V. American grand strategy in a world of plenty

Abstract

The underlying structure, incentives and costs shaping international relations, state behaviour and the nature of power are profoundly different today to how they were in the past, in ways that are scarcely recognised and widely misunderstood. For much of history, world politics was marked by profound scarcity in resources, information and security. A series of historical revolutions has largely tamed this scarcity in ways few could have imagined. These revolutions, however, have generated new, potentially catastrophic challenges for the world – the problems of plenty.

In this Adelphi book, Francis J. Gavin argues that the institutions, practices, theories and policies that helped explain and largely tamed scarcity by generating massive prosperity, and which were sometimes used to justify punishing conquest, are often unsuitable for addressing the problems of plenty. Successful grand strategy in this new age of abundance requires new thinking. New conceptual lenses, innovative policies and processes, and transformed institutions will be essential for confronting and solving the problems of plenty, without undermining the expanding efforts against scarcity.

Notes

83 G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

84 Theodore H. Tulchinsky and Elena A. Varavikova, ‘A History of Public Health’, in Theodore H. Tulchinsky and Elena A. Varavikova, The New Public Health (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 2014), pp. 1–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-415766-8.00001-X.

85 The US provides less than 0.2% of its GDP in aid to poor countries, one of the lowest percentages among wealthy countries. See George Ingram, ‘What Every American Should Know About US Foreign Aid’, 2 October 2019, Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-every-american-should-know-about-u-s-foreign-aid/.

86 The White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, 12 October 2022, p. 27, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.

87 Michael Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure’, International Security, vol. 36, no. 3, Winter 2011–12, pp. 41–78.

88 Kori Schake, ‘Can the US Make the World Safe for Democracy?’, Engelsberg Ideas, 26 September 2023, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/can-the-us-make-the-world-safe-for-democracy/.

89 The US should always call out human-rights violations wherever they occur. It should also push back against China’s mercantilist economic policies. While the US and its allies should continue to resist China’s efforts at a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ in its region, they should be aware of why China would see those efforts as highly hypocritical coming from American officials. And having alienated much of the developed world through its inept grand strategy, China’s efforts to either influence the current world order or create a new one are increasingly focused on the Global South, areas that have not fully participated in the benefits of plenty but are incurring many of its costs. The US and the developed world might learn something from this effort and also turn greater attention to that part of the world. See James Kynge, ‘China’s Blueprint for an Alternative World Order’, Financial Times, 22 August 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/8ac52fe7-e9db-48a8-b2f0-7305ab53f4c3.

90 For the details of official policy statements in each relevant capital, see ‘China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei’, 5 January 2015, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html.

91 China may have lost almost 1.5m people in just three months – December 2022 to February 2023 – while the US death toll was over 1m, numbers that rival total wars between great powers in the past. For China, see Zhanwei Du et al., ‘Estimate of COVID-19 Deaths, China, December 2022–February 2023’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 29, no. 10, October 2023, https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2910.230585. For US figures, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘COVID Data Tracker’, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatracker-home.

92 Interestingly, although China and the US have not fully cooperated when faced with global financial and monetary crises in recent decades, neither have they worked at cross purposes.

93 Francis J. Gavin, ‘Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation’, International Security, vol. 40, no. 1, 2015, pp. 9–46, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00205.

94 Erez Manela, ‘A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History’, Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no. 2, 2010, pp. 299–323.

95 Goldman Sachs, ‘The US Is Poised for an Energy Revolution’, 17 April 2023, https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/the-us-is-poised-for-an-energy-revolution.html.