https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7323-9061
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ABSTRACT
Seeking to add a comparative element to the study of patron-client relations, this article introduces a multidimensional measurement tool for analysing de facto-patron state relations. The tool is used to measure military, political, societal and cultural resource exchange sustaining de facto state patron-client relationships, focusing on the client side of this dyadic relationship as this is where the defining features of patron-client relationships are most evident due to the asymmetry of resources. The study uses original data on Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, Transnistria and their respective patron states. Comparing their degrees of dependence and differences based on the type of patronage, the article also discusses the merits and shortcomings of the tool, inviting further development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Eiki Berg for his continued support in developing this article, as well as Rafael Biermann for his work on patron-client relationships. I also extend my thanks to the editors and two anonymous reviewers, whose comments and questions helped to improve my work. All remaining errors are my own.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Data supporting the results of this analysis can be requested from the author via e-mail.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author reports there are no competing interests to declare. All data gathered through interviews was given with full understanding and consent regarding its purpose and future use.
Notes
1 The parent state is the state from which the de facto state aims to secede, and which is, by international law, considered to have sovereignty over the de facto state territory. The patron state provides varied assistance to the de facto state to the degree that it ensures the de facto state’s survival, turning the latter into a client of the former.
2 While comparative work on post-Soviet cases is already quite sizable, comparative work involving other cases is still limited (Pegg, Citation2017).
3 Kosovo’s inclusion is based on the minimalist definition of de facto states proposed by Toomla (Citation2016, p. 331): “entities that fulfil the Montevideo criteria for statehood but lack international recognition.” The “threshold” for international recognition is UN membership, which Kosovo due to continued opposition to its statehood is unlikely to achieve in near term, despite holding more than 100 recognitions.
4 The Polisario front fighting for the independence of SADR controls about the quarter of the claimed territory, the rest is governed by Morocco. Furthermore, the Polisario front does not control the proclaimed capital of the SADR, and the government operates in exile from the refugee camps on Algerian territory. Despite this, the SADR is recognised by around 40 states (Fernández-Molina & Ojeda-García, Citation2020, pp. 83–84). I do not consider it a mature de facto state on par with other cases in this study.
5 As noted by Pegg (Citation2017), Eiki Berg specifically has contributed to the creation of novel indices for the study of de facto statehood, such as a ’normalisation index’ and a recognition scale (Berg & Toomla, Citation2009) for measuring degrees of sovereignty (Berg & Kuusk, Citation2010).
6 The use of dependence by Geldenhuys (Citation2009), as opposed to interdependence, might be a reference to the de facto states’ perceived lack of agency, which still conveys the overall meaning that this is not a purely security relationship.
7 Taiwan is a notable exception, with its 23.5 million people and a well-developed economy, including high-tech production.
8 Armenia is an exception that, due to geopolitical position and regional dynamics, has itself been reliant on Russia’s security guarantees while serving as a patron for Nagorno-Karabakh.
9 More on scales and measurements can be found in the data and methodology section.
10 Taiwan is an exception here as well – it is a member of the World Trade Organization since 2002, albeit under a modified name to avoid objections by China. In another exception, Transnistria also enjoys wider access to international trade through the EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement, giving Moldova some oversight regarding Transnistrian enterprises.
11 Financial assistance to the patron state’s GDP includes direct allocations to the de facto state budget, and known loans, aid, or credits to the de facto state, but excludes direct payments to the people (e.g., pensions). It is important to emphasise that these values are “best estimations,” as assistance can be quite diffuse, directed through various channels and different financial schemes. Additionally, both parties have reason to hide the true extent of these contributions to avoid criticism.
12 To a large degree, this sense of non-urgency or false calmness is related to the relatively long-term stability surrounding many of these “frozen” conflicts. However, for most de facto states, the security situation has decreased rapidly since the end of 2020 (so-called second Karabakh war), and February 2022 (open war between Russia and Ukraine/the West). Still, it might take some time for this change to register in societal attitudes, as evidenced by reports from de facto states.
13 Taiwan-US relationship is an example here, as before Taiwan’s democratisation, US policymakers found it hard to explain continued support of Taiwan over China (Tucker, Citation2011).
14 These are TV channels and broadcasters that do not require subscription themselves, although carriers of said channels, such as cable or satellite services, might.
15 De facto states have been called informational “black holes” (King, Citation2001, p. 550), referring both to issues of access and data reliability. De facto states have struggled with building and maintaining their statistics offices, and some data is considered sensitive. As a result, researchers rely more on interview data, which is not always verifiable.
16 Northern Cyprus features a high number of paid universities, which cater to international students from the Middle East and Africa.
17 Abkhazia is multinational, but as Russians consist of about 10% of the population, the share of people identifying with the patron is minimal (O'Loughlin et al., Citation2011)
18 The scores of Abkhazia, Transnistria and Northern Cyprus are within five points, which means virtually the same result, as the differences are within the limits of error that can be associated with the difficulties of operationalization. I thank one of the reviewers for this comment.