Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan

ABSTRACT

Saudi Arabia’s soft power is visible in Pakistan because of the historic relations between Riyadh and Islamabad but the erstwhile scholarship mainly focuses on its hard power and the strategic dynamics of its relationship with Pakistan. This paper aims to bridge the gap by investigating how Riyadh uses various soft power instruments and how they are received in Pakistan. Understanding its centrality in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia has been investing in the following inter-connected soft power instruments: religion, culture, history, Islamic education, and diplomacy by dominating the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

KEYWORDS:

• Saudi Arabia
• Pakistan
• soft power
• Islam
• diplomacy

1. Introduction

For roughly 1.8 billion Muslims around the world, Saudi Arabia is a sacred place being home to the two holiest cities for Muslims, i.e. Mecca and Madina (Ismaik 2020). As the Khadim ul-Haramain us-Sharifain (custodians of the two holy cities and grand mosques in Mecca and Medina), the position currently held by the King of Saudi Arabia), the Saudi leadership has taken a central place in the Muslim world (Ummah). In 1986, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, altered the title of Saudi monarchs from king to ‘custodians of the Two Holy Mosques’, entitling them to a particular place in the Muslim world (Ottaway 2008). Because of its centrality in the Arab and Muslim world, Saudi Arabia was ranked 24^th in the Global Soft Power Index in 2021 (BrandFinance 2021). Quite surprisingly, there is no mention of the Kingdom in the Soft Power 30 Index in which Turkey was the only majority Muslim country ranked 29^th in 2019.¹ The concept of soft power in Saudi Arabia was introduced by King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz who remained the ruler between 2005 and 2015 (Alkatheeri and Khan 2019). As Saudi Arabia has been leveraging its status in the Ummah and places significance on soft power in its foreign policy (Alobaidy 2021), it is important to examine how that works out in key Muslim states. Pakistan could serve as an ideal case study to investigate Saudi Arabia’s soft power because it is the second largest majority Muslim state after Indonesia and most of its Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, just like Saudi Arabia, and it enjoys close economic and security cooperation with the Kingdom. Due to this, it is not surprising that the Kingdom influences Pakistan, which needs to be comprehensively examined vis-à-vis soft power. This study aims to answer the following questions: What are Saudi Arabia’s instruments of soft power in Pakistan? What linkages exist between various soft power instruments used by the Kingdom?

The concept of soft power gained prominence at the end of the Cold War. It was mainly because of the realization that it is costly to use hard power resources in international politics (Chong 2015). As a result, soft power has become a strategic priority, allowing states to exert influence in other states without military interventions or economic coercion. Joseph Nye, who formally introduced the idea to the study of international relations, believed that the United States could maintain its hegemony despite global shifts that increased the relative power of other nations by making better use of its soft power resources. He differentiated between soft and hard power in the following manner: ‘second component of power – which occurs when one country gets others to want what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with hard power or command power of ordering others to do what it wants’ (Nye 1990, p. 166). Nye (2008) also believed that a country’s soft power capabilities can be developed by carefully combining three national resources: culture, political principles, and foreign policies. The core concept is that through producing respect, adoration, and legitimacy in international relations, these resources can be utilized to boost a country’s international appeal. Despite the wider recognition of the concept of soft power, some scholars have either found it irrelevant or insufficient. Realists like Manor and Golan (2020) believe that soft power has become irrelevant due to heightened competition between the US and China. In terms of further criticism of soft power or over reliance on it, Li (2018) believes that it is difficult to measure soft power, unlike hard power.

States seeking soft power use various tools, such as cooperation with political parties and think tanks, to gain influence among foreign audiences (Spry 2016). In Saudi Arabia’s case, the presence of the two holiest places of Islam within the Kingdom makes it the center of Islam for millions of Muslims, especially Sunnis, around the world. Moreover, every year from across the world Muslim pilgrims congregate in the city of Mecca for pilgrimage (hajj), an Islamic ritual which is mandatory for Muslims once in a lifetime if their health and financial situation allows. As the Saudi government remains the principal administrator of the hajj organization and logistics, it holds a unique (sacred) position within the Ummah (Al-Kodmany 2009). This international stature of the Kingdom further facilitates its role in facilitating development, peace and stability at regional and international levels. Saudi Arabia contributes towards such initiatives by providing financial aid to states beset by economic and humanitarian crises, and by assuming the role of a mediator at domestic, bilateral, and multilateral levels (Kamrava 2013). These endeavors have been framed as benevolent hegemony where a regional or global hegemon impacts its sphere of influence but through tools of soft power (Snidal 1985). This is again something that this research endeavors to investigate.

There is some erstwhile literature on Saudi Arabia’s soft power. Gallarotti and Al-Filali’s work is the most relevant for this research endeavor as it focuses on Saudi Arabi’s soft power. The authors argue that Saudi Arabia derives its soft power from being the cultural capital of the Arab and Muslim worlds (Gallarotti and Al-Filali 2012). In general, scholarship exclusively dealing with Saudi soft power has remained scant. Studies have, however, elaborated on Saudi Arabia’s attempts to promote Wahhabism across the world by funding and sponsoring religious activities and Islamic causes (Mandaville 2022). The work of Ardovini (2022) focuses on how the Kingdom instrumentalizes religion (Islam) as a tool to gain political influence within the Ummah especially to counter Iran. Scholarship also exists on Saudi Arabia’s instrumentalization of diplomacy and mediation in conflict resolution (Kamrava 2013, Rieger 2016). Since the implementation of Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has introduced new diplomatic tools, including sports diplomacy, to add another dynamic to promote its soft power beyond the Muslim world (Ettinger 2023, Davis et al. 2023). This scholarship does cover aspects that fall under the domain of soft power but does not succinctly frame Saudi Arabia’s foreign influence and engagement as soft power. One cannot fully capture Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Muslim world by ignoring its soft power for which the Kingdom has mobilized a variety of instruments, including diplomacy and aid.

As mentioned above, there is literature on Saudi Arabia’s ideologically driven cultural influence but that does not capture the full extent of how various soft power tools are employed and received in a target country. We believe that Pakistan offers an ideal case study to examine Saudi Arabia’s soft power because of the deep-rooted bilateral relations encompassing cooperation in cultural, economic, diplomacy and security areas. In terms of the population, Pakistan is the second largest majority Muslim state after Indonesia but a major country where Saudi Arabia has consistently been trying to maintain its influence (Ahmed 2019). Scholarship on Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan, the previous literature looks at components of soft power, including cultural/religious influence (Weinbaum and Khurram 2014), but does not systematically employ the concept of soft power. The erstwhile literature mainly focuses on factors like religion, trade, security cooperation and their influence on the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Ahmad and Faisal 2016, Ahmed 2019, Ahmed and Akbarzadeh 2020). For instance, without examining Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan, a previous study found Saudi Arabia’s use of hard power strategies, including economic coercion, to force Pakistan to join its military coalition against the Yemeni Houthis (Ahmed 2019). Similarly, another study has found that Pakistan’s economic dependence on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries plays a major role in its foreign policy choices, and this is evident in the case of Pakistan not being able to maintain neutrality in the Saudi-Iranian conflict (Ahmed and Akbarzadeh 2020). While there have been several studies on Saudi Arabia’s hard power influence, there is no study that has examined the significance of soft power in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and how the Kingdom uses various soft power tools. This study aims to bridge this gap by investigating the extent to which the Kingdom has mobilized soft power instruments. This study however also aims to move beyond examining what soft power tools Saudi Arabia has been using in Pakistan to see what impact the Kingdom has achieved in terms of achieving its foreign policy goals in Pakistan. A key goal of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has been to maintain its centrality in the Muslim world; therefore, it has been using religion as an instrument in its foreign policy (Dekmejian 1994, Hammond 2018).

This paper begins with a section examining the significance of this research concerning not only the literature on soft power but also the significance of soft power in terms of achieving more than just influence on audiences. This section also provides our research methodology. This follows an overview of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Pakistan. Then, this paper moves to the analytical section in which we examine soft power instruments employed by Saudi Arabia and their effectiveness in Pakistan. Finally, we examine how Saudi Arabia’s modernization might affect its soft power in the Muslim world.

2. Research significance and methodology

The nature of a soft power and its political instrumentalization by a state create a regime of leverage that in turn dictates its relationship with the less powerful state. This leverage then is the outcome of a state’s soft power resources which enables it with an ability to punish (Freeman 2010, p. 125). This definition of leverage is relatively limited as it implies only a coercive understanding of the term. Hathaway frames leverage in a carrot and stick model where states can either offer rewards or threaten/punish (coercion) to convince the other side to do an act that it will otherwise not do (Hathaway 2017, p. 31). The formulation of a comprehensive regime of leverage remains directly proportional to the nature and scale of a country’s soft power but also the viability and effectiveness of its power conversion strategies and the associated infrastructure. Indeed, a regime of leverage cannot solely be sustained based on soft power resources as sources and tools of hard power are often involved in bilateral equations. Soft power can interact with hard power to either enhance its resultant impact or to fill in for its absence. Similarly hard power can be operationalized through indirect and symbolic steps while soft power can be characterized by relatively direct and concrete measures. Both forms of power are also not mutually exclusive and often have shared implications (Henne 2022, pp. 95–96). Thus, states tend to complement their soft power with their hard power resources. There is also erstwhile literature that has examined the soft power-hard power nexus, for instance, concerning Iran’s influence in Afghanistan (Akbarzadeh et al. 2023). Yet soft power resources remain critically important in terms of creating long-term political, cultural and economic opportunity structures which then can eventually translate into leverage within a target nation. The advantage of soft power is that it has a much longer shelf life concerning its impact and influence as compared to hard power which can offer immediate short-term gains.

The political instrumentalization of Saudi religious instruments has been correlated with the broader geopolitics of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has created several religious organizations primarily in this backdrop particularly as it faced political competition from Nasserite Egypt in the 1960s which emerged as the flagbearer of Arab Nationalism. Thereby these religious organizations have been instrumental in transforming the Kingdom’s soft power as the home of Islam into political legitimacy for the Saudi rulers. This resultantly increased the personal prestige and status of Saudi decision-makers within the broader Muslim world while also helping them achieve foreign policy objectives (Korany and Fattah 2010). As our analysis later explains, Pakistan has been a key target state of this Saudi religious infrastructure. By instrumentalizing Islam, for instance, through the promotion of religious education, religious diplomacy, and influence in domestic politics, Saudi Arabia has achieved a special leverage vis-à-vis the state of Pakistan. The promotion of Islamic education has been achieved through consistent investments in building religious schools across Pakistan. Another dynamic is that of religious diplomacy which has been central to Saudi Arabia’s soft power instruments. The religious diplomacy enacted through various Saudi supported religious organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and through Saudi religious officials impressed upon Pakistani political and military elites the centrality of the Saudi Kingdom in the Muslim World. Lastly, by fostering inter-personal ties with Pakistani civil and military elites, Saudi Arabia has managed to ensure that it would never remain a bystander in Pakistan’s political affairs but would be able to affect the turn of events within the country. As this paper argues, soft power has played a key role in Saudi Arabia’s influence not only in Pakistan but also in its hegemony in the Muslim world as it manages to gain the support of key actors in the Muslim world like Pakistan. While there is no shortage of literature on soft power, there is very little scholarship available that has managed to assess impacts at domestic and foreign policy levels. We believe our research provides enough empirical evidence to suggest how states reap the benefits of investing in religious soft power beyond achieving goodwill in a target country. By doing so, Saudi Arabia has been able to achieve its geopolitical gains in the Middle East or the larger Muslim world. We believe the same approach can be replicated to understand the soft power of other countries that base their soft power strategies around religious ideologies.

Considering the religiously driven nature of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy towards the Muslim world, this study focuses on the following instruments of soft power: religion, culture and history; Islamic education; domestic politics; and diplomacy. By doing so, we also explore the interlinkages among all these instruments. Another focus of this research was to gauge the impact of Saudi Arabia’s various soft power instruments; therefore, we equally focus on domestic and external dynamics. In terms of research methodology, this research relied on primary data collected through official documents, including ministries of foreign affairs, and relevant speeches of leaders and other public figures from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In addition, this research has also relied on a thorough examination of secondary data comprising of previously published work, and media reports. In terms of the timeline, the analysis in this paper covers the period from the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 to August 2023.

3. An overview of the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relationship

Because of being home to Mecca and Madina, Saudi Arabia plays a significant role in the Muslim world. As an Islamic country, Pakistan sees its relationship with Saudi Arabia as special. Since 1947, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have maintained strong political, economic, and cultural ties. Since the reign of King Faisal, Saudi Arabia has provided financial support to thousands of Pakistani Islamic seminaries (madrassas). As both countries place a great priority on consistent formal connection, Saudi monarchs have visited Pakistan regularly. Following King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 1954 visit, his successors visited Pakistan in 1966, 1974, 1976, and 1980. King Abdullah visited as crown prince in 1984, 1988, 1997, and 2003, and in 2006 as monarch, King Salman (then crown prince) visited in 2014, while Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (commonly known as MBS), the current Saudi Crown Prince visited in 2019. MBS received a special welcome as his plane was escorted by JF-17 and F-16 fighter jets as it entered Pakistan airspace – a welcome that was previously only offered to President Xi Jinping of China in 2015. During his visit, MBS signed agreements worth US$21 billion (Dawn 2019).

Owing to its persistent economic crisis, Pakistan has been economically dependent on its close friends like Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has come to Pakistan’s rescue on many occasions, for example when Pakistan was under international economic sanctions during 1998–2001 because of testing its nuclear weapons in May 1998. Then, Saudi Arabia provided oil support to Pakistan, calling the gesture ‘a gift in times of need’ (Ahmad 2016). In 2009, Riyadh granted Pakistan a loan of US$ 380 million and a gift of US$ 300 million at the Tokyo Donor Conference to help ease high oil prices (Naviwala 2015). From 2014–2022, Pakistan received three Saudi financial aid packages totaling nearly US$9.5 billion (Karim 2023a). Pakistan’s relationship is also special with Saudi Arabia because its expatriate community there makes a significant contribution to its economy through remittances. There are about 2.7 million Pakistanis living and working in Saudi Arabia (Kaifee 2019). While the Pakistani skilled workforce is contributing to Saudi Arabia’s development, they also send roughly US$6 billion annually in remittances to Pakistan (Kaifee 2019).

Besides providing economic assistance, the Kingdom has generously been helping Pakistan deal with humanitarian crises. Pakistan has also been a top recipient of Saudi humanitarian aid. During 2005–2022, Pakistan was among the top five beneficiaries of the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief) which had implemented projects worth US$146.9 million in the country (Shabbir 2022b). In the ongoing economic crisis, Saudi Arabia and Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank pledged almost half of the US$11 billion to deal with the humanitarian crisis following the 2022 floods in Pakistan (Aluwaisheg 2023).

Pakistan is among the Kingdom’s prominent security and strategic partners. As a result, Pakistan’s civil and military officials have repeatedly assured Saudi leaders that Pakistan will go to any length to protect Saudi Arabia. The robust defense cooperation has manifested in real actions with Pakistan’s decision to deploy its 15,000 troops in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Mason 2016). The Protocol Agreement of 1982 formalized bilateral security ties, allowing the Kingdom to request Pakistani soldiers if needed. During Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990–1991, Pakistan again deployed its troops in the Kingdom to protect the territorial integrity of the Kingdom and to safeguard the Muslim Holy sites in the Kingdom (Karim 2022b). Regular high-profile military-to-military exchanges and infrequent joint exercises have taken place. In terms of joint military exercises, the first one was Al-Assam I in 2004 followed by Al-Assam II in 2006, and Al-Assam III in 2009 (Ahmad and Faisal 2016). The exercises Al-Samsam-VIII and Al Kassah-IV took place in 2022 and 2023, respectively, in Pakistan (Hilal 2023). As of 2016, there were 1,180 Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia, including the majority serving as training instructors (Anis 2016). Pakistan’s membership of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) has improved bilateral defense cooperation. The IMAFT, led by Saudi Arabia, is a 41-nation coalition led by General Reheel Sharif, Pakistan’s former army chief (Ahmed 2019). On a range of levels, the two countries recognize the significance of joint ventures in defense manufacturing and expanded defense and security cooperation.

4. Instruments of Saudi Arabia’s soft power

Saudi Arabia has been investing heavily in soft power instruments to promote its culture, values, and influence globally. This is particularly evident in the case of Pakistan where the Kingdom has been using a variety of tools under its cultural and religious diplomacy.

4.1. Religion, culture and history

Saudi Arabia’s cultural soft power is mainly because of its primacy being the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam’s ‘Two Holy Mosques’ situated in the cities of Mecca and Madina and referred to as Haramain Sharifain. Millions of Muslims travel to Saudi Arabia to perform the Islamic pilgrimage of Hajj – compulsory for Muslims who can afford and have good health – and a short Hajj called ‘Umrah’. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of Hajj pilgrims was also fluctuating and had dropped from 3.1 million in 2012 to 2.4 million in 2019 (Saleh 2022a). This drop was mainly because Saudi Arabia was expanding Masjid al-Haram to accommodate more pilgrims. Because of this centrality or religious significance, Ismaik (2020) argues, ‘The United States, Russia, China, Britain: None of these countries have the Saudi Arabian soft power combination of language, religion, history and global reach’.

Pakistan is the second-largest majority Muslim state after Indonesia. In the 2017 national census of Pakistan, the population was 207 million including 96.2% Muslims (PBS 2017). As there is a significant proportion of practicing Muslims in Pakistan, many visit Saudi Arabia for Hajj and Umrah. In 2018, 1.35 million Pakistanis visited Saudi Arabia for Hajj and Umrah (Saleh 2022b). As Saudi Arabia decides the Hajj quota, not all Pakistanis who apply for Hajj get to go there, for example for the 2022 Hajj, there were 57,593 applications received for 32,453 seats under the government of Pakistan Hajj scheme (Ali 2022). This is not surprising as the majority (98%) of surveyed Pakistanis considered religion to be either very or somewhat important to them (PRC 2008). Saudi Arabia has played some role in this religiosity in Pakistan by, for example, funding madrassas and constructing mosques and madrassas in Pakistan (Siddiqa 2018). A key landmark in Pakistan, the Faisal Mosque was funded by King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz. For this, Saudi Arabia provided US$120 million and the construction of that, which began in 1976, was completed in 1986 (MOFA 2022). As the mosque was solely funded by the Kingdom, it is named after its late King Shah Faisal who was assassinated in 1975. Moreover, Pakistan renamed Lyallpur to Faisalabad (city of Faisal) in 1979 in honor of the country’s special relationship with Saudi Arabia. Similarly, a key base of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in Karachi is called the ‘PAF Base Faisal’ (Shah 2019).

Islam remains a key soft power instrument for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom uses that in various ways for example through visits of prayer leaders (Imam-e-Kaaba) from Kaaba in Mecca. Imam-e-Kaaba’s visits to Pakistan have been recognized as the country’s most significant political and social events. While approved and funded by the Saudi state, such events are organized at the invitation of the Government of Pakistan. In October 2017, Imam-e-Kaaba Saleh bin Humaid paid a visit to Islamabad was invited as a special guest to Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi’s cabinet meeting (Ishtiaq 2017). Then Imam Humaid was involved in a variety of activities at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, including an international conference on halal food (IIUI 2017). In 2021, Imam of Masjid Al-Haram Sheikh Maher al Muaiqly was invited by Prime Minister Imran Khan. During their visits to Pakistan, Imams of Kaaba usually meet not just Pakistani officials but also lead prayers in prominent mosques, such as Faisal Mosque in Islamabad and Badshahi Mosque in Lahore, where thousands gather to attend those prayers. In 2019, for example, Sheikh Abdullah Awad Al-Juhany not only led a Friday prayer at the Faisal Mosque but had a range of other commitments, including a dinner with the Pakistan Ulema Council and participation in the Paigham-e-Pakistan conference that focused on countering violent extremism in Pakistan (Zaidi 2019). From Riyadh’s perspective, such visits by the Imams of the Two Holy Mosques offer opportunities to strengthen ties between Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries and to promote cooperation on religious and cultural issues. Hence, these Imams have visited other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Malaysia and Morocco, and some non-Muslim countries like India and China. Islamic charity has played a significant role in Saudi Arabia’s soft power.

The Kingdom has a long tradition of giving charity and philanthropy, which is deeply rooted in the Islamic faith. As its charity is driven by its ideology, most of its aid has been going to majority Muslim states. From 1975 to 2021, the top 10 recipients of Saudi Arabia’s overseas development assistance included nine majority Muslim states and Palestine (Radwan 2022). For this period, Pakistan was the fourth largest recipient of aid after Yemen, Syria, and Palestine. At the Kingdom’s disposal, there are many charitable organizations besides KSRelief through which Riyadh has also been promoting its cultural soft power. A prominent example of that is the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) which was founded in 1978 and is based in Saudi Arabia. A focus of IIRO is to support programs concerning Qur’an memorization and Da’wah. Annually, IIRO organizes Hifz-o-Qirat (memorization and recitation) competitions at domestic and international levels, and the Dawah and Ziarat Wing of Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony manages such programs.² In 2021, the ‘All Pakistan Qu’ran memorization competition’ was held at the National Library in Islamabad. The IIRO organized this event and the chief guest was Pakistan’s Minister for Religious Affairs Sahibzada Hamid Saeed (Irfan 2021). The Dawah and Ziarat Wing in Pakistan also manages Pakistan’s nominations for the King Faisal Prize from the King Faisal Foundation, Saudi Arabia. Since 1979, the King Faisal Prize has been awarded in five categories: service to Islam, Islamic Studies, the Arabic language and Arabic literature, science, and medicine. In 1979, the first King Faisal Prize was awarded to Pakistan’s prominent religious scholar and then the chief of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Abdul A’la Maududi for his service to Islam (Dehlvi 2016). While the King Faisal Foundation cannot be directly linked to the Saudi state, it has been headed by Prince Khalid bin Faisal Al Saud who is the Governor of Makkah Region since 2015 and serves as a key tool in promoting the Kingdom’s soft power.

As soft power is mainly dependent on a country’s reputation and desirability (Spry 2016), it is important to see how Pakistanis perceive Saudi Arabia and whether or not they admire or desire the same kind of governance or culture in Pakistan. Religious groups, including Islamists in Pakistan like the Jamaat-e-Islami have been traditionally inspired by Saudi Arabia. During the 1980s, the Jamaat was a key ally of General Zia-ul-Haq in terms of promoting Islamization inspired by Saudi Arabia or Sunni Wahhabi Islam (Waterman 2014). There can be many indicators of desirability and one is that many things linked to the Kingdom are considered special or sacred in the Muslim world. When Pakistani pilgrims visit Saudi Arabia, they purchase holy water (Zamzam) and Saudi dates. There is however no data available on how much quantity of Zamzam water and dates Pakistani pilgrims purchase but it must be significant considering millions who work there and others who visit as pilgrims. Since 2019, Pakistani Hajj pilgrims do not have to carry Zamzam from Saudi Arabia and can receive their share once they land in Pakistan (Saeed 2019). Like elsewhere in the Muslim world, Pakistani Muslims also want to break their fasts in the month of Ramadan with dates – this practice is considered a sunnah or a deed of Prophet Muhammad – and this leads to high demand for dates in the holy month. Hence, Pakistan imports roughly half of its dates from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Ahmed 2019). Among all other suppliers of dates to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia understands the significance of its produce in its public diplomacy in Pakistan and uses that to promote its goodwill. For instance in 2014, the Kingdom gifted Pakistan 200 tons of dates (Shabbir 2022a).³

While Spry (2016) argues that ‘soft power is usually aimed at foreign audiences, not at elite individuals in positions of power and influence’, the authors believe that it can be both in countries where power and influence are controlled by a few families or institutions. As political leaders and certain elites, including heads of armed forces, come from the same society, their perceptions regarding another country are important as they can shape public opinion directly and indirectly through policy changes, for example, curriculum and textbooks. Pakistani elites look towards Saudi Arabia as a sacred place and miss no opportunity to visit the Kingdom to enhance not just Pakistan’s relationship with the Kingdom but also to offer pilgrimage. Before the 2018 elections, Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf went to Saudi Arabia on a personal/religious trip and landed barefoot in Madina to show his respect for the holy land (Idrees 2018). Even as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khan visited Saudi Arabia in 2021 to attend the Middle East Green Initiative Summit and was pictured barefoot on several occasions, even during an official meeting (Siddiqui 2021). Soon after replacing Imran Khan, Shahbaz Sharif visited Saudi Arabia with his family members and cabinet in 2022. After a few official meetings, everyone in the delegation offered Umrah (Siddiqui 2022). The Sharif family that leads the Pakistan Muslim-Nawaz has maintained a special relationship with the House of Saud. This was witnessed in April 2023 when most members of the Sharif family, including former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, visited Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage (Geo 2023).

4.2. Islamic education

Saudi Arabia has been promoting Islamic education as a soft power tool. This approach has also been helped by the fact that the Kingdom has long been a major center for Islamic scholarship and has invested heavily in promoting Islamic education at home and across the Muslim world. In Pakistan, Saudi Arabia enjoys a multifaceted influence on education, especially religious education. There are many facets of that including the impact on madrassas, public sector schools, and universities.

There are four different types of madrassas, separated along sectarian lines and dominated by the Deobandi and Barelvi sects, in Pakistan. Similarly, Shi’a Muslims and Ahle Hadith/Salafi Muslims each have their madrassas. At the time of Pakistan’s independence from the British Empire, there were only 137 madrassas in West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) but there was a sudden growth during the 1980s (Zaman 1999, p. 310). To provide fighters in the Afghan-Soviet War, at least 1,000 new madrassas were established in Pakistan during the 1980s (Iqbal and Raza 2015, p. 28). By 1994, there were more than 2,500 madrassas in Punjab alone (Zaman 1999, p. 310). There are now more than 30,000 madrassas in Pakistan (Sayeed 2019), and it has mainly been possible because of the funding availability, mainly from rich Arabs in the Gulf. Between 1.5 and 2 million pupils are expected to be enrolled in these madrassas (Delavande and Zafar 2015, p. 248).

The petrodollar was introduced as a concept and applied in the 1970s. Since then, oil-rich Gulf monarchies have been making a fortune. Particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, petrodollars have certainly enhanced the Kingdom’s ability to promote Sunni Wahhabi Islam – something that fits neatly with Snidal’s conceptualization of soft power to attain benevolent hegemony (Snidal 1985). The rise in wealth from oil coincided with significant regional development in the shape of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the new regime in Iran that had made its intentions clear of exporting its revolution to other countries. This led to some foreign policy recalibration in Saudi Arabia as it began seeking influence in Iran’s neighborhood, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hozoori 2022).

Due to the reasons mentioned above, Pakistan remains an important country for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s funding before the 1980s was mainly towards building mosques and madrassas in Pakistan but this shifted towards the promotion of anti-Shi’a ideology during the 1980s (Weinbaum and Khurram 2014). While the Kingdom has always enjoyed a special place among Pakistani Muslims, Riyadh was offered an important opportunity during the Afghan-Soviet War (1979–1988) to expand its ideological influence in Pakistan. Then Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sided with the United States and promoted jihad (holy war) against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The bilateral relationship reached such a level that Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the former head of Saudi Intelligence, described it as ‘probably one of the closest relationships in the world between any two countries without any official treaty’ (Karim 2023b, p. 158). While Pakistan played a key role in terms of hosting and training warriors, Saudi Arabia’s funding was crucial as that led to the establishment of hundreds of madrassas from where today’s Afghan Taliban emerged in the early 1990s (Ayoob 2021). A prominent madrassa in Pakistan’s north-west, Dar-ul Ulum Haqqania had a visible acknowledgement of Saudi funding as it has a plaque mentioning that a room was built as a gift from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Friedman 2001). As reported by Rahman (2000), Ahle Hadith madrassas in Pakistan heavily rely on Arabic books published and printed in Saudi Arabia.

Then there is the curriculum of public schools in Pakistan that in a way also helps Saudi Arabia and the Arab world’s soft power in Pakistan. Created for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, Islamic identity has been a prominent feature of state-building in Pakistan (Ahmed 2023). As Arabic is seen as the Islamic language because Qur’an is written in Arabic, there were discussions in Pakistan, until the 1970s, to include Arabic as an official language to bring the ethnically divided population together (Rahman 2000). This however did not happen as Urdu and English were declared as the official languages of Pakistan. While Arabic has been included in madrassa education, Arabic teaching in public schools has been introduced from time to time. As per the directives of the 1973 constitution, Arabic was introduced in classes sixth to eighth in public schools in the 1970s (Rahman 2000). In terms of the role of Arab countries, Saudi Arabia has been a leading actor in the promotion of Arabic in Pakistan. The Kingdom has a long history of cooperation with Pakistan, for example, an agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s Open University under which the Kingdom provided support for the teaching of Arabic. In an attempt to further Islamize Pakistan, in 2021, the Imran Khan government made Arabic compulsory in primary and secondary schools across the country (Hoodbhoy 2021).

The dominance of Islamic institutes, such as the International Islamic University, Islamabad (IIUI), exemplifies Saudi soft power’s success. Saudi nationals either have held or are holding leadership positions in the IIUI which has a main campus in Islamabad. For instance, the current president of the university is Professor Hathal Homoud Alotaibi and previously this post was held by another Saudi, Professor Ahmed Yousif Ahmed Al Draiweesh, who only spoke Arabic. There was some controversy over the selection of a junior Saudi academic, Dr Alotaibi, as the president of the IIUI being an assistant professor at that time in Saudi Arabia, but the Pakistani side never raised those concerns with Saudi Arabia and the appointment was finalized in 2020 (Abbasi 2020). The IIUI’s pro-chancellor, Prof. Ahmad Salem Muhammad Al-Ameri, is also a Saudi national who was appointed in 2020.⁴ Previously he was Rector of Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud University which has a reputation for imparting Islamic education. This university only used to offer religious education through the College of Sharia Sciences until the 1980s when other colleges were opened. Many academics in the university have received degrees from Saudi universities. Many of those are teaching in disciplines within Islamic Studies, such as tafseer (exegesis of the Qur’an) and Qur’anic Studies. How can this influence be explained when Saudi Arabia is not funding the university? According to a media report, the IIUI is mainly funded by the government of Pakistan except for a one-time funding of US$1 million from the United Arab Emirates (Abbasi 2020). Unlike four other Islamic Universities, such as the International Islamic University Malaysia and Islamic University Niger, the IIUI is not sponsored by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). There are other ways by which Saudi Arabia supports the IIUI, for example, by providing textbooks that are published in the Kingdom (Rahman 2000). This is an indication of Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan because Islamabad looks towards the Kingdom for inspiration in religious matters, including religious education. The IIUI is a public sector university in Pakistan and has campuses across the country, such as Islamabad (main campus), Faisalabad, Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, and Gwadar. The Saudi leadership of the university is a manifestation of its cultural soft power in Pakistan. This fits neatly into Nye’s description of soft power as Saudi Arabia has been able to affect policies and institutions in Pakistan by ‘attraction and persuasion rather than just coercion and payment’ (2017, p. 17).

The Kingdom’s influence is not just limited to the IIUI because there are various other ways through which Saudi Arabia has been promoting its religious ideology and culture in Pakistan. Education scholarships are an effective way for countries to wield soft power and promote positive relationships with other nations (Aras and Mohammed 2019). The Kingdom has a generous scholarship scheme for Muslim students. The scholarship scheme for Pakistan is quite targeted as it mainly focuses on religious studies and excludes degree programs in other disciplines like health and medicine. Mainly the scheme has offered scholarships – administered through the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan – to Pakistanis interested in religious studies programs in 25 Saudi universities, including Islamic University, and Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University. As Pakistan holds a central place in the Kingdom’s soft power strategy, it is not surprising that Saudi scholarships are increasing for Pakistani students. In 2021, Saudi Arabia announced 600 scholarships for Pakistan, compared to 583 in 2019 (Shah 2019, UET 2021). Riyadh understands the importance of its cultural diplomacy and while announcing the scholarship scheme in 2019, the Kingdom’s Cultural Attaché in Pakistan, Dr. Ali Mohammed B. Hawsawi, highlighted that such scholarships offer Pakistani students opportunities to study courses like Sharia and Arabic language in Saud Arabia (Shah 2019).

Like the IIUI’s case, most graduates from Saudi Arabia return to Pakistan and teach Islamic Studies at different universities across the country. Since 1978, Islamic Studies has been a compulsory subject at all levels of education up to the first degree, including professional qualifications. On the website of the Higher Education of Pakistan, there are 236 degree awarding institutions listed.⁵ Hence naturally, there is a significant demand for graduates of Islamic Studies, especially the graduates from Saudi universities and the IIUI. Most faculty members in the University of Wah’s Department of Islamic and Pakistan Studies have degrees from the IIUI. Many of Pakistan’s religious academics and clerics (Ulema) from Ahle Hadith (people of Hadith or followers of Prophet Muhammad’s teachings) are educated at this university. The voluntary or automatic submission of many Muslim states, particularly Pakistan, is also a product of Saudi soft power influence, but this must be understood.

In its efforts to gain influence in Pakistan, for geopolitical gains vis-à-vis Iran, Saudi Arabia has historically been promoting Salafism. As mentioned above, not all of the Kingdom’s cultural influence is benign as Pakistan continues to suffer from radicalization and extremism that had mainly started through the establishment of Saudi-funded madrassas in the 1980s. Hence, Pandith (2019) claims that extremism is Saudi Arabia’s top export. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were both key US partners in the Afghan-Soviet War, but the former’s role was much bigger in terms of the recruitment and mobilization of fighters (mujahideen) to defeat the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia’s funding played a key role in terms of promoting conservative Wahhabi ideology in South Asia and laid the foundations of violent religious extremism. A noticeable example is of the Afghan Taliban, an organization that was formed by Afghan Pashtun mujahideen from Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan (Hegghammer 2010). At a social level, Pakistan continues to suffer from a massive social change that occurred because of a significant Islamization during the 1980s. Due to external interventions, including from Saudi Arabia, Pakistani society changed from a moderate society in the 1950s and 1960s. Islamization in the 1980s – not all because of Saudi policies – is responsible for sowing the seeds of sectarianism in Pakistan as was witnessed through the worst decade of sectarian violence in the country in the 1990s (Siddiqui 2015).

4.3. Diplomacy

While Nye (2008) supported the idea of combining culture, political principles, and foreign policy to enhance a state’s soft power capability, Saudi Arabia has mainly been able to combine culture with foreign policy. As a monarchy and a non-democratic state, it has not tried to promote political principles like Western democratic states. As far as combining culture and diplomacy is concerned, the Kingdom’s influence is very much visible through the OIC.

Diplomacy plays a key role in public diplomacy through which Riyadh aims to maintain Saudi Arabia’s centrality within the Ummah. Saudi Arabia’s prominence in the OIC plays a significant role in promoting Saudi Arabia’s goodwill within the Ummah. There are structural factors that contribute to the Kingdom’s dominance within the OIC and those include the Saudi funding for the organization and the fact that the OIC secretariat is based in Jeddah (Akbarzadeh and Ahmed 2018). By its funding, the Kingdom hosts many OIC events in Jeddah and, as a norm, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs organizes Umrah for the delegates. Saudi Arabia’s desire to dominate the OIC was also reflected through the OIC Secretary-General position being held by two Saudi nationals, namely Iyad Ameen Madani and Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen from 2014 to 2021.⁶

The OIC is the most prominent example of pan-Islamism involving 57 member states. Pan-Islamism in Pakistan pre-dates its creation as many of the political leaders of the Pakistan Movement were inspired by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī who is known for coining the term pan-Islamism (Ahmed and Akbarzadeh 2023). Pakistan began promoting pan-Islamism soon after its independence, for example in February 1949, Pakistan hosted the World Muslim Congress in Karachi. This was done to revise the Motamar Al Alam Al Islamic that was formed in Mecca in 1926 (Chopra 1993). Pakistan however did not push for pan-Islamism during the 1960s and it was mainly after its disintegration in 1971 that Islamabad showed more interest in the OIC and hosted the 1974 summit in Lahore. This summit was jointly sponsored by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and Islamabad benefitted from this opportunity to lobby for its clandestine nuclear program also known as ‘the Islamic bomb’ (Khan 2012). Besides the natural dominance of the Kingdom within the OIC Secretariat, its soft power is visible concerning Saudi nationals being appointed to leadership positions in other OIC organs that are not based in Saudi Arabia. While the Islamic Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture is based in Karachi, its two key executives are Saudi nationals: Abdullah Saleh Kamel is president and Yousef Hasan Khalawi is secretary-general.⁷

Concerning its conflict with India over the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has always looked to the Muslim world, especially Saudi Arabia, for support. The Kingdom has also counted on Pakistan to understand its conflictual relationship with Iran – Pakistan’s neighbor. It is primarily because of Pakistan’s multifaceted relationship with Saudi Arabia, such as cultural and economic cooperation, that Islamabad has failed to maintain neutrality in its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia (Karim 2022a). There are many examples of how Islamabad has backed Saudi Arabia in comparison to Iran. This has happened unilaterally and through the OIC. In 2016, the Kingdom executed a prominent Shi’a cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. Despite being home to the second-largest Shi’a population after Iran, Pakistan’s Foreign Office did not comment on al-Nimr’s execution but condemned attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad (MOFA 2016).

Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the country’s engagement with the OIC came under crisis as Saudi Arabia adopted a rather neutral stance on India’s decision to abrogate the special status of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region in August 2019 (Batrawy 2019). Similarly, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision alongside his Turkish and Malaysian counterparts to hold a summit of Islamic countries in Kuala Lumpur to address issues concerning the Muslim world further complicated ties with Saudi Arabia. As the Kuala Lumpur Summit was seen by the Kingdom’s leadership as a challenge to its leadership position in the Muslim world and the Malaysian forum as an alternative to the Saudi-led Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Waikar and Osman 2020), Pakistan eventually backed out of the Kuala Lumpur Initiative making it lusterless. This episode showed the political sensitivity held within the Kingdom vis-à-vis OIC.

5. Impact on domestic politics

While above we have examined how the Kingdom has been using various soft power tools and how they are received in Pakistan, here we feel that it is important to dig deeper into the local dynamics in Pakistan to expand our examination of Saudi Arabia’s soft power. A combined influence of Saudi Arabia’s soft power instruments, including religion, culture, history, Islamic education, and diplomacy, can be seen through the Kingdom’s historic influence on right-wing religious parties. In relation to domestic politics, a visible impact is not only noticeable in the case of Islamic parties but also in right-leaning major parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz.

Saudi Arabia has exerted its influence on Pakistani politics in various ways. One method of cultivating this source of soft power has been the development of cordial interpersonal ties between the ruling elites in Pakistan and Saudi Royalty. In the 1970s, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began prioritizing pan-Islamism and Islamic identity in Pakistan’s foreign policy. This approach while drifting Pakistan away from its Western allies, for example, the United States, pushed Pakistan closer to the Arab world through close ties with Saudi Arabia and Libya (Haqqani 2004, Ahmed and Akbarzadeh 2023). Bhutto’s slogans of Islamic unity and pan-Islamism brought him close to Saudi monarch King Faisal and this engagement gradually developed into a personal friendship (Haroon 2016, p. 306). This camaraderie and aligned foreign policy outlook were evident during the 1973 Ramadan War and later during the 1974 OIC summit in Lahore. Bhutto’s proximity with Saudi Arabia was also at play during the 1977 anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) agitation when Bhutto requested Saudi Arabia to mediate between him and his foes and Saudi ambassador in Islamabad Riaz AlKhateeb undertook this task (Hussain 2009).

As Bhutto was removed in a coup d’état in 1978, the Saudis remained cautious of the new Pakistani ruler and were only co-opted after extensive pilgrimage diplomacy by General Zia-ul-Haq. The takeover of Kaaba in Mecca by Saudi militants and the start of the Iran-Iraq War also brought the two sides closer necessitating the stationing of Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia (Godsell 1981). Being a conservative Muslim himself, Zia instrumentalized religion to garner legitimacy for his rule and started a drive to further Islamize the country’s institutions and political discourse. Zia’s vehement opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a relative anti-Shi’ite persona brought him further close to Saudi ruling quarters (Hiro 2019, pp. 111–124). After Zia’s death in a plane accident in 1988, Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League became the political heir of Zia’s legacy and was successful in developing a personal rapport with Saudi leadership. It was due to this reason that in the aftermath of the October 1999 military coup by General Pervez Musharaf, the Saudi Crown Prince intervened personally and arranged for Nawaz Sharif to be politically exiled to the Kingdom rather than persecuted in Pakistan (Weinbaum and Khurram 2014). Afterwards, General Musharaf also maintained cordial ties with the Saudi leadership. In an interview, Musharaf claimed that King Abdullah was like a brother to him and provided him with a good deal of financial support after his ouster from power in Pakistan (Dawn 2017).

Influence on political parties and other institutions, such as think tanks, is also seen as an indication of soft power (Spry 2016). There are two categories of political parties in Pakistan, Islamists, and others. Islamists, mainly dominated by the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, have never been able to win enough seats to form the government in the center but their influence has been significant in terms of the Islamization of Pakistan. The Jamaat was among the leading political parties that worked closely with the General Zia-ul-Haq administration to Islamize Pakistan (Ahmed and Balasubranian 2010), therefore, let us look at its level of connection with Saudi Arabia first. The founding chief or ameer of the Jamaat, Maududi, enjoyed close relations with the House of Saud and was even involved in establishing the Islamic University of Madina (Abdul-Rahman 2009). Another sign of Saudi Arabia’s soft power vis-à-vis Pakistani Islamists is that of prominent religious parties urging Pakistan to send troops to Saudi Arabia to fight the Yemeni Houthis. In 2015, Riyadh approached Islamabad to seek Pakistan’s military support in fighting Houthis. As the parliament decided to stay neutral, a conference ‘Difa-e-Khadim-e-Haramain Sharifain (Defencing the holy cities) was organized by Jamiat Ahle Hadith. In attendance were several religio-political leaders, including Mauala Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), who criticized the parliament’s resolution and said that that was a ‘conspiracy to isolate Pakistan from the Muslim world’ (The Express Tribune 2015). The participants also announced their ‘unflinching support’ for Saudi Arabia and ‘readiness to sacrifice lives for the protection of Haramain and Sharifain’ (Ibid).

Saudi Arabia does not have to do much to maintain its influence on Islamists in Pakistan as most of them have a natural inclination towards the Kingdom. It is for their religio-political gains that they desire to be identified with Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom however has various ways of maintaining its connection with prominent religious parties in Pakistan, for example, through its embassy in Islamabad. While the JUI-Fazal (JUI-F) won no seats in the 2018 general elections in Pakistan, its chief met the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan in 2019. The Saudi embassy in Islamabad even tweeted about this meeting and the Saudi Press Agency published a news item that JUI-F’s Maulana Fazlur Rahman ‘lauded deep-rooted brotherly ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’ (Arab News 2019). It is common for a Saudi ambassador to meet political leaders, especially from religious parties. In 2015, for example, then the Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan met the chief of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Siraj ul Haq (Anis 2015).

Other political parties have maintained close relations with Saudi Arabia. There are many reasons for that, including political, economic, and ideological. Political leaders, not just Islamists, understand that millions in Pakistan consider Saudi Arabia a sacred place and the center of the Ummah. There is therefore domestic consumption too of closeness with Saudi Arabia. Also, there are economic reasons as many Pakistani governments have looked to the Kingdom for economic support in times of crisis. In 2022, Riyadh agreed to extend the availability of US$3 billion that it has kept in Pakistan’s State Bank to help deal with the foreign exchange deficit (Zhdannikov 2022). Among all the political parties, PML-N led by the Sharif political dynasty has enjoyed cordial relations with Saudi royals as has been explained above.

6. Modernization in Saudi Arabia and its soft power

Under the current leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, since 2015, the Kingdom has been undergoing an unprecedented level of social liberalization. The vision ‘implies a degree of social liberalization to enable the growth of entertainment and tourism industry, as well as extensive reforms to the education system, traditionally a stronghold of Saudi Arabia’s religious clerics’ (Kinninmont 2017). Since then, the Kingdom has experienced several key changes, for example, now Saudi women are allowed to drive and offer Hajj without a male companion (Nasrallah 2022). In 2021, the state allowed the MDL Beast Soundstrom concert which was attended by roughly 18,000 Saudi men and women (Nereim 2021). In terms of soft power tools, one cannot say that Saudi Arabia is shifting away from its traditional use of religion as a tool to gain influence in the Muslim world, but there are additional tools employed. This is particularly noticeable through investments in sports diplomacy through investments in soccer and golf (Ettinger 2023, Davis et al. 2023). These new approaches, motivated by the Kingdom’s Vision 2023, appear to be focused more on the country’s image in the West. It is too early to see if the Saudi leadership wants to transform its image in the Muslim world as well.

As the Kingdom has built a reputation for following and promoting Islamic fundamentals, it is important to see how this will impact its soft power within the Ummah where it is seen as the center of the Muslim world. Within Saudi Arabia, this state driven modernization and social liberalization have been supported by the Saudi religious establishment. The Ahle Hadith sect within Pakistan as discussed above remains the principal Saudi religious constituency in Pakistan. On societal issues and modernization, they tend to retain the dogmatic positions adopted and propagated by conservative Saudi Salafi scholars like Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz (former grand mufti of the Kingdom), Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad and Muhammad ibn Saalih al-ʿUthaymeen, who have also remained their teachers in Saudi Arabia (Zahab 2014, pp. 126–142). Thereby, most of them have not endorsed these changes. In private conversations, they have rejected and criticized the current approach of Saudi leadership but publicly have adopted silence on the issue as they fear any criticism against Saudi leadership may result in the termination of financial support from the Kingdom (Hussain and Akhtar 2022).

Similarly, within the ranks of Pakistani Islamists especially those belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami, these new developments within Saudi Arabia have not been welcomed. The Jamaat has remained critical of the Saudi backing of General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi’s military coup in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood linked government of President Morse Hence in 2015, and the Jamaat did not join pro-Saudi rallies in Pakistan to pressure the government of Pakistan to send troops to Saudi Arabia for its war in Yemen (Sial 2015). Jamaat’s cadres have rather seen inspiration in the rise of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and have been at the forefront to eulogizing his personality and politics within Pakistan (Sajid 2022).

7. Conclusion

This study aimed to understand the prominence of soft power as a strategy in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy and its effectiveness. By examining Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan, this study has found that the Kingdom has been promoting its soft power by using various tools, such as cultural diplomacy and religious education. While Riyadh has been consistently investing to promote its goodwill and maintain influence in Pakistan, its job has become easier in the Muslim world because of its religious affinity. This is the case of Pakistan where the Kingdom holds a sacred place being home to Mecca and Madina for millions of Muslims. This is reflected in the fact that millions of Pakistanis visit Saudi Arabia every year as pilgrims. Being the second largest Muslim state after Indonesia, Pakistan is important for Saudi Arabia in terms of its religiously driven soft power strategy. As this study argues, Saudi Arabia has reaped the benefits of investing in its soft power in Pakistan. Besides its goodwill and influence in domestic politics, the Kingdom has counted on Pakistan’s diplomatic support. There is a strong correlation between the soft power instruments employed by the Kingdom, and Islam acts a common thread across all those instruments from religion, culture and history to Islamic education and diplomacy. While impacts of the Kingdom’s soft power are visible in all categories, in particular Islamic education, in Pakistan, we have particularly focused on domestic politics to highlight that religion plays a role there too. This is evident through how various right-wing parties’ leadership views Saudi Arabia through the lens of religious identity.

Benefiting from ideological influence, Saudi Arabia has been using religion as a tool to promote and expand its soft power in Pakistan. In this endeavor, the Kingdom uses its influence in the OIC but also has other organizations, such as IIRO, that help Saudi Arabia’s soft power in Pakistan. Linked to its religious influence is how Saudi Arabia has been using Islamic education for its soft power in Pakistan. The Kingdom has a generous scholarship scheme for Pakistanis for degree programs, especially in Islamic Studies, in Saudi Arabia. Many graduates of those programs return and teach Islamic Studies in Pakistan. This also helps in Saudi Arabia’s goodwill as there is a growing alumni network of Saudi universities. Regarding education, a visible example of Saudi Arabia’s soft power is evident through Saudi nationals holding leadership positions in the IIUI. There is a domestic dynamic too as major political parties understand the sentiment of Pakistani Muslims toward Saudi Arabia, therefore, maintaining good relations with the Kingdom is important.

Despite the fact that Saudia Arabia has economic influence in Pakistan, soft power plays a key role in terms of Saudi Arabia’s goodwill and influence in the country. As examined through various case studies, Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies have significant support in Pakistan. This was reflected at the time when Saudi Arabia had invited Pakistan to join a military coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. Pakistan has consistently supported Saudi Arabia’s stance on its conflict with Iran, for example, at the OIC. While our research focused only on soft power dynamics, we do not claim that soft power influence alone can explain Saudi Arabia’s outreach and impact on Pakistan state policy towards the Kingdom as the state of Pakistan and various religious seminaries are economically dependent on Saudi Arabia.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Zahid Shahab Ahmed

Zahid Shahab Ahmed is an Associate Professor at the National Defence College of the United Arabi Emirates in Abu Dhabi. He is also an Honorary Fellow at Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University, Australia, where he previously worked a Senior Research Fellow during 2016-2023. During 2013–2016, he was Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Peace and Stability, National University of Sciences and Technology in Pakistan. He has published extensively on Pakistan’s foreign relations. Among his publications is Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC (Routledge, 2013).

Umer Karim

Mr. Umer Karim is a PhD scholar in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. His academic research focuses on Saudi foreign policy and politics, in particular the Saudi regional policy outlook and the broader geopolitics of the Middle East. Karim’s work has appeared in academic journals and mainstream news sources alike.

Notes

1. See the Soft Power 30 website, https://softpower30.com/.

2. See, https://mora.gov.pk/Detail/NTkxNDc1ZDYtYTcwNS00YWY2LWI2YWYtZDY0Yzg5MjljZTgw.

3. It is important to mention that Saudi Arabia is among the world’s largest exporters of dates accounting for 17% share in the global market (Shabbir 2022a).

4. See the IIUI website, https://iiu.edu.pk/default.htm.

5. See, https://hec.gov.pk/english/universities/pages/recognised.aspx.

6. In November 2021, Al-Othaimeen was replaced by Hissein Brahim Taha of Chad.

7. For more, visit https://www.iccia.com/iccia-executives/.