated the IND as its implementing branch, stating the former’s functions would be to ‘oversee’ and ‘audit’ (Senior Policy Officer #5). In this way, the combination of Law 19.712 (2001) and Law 20.686 (2013) accentuated a dichotomy between policy-making (MINDEP) and implementation (IND), or between thinkers versus doers (see also Howlett et al. 2009). Thus, just as with DIGEDER’s loss of discretionary power after the creation of the IND, the enactment of Law 20.686 (2013) eroded the IND’s authority. As Senior Policy Officer #3 recounted:

The Ministry of Sport arrives, and this council of wise people gets established [and] starts telling us that they design and we now just implement; that was like a bomb in the IND. I mean there has never been that much hate against the MINDEP when they arrived and established this figure of: we design, we think, and you do. (Senior Policy Officer #3)

Moreover, in the words of Senior Policy Officer #1:

The IND did not accept the existence of a new organisation above them. They were used to controlling all public policies and now with the creation of the MINDEP there was a superior entity that was the Ministry of Sport so at the beginning, the frictions were evident and the relationships were not the best …. (Senior Policy Officer #1)

In short, the IND lost power and decision-making capabilities (Senior Policy Officer #2), and officials initially perceived MINDEP as a ‘boot stepping on them’ (Senior Policy Officer #1, #2). Hence, the interviewees’ accounts of both law changes (2001 and 2013) suggest that reforms aimed at separating policy-making from implementation generated conflict.

Importantly, this dichotomy has remained a source of strain. For example, Senior Policy Officer #6 pointed out that:

There is not much clarity regarding how the Ministry creates [the] policies because what should happen is that they … tell me … this is what has to be done, you execute and for that, you have to do it within these limits. You have these resources, and have to have this level of efficiency, this level of coverage, and this level of results … but I don’t think that model exists today. (Senior Policy Officer #6)

While the above suggests that the policy-implementation differentiation is fraught at an operational level, another interviewee suggested that the dichotomy acts as constraint to change. As Senior Policy Officer #1 pointed out:

I believe that a divided institution does affect the history of that institution; and it hasn’t been possible in the last years to have a unified institution and while there is no unified institution, there is little that can be done. (Senior Policy Officer #1)

Along similar lines, another official suggested that the modernisation of the public sector failed to encourage a long-term vision (Senior Policy Officer #6). S/he noted that: ‘You are forced into the short-term … your logic has to be the short-term and the system always reminds you of that’ (Senior Policy Officer #6).

Practices

One of the practices contributing to the institution’s short-term outlook, is the wider Chilean state custom – known as cuoteo (see also Siavelis et al. 2022) – in which large numbers of public officials are removed and replaced following each new government (Cejudo 2015, González-Bustamante et al. 2016). According to officials #1, #2, #3 and #6, this practice leads to a constant rotation of the public workforce and the interruption of processes. Thus, with each new government, officials feel that expertise is lost (Senior Policy Officer #6, #2, and 4), and that programmes are interrupted or terminated (Senior Policy Officer #3). Furthermore, interviewees reported that new officials ‘are not the best in their areas but instead, politically appointed’ (Senior Policy Officer #4), which does not allow ‘retaining the knowledge of the institution’ (Senior Policy Officer #6). In this regard, Senior Policy Officer #2 observed that such job insecurity creates anxiety:

There is a lot of nervousness … every time there is government change because people are terrified to lose their jobs … people would suffer, especially in the period of annual contracts renewal … that impedes a public service career. (Senior Policy Officer #2)

From these accounts, the practice of cuoteo creates an aversion to risk for sport bureaucrats, and possibly curtails ‘free, frank and fearless’ advice.⁴ For example, Senior Policy Officer #1 observed that the government programmes’ objectives are designed ‘to obtain political returns and popularity’ and ‘do not originate from an exhaustive work to promote physical activity and have a less sedentary country’.

Alongside this politicisation of appointments, officials reported parochial practices within and across the MINDEP-IND institution. Senior Policy Officer #5 observed that the IND would withhold information from the MINDEP, as a form of resistance to the latter’s power and control over policy-making. Senior Policy Officer #2 likewise described the Chilean model – and its practices, as non-consultative and uncooperative:

[V]ery reactive, that lacks participation, of enclosed compartments towards the institution as well as towards the outside. It is a model … that lacks participation, where people do not work together, with other entities or other public or private organisations unless it is a very specific issue. (Policy Officer #2)

The lack of cooperation within the institution is thus reflected in its policy-making practices. In 2016, for example, MINDEP announced its sporting plan, yet IND – the implementing organisation – was not aware of the plan or its source, resulting in significant ‘embarrassment’ for all (see also Arellano 2016, 9 May; Rivera 2016, 9 May). Indeed, Senior Policy Officers #1, #2, and #3 claimed not to know with any certainty why the plan was adopted nor who was responsible for that decision, but they did agree in the underlying motivation: it was a ‘shortcut’ on the part of political authorities (Senior Policy Officer #1, #3). For these officials, such unilateral actions are long-standing practices that may continue to hinder policy-making in the future. Encapsulating this point, one interviewee suggested:

We could have had a country much more advanced in the area [of sport and physical activity] but that is hard to achieve when you have egos that have diverse interests and opposite to each other. I believe that we will need many years to be cohesive so it can allow us to work better for the community. (Senior Policy Officer #1)

Taken together, the data suggests that external political practices (such as politically based staff appointments) have combined with internal (parochial) practices to mutually reinforce the politics-administration dichotomy brought about by legislative reforms. Indeed, officials reported a clear conflict between the technical, procedure-based practices of the IND, and the short-term, politically oriented interventions of MINDEP and its leaders (Senior Policy Officer #1, #4, #6).

Narratives

While practices are akin to conduct (i.e. ‘how we do things around here’), narratives are verbal expressions to explain or justify why rules exist and/or why such conduct is appropriate (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). As verbal expressions, narratives are inextricably emotionally structured (Kleres 2011). Narrative elements thus ‘configure emotional experience’ (Kleres 2011, p. 185) and in this way, the narratives/emotions emerging from the data reflect: 1) a general pessimism about the institution’s capacity to change, and 2) a shared view about the importance of building legitimacy in the face of historical corruption.

The narrative of incapacity refers to the story of constraints that officials see as incapable of overcoming by themselves. In part, this incapacity stems from the low priority of sport in wider government circles. Thus, Senior Policy Officer #2 observed that: ‘Among public officials of the country [there is a sense] that physical activity and sport are not relevant to the Chilean State’ (Senior Policy Officer #2). In speaking about sport’s possible inclusion as a constitutional right of citizenship, interviewees were sceptical about its impact, owing to a lack of existing capacity for current institutions to uphold such a right. As noted by Senior Policy Officer #1, sport as a constitutional right would be beneficial ‘if the laws [rules] around sport and physical activity can be implemented’. Furthermore, Senior Policy Officer #6 observed that for sport to be a right, there has to be a ‘nexus between what is written and what exists’ and the institution has to have the capacity to implement policy by defining clear roles and strategies (Senior Policy Officer #6; Senior Policy Officer #3).

Such concerns for the institution’s capacity are evident in the pessimism and frustration expressed by interviewees. In regards to the practice of political appointments described above, one policy officer said:

I am burning my eyelashes, I stay every day until very late, I am sleeping bad, anxious, doing a lot of work, my teams are stressed and then from one day to another, they appoint a guy with no experience, that has no idea of how things are done … those things are painful. (Senior Policy Officer #3)

Echoing a similar frustration, Senior Policy Officer #2 noted:

[O]ne tries to do everything that should be done, creating teams, consciousness [about sport], being communicative and good communicator, not closing-up [to others] … but unfortunately my point of view after 27 years is not negative, but very critical and I have to recognize a little pessimistic. (Senior Policy Officer #2)

Taken together, these expressions of pessimism suggest a story of path dependence (Cortell and Peterson 2001), where substantive change seems an unlikely prospect. Importantly, however, the narrative of ‘incapacity’ towards change is highly critical of the existing rules and practices, perhaps pointing to their possible disruption over time.

One indication of a new narrative surrounds the agencies’ desires to engage with the public in a more meaningful way. Interviewees often referred to the social role that MINDEP and IND should have in the communities and emphasised the importance of the institution’s hands-on approach to solve diverse challenges. For example, Senior Policy Officer #4 noted that the ‘Sport Promotion’ programme was an opportunity to ‘show the Ministry to the community’ and on this front, there is evidence of a shared narrative among officials, surrounding the importance of more engagement in (and with) the communities. As Senior Policy Officer #2 noted: ‘to be able to implement policies that benefit everyone, we need to capture the views of [everyone]’. In the words of another interviewee:

The MINDEP is a Ministry created to deliver good news and for some reason we have not been able to give them [that]. We should be that Ministry that gives good news to the people […], that if a neighbourhood was taken by drug dealing, it can stop being like that thanks to sports, thanks to infrastructure. (Senior Policy Officer #3)

In context, the need to deliver ‘good news’, and involve the community in the policy process might be a consequence of the institution’s reputational damage from past events. It was little more than a decade before that the Government Accountability Office found several violations in the accounting procedures of 2014 Santiago South American Games (Contraloría 2016, Bravo et al. 2018) as well as in the MINDEP/IND funding allocations for infrastructure development (Contraloría 2021, Resumen 2022, Jan 20). Corruption and/or accounting irregularities had also been discovered in National Sporting Federations of soccer (2017), athletics (2022) and aquatic sports (2019) (Jara 2017, 27 May; IND 2019; Gonzalez Lucay, 2022, 19 April). In this regard, Senior Policy Officer #3 observed that the IND ‘still [had] the stigma of Chilerecortes’ (the aftermath of the corruption case), when additional scandals (see also Solís 2022, Feb 22) ‘hit the State Sport institution again’.⁵ On this point, Senior Policy Officer #6 suggested that the IND is quite ‘fragile’, referring to how the scandals and tensions, have transformed the IND’s internal processes, practices and behaviour. For example, narratives surrounding citizen participation are evident in a former Undersecretary of Sport (2014–2018) tweet where she stated that:

Public policies and strategies today require more participation of the community as well as from professionals that know the issues, not only because it gives more coherence to [them], but legitimises [them] adding public-value. (NikiSaez 2021, Jun 7)

Similarly, former Minister of Sport, Alexandra Benado, stated in an interview that ‘the most important thing’ was to be ‘out there with the people, athletes and organisations’ in order to fulfil their needs (Gonzalez Lucay, 2022, Apr 4). Hence, the engagement narrative shows both elected and bureaucratic officials are aware of the past, and should, through their present actions, try to redeem an image they see as previously damaged. In combination, the narratives around a) the system’s incapacity, and b) the need to engage more widely, may be interpreted as complimentary, but perhaps in conflict with the existing MINDEP-IND dichotomy that has advanced a clear ‘thinker-doer’ division of roles.

Discussion

The introduction of NPM into Chile’s public sector during the late 1990s (Pliscoff 2009, Pliscoff-Varas 2017) brought new rules into state-run sport from 2001 onwards. Specifically, the incorporation of DIGEDER officials into the newly created IND, coincided with NPM-inspired KPIs, evaluations and measurements (Pliscoff-Varas 2017) advanced in the name of democracy and transparency.⁶ These changes effectively challenged DIGEDER’s discretionary practices towards resource use. However, Cortell and Peterson (2001) note that the influence of past institutional configurations can carry forward incongruencies and asymmetries that might lead to unwanted outcomes. In this regard, interviewees reported internal clashes within the IND, because former DIGEDER officials resisted the new rules and regulations that demanded more accountability and transparency. Therefore, the combination of (new) rules such as Law 19.712 (2001) along with the overarching NPM reforms led to the emergence of conflicting organisational practices that variously privileged oversight and procedures over discretion.

One interpretation of the data is that in this environment, IND agents may have developed ‘competing expectations about appropriate organizational goals and lacking a clear guideline as to which goals should prevail’ (Besharov and Smith 2014, p. 371). These conflicting interpretations are key to understanding political action because broken rules, ignored practices and counter-narratives can lead to change (March and Olsen 1995, Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In the face of the institution’s reforms and associated conflict, there is a possible connection between broken rules, such as the corruption case of Chiledeportes (Pliscoff 2009, p. 13) and the reported resistance to practices around accountability and oversight during that period. Likewise, interviewees reported that parochial practices (i.e. uncooperativeness towards ‘outsiders’) worked against modernisation efforts which intended to ‘design out’ self-interested behaviour (Gains and Stoker 2009). Thus, based on documents and interview data, some instability in the DIGEDER-IND institution may be attributable to the incommensurate rules, practices and narratives during this period. In this regard, the combination of internal conflicts within the IND, the corruption scandals (Pliscoff-Varas 2017), the diverse values and expectations (Pache and Santos 2013) carried over from DIGEDER, and in general, the conflicting combination of rules, practices and narratives, may have enabled the rise of a new institutional arrangement (March and Olsen 1995). Bravo et al. (2018) would perhaps agree insofar as they observed the DIGEDER-IND’s alignment of rules, practices and narratives, encouraged subsequent Chilean government officials to bid for sport mega-events (SMEs). In their words:

The new institutional setting of sport, the existence of a new legal framework, and the arrival of new leadership to many sport organizations, are all plausible explanations for why government officials believed it was time to embark in the arms race of bidding for SMEs. (Bravo et al. 2018, p. 71)

Perhaps emboldened by the successful bids, a new structure emerged in 2013 from the promulgation of Law 20.686, creating the Ministry of Sport (MINDEP) and redistributing once again, new rules, practices and narratives. In light of the IND’s internal conflicts and apparent incapacity to tackle long-term challenges, the creation of MINDEP was at first internally supported by narratives concerning the need for sport to have formal political recognition. Indeed, as the IND officials reported, MINDEP represented an opportunity to steer the institution and provide it with its raison d’etre (Hunte et al. 2014) reaffirming the political importance that sport should have in society. Consequently, the new legislation created an institutional dichotomy; the Ministry was positioned as the decision-maker and designer of policy (as thinkers), and the IND was to become the implementer (the doers) (see also Lowndes and Roberts 2013, p. 78). In other words, the recombination of acceptable and legitimate rules (Campbell 2004), such as Law 20.686; and narratives like ‘elevating the political recognition of sport’ enabled the present configuration MINDEP-IND and its division of responsibilities.

By this time, the IND had adopted a technical and more evidence-based approach towards policymaking and an efficient administration of the law (see Kettl 2006). In line with the new dichotomy, the data suggests that MINDEP steered the policy environment towards short-term and politically oriented horizons. Hence, the new institutional setting marked by MINDEP leadership may have enabled two overarching effects.

First, the dichotomy appears to have reinforced the tendency towards stability/continuity. Indeed, from the data, narratives surrounding incapacity, pessimism and frustration, shaped agents’ perceptions around the prospects of change. These narratives are significant with respect to explaining the institution’s development because as some IND participants suggested, the perception of incapacity emerged as a consequence of the MINDEP exercising its authority and reducing the IND to a subordinate role. Reinforcing this narrative (and mirroring the earlier IND-DIGEDER era), officials reported that bureaucratic practices (such as KPIs) and procedures created powerful incentives for them to be followed for their own sake, perhaps limiting the capacity to pursue other alternatives (see also Kettl 2006). Where this tension was evident in the previous IND-DIGEDER regime, it shows the ‘stickiness’ (Pierson 2004) of old practices, however, it also speaks to the institutionalised constraint against operating cooperatively and with a long-term view. As one informant expressed, the ‘system’ constantly reminds them about the KPIs and evaluations which shows the importance of the legal framework in determining the practices within public bureaucracies. To this extent, MINDEP-IND has remained relatively ‘stable’, allowing elected governments from different ideological backgrounds to modify programmes and policies to suit their agenda.

Secondly, while the dichotomy seems to have resulted in continuity (or ‘stagnation’ from the perspective of some of the informants), it has also been an apparent source of change. As Bravo et al. (2018) point out, the appetite for hosting mega events during the period 1990 to 2014 resulted in several forms of legislations to support or facilitate their development, and this has continued apace since the 2013 reforms. One possible explanation for this lies in the data showing the continued practice of political appointments in both MINDEP and IND. The practice may have sustained event bidding strategies insofar as these decisions have often been linked with ‘high politics’ and their populist possibilities (Jennings 2013). Yet despite bureaucrats’ frustration with political appointments, it may be this very friction (as against a ‘modern’ NPM public sector), that has spurred the discovery of corruption in the state apparatus (González-Bustamante et al. 2016, Siavelis et al. 2022). Where political practices have conflicted with NPM expectations of efficiency and procedural rigour, they have perhaps drawn attention to a ‘third way’, evident in the MINDEP former undersecretary’s recent intentions to engage with communities and incorporate professionals in the policy process (NikiSaez 2021, Jun 7).

Taken together, the institutional approach of this study allows for important reflections. First, it corroborates institutional theory as an effective approach to explore the ‘subtleties’ of policy making at a micro-level (Peters 2022). For example, the ‘stable instability’ or ‘contained tension’ that exists within the institution shows that what gets done depends not so much on the will of the MINDEP and IND, but in the negotiation of the parts, all enabled and constrained by the legal framework (rules) and range of viable practices (see March 1995).

Secondly, this study provides a modest explanation of continuity and change in Chile’s sport institutions, as a result of the ‘melding’ or disassociation of rules, practices and narratives (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). As Lowndes and Roberts (2013) point out, trying to ‘reconstruct’ how these rules, practices and narratives combine, can help to explain not only why change occurs when these do not ‘align’ but also how these gaps and fissures emerge and lead (or not) to institutional change (see also March and Olsen 1989).

Finally, this study opens the door to further explore the ‘inner worlds’ of public sport structures and how actors help to create, maintain or disrupt the sport policy process (Nite and Edwards 2021). More specifically, an approach to the bureaucratic arrangements of sport and the role of public officials shaping sport policy, can illuminate important questions in relation to state sport institutions (Downs 1967, Page and Jenkins 2005, Kettl 2006, Poocharoen 2012, Peters 2018, Stenling and Fahlén 2021).

Conclusion

This study traced Chile’s government-led reforms to the state’s sport structures (comprising DIGEDER, IND and MINDEP). Drawing from documents and interviews with policy officials, the study analysed these reforms in relation to rules, practices and narratives underpinning the institution’s formation (comprising DIEGER, IND and MINDEP). Overall, there were two main findings in this investigation.

First, this investigation found that previous institutional reforms continue to influence, the actions of agents today. The introduction of NPM (as a bundle of rules) and the carryover of DIGEDER practices into the IND resulted in a legacy of conflict that has been hard to overcome. The intended modernisation of Chile’s state sport structures was impeded, owing to an apparent clash between technocratic practices (inspired by NPM) and previous practices allowing discretion and political clientelism. The second finding concerns the dichotomy between MINDEP and IND and the apparent tension brought about by new ministerial oversight and the continued practice of politically based appointments. While policy officials reported frustration with the MINDEP-IND dichotomy (due to the system’s incapacity to change), the evidence suggests important implications. It is suggested that the MINDEP-IND dichotomy has solidified political influence over the agenda (e.g. event bidding). At the same time, the tension between this political influence and the legacy of NPM-inspired rules, has arguably enabled the detection of broken rules (in the form of corruption scandals), signalling further change in the future.

This investigation shows that rules, practices, and narratives within the Chilean state sport institution can be mutually reinforcing as well as disruptive to one another; explaining why the institution has gone through periods of stability and change. Moreover, this investigation shows that the interconnectedness (or not) of rules, practices and narratives can help explain the process and trajectory of sport policy. Programmes such as Escuelas Deportivas Integrales/Crecer en Movimiento (Integral Sporting Schools/Grow with Movement) and the interest in mega-events that have characterised much of Chilean sport policy over the last 20 years, can thus be partly explained through the analysis/interrelation of these institutional constraints (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Because institutions embed historical experience, the convergence of rules, practices and narratives can provide important explanations regarding why Chilean sport policy is the way it is, and shed light on the plausibility of future institutional change (March and Olsen 1989, Heclo 2008, Peters 2012, Lowndes and Roberts 2013).

In light of these two main findings, this investigation also acknowledges some limitations. First, it does not account for the virtues/vices of public officials’ behaviour. A detailed analysis of how the institutional structure enables or constrains officials’ behaviour in diverse echelons of the state sport institution could significantly advance a deeper understanding of the policy-process vis a vis the hierarchical structure that they are subject to.

Secondly, while our interviews allowed for data saturation and represent diverse viewpoints from within the Chilean state sport institution, an additional data collection from other departments, divisions and local territories could enable further comparison and analysis of their behaviour and the associated implications for the policy process.

Overall, it is suggested that future studies explore middle-income countries like Chile that have important insights to offer. As Bravo et al. (2016) point out, Latin American countries share similar rationales and strategies with developed nations. As such, Latin American sport can be used as case studies to contribute to key debates and theoretical developments (Grix et al. 2018) expanding what we know about institutions and their links with contentious topics such as mega events, athlete welfare (Bravo et al. 2018, Grix et al. 2022), and integrity (Tak 2018, Tak et al. 2018).

Ethics approval

Ethics Committee Approval reference number D22/081

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Graduate Research School Publishing Bursary Reference number UO-00219941.

Notes

1. Expanding on Helmke and Levitsky (2006), Chile’s constitutional structure has conferred substantial authority upon its presidents. However, as Helmke and Levitsky (2006) add, due to the existence of informal arrangements and power-sharing practices, presidents have consistently refrained from fully exercising that authority. This constitutional structure while potentially contributing to political stability, may have also cultivated an environment where informal practices play a prevalent role in shaping the political agenda. Today, Chile continues its substantial constitutional reform process, with the final decision slated for approval in December of 2023.

2. The bid and first part of organising the 2023 Santiago Pan American Games occurred during the administration of Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018).

3. Siavelis et al. (2022) points out that in Latin America, ‘informal institutions’ that regulate political behaviour evoke notions of clientelism, corruption and nepotism; and their existence is a consequence of institutional weaknesses.

4. Similarly, Numerato (2009) notes that Czech sport civil servants would refrain from acting unless required by a higher authority (p.22).

5. These additional public scandals involved accusations of missing public goods, misuse of resources and complaints after the former Minister moved offices during the pandemic to the National Stadium premises, apparently to reduce the interactions with staff from the Ministry (Solís 2022).

6. It is important to note that by the 1990s Chile was still recovering from the (institutional) legacy of the dictatorship and human rights violations.