Brexit and the Premier League: perspectives from a boundary-making approach

ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of Brexit’s referendum polls, there were many predictions as to what its impact would be for the United Kingdom. While its socio-economic consequences have often featured as the main topic of discussion, this may lead to people overlooking its significance regarding its redefining of the British political community. One social field in particular which may see these dynamics play out is sports. More particularly, looking at England’s favourite pastime, football and its top division, the Premier League, can be quite revealing in understanding how sports can contribute to defining the nation. Following from this idea, the theoretical framework of boundary-making processes is applied to the Premier League and its Brexit contextualisation. The findings from this approach demonstrate the government’s underlying efforts in redefining the country’s political community away from Europe through the sports regulation changes associated with Brexit. However, these are also found to be mitigated by the influence of external actors.

KEYWORDS:

• Brexit
• Premier League
• boundary-making
• external actors
• symbolic power

Over the past couple of years, Brexit has been one of the most significant political events in the realm of the European Union (EU). Whereas, discussions of expansion had previously characterised the Union, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave its midst, claiming to seek its own path. While much has been written on the reasons for the exit and its consequences (Dennison et al. 2020, Igwe 2022), sports remain an underexplored realm, even three years from the onset of Brexit. This is not to say that the topic has been ignored completely, as some papers have discussed it under this perspective. For example, May and Bason (2023) have written about the impact of international agreements, with cricket and Brexit as a case study. However, these papers have usually not taken the Premier League (PL) as a centre focus, which represents an interesting case study on its own. Even when it was, most of the current literature mainly outlined the consequences for England’s top professional football league in isolated terms, such as the economics, the impact on player movements or what it means for media deals (Perry and Steenson 2019, May and Bason 2023, p. 512). The following article aims to adopt a different perspective, using the lens of boundary-making.

The paper will begin with a discussion of UK’s political community and an overview of the boundary-making processes framework, as theorised by Wimmer (2013). Subsequently, an overarching background of Brexit and the Premier League will be outlined. This will include a description of the major actors, how the league was organised under European Union (EU) laws, as well as how Brexit has changed the rules of the game. Having contextualised the case study at hand, the theoretical concepts will be applied to it. In doing so, the interplay between state actors and external ones will be explored, an aspect which had not been emphasised in Wimmer’s initial theoretical conceptualisation of boundaries. Consequently, it is argued that the sports regulation changes associated to Brexit demonstrate the government’s underlying efforts in redefining the country’s political community, whilst still taking external actors in consideration. Finally, a conclusion based on the paper’s analysis will be laid out, offering potential outlets for future research.

Theorising the boundary-making approach

In the aftermath of the 2016 referendum, various explanations emerged in attempting to understand the results which had initially shocked the interested parties (Dennison et al. 2020, p. 1–2). Amongst these, factors linked to definitions of the country’s political community featured prominently, namely in the shape of individuals’ attitudes towards immigration, the EU, as well as their own values (ibid). This could be further supported by dominant narratives about Brexit which followed from its slogan of ‘taking back control’ (Black 2019), suggesting a desire of the ‘people’ to regain their sovereignty (Zappettini 2020). In doing so, the slogan appealed not only to an idea of democracy, due to its opposition to EU impositions, but also to xenophobic imaginaries of the ‘other’ (Kenny 2016). Whatever the interpretation, questions of membership were inevitably tied to Brexit.

While conceptualisations of the political community are usually framed under the frameworks of the nation, this article will opt for the notion of the political community. This is because the UK’s case presents a complex case study when it comes to understanding the relationship between the nation, the country and the state; the UK consists of several nations as defined by (Smith 1989), with England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all offering distinct options in terms of nationalities. Whereas, national boundaries are usually conceptualised as existing between those associating to the nation, and for those who do not, these boundaries may, in fact, occur within multinational states as well, with the UK being a prime example of that dynamic (Whigham and Black 2020, p. 6).

To add to the complexity of the issue at hand, there is also the English question which is added to the equation, whereby the definition of the English nation is contested; the concept of Englishness is often conflated with the notion of Britishness (Kumar 2003, Wellings 2016, Black et al. 2020). This is not only present in daily narratives, as studied by Whigham and Black (2020), and Black et al. (2020) in their analyses of newspapers’ sporting reports, but also on a political level. Whereas other nations of the UK have their own parliaments, the English do not, which subsequently muddies the waters in trying to understand English nationalism (Black 2019). There has been a wide range of writings which have treated on the topic, trying to disentangle the various trends of how nationalism, the state and the country are all related to one another within the context of the UK (Kumar 2003, Colls 2012, Finn 2016, Morris 2016, Outhwaite 2016, Wellings 2016, Black 2019). However, delving into these questions requires scrutiny which goes beyond the scope of this article.

Instead, sticking to the idea of the political community allows the paper to make its arguments without engaging in depth with the British/English conflation issue or the national questions found within the UK. After all, the concept of the nation would have been only key in so far as it may have provided a concept which refers to a set of individuals who share a certain sense of belonging, or in other words, a community (Wimmer 2013, p. 7). Thus, when Brexit is discussed, its narratives revolve around the UK’s interests, about representing the right type of people which can be synonymised with discussions of membership to a polity. Another way to understand this approach is that the concepts used throughout this article remain within the field of studies which encompasses discussions about nationalism, ethnicity and race. Despite the fact that this article does not use those terms directly, the dynamics associated to them still remain relevant to the analysis of this paper. Thus, as it was proposed by Brubaker (2002), the processes which involve nationalism, ethnicity and race, or the political community as discussed in this paper, should be understood as being relevant in how they are about categorisations frames which are used for actors to make sense of the world (ibid). Accordingly, it is then understood that while Wimmer’s model, which will be discussed later on, might be discussing ethnic boundaries, the dynamics which are analysed remain highly relevant in the framework of the political community. Within this discussion it is also important to highlight that the notion of British that will be used throughout this paper will refer to the political community, as opposed to the nation of Brits.

Having established the use of the political community, the focus now shifts towards its definition. Taking from Mouffe’s (1991) characterisation of the concept, one’s belonging to a political community is defined by the acceptance of a common way that individuals should behave themselves (ibid., p. 77, Mouffe 1992, p. 31). Based on this understanding, a sense of identification is subsequently formed (Mouffe 1991, p. 77). Thus, the contemporary political community is not ‘held together […] by a substantive idea of a common good but by a common bond, a public concern’ (ibid., p. 77). Consequently, the community is said to be shapeless, and only upheld through continuous practices (ibid., p. 77, Mouffe 1992, p. 31), thereby indicating its constructivist nature. Under this perspective, politics are about the definition of the community, where a construction of the collective, or ‘we’, must be built, thereby also inferring the existence of a ‘they’ or the ‘other’, through the establishment of boundaries (Mouffe 1991, p. 78, 1992, p. 30).

This description of the political community is not meant to be homogenising. Rather, the political community is subject to power struggles, where various interests seek to gain hegemony, allowing various actors to challenge ideas about the community’s definition (Mouffe 1991, p. 78). Consequently, politics are said to be an arena of conflict and division, where compromises can be made without ever being complete since they inherently require the exclusion of certain actors (ibid., p. 78). At the same time, the presence of different interests does not mean that the perceived bond of the community is weak. The ethical and political values which were described as creating a sense of recognition of membership in others can be interpreted in various ways (ibid., p. 79). For example, the principles of liberty and equality may have a wide range of different interpretations about how these should be implemented (ibid., p. 79). Consequently, a certain agreement between the various actors has to be settled, where they accept the rules of how they can vie for their interests (ibid., p. 79). It is important to note that that this process is not only motivated by interests, but one that also affects the actors’ understanding of themselves, of their identities (ibid., p. 80). Thus, the conceptualisation of a plural society does not require the erosion of the bonds that hold it together and can still acknowledge the power imbalances that exist within it.

As it was mentioned earlier, the dynamics covered through this understanding of the political community can also be found in the literature covering nationalism. Thus, Anderson has coined the nation as an ‘imagined community’ (King 2006, p. 4). While subsequent scholarship has criticised this concept (ibid., p. 4), it remains an apt image to the research at hand. From this term, it is understood that the nation is a social phenomenon that must be worked upon to become reality. Members of such a community must recognise that they share bonds with other individuals claiming to pertain to that same group (ibid., p. 4). This is not born out of thin air as the nation must be concretised and consolidated somehow. While there are various theories which posit how this is done, from grounded nationalism (Malešević 2019) to everyday nationalism (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008), through banal nationalism (Billig 1995), the importance of iterating these points is to further support the links between the literature on political communities and on nationalism, highlighting the parallel characteristics of some of their concepts and their applicability, such as the construction of boundaries.

Having described the political community as a concept that is overarchingly dictated by questions of struggles over definitions of membership, this leads the discussion towards the boundary-making approach. While there are several different takes on the latter, the paper at hand focuses on Wimmer’s (2013) take, as it offers a holistic model. Within its theorisation, it includes ideas seen in previous works such as those on methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), everyday nationalism (Edensor 2002) and national capital (Hage 1998). It also offers concepts that are parallel to other influential works, such as Brubaker’s explanation regarding how ethnicity, race and nation are all processes that fall under the same procedure of categorisation, as mentioned earlier on (Brubaker 2002).

Hence, taking from the theoretical descriptions of ethnicity, race and the nation, boundary-making is understood as processes, whereby individuals create categories, or frames to understand the social world around them (Wimmer 2013, p. 2). These may also occur at the cognitive level or discursively, but the dynamics involve remain the same (ibid., p. 2). With the involvement of categories, boundaries are inevitably constructed to make distinctions between them. Based on these, individuals shape their behaviours (ibid., p. 2). Thus, when a person claims to belong to a certain identity, such as that of the political community, they are effectively associating themselves with a certain category, and its respective set of behaviours; this process is not only intrapersonal, as they are also associating themselves with other individuals of the same claim, behaving towards them accordingly. On the flip side, creating bonds by association inherently requires discrimination; those who do not share the same identity are not to be treated the same way as those who are (ibid., p. 4). Despite the initial categorisation that occurs, the labels of insider and outsider are constantly being re-evaluated by actors engaging in social interactions (Duemmler 2015, p. 4). Thus, depending on an individual’s actions, they may be repositioned as having more or less claim to the given identity, needing to prove themselves constantly through their interactions (Wimmer 2013, p. 4). In other words, both self-perspective angles and perceptions from others are important. Within such a framework, dynamics of power and social standing become particularly relevant as these processes are intrinsically involved in how boundaries are defined, practiced and operate from narratives (ibid., p. 4). Thus, from this understanding of boundaries, their malleability is highlighted as they emerge from social interactions (ibid., p. 4).

The last point leads to the next aspect within this theory of boundaries; since actions matter in shaping boundaries, the struggles over defining boundaries matters, including considerations about its significant actors (ibid., p. 4). What was coined as ‘boundary work’ by Gieryn refers to the fact that these interactions take place on a wide range of levels, whether they be institutional or individual, and that they can occur as background processes or be explicit (ibid., p. 4–5). The struggle over boundaries puts at stake a range of benefits from resource gains to social capital (ibid., p. 5). This introduces a strategical aspect to the theory, but the latter should not be overemphasised.

While Wimmer offers further theoretical considerations within his comprehensive model of boundary-making processes, for the purpose of this paper, institutional actors and how they approach boundary-making will be the focus of its theoretical framework. Despite acknowledging the importance of individual actors and the relevance of their agency in engaging with boundaries and ethnic categories, due to power differentials, it cannot be ignored that institutions have a greater impact in the creation and maintenance of boundaries than individuals due to their power differentials (Wimmer 2014, p. 837). This can notably be observed in how institutions may set rules which provide certain incentives in approaching boundaries in a way rather than in another (Wimmer 2013, p. 32), or through their access to a wider and deeper set of resources which can consequently influence other actors’ behaviour concerning boundaries (ibid., p. 32). The other way which in which institutions can be found to be dominant is their outreach capacity, whereby they are able to reach more people and therefore disseminate ideas about boundaries in a certain way (ibid., p. 32).

Given their capabilities, institutional actors have access to certain strategical approaches vis-à-vis boundaries which are easier accessible for them than to individuals. Wimmer outlines them in his typology of boundary-making processes with their respective characteristics and describes them as strategies which seek to affect the ‘location of existing boundaries’ (ibid., p. 49). These are labelled as expansion and contraction. The first, expansion, is defined by movements of the boundaries seeking to include more members within the group that it delimits (ibid., p. 50). These include processes such as nation-building and ethnogenesis (ibid., p. 50–54). The second, contraction, on the opposite side, seeks to reduce the number of individuals within a given category (ibid., p. 55).

These various boundary shifts are undertaken via different methods, requiring certain conditions to occur. The use of discourses and symbols, as well as discrimination, political mobilisation and the use of violence are the main approaches to enact change when it comes to boundary work. Discursive and symbolic resources are important when it comes to the latter as they are used to shape categorisation (ibid., p. 64). They may include the likes of rituals, historical tropes, as well as significant dates and holidays (ibid., p. 64). Whomever is able to yield such resources effectively has the power to impose and entrench their desired categories (ibid., p. 64).

As with any inclusion processes, there must be exclusion ones on the flip side; discrimination serves to distinguish the in-group from the out-group. This may occur in the realm of law, where various groups are treated differently (ibid., p. 68), but it can also occur in the daily, where access to certain resources, such as housing and education, are restricted based on one’s perceived ethnicity (ibid., p. 68).

Political mobilisation is about the use of a significant proportion of the population to shape the boundaries in a way that favours a certain group over others. While it may emerge from elite manipulation, it is not always the case as certain groups might associate liberation movements with gaining control over ethnic boundaries (ibid., p. 69). The underlying factor, in this process, lies in mass opinion and the capability to capitalise upon it by generating movements out of it (ibid., p. 69). The use of violence may find some overlap in this method, physically enacting perceived divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (ibid., p. 70–72).

While the strategic approach was discussed above, there are other factors which can shape boundary-making processes. After all, actors do not interact within a vacuum as they are constrained by certain structures. These may be labelled as institutions, resource distribution and networks (ibid., p. 32). Institutions include elements such as the labour market and education. As for resource distribution, it is about individuals’ access to economic opportunities, the ability to have an impact politically and the capacity for cultural manifestations (ibid., p. 34). Lastly, networks concern the people who surround an individual, what the possible ties are based on and how they are used (ibid., p. 36).

Given the presented characterisation of boundary processes, the state holds a dominant position when it comes to defining boundaries, being able to instrumentalise laws and institutional incentives to entrench understandings about in-groups and outsiders (ibid., p. 94, 108–109). This dynamic is not limited to the realm of definitions as it also affects the balance of power present in society, where the state may favour certain selected categories (ibid., p. 31). Amongst the means of boundary work, discursive and symbolic rank highly amongst the state’s capabilities, since it is able to accentuate certain historical narratives about the nature of the political community, through the educational system for example, or entrench categories through censuses (ibid., p. 64). More radically, the state usually has control over violent capabilities which can also serve in imposing definitions of the political community’s composition (ibid., p. 70). All in all, the state has the ‘means to enforce particular categorical boundaries by making them relevant for the everyday lives of the population’ (ibid., p. 90).

Justifying the boundary-making approach

With a better understanding of boundary-making, the justification for adopting its theoretical framework can now be addressed. As described above, the concept of boundaries is said to describe dynamics linked to categorisation and representations of certain collectives (Wimmer 2013, p. 9). Considering that some of Brexit’s main narratives have surrounded the topics of migration and the EU (Chan et al. 2020), the idea of boundaries appears appropriate to this study since those narratives effectively discuss political inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, the constructivist approach makes sense within this context as Brexit’s nature points to the malleability of definitions associated with the political community; the UK had initially joined the European Economic Community, EU’s precursor, through many challenges, including the 1975 referendum where the people had voted to remain (Goodlad 2021, p. 682). Subsequently, low self-perceptions of Europeanness across the country (Cinnirella and Hamilton 2007) and punctual questions about the European project’s viability characterised the UK’s membership. This was notably observable around the topics of EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004 and its 2009 Treaty of Lisbon (Goodlad 2021, pp. 682–683). Despite all of these, the UK remained an EU member for several decades (Coricelli and Campos 2015), raising enquiries about the conditions, which finally pushed the UK to vote in favour of Brexit.

With Scotland seeking to determine its own path through secession, the emergence of narratives concerning political identities in the UK came to the forefront once again in 2014. This compounded with the UKIP and the Conservatives bringing back Euroscepticism on the agenda; this time, the discussion was framed through the EU impeding on the UK’s development (Wellings 2018, p. 151) during a period of perceived growing inequalities and precariousness (Arnorsson and Zoega 2016). On the back of this platform of taking back control over their country, individuals who felt marginalised went to the polls, hoping to find a solution to their situation (Wellings 2018, p. 153).

Translated into the discussion of boundaries, it can be said that initially, the idea of being within a European community was not a threat to the British political community since both of these so-called entities could be compatible. However, ideas of Euroscepticism never fully went away, and these sentiments were eventually mobilised through Brexit. Consequently, European identification was said to threaten the UK’s capacity to exercise its sovereignty, as in fact, the Brits, as a group, had a different set of interests from Europeans. Thus, this dynamic points to a change of perception in the community’s boundaries; whilst the European category might once have been encouraged as having certain overlaps with Brits, regardless of whether they were considered to be complete or partial, this changed to rather favour mutually exclusive categories.

Beyond the justifications found within the case study itself, the study of boundaries in the field of sports has also been fruitful in other scholarly works. For instance, Black and Fielding-Lloyd (2019) have looked at how football and its media coverage can entrench gender boundaries. On questions of citizenship, Han et al. (2023), Oonk (2022), Van Campenhout et al. (2019), as well as Reiche and Tinaz (2019), have all looked at the fluidity of the concept in various contexts, with China, international sporting competitions, the World Cup, as well as Qatar and Turkey being analysed, respectively. All of these articles have discussed the significance of boundaries, albeit with various approaches. Nevertheless, dynamics of boundary-making underlined all of them, such as the issue of defining in-groups in opposition to outsiders.

An overview of Brexit and the PL

Under normal circumstances, states are said to hold the most symbolic power due to their capacity to impose boundaries onto other actors which are present within their borders (Wimmer 2013, p. 78). However, the hegemony of actors is should not be overstated, with subordinate domestic actors being able to create their own understandings of boundaries (ibid., p. 94–95).

Within the realm of professional football, the Football Association (FA) may be cited as one of these domestic actors with its members having had their own preferences when it came to how Brexit would affect England’s top division. In the summer of 2018, it was reported that the FA saw the upcoming break with the EU as an opportunity for the Premier League to field more domestic players and to promote English talents (Weatherill 2022, p. 127). Consequently, its logic was that more domestic players playing in a top division would subsequently translate into a deeper pool of talent for the national team and consequently, better results on the international scene (Gibbons 2014, p. 56). Given the FA’s priority, which lies in seeing its international representations succeed (May and Bason 2023, p. 517), it makes sense that it would be in favour of Brexit regulations. In that optic, Martin Glenn, the FA’s former Chief Executive, even proposed to reduce the quota of foreign players from 17 to 12 out of the 25 who constitute a club’s official squad (Goodlad 2021, p. 672). In that sense, it could be said that the FA’s stance mirrored Brexit’s project as it relished the opportunity to have greater control over players’ migration policies. This assessment is not far fetched since a similar position has been observed in cricket, where the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) saw Brexit as a positive event rather than a detrimental one (May and Bason 2023); its reasoning was similar to that discussed with the FA, where controlling the influx of foreign players could favour domestic ones (ibid).

However, unlike cricket’s case, the PL’s cap on foreign players is much less restraining (May and Bason 2023, p. 517). Whereas, the ECB’s pool of players is in majority considered to be local, with 1,519 out of 2,192 of them qualifying under such a term between the years of 1998 to 2021 (ibid., p. 517), the PL has come to be characterised by its international talents; in 1992/1993, which was the PL’s first season, 69% of the players who started games qualified to play for the English national team (Williams 2017, p. 167). This number subsequently dropped to 32% during the 2012/2013 season (ibid., p. 167). Players were not the only ones to see this internationalisation trend, as managers also followed it. In the inaugural season, 19 out of the 20 clubs had British managers, with the last one being Irish (Champion and Lee 2023, p. 22). Meanwhile, the 2022/2023 season saw eight British managers take the helm (ibid., p. 22), further supporting ideas of the PL being an international league.

Given the described make-up of the league, initial discussion surrounding Brexit around the PL were concerned with how this project would affect it. Pre-Brexit, the PL was regulated by three separate legislative bodies, each of which were subject to their respective regions’ laws. Thus, the PL found itself under the guise of UK laws, being located in the country, Swiss law, due to FIFA’s headquarters being located there, as well as the EU’s regulations given UK’s European membership (Goodlad 2021, pp. 675–676). Under the latter’s legislation, sports were viewed as economic activities (ibid., p. 679), while also regulating players’ movements through its Bosman and Kolpak rulings (Uniyal 2021, Marcén 2014, Perry and Steenson 2019).

This order of the day was changed with Brexit, as EU court rulings no longer needed to be applied. Followingly, the UK increased its requirements for migration to the country, with visa prerequisites for professional athletes also being changed (Perry and Steenson 2019, p. 19). Under this system, PL players must apply for a visa and obtain a Governing Body Endorsement (GBE) through the FA (ibid., p. 19). This selection process is supposed to only allocate them to individuals who ‘will make a significant contribution to the development of that particular sport in the UK at the highest level’ (ibid., p. 19). Once the GBE is acquired, the application is subsequently forwarded to the Home Office who will take a final decision on the permit (ibid., p. 19).

The GBE is composed of several different criteria which filter the applicants progressively; if someone meets the initial requirements, they may go through other stages, while if they fail, they must undertake more administrative processes. The first criteria determining a player’s eligibility is the proportion of senior international appearances that they have made for their country over the last two years (ibid 19; Uniyal 2021, p. 3). Depending on the footballer’s nationality, they will be required to have played more or fewer games. Underneath is a table breaking down the proportions for male players.

As it can be observed from Table 1, only countries that are ranked in the top 50 of FIFA’s rankings can be found. This is because players who find themselves outside of such nations are excluded and consequently must go through an Exceptions Panel to obtain their GBE (ibid., p. 20). This extra assessment can be summed up as a point-based system where the transfer fee for the player, the amount of minutes played for the former club, the quality of the division where they played and appearances in continental competitions (such as the Champions League), all count towards increasing the likelihood of obtaining the GBE (ibid., p. 20).

Table 1. Match requirements depending on FIFA ranking (Perry and Steenson 2019, p. 19).

OFFICIAL FIFA RANKING	REQUIRED % OF INTERNATIONAL MATCHES PLAYED IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS HI’ PLAV l’ll IN TH 1’
FIFA 1–10	30% and above
FIFA ll-20	45% and above
FIFA 21–30	60% and above
FIFA 31–50	75% and above

Once the GBE is granted, the Home Office must decide whether a player will obtain a Tier 2 or a Tier 5 visa (Goodlad 2021, p. 692). The former is meant for sportspersons (ibid., p. 692), where the individuals would be taking a role that cannot be fulfilled by the UK’s own labour force (Perry and Steenson 2019, p. 21). This visa is also attributed according to a points-based assessment, where an endorsement, a demonstration of sufficient funds to live in the country and a certain knowledge of the English language all contribute to earning more of them (ibid., p. 21).

If the player cannot accumulate enough points to obtain a Tier 2 visa, a Tier 5 permit, designed for temporary workers (Goodlad 2021, p. 692), can be attributed (Perry and Steenson 2019, p. 21). Successfully sitting an English language test may bump up the visa to Tier 2, and a Tier 5 visa might allow a club to reapply for a GBE if it was not successful in the first place (ibid., p. 21–22).

So, what does this new system potentially mean for the PL? The first answer is that it may affect the players’ mobility since the country is no longer bound to apply EU legislation which grants freedom of labour movement across its territory (Uniyal 2021, p. 1). The UK’s new approach to immigration means that both the movements of British players to continental leagues and the influx of EU players to England becomes more complicated, requiring more administrative work, along with the fees and delays that are associated with it (ibid., p. 1).

The PL’s recruitment of young talents is another area that may be influenced by the new regulations. While FIFA does not allow players under 18 to transfer overseas, the framework provided by the EEA had allowed English clubs to do so as soon as the players reached 16 (Uniyal 2021, p. 3–4). In a post-Brexit context, this means that UK clubs lose on a two-year period during which other continental clubs can sign up those talents (ibid., p. 3–4). Besides losing on a certain pool of talent, PL clubs competing in UEFA competitions must still abide by the Homegrown talent rules (ibid., p. 5). The term refers to players who have spent at least three seasons with a same club or one of its affiliates between the ages of 15 and 21 (ibid., p. 5). While EU players could formerly qualify relatively easily, given the additional years at hand, the timeframe is now reduced since an English club would have to sign a player as soon as they turn 18 (ibid., p. 5). The most likely outcome is that PL clubs will turn towards domestic talents to fulfil the quota of 8 out of 25 players needed in continental competitions (ibid., p. 5).

Beyond the consequences for players, teams’ staffs may also potentially be affected. Experts associated to clubs are required to undergo their own set of requirements linked with their respective work (ibid., p. 2).

Some of the potential consequences of the new migration policies have been outlined above. However, how have these materialised themselves in practice? The answer to this question is rather mixed. On the one hand, certain changes in the nature those transfers have been noted, where the opportunities for European players to move to the UK have been somewhat restrained, while non-Europeans, more specifically players from South America, have seen the opposite trend (May and Bason 2023, p. 512). Thus, on the European restrictions, revisiting past transfers, such as those of N’Golo Kante and Riyad Mahrez, reveals the regulations’ impact as these transfers could not have occurred under Brexit’s regulations; due to these players having plied their trade in lower French leagues, they would not have satisfied the GBE standards (Champion and Lee 2023, p. 27). As for non-European transfers, two of its examples are Yerson Mosquera and Kayky who have recently taken their talents to the PL, something which would have most likely not occurred prior to the new Brexit regulations (May and Bason 2023, p. 512).

Nevertheless, even following the advent of Brexit, European players’ movements to the league have not been impacted significantly. For example, Brighton is the second football club that has signed the most players from different nationalities in the span of the seasons of 2013/2014 to the summer transfer window of 2022 (Rose 2022). They have also been known for their scouting, which goes beyond the usual markets for the PL, finding talents such as Kaoru Mitoma in Japan and Moisés Caicedo in Ecuador (Naylor and Sheldon 2023). Despite this, in the transfer windows which have followed Brexit, thus from the winter window of 2021 to the summer window of 2023, 11 of their 24 transfers have had European citizenship (Brighton and Hove Albion [online]). Furthermore, out of the 13 non-European signings, 4 of them came from the UK, with 3 of them being English nationals, and one being Scottish (ibid). Thus, even within a club known for the diversity of its signings, European players have remained a significant part of the team building despite the new regulations.

On the other hand, youth transfers have been affected, with perhaps the most opposition from the PL coming from this aspect (Buckingham 2022). An example of the impact of this policy can be seen in Liverpool’s transfer approach when it comes to young players in the most recent years. Prior to the advent of Brexit, the club signed several European young players (The Athletic UK Staff 2021); the signings of Stefan Bajčetić from Spain, as well as Fabian Mrozek, Mateusz Musialowski, both from Poland, and Melkamu Frauendorf from Germany were all made in the windows preceding January 2021, when Brexit regulations kicked in. Since they took effect, Liverpool has exclusively signed home-grown young players from other domestic academies due to foreign signings being forbidden. In the summer transfer window of 2023, this has resulted in the recruitment of Kornel Musciur, Trey Nyoni and Amara Nallo (Liverpool FC U18 [online]).

As for the question of staff members, the transfer of managers has not seemed to be impacted significantly, with Mauricio Pochettino, an Argentinian, and Andoni Iraola, a Spanish, being able to make the switch from PSG to Chelsea and Rayo Vallecano to Bournemouth respectively, prior to the beginning of the 2023/2024 season (Premier league: managerial changes during the season [online]). While this might have been expected in the case of managers with more renown, the issue of visas has still been raised regarding their support staff (Cannon 2018). This has exemplified by the Spanish national Iñigo Pérez, who was supposed to join Iraola at Bournemouth as the assistant manager (Tanner 2023). However, due to work permit issues, he has still not been able to do so (ibid).

The role of external actors

So how should the new regulations regarding the transfers in the PL and their impact be understood? Here, it is suggested that the disparity between the idea of border control proposed by Brexit and the constant influx of players is explained by the influence of external actors. The impact of the latter is an aspect of boundaries which was not covered as much in Wimmer’s (2013) theoretical framework. This is because the focus of his book has been on the intricacies associated with the institutions provided by the state itself, as he describes it as the most influential actor in the definition of boundaries (ibid., p. 31, 64, 90). The following section will attempt to demonstrate how external actors can be influential in that process.

Speaking of external actors, it is important to understand the reasons for which the PL would push against the government’s border control policies. When it comes to the PL’s interests, its stakeholders are most interested in the quality of the product that they are offering, and the financial opportunities associated to it. This means that, regardless of the players’ nationalities, they wish to get the best players in the world, with what initially seems to be little conscious consideration given to boundary-making projects. Thus, the PL, much like corporations, is underlined by stakeholders’ interests which benefit from migrations (Hampshire 2013, p. 38). Amongst the upside of such migration policies for private interests is the optic that they will be able to recruit from a larger pool of migrant workers (ibid., p. 44, Elliott 2017, p. 93) under conditions which advantage them, whether these are considered to be financial or talent oriented. Consequently, their preference inevitably tends towards favouring porous borders (Hampshire 2013, p. 38, Elliott 2017, p. 93).

Despite these stakeholders’ interests, this does not mean that the state becomes a passive player in managing its migration flows. Within the context of the PL, the state can still be seen to engage in boundary-making through the institutions of visas and migration laws as outlined above; from them, a certain arbitrariness of footballers’ capabilities to obtain visas can be observed, predominantly being predicated upon their country of origin and FIFA’s rankings. If two individuals have similar capabilities, the one with the so-called better national background is favoured. FIFA’s rankings, despite pretences of foundations in rational calculations, are far from that as they have their own set of problems, including self-referential contradictions (Skov 2011). Regardless of those considerations, they may well determine whether a player is able to obtain a visa in the UK. Another example of boundary work can be observed in Tier 5 visas being upgradable to a Tier 2 if the individual is able to pass an English test, thereby proving his potential to integrate within the political community. From these aspects, phenomena of distinction between various groups, and subsequent boundary shifting in processes of assimilation or integration can be observed.

Even beyond the workings of the law, the proceedings concerning the visa application also incorporates aspects of boundary work. Provided that the players are not able to clear the initial standards concerning international games played, their cases go to a committee. The latter is composed of individuals that may have various predispositions when it comes to perceiving certain conditions as valid or not. The occurrence of a case in front of a panel in general incurs an interactional aspect, where a party must present arguments as to why they deserve work within, or more aptly for, the host country. Discrepancies in this process have notably been noticed between Scotland and England, where the former’s boards have generally taken a more lenient approach to the law as opposed to the latter (Campbell 2022). This has therefore translated into more foreign signings for the Scottish Premier League which might not have been approved in the EPL.

However, the events of Brexit do not occur in vacuum. As covered by (Chang 2018), Brexit’s economic policy pivot has meant that the country was in a position whereby state-actors were not ready to compromise one of their most important economic sectors. After all, the EPL has largely contributed to that side of the country, which could be exemplified by its $4.4 billion in tax revenues for the 2016/2017 season or its contribution of $10 billion to the country’s economy (Goodlad 2021, p. 674). This situation was further compounded by the aftermath of Brexit which saw the depreciation of the British pound (Perry and Steenson 2019, pp. 13–14) and an uncertain economic future as the UK was angling towards negotiating new economic agreements (Hestermeyer and Ortino 2016).

The economic component is emphasised due to how the global capitalist system has developed in recent decades (Hampshire 2013, p. 38). After all, buttressed by political and economic institutions such as corporations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, capitalism has had its own role in shaping social structures, even those which are national (Skey 2011). Thus, even beyond Brexit’s economic situation, governments’ prerogatives are often aligned with those of the capital under current global economic system, where ‘the “demands” of the latter are also the “needs” of the former’ (Hampshire 2013, p. 44). For migration, this means that its policymaking is contingent on both the fact that governments want to attract foreign investments and that private interests seek places which offer them favourable conditions.

Furthermore, in the case of the PL and Brexit, the capacity of external actors to influence domestic politics has to be understood through its setup which was set prior to its inauguration in 1992/1993 (Williams 2017, p. 169). At the time, the government had little interests in these talks, leaving the FA with the task of negotiating the PL’s regulations. According to Williams (2017), its approach was flawed from the start as it assumed that corporate interests, owners’ desire for profits, the health of the game in the nation and the performance of the national team could all be compatible (ibid., p. 169). The impact of this mistake is consequently said to still be felt today, since the clubs’ representatives now dominate the agenda-setting when it comes to regulations about the league (ibid., p. 170). In other words, the PL, ever since its inauguration, has increasingly been shaped by capitalist neo-liberal imperatives, where fast successes and profits are sought after (ibid., p. 169).

This stance was notably observable in the early days of Brexit’s at the time on going deliberations; Richard Scudamore, who held the Executive Chairman position between 2014 and 2018, said that all 20 clubs of the PL were for remaining within the EU, and associating the PL with openness in opposition to Brexit’s proposed project (Goodlad 2021, p. 671). Even once the referendum’s result was confirmed across the country, the PL clubs made it a point to the FA that they would not compromise on the number of foreign players that they are allowed to sign (ibid., p. 671). Amongst their justifications was the fact that doing so would reduce their level of competitivity on the international scene, whilst also reducing the appeal of the competition for television diffusion (ibid., p. 671).

While it might be tempting to argue that the PL does not have the influence to shape policy, it has shown certain capacities in that aspect. For example, discussions of an independent football regulator in England have been staved off for several years due to the league’s ability to leverage its financial gains (King 2022). Even though this featured as one of the benefits Brexit would bring to the UK. (The benefits of Brexit: how the UK is taking advantage of leaving the EU 2022, p.64), there has yet to be any significant movement on that front (Press release: Government outlines preferred structure of new independent football regulator [online]). It is interesting to note that this declaration of intent was made specifically with the English system in mind, which can most likely be attributed by its size and its economic weight. Even if the regulator could still come to be under PM Sunak (Wheeler 2022), discussions over this topic have demonstrated the league’s capabilities in fighting unwanted changes. Through this characterisation of the PL’s influence, its initial apparent unwillingness to directly engage with boundary-making processes of the nation has been proved to hold up only in so far as the status quo has favoured their interests (Weatherill 2022, p. 127). In other words, despite claims to avoid political involvement, these have shown that social interactions, especially on the level of the PL, always have a political aspect.

It is against this backdrop that the UK’s government had to determine which direction they would take with PL regulations in the context of Brexit, and the underlying boundary definitions which accompany this process. Considering that actors adopt strategies which they think will benefit them, whilst accounting for their access to various resources (Wimmer 2013, p. 93), the state actors were presented a situation whereby the UK’s breakaway from the EU and their economic interests had to be balanced. This follows from Hampshire’s (2013) understanding that states attempt to balance out the wide range of interests that they hold (ibid., p. 38). In other words, the project of sovereignty for the British as proposed by Brexit was restricted by the state’s aim to have a strong economy. Under Wimmer’s (2013) theory, this is also known as a cultural compromise (ibid., p. 98–101); actors with varying interests concerning boundary-making may come to a consensus due to exchanges of resources (ibid., p. 98). Thus, when the UK agrees to curb its restraints on PL regulations, it is doing so due to the league’s being able to provide on the level of economic resources. This comes at a relative expense of capacity over symbolic ones, but it does not forfeit it completely. Meanwhile, the PL stakeholders retain their economic resources but have to adapt certain of their methodologies.

By looking at the impact of the migration policies, this compromise between the state’s own interests and those of external actors can be found. In making changes to the regulations for football players, the government is able to be consistent with Brexit’s project of sovereignty, whereby control of migration fluxes are brought back into the fold. However, this can only be realised to the extent that it will not affect too significantly the stakeholders’ interests. Thus, PL clubs have had to rethink part of their transfer strategies, such as by going to leagues, which had not been explored to the same extent prior, or by turning towards domestic sources when it comes to young players (Champion and Lee 2023). However, these were not considered to be significant enough to raise significant opposition from the stakeholders. This is probably due to the PL’s access to significant sums of money which allow them to outbid other continental clubs provided that the interested parties are judged to be of the same level (Williams 2017, p. 174).

While the PL’s stakeholders interests might be straightforward, as it is mainly profit-driven, the question then arises pertaining as to why the government would even engage with changes of regulations, if the impact in the end is not that significant that it changes the landscape of the PL in favour of domestic players. For one, the topic of migration is key to the state, as the differentiation between migrants and members of the political community is key to defining the latter (Wimmer 2013, p. 28). It is a process which involves every member of society as it has the potential to change who holds more symbolic power and accordingly, who can impose their desired categories (ibid., p. 31). Even if similar dynamics of discrimination could be observed pre-Brexit in migration policies, such as so-called Global North countries being favoured over Global South ones, the key lies in the slight differences. As discussed earlier, with distanciation from Europe being crucial to Brexit, this has been observed to some extent through the new types of boundaries, and their associated legal restrictions, that have been set for the PL. Therefore, even if the regulations may only impact a minority of actors involved with the PL, as seen with Iñigo Pérez, the process itself remains relevant.

This is amplified by the public realm of sports which is ideal to entrench normative ideas; this has notably been noticed during the COVID-19 lockdown where PL athletes were noted to have an impact on the behaviour of their followers (Smith 2022). Consequently, the same ideas as discussed above are observed where the political elite is said to be interested in politics of membership definition, since it lends legitimacy to their governance where like should represent like (Wimmer 2013., p. 90). Through the measures and the changes of regulations concerning who is eligible to play in the PL and who is not, these restrictions shape normative ideas of political community membership; individuals considered to be good enough to contribute to one of the country’s main entertainment and economic driver have stronger claims to belonging. By extent, they are also worthy of having a role in defining British society, even potentially turning into full nationals and citizens themselves with time. This could be exemplified by the media discussions which surrounded Arsenal’s former goalkeeper Manuel Almunia (Skey 2015, p. 271, Gibbons 2015). At the time, the English national team was said to be lacking in that department, and, seeing as he became eligible through residency, the idea emerged to recruit him (Skey 2015, Gibbons 2015). In the end, it did not materialise itself, but the readiness to accept Almunia as English due to his performances on the pitch and contribution to the country economically (Gibbons 2015) is an indication of boundary negotiations, whereby one is conditionally accepted as long as they can provide something to the in-group (Skey 2015).

With a given player becoming a recognised member, their family may also be included within this new political community. For example, attending British schools, even if they are international programmes, may entrench the sense of belonging for their children. While questions of political membership were present prior to Brexit, different dynamics have been emphasised within its system. Under an EU framework, possibilities of claiming to belong to both British and EU categories were more permissible. However, under the Brexit approach, such a duality goes against its ideas of political membership (Finn 2016, Morris 2016); the contraction of boundaries (Wimmer 2013, p. 55), which underlines Brexit effectively seeks to restrict this type of overlaps in association (Finn 2016, Morris 2016).

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, the events surrounding Brexit as well as their impact for the PL have been outlined. While this had been done in previous works, the objective here was to offer a new perspective about these events, adopting the boundary-making approach and adding the impact of external actors to the model. Having described the PL’s situation post-Brexit in details, it could have been noted that, in the end, much of the existing structure has not been affected (Weatherill 2022, p. 122). After all, the football governing bodies remain the same, as the PL still has to answer to UEFA and FIFA, and the wealth of the PL teams and the talent that they attract often mean that the players that they want to sign will not have any problems obtaining a visa. However, through the perspective of boundary-making, it is understood that what it means on the larger scale is a harmonisation of political intent between the interests of the government in membership definition and those of the stakeholders in financial gains. The PL gets to keep its status while the UK is able to integrate symbolic power dynamics and apply its political project in a way that agrees with its Brexit policies. Through changes of frameworks, the government is able to maintain the PL’s status, while also seeking to entrench ideas of differences between Europe and the UK.

While the nature of the new regulations have left some actors relatively satisfied with the situation given Brexit’s circumstances, that has not been the case across the board. The new system has been criticised for potentially emphasising the inequalities between the have’s and have-not’s, where the former will be least affected by regulations contrarily to the latter (Kelly 2020). This raises interesting questions about the viability of the situation for other sporting leagues associated with the UK. While this paper’s focus has been the top league in England, it is important to note that Brexit has also affected the leagues below it, as well as the leagues from the other British nations, such as Scotland. The latter is not an insignificant player in continental European football with both of its top teams, Celtics and Rangers, often partaking in its competitions. While much of the changes that were discussed did not affect the PL as much due to its size and financial strength, the same cannot be said about the Scottish Premiership. In fact, most of its sides, which cannot compete with the Old Firm teams, will have to find new solutions to carrying out their transfers and making their clubs financially viable. This might appear to consist only of a sporting concern, but it also plays a role in shaping the daily lives of Scottish citizens who consume football just as much as their English counterparts. The livelihoods of many of them also depends on these clubs, as they are significant economic stimulators. Within a context that saw Scotland vote ‘remain’ when it came to Brexit, it seems like future discussions about secession from the UK are not far from the horizon once again.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).