Anticipatory consent to military intervention: analysis in the wake of the coup d’état in Niger in 2023*

ABSTRACT

Following the coup d’état in Niger on 26 July 2023, the situation in Niger remains tense. However, it is not the coup against a democratically elected government itself that attracts attention from an international law perspective, but the threat by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intervene militarily in Niger to restore the pre-coup balance of power. The international legal assessment of ECOWAS’s threat to use force not only raises common questions within the doctrine of ‘intervention by invitation’, but also highlights the relevance of a problem about which there is little clarity in international legal doctrine – the problem of forward-looking intervention treaties containing anticipatory invitations. Using the case of Niger as a starting point, this article aims to examine the legal concept of anticipatory intervention treaties in the jus ad bellum, before ultimately applying the results of this legal analysis to the case of Niger.

KEYWORDS:

• Use of force
• Jus ad bellum
• intervention by invitation
• anticipatory invitation
• treaty-based consent
• coup d’état

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Claus Kreß for his invaluable comments on previous drafts, as well as James A Green and Marcus Hickleton for their helpful remarks and editorial guidance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Sarah Dean, Niamh Kennedy and Larry Madowo, ‘Niger soldiers claim power after president’s own guards reportedly seize him’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html.

2 Peter Beaumont, ‘Gabon military officers declare coup after Ali Bongo wins disputed election’, The Guardian (31 August 2013) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/30/gabon-coup-military-takeover-gabonese-election-disputed.

3 The coup d’état in Gabon was the first in recent years in a member state of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). ECCAS condemned the coup on 31 August 2023 and announced that an ECCAS Peace and Security Council will be convened soon to discuss the issue: ECCAS, ‘Communique sur la Situation Politique au Gabon’ (30 August 2023) https://ceeac-eccas.org/2023/08/31/communique-sur-la-situation-politique-au-gabon/. The AU has suspended Gabon’s membership in the AU: see African Union, ‘Communique of the 1172nd of the PSC held on 31 August 2023, on the situation in the Republic of Gabon’ (31 August 2023) https://peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1172nd-of-the-psc-held-on-31-august-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-gabon. To the fact, however, that ECCAS’s ability to have an impact on the situation may be limited due to its close ties to Gabon, see Alexander Hudson and David Towriss, ‘Two More Coups in Africa: Similarities, Differences, and What Comes Next’, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (5 September 2023) www.idea.int/blog/two-more-coups-africa-similarities-differences-and-what-comes-next).

4 Declan Walsh, ‘Coast to coast, a corridor of coups brings turmoil in Africa’, New York Times (29 July 2023) www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/world/africa/africa-coups-niger.html.

5 See ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security’ (10 December 1999) https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Prevention-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf (Lomé Protocol).

6 Svenja Raube, Die antizipierte Einladung zur militärischen Gewaltanwendung im Völkerrecht (Nomos Verlag, 2023).

7 ‘Niger general Tchiani named head of transitional government after coup’, Al Jazeera (28 July 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/niger-general-tchiani-named-head-of-transitional-government-after-coup.

8 Paul Melly, ‘Niger’s coup leader General Tchiani: The ex-UN peacekeeper who seized power’, BBC News (10 August 2023) www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66430115.

9 ECOWAS Commission, ‘Fifty First Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger’ (Final Communique, 30 July 2023) https://ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Final-Communique_ENG-2_230730_161029.pdf.

10 ‘Niger coup: Burkina Faso, Mali warn against intervention’, DW (1 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-mali-warn-against-military-intervention-in-niger/a-66402134.

11 ECOWAS Commission, ‘Second Extraordinary Summit of the Ecowas Authority of Heads of State and Government on the Political Situation in Niger’ (Final Communique, 10 August 2023) https://ecowas.int/final-communique-second-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-of-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/.

12 Adam Taylor, ‘West African bloc says it is ready for “D-Day” intervention in Niger’, Washington Post (18 August 2023) www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/18/niger-ecowas-military-intervention-coup/.

13 ‘Niger coup leader proposes a three-year transition of power’, Al Jazeera (20 August 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/20/niger-coup-leader-proposes-three-year-transition-to-civilian-rule; Peter Beaumont, ‘African Union issues ambiguous view on possible Niger military intervention’, The Guardian (22 August 2023) www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention.

14 United Nations, ‘Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Niger’ (Press Release, 28 July 2023) https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15372.doc.htm#:~:text=The%20members%20of%20the%20Security%20Council%20called%20for%20the%20immediate,and%20members%20of%20his%20Government.

15 African Union, ‘Communique of the 1164th Meeting of the PSC held on 28 July 2023, on the Situation in the Republic of Niger’ (28 July 2023) www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1164th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-28-july-2023-on-the-situation-in-the-republic-of-niger.

16 Council of the European Union, ‘Statement by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on the Situation in Niger’ (28 July 2023) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/28/niger-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu/.

17 ‘Emmanuel Macron condamne “avec la plus grande fermeté” le coup d’État au Niger’, France 24 (28 July 2023) www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20230728-pour-la-france-la-tentative-de-coup-de-force-au-niger-n-est-pas-d%C3%A9finitive.

18 ‘Auswärtiges Amt zu den jüngsten Entwicklungen in Niger’, Auswärtiges Amt (27 July 2023) www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/-/2610290#:~:text=Wir%20verfolgen%20die%20Ereignisse%20in,und%20in%20ihre%20Unterk%C3%BCnfte%20zur%C3%BCckzukehren.

19 Matthew Miller, ‘Press Statement on Reports of an Attempted Takeover in Niger’, US Department of State (26 July 2023) www.state.gov/on-reports-of-an-attempted-takeover-in-niger/.

20 ‘African Union, world leaders condemn “attempted coup” in Niger’, Al Jazeera (26 July 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/african-union-world-leaders-condemn-attempted-coup-in-niger.

21 ‘World Bank “strongly condemns” efforts to destabilize Niger’, Reuters (26 July 2023) www.reuters.com/article/niger-security-worldbank-idAFL1N39C3FQ.

22 Security Council Press Statement (n 14).

23 United Nations, ‘Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General – on Niger’ (26 July 2023) www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-07-26/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-niger-scroll-down-for-french-0#:~:text=The%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20strongly%20condemns,his%20safety%20and%20well%2Dbeing.

24 ‘Niger coup: West African leaders suspend ties with junta’, DW (30 July 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-coup-west-african-leaders-suspend-ties-with-junta/a-66386858; Niamh Kennedy and Pierre Bairin, ‘African Union suspends Niger in crackdown over coup’, CNN (22 August 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/22/africa/african-union-suspends-niger-intl/index.html.

25 ‘Most of West Africa ready to join standby force in Niger: ECOWAS’, Al Jazeera (17 August 2023) www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/17/most-ecowas-members-ready-to-join-standby-force-in-niger-commissioner.

26 ‘Mali and Burkina Faso warn against any foreign military intervention in Niger’, Africa News (1 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/01/mali-and-burkina-faso-warn-against-any-foreign-military-intervention-in-niger/.

27 ‘Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali form military pact’, DW (25 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-burkina-faso-and-mali-form-military-pact/a-66628372#.

28 ‘Niger: Army delegation thanks Guinean government for “support” after coup’, Africa News (13 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/13/niger-army-delegation-thanks-guinean-government-for-support-after-coup/.

29 African Union (n 15).

30 African Union, ‘Communiqué of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Support of the 10 August 2023 ECOWAS Decisions Regarding Niger’ (Press Release, 11 August 2023) https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230811/communique-support-10-august-2023-ecowas-decisions-regarding-niger.

31 Beaumont (n 13).

32 ‘Algeria delves into Niger crisis, seeks support for compromise initiative’, The Arab Weekly (30 August 2023) https://thearabweekly.com/algeria-delves-niger-crisis-seeks-support-compromise-initiative. The Algerian president stressed that ‘a military intervention could ignite the whole Sahel region and Algeria will not use force with its neighbours’: see Beaumont (n 13).

33 France Diplomacy, ‘Niger – Communique issued by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs’ (10 August 2023) www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/niger/news/article/niger-communique-issued-by-the-ministry-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-10-08-23.

34 Antony J Blinken, ‘ECOWAS Call for Restoration of Constitutional Order in the Republic of Niger’, US Department of State (10 August 2023) www.state.gov/ecowas-call-for-restoration-of-constitutional-order-in-the-republic-of-niger/.

35 Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The Niger Coup and the Prospect of ECOWAS Military Intervention: An International Law Appraisal’, Lieber Institute, West Point (21 August 2023) https://lieber.westpoint.edu/niger-coup-ecowas-military-intervention-international-law-appraisal/.

36 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 47.

37 Buchan and Tsagourias furthermore point to the fact that such an authorisation is rather unlikely in the current moment, noting the fact ‘that the Council’s permanent veto-wielding members are engaged in a bitter and multifaceted competition’: see Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

38 Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

39 Claus Kreß and Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention in Current International Law: The Case of The Gambia in January 2017’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 239, 244–6.

40 For a pledge in favour, however, see W Michael Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)’ (1984) 78 American Journal of International Law 642, 643–4.

41 Kreß and Nußberger (n 39); Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

42 Olivier Corten, The Law Against War, The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law (Hart Publishing, 2nd edn 2021) 254; Georg Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ (2010) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law para 16; Chiara Redaelli, Intervention in Civil Wars: Effectiveness, Legitimacy and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2021) 67. Within the predominant view, positions diverge as to why intervention upon invitation falls outside the scope of Article 2(4) UN Charter. For a helpful overview of the diverging views, see Laura Visser, ‘May the Force Be with You: The Legal Classification of Intervention by Invitation’ (2019) 66 Netherlands International Law Review 21, 40–2. According to another view in the scholarship, an invitation has justificatory effect: see Florian Kriener, ‘Invitation – Excluding ab initio a Breach of Art. 2 (4) UNCh or a Preclusion of Wrongfulness?’ (2019) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht 643; Federica Paddeu, ‘Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons against Force: Consent as a Defence to the Prohibition of Force’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 227.

43 Erika de Wet, ‘Military Assistance based on Ex-Ante Consent: A Violation of Article 2(4) UN Charter?’ (2020) 93 Die Friedens-Warte 413, 414–5.

44 ‘Niger junta rejects African, UN diplomatic mission’, DW (8 August 2023) www.dw.com/en/niger-junta-rejects-african-un-diplomatic-mission/a-66457424.

45 Elise Barthet and Morgane Le Cam, ‘Niger: France was asked to intervene to free President Bazoum’, Le Monde (19 August 2023) www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/19/niger-confirms-france-was-asked-to-intervene-to-free-president-bazoum_6098979_4.html.

46 Mohamed Bazoum, ‘President of Niger: My country is under attack and I’ve been taken hostage’, Washington Post (3 August 2023) www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/03/mohamed-bazoum-coup-niger-democracy/.

47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 246; Erika de Wet, ‘The Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation in Africa and its Implications for the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2016) 26 The European Journal of International Law 979, 981.

48 Erika de Wet, Military Assistance on Request and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2020) 21.

49 Letizia Lo Giacco, ‘“Intervention by Invitation” and the Construction of the Authority of the Effective Control Test in Legal Argumentation’ (2019) 79 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 1.

50 Brad Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1999).

51 Philippe Gerard, ‘Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti’ (2004) 24(1) Journal of Conflict Studies 20.

52 Corten (n 42) 286.

53 Benjamin Nußberger, ‘Military Strikes in Yemen in 2015: Intervention by Invitation and Self-Defence in the Course of Yemen’s “Model Transitional Process”’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 110.

54 For a detailed analysis, see Kreß and Nußberger (n 39).

55 De Wet (n 48) 73.

56 Ibid, 67, who inter alia cites the following examples: the Afghan Transitional Authority negotiated under UN auspices in December 2001, the Iraqi Transitional Government of 2004, the Malian Transitional Government of 2012 (under ECOWAS), and the National Transitional Council of the Central African Republic of 2013 (under AU and ECCAS).

57 Corten (n 42) 277–80.

58 De Wet (n 48) 21.

59 Dalal Mawad, Sarah Dean and Sana Noor Haq, ‘Niger army endorses presidential coup plotters despite international condemnation’, CNN (27 July 2023) https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/27/africa/niger-army-backs-presidential-coup-intl/index.html.

60 Press Statement by the Security Council (n 14) (emphasis added).

61 Kreß and Nußberger (n 39) 249–50.

62 Claus Kreß, ‘Zur Lage des völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbotes’ (2019) 12 Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 460; Kreß and Nußberger (n 39) 249–50.

63 Omar Hammady, ‘Assessing the legality of ECOWAS planned military intervention in Niger’, EJIL: Talk! (6 September 2023) www.ejiltalk.org/assessing-the-legality-of-ecowas-planned-military-intervention-in-niger/.

64 Also, Hammady (n 63) points to the cases of Libya (in which the UNSC supported ‘the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate government of Libya’ and ‘call[ed] upon Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority’ (UNSC Res 2259, UN Doc S/RES/2259 (23 December 2015)), and the case of Yemen (in which the UNSC reaffirmed its ‘support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and reiterat[ed] its call to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine … the legitimacy of the President of Yemen’ (UNSC Res 2216, UN Doc S/RES/2216 (14 April 2015)).

65 UNSC Res 2337, UN Doc S/RES/2337 (19 January 2017) (emphasis added).

66 ‘Niger: Coup-instigating general declares himself new leader’, Le Monde (28 July 2023) www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/07/28/niger-coup-instigating-general-declares-himself-new-leader_6070445_4.html.

67 ECOWAS Commission, Final Communique (n 9).

68 ‘Niger: The future of ECOWAS at stake, according to the President of Guinea-Bissau’, Africa News (10 August 2023) www.africanews.com/2023/08/10/niger-the-future-of-ecowas-at-stake-according-to-the-president-of-guinea-bissau/.

69 Delegation of the European Union to Niger, ‘Niger: Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell on the Latest Developments’ (29 July 2023) www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/niger-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-latest-developments_en?s=113#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20does%20not,place%20unconditionally%20and%20without%20delay.

70 Hammady (n 63).

71 See n 26 – n 28.

72 De Wet (n 47) 992.

73 According to De Wet, this is particularly the case where the ‘competing entity claiming to constitute the de jure government has won elections against the incumbent regime and the election results have been widely endorsed by states and international organizations’, as was the case, for example, in the case of Gambia in 2017, ‘where the newly elected President was recognized as such by ECOWAS, the AU and the UNSC, despite the fact that the incumbent President was still contesting the election results and retained effective control (by refusing to leave office)’: see De Wet (n 48) 71.

74 Hammady (n 63).

75 The same conclusion is reached by Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

76 On the fact that a government may also be implicitly recognised by the establishment of diplomatic relations with it, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford University Press, 2001) 7.

77 Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

78 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, paras 46–7; Eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent (Routledge, 2013) 11. Buchan and Tsagourias however rightly point out that the ICJ in the Armed Activities case found an implicit treaty invitation based on an interpretation of the subsequent practice of both states and the absence of contradiction: see Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

79 Here, the President of Gambia called on ECOWAS, AU and UN ‘to support the government and people of the Gambia in enforcing their will, restore their sovereignty and constitutional legitimacy’: see Ruth Maclean, ‘Troops enter the Gambia after Adama Barrow is inaugurated in Senegal’, The Guardian (19 January 2023) www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/new-gambian-leader-adama-barrow-sworn-in-at-ceremony-in-senegal.

80 See Gerhard Hafner, Institut de Droit International, ‘Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law: Sub-Group on Intervention by Invitation’ (10th Commission, Session de Naples, 2009) 73 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 299, 402 (stating that another state organ of comparable rank can replace the head of state as the authority to issue consent, ‘in cases where the head of State was arrested by the rebels and prevented from performing its constitutional functions’) (emphasis added).

81 For the legal effect of such a declaration, and that such a declaration might mean a revocation of an invitation, see section 3.5.

82 The same conclusion is reached by Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

83 International Law Association, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 1155 UNTS 331, Article 7(2)(a)), which according to the IDI provides guidance in the identification of the state organ to issue consent: see Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 402.

84 Corten (n 42) 154–5; Georg Nolte, Eingreifen auf Einladung: Zur völkerrechtlichen Zulässigkeit des Einsatzes fremder Truppen im internen Konflikt auf Einladung der Regierung (Springer, 1999) 582.

85 Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 325.

86 See n 45.

87 Hammady (n 63).

88 The cases in which the collective security mechanism shall apply are according to Article 25: ‘a) In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof; b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; c) In case of internal conflict: (1) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or (2) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; d) In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law, e) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government; f) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council’: see Lomé Protocol (n 5).

89 Ibid, Articles 21 and 22.

90 Article 26 Lomé Protocol specifies that the bodies authorised to initiate the mechanism, however, include: the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, a member state, the AU and the UN.

91 See Lomé Protocol (n 5) Article 8.

92 See, e.g. David Wippman, ‘Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?’ (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 607, 615; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford University Press, 1963) 317–21; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol 1 (Longman, 9th edn 1992) 435, 446–7.

93 Lieblich (n 78) 10.

94 While the terms ‘anticipated’ or ‘anticipatory consent’, strictly speaking, seem to be a bit more comprehensive, since it is not excluded that an anticipated invitation could theoretically also take the form of a unilateral declaration, the term treaty-based consent is, however, accurate in terms of state practice and might simplify the topic. For a use of these terms in scholarship, see, e.g. Wippman (n 92); Agata Kleczkowska, ‘The Meaning of Treaty Authorisation and Ad Hoc Consent for the Legality of Military Assistance On Request’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 270.

95 Georg B Zotiades, Intervention by Treaty Right – Its Legality in Present Day International Law (Nicosia Geka Press, 1965) 32; Brad R Roth, ‘The Illegality of “Pro-Democratic” Invasion Pacts’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 328, 334, 337; Corten (n 42) 257; W Michael Reisman, ‘The Termination of the USSR’s Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran’ (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 144, 151–2; for an argument against any normative collision, see Aaron J Thomas and Ann Van Wynen Thomas, Non-Intervention, The Law and its Import in the Americas (Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) 92.

96 Brownlie (n 92) 317–21.

97 Jennings and Watts (n 92) 446–7.

98 Wippman (n 92) 615; Ademola Abass and Mashood Baderin, ‘Towards Effective Collective Security and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African Union’ (2002) 49 Netherlands International Law Review 1; Lieblich (n 78) 192–202; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge University Press, 6th edn 2017) 129.

99 The SS Wimbledon [17 August 1923] PCIJ Ser A No 1, 25.

100 Lieblich (n 78) 192–7; Visser (n 42) 30.

101 De Wet (n 43) 419–27; Kleczkowska (n 94) 270–91.

102 M Gerard Hafner, Institut de Droit international, ‘Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law: Sub-Group C – Military Assistance on Request (Tenth Commission, Session de Rhodes, 8 September 2011) Article 4(3): ‘If military assistance is based on a treaty, an ad hoc request is required for the specific case.’

103 Other possible functions would be the deterrence of potential adversaries and the protection of a status quo: for an enumeration of potential functions, see Kleczkowska (n 94) 272–3.

104 Such cases of conflict can be, for example, a foreign aggression, an internal conflict, or a humanitarian catastrophe on the territory of the inviting state.

105 It should be clarified, however, that such temporal proximity may also exist in the case of an anticipatory invitation, but that such temporal proximity here would seem rather coincidental.

106 However, there are also examples of ad hoc invitations issued in international treaties. For one of many examples, see the ‘Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq’ (17 November 2008) www.acq.osd.mil/log/LOG_CSD/.policies.html/SE_SOFA.pdf, in which Iraq requested temporary support from US forces.

107 See subsection 3.3. For an extensive study of state practice, see Raube (n 6) 156–311.

108 For a classical example, see the London Treaty of Guarantee signed by Britain, France and Russia in 1863 to protect the independence of Greece: cited in Jennings and Watts (n 92) 446.

109 For an overview, see Percy Henry Winfield, ‘The Grounds of Intervention in International Law’ (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law 159; Zotiades (n 95) 1.

110 Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (1921) LONTS 268, 401; Kleczkowska (n 94) 281–3.

111 However, it is important to mention that, strictly speaking, the Warsaw Pact was a collective defence treaty, although the Soviet Union arguably used it to justify the existence of an anticipatory invitation: see section 3.4(b).

112 Treaty of Guarantee (16 August 1960) 5475 UNTS 4, 4.

113 For the Turkish argument, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) para 226.

114 For the position of Cyprus, already before the invasion, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1098 (27 February 1964) paras 95–8, 101, 109–41. Even though Cyprus no longer explicitly asserted the invalidity of the treaty after the invasion, an interpretation of its position suggests that Cyprus still considered the Treaty of Guarantee to be invalid and, in the alternative, asserted the argument that in any case, the preconditions of the guarantee treaty were not met: see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) paras 202–13, 238.

115 For this position taken by Greece, for example, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) para 218.

116 For a more detailed analysis of the Cyprus case, see Raube (n 6) 186–97.

117 For the legal justification of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.2186 (5 January 1980) para 17. For the treaty, see Afghanistan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation (1978) 1145, I-17976 UNTS 333.

118 ACR 1978/79B. 684; ARB 1979, 5118: cited in Nolte (n 84) 400.

119 United States of America and Panama, Panama Canal Treaty (1977) 21086 UNTS 4; Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal (1977) 1161 UNTS 177.

120 George Bush, ‘Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama’, The American Presidency Project (20 December 1989) www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-announcing-united-states-military-action-panama. For the press statement, which, however, contained in particular the American justification, see Marian Nash Leich, ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law’ (1990) 84 American Journal of International Law 536, 548.

121 For the agreement, see Jeremy Levitt, ‘African Interventionist States and International Law’ in Roy May and Oliver Furley (eds), African Interventionist States (Routledge, 2001) 24.

122 Levitt (n 121) 26–7.

123 Letter dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/46/608 (30 October 1991) annex (Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Article 6).

124 Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the Chargé d' Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/26272 (6 August 1993) annex (Cotonou Agreement (25 July 1993), Article 8(3)).

125 Letter dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/50/790 (30 November 1995) annex (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

126 De Wet (n 43) 415.

127 Traité destiné à adapter et à confirmer les rapports d'amitié et de coopération entre la République française et la Principauté de Monaco (24 October 2002).

128 Bethan McKernan, Julian Borger and Dan Sabbagh, ‘Turkey unleashes airstrikes against Kurds in north-east Syria’, The Guardian (9 October 2019) www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/turkey-launches-military-operation-in-northern-syria-erdogan.

129 The Adana Agreement came into being in 1998, in response to a Turkish ultimatum by which Turkey demanded that Syria cease its support for the PKK. The international treaty includes provisions for joint cooperation against the PKK. In particular, the treaty obliges Syria not to allow or tolerate PKK activities on its territory, and both sides agreed to establish certain mechanisms to enforce the measures adopted. For a non-official version in English, see Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Minutes of the Agreement signed by Turkey and Syria in Adana’ (20 October 1999) www.mafhoum.com/press/50P2.htm. For further information, see Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour, ‘Border Nation: The Reshaping of the Syrian-Turkish Borderlands’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (March 2022) https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tokmajyan_Khaddour_Syria_Turkey_final.pdf.

130 Indeed, the Turkish use of force went far beyond the five-kilometre limit agreed in Annex 4: see also Claus Kreß, ‘A Collective Failure to Prevent Turkey’s Operation “Peace Spring” and NATO’s Silence on International Law’, EJIL: Talk! (14 October 2019) www.ejiltalk.org/a-collective-failure-to-prevent-turkeys-operation-peace-spring-and-natos-silence-on-international-law/.

131 Dan Kuwali, ‘The Rationale for Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge, 2014) 13, 15.

132 Kuwali (n 131) 16; Ben Kioko, ‘The Right of Intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 819.

133 Kuwali (n 131) 20.

134 ‘Constitutive Act of the African Union’ (Lomé, Togo, 11 July 2000) https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf, Article 4(h).

135 ‘Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union’ (11 July 2003) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/35423-treaty-0025_-_PROTOCOL_ON_THE_AMENDMENTS_TO_THE_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION_E.pdf; ‘List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union’ (16 July 2019) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/35423-sl-PROTOCOL%20ON%20THE%20AMENDMENTS%20TO%20THE%20CONSTITUTIVE%20ACT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf.

136 ‘Pacte d’Assistance Mutuelle entre les Etats Membres de la CEEAC’ (24 February 2000) www.droitcongolais.info/files/0.42.02.00-Pacte-d-assistance-mutuelle-du-24-fevrier-2000-entre-les-Etat-membres-de-la-CEEAC.pdf.

137 ‘Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region’ (30 November 2006) Article 4(8). By contrast, Article 11 para 3 d) of the SADC Protocol does not constitute an example of state practice for an anticipatory invitation, as it still expressly makes future intervention by the SADC dependent on additional authorisation by the UNSC, and therefore does not claim to have any independent legitimising effect detached from an ad hoc invitation.

138 See also David Wippman, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 797, 812.

139 See Lomé Protocol (n 5).

140 Pacte d’Assistance Mutuelle entre les Etats Membres de la CEEAC (n 136).

141 Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region (n 137).

142 Martin Kunschak, ‘The Role of the United Nations Security Council in the Implementation of Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge, 2014) 54, 62.

143 South African Development Community, ‘SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-Operation’ (14 August 2001) www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf.

144 Christian Walter, ‘Article 53’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford Commentaries on International Law, 3rd edn 2012) 1491, para 37.

145 See n 83.

146 ‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union’ (9 July 2002) www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf, Articles 16 and 17 (emphasis added).

147 Kunschak (n 142) 58.

148 Ibid; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’ (4 April 1949) www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm; Organization of American States, ‘The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance’ (2 September 1947) www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html.

149 Lomé Protocol (n 5) (emphasis added).

150 Claus Kreß, ‘The State Conduct Element’ in Claus Kreß and Stefan Barriga (eds), The Crime of Aggression, A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 498–9.

151 Dan Kuwali, The Responsibility to Protect: Implementation of Article 4(h) Intervention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 5.

152 Cited in Ademola Abass, Regional Organisations and the Development of Collective Security (Hart Publishing, 2004) 166.

153 African Union, ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus’ (7–8 March 2005) Ext/EX.CL/2(VII) 6.

154 While not an official AU statement, these were developed by a group of experts comprising interdisciplinary scholars, practitioners and policy makers led by the Human Rights Centre at the University of Pretoria: see ‘Principles on Ending Mass Atrocities pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union’, cited in Kuwali and Viljoen (n 131) 347.

155 Katharina Ziolkowski, Gerechtigkeitspostulate als Rechtfertigung von Kriegen (Nomos, 2008) 248–9.

156 Armed Activities (judgment) (n 78) para 46.

157 Jennings and Watts (n 92) 446–7; Dinstein (n 98) 129; Corten (n 42) 254.

158 See, e.g. Roth (n 95).

159 Nicaragua (merits) (n 47) paras 165, 199; Dinstein (n 98) 319–20; James A Green, ‘The “Additional” Criteria for Collective Self-Defence: Request But Not Declaration’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 4.

160 Interesting in this regard is a January 2018 debate on whether the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (19 January 1960) contains a ‘standing consent’, which has been rejected by the majority of doctrinal authors: see Craig Martin, ‘Japan’s definition of armed attack and “bloody nose” strikes against North Korea’, Just Security (1 February 2018) www.justsecurity.org/51678/japans-definition-armed-attack-bloody-nose-strikes-north-korea/; Kevin Jon Heller, ‘No, there is no international legal basis for the “bloody nose” strategy’, Opinio Juris (22 January 2018) http://opiniojuris.org/2018/01/22/33412/; Michael Schmitt and Ryan Goodman, ‘Best advice for policymakers on “bloody nose” strike against North Korea: It’s illegal’, Just Security (23 January 2018) and, from a Japanese perspective, Masahiro Kurosaki, ‘The “bloody nose” strategy, self-defence and international law: A view from Japan’, Lawfare (15 February 2018) www.lawfaremedia.org/article/bloody-nose-strategy-self-defense-and-international-law-view-japan.

161 Examples of bilateral treaties which contain an ad hoc consent requirement are the defence treaty between the USA and Liberia (1959), the defence treaties of Great Britain with Malta (1954) and Mauritius (1968), or the defence treaty between Djibouti and France (1982). Among the treaties of regional organisations, examples are Article 6 of the Pact of the League of Arab States (1945), Article 3(2) of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947), the ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance, and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. For further evidence, see Raube (n 6) 292–3.

162 Where defence treaties do not explicitly stipulate such a consent requirement, they usually refer to Article 51 of the UN Charter instead: see, for example, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) (n 148); Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (1955) 219 UNTS 3, 8); Article 42(7) EU Treaty (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union (2010)) or Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty (1960) (n 160). By making the reference, states show that they wish to act within the limits of the right of self-defence as recognised in international law: see n 159. The ICJ’s jurisprudence shows a tendency towards an ad hoc request for assistance due to the fact that the ICJ also considers the notification of the case of attack to be a requirement of customary international law, which can logically only take place in temporal proximity to the case of attack: for further evidence, see Raube (n 6) 293–310.

163 Examples can be found in the field of health declarations (living wills, organ donation declarations, etc). For an analysis of anticipatory consent in domestic law, focused on German and English criminal law but also in comparison to other legal systems, see Raube (n 6) 333–419.

164 Nolte (n 84) 474, 590; Raube (n 6) 429–30.

165 Raube (n 6) 427–36, 531–7.

166 According to the opposing view, a valid invitation constitutes a defence of the prohibition of the use of force, see n 42.

167 This question, however, becomes relevant at a later point: see section 3.5(a). Advocates of the view according to which an intervention by invitation violates the prohibition of the use of force, but according to which the invitation constitutes a defence, must solve the problem differently, see Paddeu (n 42) 227.

168 Nicaragua (merits) (n 47) para 205. For further detail, see Lieblich (n 78) 43–4.

169 For further detail, see Raube (n 6) 445–51.

170 See section 3.4(b).

171 Lieblich (n 78) 200–1; Tom J Farer, ‘A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention’ in Lori F Damrosch (ed), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993) 316, 332; Peter E Harrell, ‘Modern-Day Guarantee Clauses and the Legal Authority of Multinational Organizations to Authorize the Use of Military Force’ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 417, 429; Georg Nolte, ‘Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict’ (1993) 53 Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht 622, 626. For the opposing view, see, e.g. Diana Amnéus, Responsibility to Protect by Military Means – Emerging Norms on Humanitarian Intervention? (Doctoral Thesis, Stockholm University, 2008) 461; also critical of this view, see Walter (n 144).

172 Kleczkowska (n 94) 273.

173 Kleczkowska (n 94) 288.

174 De Wet (n 43) 413–27.

175 For a background, see Eliav Lieblich, ‘The Soviet Intervention in Hungary ­– 1956’ in Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten and Alexandra Hofer (eds), The Use of Force and International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 48–66.

176 For a background, see Antonio Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict (Dordrecht, 1993) 160–2; Gerhard Hafner, ‘The Intervention in Czechoslovakia – 1968’ in Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten and Alexandra Hofer (eds), The Use of Force and International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 143–57.

177 For a background, see Georg Nolte and Janina Barkholdt, ‘The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan – 1979-80’ in Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten and Alexandra Hofer (eds), The Use of Force and International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 298.

178 Wippman (n 92) 681; Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The US Intervention in Panama – 1989’ in Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten and Alexandra Hofer (eds), The Use of Force and International Law: A Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 433.

179 Eliav Lieblich, ‘Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements’ (2011) 29 Boston University International Law Journal 337, 367.

180 Levitt (n 121) 26–7.

181 Hammady (n 63).

182 Raube (n 6) 492–6. This relationship of subsidiarity is also well known in domestic law.

183 For more detail on the case of Hungary, see Raube (n 6) 167–72. For the argument of the Soviet Union in this case, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.754 (4 November 1956) para 53. On the case of Czechoslovakia, see Raube (n 6) 180–6. For the argument of the Soviet Union, see UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1443 (22 August 1968) para 169.

184 See Article 4 (n 127).

185 For an extensive analysis of state practice, see Raube (n 6) 160–238.

186 See, e.g. UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.1781 (20 July 1974) para 218.

187 See, e.g. UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.746 (28 October 1956) paras 78–9 (Great Britain); para 90 (France).

188 This is due to the fact that the exercise of the right to collective self-defence is subsidiary to an intervention on the basis of an invitation of the territorial state, when force is used against non-state actors. If the goal of ending a non-state armed attack can be effectively achieved through coordinated military action with the territorial state, this path must in principle be followed because only this path can reconcile the requirements of protecting the sovereignty of both the victim state and the territorial state: see Claus Kreß, ‘The fine line between collective self-defence and intervention by invitation: Reflections on the use of force against “IS” in Syria’, Just Security (17 February 2015) www.justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-force-isil-syria/; Laura Visser, ‘Intervention by Invitation and Collective Self-Defence: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 292, 311–2.

189 Raube (n 6) 170–2.

190 While in the case of Hungary the Soviet Union tried to use the Warsaw Treaty as an anticipatory invitation, in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union invoked the Warsaw Treaty in support of a right of collective self-defence. Since, however, the doctrine of collective self-defence seems to recognise that there must be an ad hoc request by the victim state (see section 3.4(a)), the Soviet attempt to establish ad hoc consent in the case of Czechoslovakia is all the more explainable.

191 Raube (n 6) 204.

192 Kreß and Nußberger show that a coup or attempted coup in the sense of Article 25 e) Lomé Protocol presupposes that the government to be overthrown has already been installed. In the situation of Gambia, Barrow, however, was not installed as president of Gambia until 19 January 2017 at the earliest. The situation threatening democracy in Gambia was therefore not a coup or attempted coup, but the ‘refusal of a deselected Head of State to respect a democratically legitimate election result’: see Kreß and Nußberger (n 39) 247.

193 This was put forward as an argument by Hammady: see Hammady (n 63).

194 ‘Niger: Junta threatens immediate response to any “aggression”’, Le Monde (4 August 2023) www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/04/niger-junta-threatens-immediate-response-to-any-aggression_6079637_4.html.

195 However, the protest would have to be interpreted as a revocation of any existing invitation of Niger, if the military junta were the recognised government of Niger (which is not the view taken in this article): see sections 2 and 4.

196 Nina Wilén and Paul D Williams, ‘The African Union and Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Burundi’ (2018) 4 Journal of Modern African Studies 686; De Wet (n 43) 421–2. It remains to be seen whether the situation in Niger (2023) will become another case in which an African regional organisation could potentially invoke an anticipatory intervention clause – which will have to be examined (see section 4) – and ultimately does not do so.

197 Hammady (n 63). For the criticism of states, see De Wet (n 43) 421.

198 Wilén and Williams (n 196) 673.

199 African Union, Peace and Security Council, ‘Communiqué of the 571st Meeting of the PSC, at the Level of Heads of State and Government, on the Situation in Burundi’ (29 January 2016) PSC/AHG/COMM.3 (DLXXI) para 11a.

200 Ibid, paras 10, 11a).

201 Wilén and Williams (n 196) 680, 687, who also show that the case of Burundi has been assessed in very different ways. While some commentators were concerned that the non-deployment of MAPROBU could have weakened the AU’s credibility, others pointed out that the Burundi case was able to demonstrate the organisation’s fundamental willingness to intervene in an escalating crisis through its mandate. It has also been suggested that the threatened activation of Article 4 h) AU-CA could have prevented the conflict from escalating even further: see Wilén and Williams (n 196) 692.

202 This is due to the fact that all African states are members of the AU: for an overview, see African Union, ‘Member States’, https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2.

203 See section 3.3(b).

204 This has been stressed by Nolte as a consequence of the view which always requires supplementary ad hoc consent, when commenting on the Rhodes Resolution of the IDI: see Georg Nolte, ‘The Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on Military Assistance on Request’ (2012) 45 Revue belge de droit international 255.

205 See section 3.5.

206 Hammady (n 63).

207 See section 3.5(c).

208 See, e. g. Amnéus (n 171) 461. Also critical of this view, see Walter (n 144).

209 Lieblich (n 78) 200–1; Farer (n 171) 332; Peter E Harrell, ‘Modern-Day Guarantee Clauses and the Legal Authority of Multinational Organizations to Authorize the Use of Military Force’ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International Law 417, 429; Georg Nolte, ‘Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict’ (1993) 53 Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht 622, 626.

210 Thomas and Thomas (n 95) 91.

211 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (advisory opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 164; Erika de Wet, ‘The Evolving Role of ECOWAS and the SADC in Peace Operations: A Challenge to the Primacy of the United Nations Security Council in Matters of Peace and Security?’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 353, 356; Nolte (n 84) 210.

212 Walter (n 144) para 37.

213 This view is, however, taken by Hammady (n 63).

214 Similarly, see Wippman (n 92) 654.

215 Hammady (n 63), who points to the fact that this is particularly true since the prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm. Indeed, the prohibition of the use of force can be – at least in its core – regarded as a peremptory norm: see n 230.

216 David Wippman, ‘Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 293, 319. To the fact that the Dayton Agreement embodies a borderline case between anticipatory and ad hoc invitation, see Raube (n 6) 214–8.

217 Raube (n 6) 547.

218 This can also be inferred from the ICJ’s reasoning in the Armed Activities case (see Armed Activities (judgment) (n 78) para 47) and also from the UNSC’s reaction to the revocation of the DRC's invitation in the 1999 Congo conflict. Following the DRC’s revocation of its invitation, the UNSC not only called in its resolutions for Uganda and Rwanda to withdraw immediately from the DRC, but also explicitly considered the continued presence of troops from that point on as a violation of the DRC’s territorial integrity and sovereignty: see UNSC Res 1332, UN Doc S/RES/1332 (14 December 2000) para 10; UNSC Res 1341, UN Doc S/RES/1341 (22 February 2001) para 2; UNSC Res 1355, UN Doc S/RES/1355 (15 June 2001) para 3.

219 Armed Activities (judgment) (n 78) para 47.

220 See Rhodes Resolution (n 102) Article 5.

221 See, e.g. ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1999) vol I(1), para 40.

222 See Corten (n 42) 274; Lieblich (n 78) 192–4.

223 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.746 (28 October 1956) paras 20, 156.

224 UNSC Verbatim Record, UN Doc S/PV.754 (4 November 1956); UNGA Res 1004, UN Doc A/RES/1004 (4 November 1956).

225 De Wet (n 48) 165.

226 Rhodes Resolution (n 102) Article 5 (emphasis added).

227 Wippman (n 92) 647; Farer (n 171) 341; Lieblich (n 78) 193–4; Redaelli (n 42) 91.

228 De Wet (n 48) 165.

229 VCLT (n 83) Article 54.

230 A part of the international law doctrine assumes that the prohibition of the use of force embodies jus cogens in its entirety: Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 27; Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 91; Corten (n 42) 200–12. But another part of the doctrine, including the ILC, convincingly argues that at any rate the prohibition of aggression as the core of the prohibition of the use of force constitutes jus cogens: see Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Ius cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988) 356. See also ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 85, Article 26, commentary para 5, 112–3, Article 40, commentary para 4.

231 Hafner, Institut de Droit International (n 80) 329.

232 UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), UN Doc A/RES/3314 (14 December 1974).

233 See in particular Article 17 of the original draft articles, which regarded the ‘treaty of alliance or of military co-operation’ as one of the types of treaties in which an implicit right of termination should arise from the nature of the contract: see ‘Report of Sir Humphrey Waldock’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963) vol II, 64.

234 De Wet (n 48) 155; David Barthel, Die neue Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union (Springer, 2012) 247.

235 See section 2.2(b).

236 Raube (n 6).

237 This is at least the case if one assumes that the protective effect of the prohibition of the use of force does not cease completely in the case of a failed state. For this view, see Matthias Herdegen, ‘Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt im Völkerrecht: “The failed state’” in Daniel Thürer, Matthias Herdegen and Gerhard Hohloch (eds), Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: ‘The failed state’ (Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 34, 1995) 60. For the contrary view, see Robin Geiß, Failed States: Die normative Erfassung gescheiterter Staaten (Duncker und Humblot 2005) 123–36.

238 Dinstein (n 98) 129–30; Lieblich (n 78) 163–5, 196.

239 See, e.g. ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1979) vol II(2), Article 29, paras 11, 14.

240 Abass points out, for example, that in this way the African Union could also intervene in a failed state in the presence of the ‘grave circumstances’ of Article 4 h) AU-CA and thereby save it from atrocities on its territory under certain circumstances: Abass (n 152) 204.

241 Lieblich (n 78) 196.

242 Ibid, 216.

243 See section 2.2(b).

244 See section 2.2(b) (Haiti 1994, Sierra Leone 1997-1998, Yemen 2015 and Gambia 2017).

245 See De Wet (n 48) 65, who inter alia points to the military coups in Egypt (2013), Thailand (2014), and Zimbabwe (2017).

246 The right of a state to choose its political, economic, and social system has already been established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua judgment: see Nicaragua (merits) (n 47) para 258. See also the UN General Assembly in the Friendly Relations Declaration: UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), UN Doc A/RES/2625 (24 October 1970).

247 Redaelli (n 42) 258.

248 Wippman (n 92) 676–7; Redaelli (n 42) 259.

249 See De Wet (n 48) 31–68, also pointing to examples of coups within OAS states.

250 De Wet (n 48) 63–5.

251 While it could be considered that such a possibility might have been created by the new variant of Article 4 (h) AU-KA by the Amendment 2003, however, this new variant would only protect the ‘legitimate order’, without making explicit reference to a democratic order, as the Lomé Protocol.

252 Raube (n 6) 238–46.

253 Lieblich (n 78) 202. For an analysis of this argument, see Raube (n 6) 559–89.

254 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Article 2(1)’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford Commentaries on International Law, 3rd edn 2012) 155, paras 51–2; Coman Kenny and Sean Butler, ‘The Legality of “Intervention by Invitation” in Situations of R2P Violations’ (2018) 51 International Law and Politics 156.

255 Lieblich (n 78) 173.

256 Wippman (n 92) 679; John-Mark Iyi, Humanitarian Intervention and the AU-ECOWAS Intervention Treaties: Towards a Theory of Regional Responsibility to Protect (Springer, 2016) 265.

257 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006).

258 Ibid; Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights, The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 1.

259 Although the state practice on humanitarian intervention is complex, the figure of humanitarian intervention is (still) predominantly rejected by states as a legal basis: see Claus Kreß, ‘Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force’ (2014) 1 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 11, 19–37.

260 To the contrary, some scholars regard treaty-based intervention clauses such as Article 4(h) AU-CA as the normative claim of a regional right to humanitarian intervention: see, e.g. Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 4th edn 2018) 56; John-Mark Iyi, ‘The AU/ECOWAS Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Legal Regimes and the UN Charter’ (2013) 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 489.

261 UNGA Res 60/1, UN Doc A/60/1 (24 October 2005) 30, paras 138–9.

262 See Article 4(8) (n 137).

263 Mohamed Helal, ‘Crisis in The Gambia: How Africa is Rewriting Jus ad Bellum’, Opinio Juris (24 January 2017) http://opiniojuris.org/2017/01/24/crisis-in-the-gambia-how-africa-is-rewriting-jus-ad-bellum/; Dan Kuwali, ‘The Meaning of “Intervention” under Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge, 2014) 33; Ademola Abass, ‘Calibrating the Conceptual Contours of Article 4(h)’ in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds), Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (Routledge, 2014) 43; Barthel (n 234) 251.

264 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (Report, 1 December 2001) para 4.1.

265 Iyi (n 256) 265; Wippman (n 92) 679.

266 Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, ‘Remarks at Breakfast Roundtable with Foreign Ministers on ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Responding to Imminent Threats of Mass Atrocities’ (23 September 2011); Eliav Lieblich, Intervention in Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent (Columbia University, Doctoral Thesis, 2012) 318–9, 322–3.

267 Lieblich (n 78) 202.

268 Lieblich (n 267) 348.

269 WSOD (n 262) paras 138–9.

270 Raube (n 6) 579.

271 See also Kreß (n 188).

272 It could be argued that in this case such an ad hoc invitation was already issued by President Bazoum himself in early August: see section 2.2(b).

273 Buchan and Tsagourias (n 35).

274 Hammady (n 63).

275 See n 44.

276 This view has also been taken in a previous analysis: see Svenja Raube, ‘An international law assessment of ECOWAS’ threat to use force in Niger’, Just Security (16 August 2023) www.justsecurity.org/87659/an-international-law-assessment-of-ecowas-threat-to-use-force-in-niger/.

277 See section 2.1.

278 Ovigwe Eguegu, ‘Crisis in Niger: West Africa at the cusp of a proxy war’, Observer Research Foundation (5 August 2023) www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/crisis-in-niger-west-africa-at-the-cusp-of-a-proxy-war/; Méryl Demuynck and Mathis Böhm, ‘Unravelling the Niger coup and its implications for violent extremism in the Sahel’, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (4 August 2023) www.icct.nl/publication/unravelling-niger-coup-and-its-implications-violent-extremism-sahel; Hammady (n 63).

279 Raube (n 6).