Liberal universalism in crisis: The nationalist populist challenge of transnational political standards

ABSTRACT

The explanation of the right-wing populist attack on transnational standards of pluralism and cooperation as caused by unsolved problems of the economic structure is often disputed by regarding populism a “cultural backlash” supported by groups now deprived of their former predominant position by new universalist standards. However, the “cultural” explanation disregards the historical fact that antiliberal backlash in the direction of authoritarianism, nationalism, scapegoating, anti-migration has frequently followed severe economic crises and the preceding erosion of integrating political legitimacy sources. The weakness of the liberal political discourse position is at its core a knowledge crisis in the face of the failure of its own universalist agenda, while the transnational populist regression to particularism is rather its effect.

KEYWORDS:

• Universalism
• transnational standards
• populism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. By assigning the term “transnational” to political standards we presuppose a communication infrastructure across nation state borders, allowing the dissemination of cultural patterns (e.g. norms and standards). The existence of these borders can have “translational” effects on the crossing patterns or simply result in repudiation. Transnationalized cultural patterns in this sense are at least “universally” comprehended (like “spaghetti”). Cultural patterns like theories or norms transport a claim for validity, demanding “universal” recognition. Ironically, political nationalism itself is a classic “transnationalized” semantics. By means of standardization and conventions (state, borders, flag, national food etc.) it allows a generalized recognition of “identity” (Durham & Power, 2016).

2. This paper will mention, but not focus on national characteristics of the nationalist populist surge.

3. Private debt levels are still too high in many important economies to push growth sufficiently by further credit growth. See section 4.

4. We discern several dimensions of “universalism” regarding norms: To deem a norm “natural” (e.g. in human rights discourse), to deem a positive norm “valid for all” (regardless of origin, race, gender…) and to deem a norm to be producing the “common good” or to be “beneficial for all” (e.g. pareto-optimal). These dimensions correspond to the Weberian rationality types.

5. When we use the term “liberal,” we refer to “small state” liberalism. In American political semantics, the bankruptcy of laissez-faire liberalism in the face of the Great Depression catalyzed a change of terms. “Liberalism” became used to designate “social liberalism,” embracing state efforts deemed necessary to produce (more) equal opportunities, while opposing conservatism maintained the classical liberal tenet of economic nonintervention (while not necessarily championing liberty in other regards). So, the term libertarianism had to be coined to signify the positions of classical liberalism (often radicalized, because not in charge). Neoliberalism (in the sense used today) refers to a return to economic laissez-faire in the last 40 years, either as part of the conservative contestation of social liberal state intervention or as the economic policy of social liberal converts subscribing to economic laissez-faire.

6. Therefore, we reject another, narrower definition of populism (Muller, 2016; Pelinka, 2013) as being intrinsically anti-pluralist or anti-liberal. It is only a specific constellation that allows identifying anti-establishment movements and illiberalism.

7. While particularism is never absent in politics, the point of ideological reference is the appreciated value of “equal treatment,” which justifies policies going in the “right” direction and makes others “a necessary evil.”

8. The preceding civil war was won by the democratic radicals, but they lost the peace due to their religiously based totalitarianism (Woolrych, 2002).

9. Empirical research finds that economic insecurity, rather than actual unemployment causes anti-immigration prejudices (Billiet, Meuleman, & De Witte, 2014; Golder, 2003).