Is security still the chiefest enemy? The challenges and contradictions in European confidence- and security-building in the Cold War

ABSTRACT

The regime of Confidence- (and Security-) Building Measures (C(S)BMs) represented an effort to re-imagine Arms Control in Europe and reduce the possibility of unwanted escalation due to misunderstanding or misperception. The regime was first developed during the Cold War due to concerns about large-scale military exercises, and its ongoing importance has come into sharp relief given that NATO and Russia have increasingly engaged in similar manoeuvres. However, despite the C(S)BMs, military exercises represented a point of conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union, and there is little indication that the regime led to the development of confidence in the benign intent of other participants. What prevented this from occurring? This paper compares the theory and logic of confidence-building with the negotiations around the CSBMs, highlighting three primary points of discontinuity that undermined the ability of the regime to fully deliver on its potential. The competitive nature of negotiation about its terms resulted in incomplete transparency, the conflation of the concepts of ‘confidence’ and ‘security’ shifted the focus towards assessing an adversary’s military capability rather than intent, and the regime’s inflexibility meant that it did not account for technological changes that otherwise altered understanding of proximate threat.

KEYWORDS:

• Confidence-building
• security-building
• European security
• threat perception
• transparency
• defence policy

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the Reviewers and Editors for their diligent and thoughtful comments and their assistance in bringing this article to publication. The author is also grateful to the panellists, discussant, and audience at the Atlantic Provinces Political Science Association Conference 2021 for their support in honing this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The 1983 General Policy Considerations of the North Atlantic Council in October (North Atlantic Council, 1983, p. 1) stated that ‘The West should aim at reducing the risks of political and military instability caused by the Warsaw Pact’s conventional force superiority in Europe’ and listed seven objectives: Increase openness by accustoming Eastern countries to exchanging information and accepting observation and inspection of military activities; Reduce ability of Eastern countries to maintain secrecy; Promote stability and inhibit use of force for political purpose; Promote agreed standards and patterns of routine military activity through establishment of clear guidelines for reporting, and possibly limiting, the size and scope of military activity; Contribute to reducing the risk of a surprise attack by making it difficult for the East both to comply with the CSBMs and to mount an effective attack; Facilitate political decisions by Allies on military action in periods of tensions or crisis; Where applicable, to help monitor and verify compliance with commitments.’

2 See, for example, the complaints in 1989 about the designations of Soviet troops that were engaging in exercises not matching their peacetime designations (Krohn, 1990, p. 519). By giving units special designations for the duration of exercises, rather than continuing to use the usual peacetime name of a regiment, it was more difficult for observers to gain an accurate picture of which troops were exercising and make assessments as to the military’s structure, strategy, and capability.

3 Soviet perceptions about the possibility that Able Archer 86 was, in reality, preparation for offensive action represented the most dangerous incident of this type, albeit there is some debate as to the true extent of the Soviet concerns (Heuser, 2018).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thomas Hughes

Thomas Hughes is the McKenna School Post-Doctoral Fellow at Mount Allison University, and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba. His research focuses on threat perception, in particular the way in which the military is used and understood as a signalling mechanism, and North American defence policy.