Mamluk leadership between religious and political arrangements under Sultan Baybars’ rule

Abstract

This research aims to show the role of Sultan Baybars (d. 1277CE), in contributing to the support and consolidation of the Mamluk state in Egypt and the Levant on Islamic foundations, which gave Baybars an Islamic leader who bears the appropriate titles like the senior Muslim leaders who preceded him. This study will examine Baybars’ political characteristics and leadership in light of Islamic norms of conduct and culture. Baybars proved his military abilities through his victory and success in two decisive battles: al-Manṣūra against the Crusaders (Franks) in 1249 and ʿAyn Jālūt against the Mongols in 1260. In 1261, he came to power by force after the assassination of Sultan Quṭuz. This aspect of Baybars’ rule (r. 1260–1277) is referred to by Muslim scholars as wilāya jabriyya or istīlā’ (ruling by force). Baybars acted in various fields of religion and politics (sharīʿa and siyāsa) until he managed to achieve stability, security, and a powerful Islamic regime. Therefore, the Baybars deserved the title qasīm amīr al-mu’minīn” (partner of the Commander of the Faithful, i.e., the Caliph), which was given to him by the restored Caliph in Cairo, in addition to other titles that testify to his high-ranking religious status as a defender of Islam. This research relied on the method of literary research on the personality of Sultan Baybars, through comparison and analysis of his characteristics and approach to governance, as mentioned in contemporary historians’ works who documented Baybars’ biography and the sources of the Mamluk era. This paper also relied on conclusions and extrapolations of Baybars’ personality through official documents and letters received from him or issued for him, in addition to recent historical literature and research on Baybars and the Mamluk era.¹

Keywords:

• Mamluks
• Sultan Baybars
• Islamic leadership
• charisma
• authorities
• Abbasid Caliphate
• Islamic conduct

1. Introduction

Two renowned chroniclers of the Baybars era, Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir (d. 1292) and ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Shaddād (d. 1285), provide a detailed account of Baybars’ biography and his period, creating an obvious image of his rule and acts.² Due to his background as a slave (mamlūk), contradictory narratives with different views of his characteristics and acts as an Islamic leader were written. He was not familiar with the Arabic language or Islamic knowledge (ʿilm), and he had to prove his ability to manage the authority of the state as an Islamic leader. Baybars worked on implementing Islamic principles according to the Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition (sunna) as much as possible, exploiting his status as a charismatic Muslim leader with full authority until his death in 1277. The impact of political circumstances on the Baybars’ leadership demand a quite extraordinary study and evaluation in light of Islamic teachings and Quranic instructions, on the one hand, and the religious situation and changeable political and social realities in the region, on the other.³

Two moves gave the Baybars religious authority as a leader defending Islam: first, the restoration of the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo in 1261, after 3 years of abeyance; and second, the move taken by the Baybars to control and supervise the main holy sites of Islam, and his efforts to provide security, peace, and freedom of worship, with contributions to Islamic institutions and knowledge. All of which gave him the status of defending the holy places with the title ḥāmī al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn (protector of the two Holy Mosques).⁴ Baybars’ strict approach can also be explained by the need to implement clear Islamic patterns, at the official and public levels, in the reforms, he had established in matters of law and by bringing the judges closer to him through consultation (shūra) on matters of religion and state.

With the consolidation of Baybars’ government and implementation of Islamic policy, he worked to organize administrative arrangements in all areas: financial, military, legal-religious, regional administration, and more. He acted to fight against innovations (bidʿa) and customs that were contrary to Islam and religion. Commanding right and forbidding wrong “al-amr bil-maʿrūf wal-nahyʿan al-munkar” has traditionally been considered Baybars’ policy.⁵ “commanding right and forbidding wrong.”

This study examines Baybars’ qualities and characteristics as a model of Islamic leadership, with the authority and charisma to face the challenges threatening Islam during his reign and to deal with them rigorously. The study aims to follow the process by which the Baybars achieved his goals in forming a unified religious and political authority that strengthened and shaped the image of the Mamluk state for many years to come.

1.1. Islamic leadership in transition: from Ayyubids to Mamluks

After the death of the Ayyubid Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn Ayyub in 1250, there was a political vacuum in Egypt, accompanied by conflicts among the Ayyubid heirs.⁶ At the time, the Crusader threats to north Egypt, in Damietta and Manṣūra, affected the state entity, and the decline of the Ayyubid dynasty opened the door for high-ranking Mamluk leaders to seize power in Egypt. For nearly 10 years, until the Baybars came to power, the Islamic states in Egypt and the Levant (Syria) experienced struggles for power and leadership between different groups, at a time of external threats from the Franks and Mongols, and of internal crises. This reinforced the need for a strong Islamic leadership to restore order and to protect religious and state affairs despite this seeming like rule by force (wilāya jabriyya).⁷

The transition of leadership from the Ayyubid dynasty to the Mamluks of slave background is of great importance in understanding the attitude of the Muslim ulama. In Ayalon’s study, he dealt with Mamluk Egypt, focusing on the slave institution and its role in the expansion and defense of Islam.⁸ In her study on the formative years of Mamluk rule, Levanoni states that the Mamluks appeared to derive legitimacy from their role as the protectors of the faith. They considered that Islamic traditions were among the tasks of the government, and they were the ones who defended Islam from its enemies and ruled according to Islamic law (sharīʿa).⁹ In his study, Steenbergen has dealt with many references, including repeated terminology used by the sources to identify Mamluk's legitimate and effective power and the struggles for power that express the Mamluks’ actual superiority in ruling.¹⁰

In such cases, the ulama were ready to recognize any ruler, if only he respected minimal Islamic norms. The concept ^“any rule is better than anarchy” is accepted in such cases of conflicts and political crises of leadership. This saying is based on the ulama’s interpretation, aiming to avoid incitement to rebellion against the ruler, even if he is a tyrant, as long as he does not offend Islam. Two senior scholars of Sunni Islam addressed the issue of rule for the benefit of the entire Muslim nation. In an early example, Imam Malik b. Anas (d. 795) argued that “a tyrannical ruler for seventy years is better than a nation without a leader for one hour of a day.”¹¹ Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), one of the renowned and influential ulama, also said in a similar sense: “Sixty years of tyrannical rule is better than one night without a ruler.”¹²

1.2. Baybars’ leadership: charisma, authority, and religious acts

P. Crone studied Islamic political thought by linking it with the contexts in which it was formulated. She states that in the Middle Ages, religious and political power was an integral part of a single Muslim community that enjoyed divine acceptance of one community and one country. Therefore, disputes took the form of a longstanding controversy over the nature and function of the Islamic leadership.¹³

To judge Sultan Baybars and his eligibility for the position of Islamic leadership, it is important to examine several aspects of his personality and actions in the interest of Islam and Muslims, in accordance with the religious teachings of the Quran and Prophetic tradition. By studying Mamluk sources, it is concluded that Sultan Baybars was qualified to be a strong Islamic leader, in terms of all criteria of charisma, authority, and religious acts. In his study, R. Amitai states that the legitimization of the Mamluks’ rule was through their important presentation as holy warriors acting to defend Islam and Muslims.¹⁴ As a sign of power, it is not surprising that Sultan Baybars adopted the image of a lion as his symbol, engraved on the Mamluk coin (dirham), and on many of his building projects.¹⁵

1.2.1. Baybars’ charisma

Baybars’ military background indicates that he was distinguished by significant qualities that provided him with charisma, such as intelligence, activity, courage, and ingenuity.¹⁶ Baybars proved his ability to manage many aspects of state politics and administrative management, such as in fighting against the Crusaders, the Mongols, and internal rebels. P. Thorau sees the Baybars as a great conqueror and a key figure in world history for saving the Islamic and Christian worlds from the Mongols. He is considered the destroyer of the Crusaders in Egypt and the Levant and the founder of the Mamluk Sultanate.¹⁷ Baybars is also considered by other historians to be the first Islamic ruler to bring the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs to obey him, in 1264, after a long period in which the former had received tributes and forced gifts from various Frankish rulers and kings in Syria and beyond. Thus, Baybars considered himself the head of all Syrian princes, including the Nizārī leaders.¹⁸

Baybars is also considered by Islamic tradition to have been one of the conquerors of Syria-Palestine, who restored glory to Islam after a period of defeat and regression.¹⁹ Al-Nuwayrī noted some remarkable actions of Baybars, who used to travel extensively between Egypt and Syria to check the readiness of fortresses against the Mongols and Crusaders.²⁰ He pursued a cautious policy, moving between Egypt and Syria and other places in secret and in disguise, in order to discover the state of his kingdom and to surprise his troops and officials in the Syrian provinces. Through visiting several places in Syria, he aimed to become closely acquainted with the country’s affairs and to act to repair matters. Even when he traveled to Mecca for pilgrimage (ḥajj) in 1270, he used secret movements until his return to Egypt.²¹

By following one of the Baybars’ trips between Egypt and Syria in 1272, much of Baybars’ policy and his work in monitoring affairs can be understood: arranging the administration and managing state affairs in general without any disruption, supervising castles, and forts to ensure their readiness.²² This policy of Baybars bestowed strong charisma upon him, not only in the eyes of his people but also of his enemies. Therefore, no one even dared to speak against him, fearing the Sultan. Ibn Shaddād describes an event in Cairo that testifies to Baybars’ central power in the region, when he received about 25 missions from different countries at the same time in January 1276 (Rajab 674 H), from Yemen, the Mongols, Genoa, and others.²³

Baybars’ military origin gave him high status among Mamluk troops, as he had risen from the ranks to become known as one of the high-ranking military leaders. He had good instincts that he used to select suitable and deserving persons and commanders for different military and civilian positions. Ibn Taghrī Birdī mentions that Baybars wanted to know the conditions of his princes and notables so that nothing would be hidden from him, and experts in every art and science were close to him.²⁴

1.2.2. Baybars’ authority

Baybars derived his extensive authority from different sources that gave him an image of a strong Muslim leader; first, his military status and position in the sultanate as wilāya jabriyya/istīlāʾ; second, his religious characteristics, generosity, love of goodness, charity to the poor, his acts in enhancing Islamic values; third and perhaps most important, restoring the Abbasid Caliphate under his government gave him broad authority, as described above, through official deeds issued to him by the two restored Caliphs.²⁵

Mona Hassan gives a rational account of the judicial theory of the caliphate under the Mamluks in Cairo. She explains that the caliphate remained an expression of desire for religious identity.²⁶ In addition, M. Banister, based on other studies, concludes that “the Abbasid caliphs were primarily expected to strengthen the legitimacy of the Mamluk establishment,” and “the Abbasid caliph provided a measure of common ground between the religious establishment and the political administration.”²⁷ On the other hand, S. Jackson claims that the Abbasid caliphate was not expected to be the only source of Mamluk legitimacy. al-Qāsim Aḥmad remained Caliph only by name so that Baybars’ regard for the political advantages of a relationship with the Caliph was small.²⁸

Baybars acted to restore the lost Caliphate and made use of it to legitimize his rule and provide it with the image of a recognized Islamic leadership. Al-Maqrīzī describes the celebration of the new Abbasid Caliph in Cairo, saying: “… The Sultan went to the al-Naṣr Gate, entered Cairo and wore the Abbasid costume, and people came to see him, and it was one of the greatest days of Cairo … and the Sultan exaggerated in honoring him and in founding his grant.” Sultan Baybars held a general council in the Grand Court of the castle and summoned all the dignitaries of the country to be present before the Abbasid prince Aḥmad, including the most prominent judges and ulama with other scholars, such as ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, high ranking Sufi sheikhs, military emirs and commanders, merchants, and other respectable people. This celebration seemed to be an official and public event in which Baybars showed that he was implementing Islamic rules by recognizing the Caliph of the Muslim umma. The Sultan himself showed respect and humility, as an example for others, and pledged allegiance to the new Caliph as an act of recognition toward him. Baybars promised to preserve Islamic rules according to the Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition, commanding right, forbidding wrong, and performing the jihad for the sake of God.²⁹

Restoring the Caliphate seems to have been a process of mutual interest for both the Caliph and Sultan Baybars. After Baybars and other people present had made their oaths to the new Caliph Aḥmad, he received the title “al-Mustanṣir bi-Allah” and his authority as the Muslim Caliph. Then, Sultan Baybars officially received his own broad powers and authority under the guidance of the Caliph al-Mustanṣir, giving him responsibility as a recognized Islamic leader of the Islamic state and what might be added from the land of infidels through jihad war. As a sign of authorized and legitimate rule, the Caliph issued messages to kings and governors of different countries, asking for allegiance (bayʿa) to himself, as usual, and for his name to be blessed in the mosques together with praise for the Sultan Baybars after him, and that their names be engraved on coins.³⁰

However, despite the magnificent celebrations performed in honor of restoring the Caliphate in Cairo, it emerged later that the Caliph’s status was extremely weak, a symbol without political or administrative power or authority. Rather, the actual authority was in the hands of Sultan Baybars and then the other Mamluk Sultans after him.³¹

Restoring the Abbasid caliphate in Cairo gave Baybars more religious and moral support. The official and popular ceremonies celebrated for this reason, in addition to the propaganda of preaching in the mosques, increased the Sultan’s authority and status as a Muslim leader who cares for Muslim interests. Through decrees of appointment, Baybars received extensive power in the government to preserve the religious laws (iqāmat al-ḥudūd), by giving him religious authority to protect the Muslims. These powers are seen through epithets and titles given to Baybars by the Caliphs or by Baybars himself in covenants and decrees he issued.³²

The application of the religious authority given to Baybars by the Caliph is considered a parameter to judge his Islamic leadership by some modern researchers, who see him as one of the greatest leaders of Islam, like the Ayyubid Sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn for instance.³³ R. Amitai discusses the process in which the Mamluk sultans devoted much effort into the enforcement of the sharīʿa, especially the concept of “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” the reform of the judicial system and the restoration of the Abbasid caliphate.³⁴ In her study, Denise Aigle states that the sources contributed to emphasizing Baybars’ image as an ideal Muslim ruler and protector of the caliphate and the holy sites.³⁵ On the other hand, A. Troadec argues that Sultan Baybars had no ancestry to legitimize his reign, so he sought to compensate for his lack of dynasty by using other strategies.³⁶

This authority of Baybars is also apparent through the decree he issued to his emirs, giving them land properties (tamlīk) as grants in Palestine after conquering Caesarea (Qaysāriyya) and Arsūf from the Crusaders. Some of the titles testify to Baybars’ authority, such as “The Sultan of Islam and Muslims,” “The Reviver of Justice in the World,” “The Sultan of God’s Countries,” “The Qur’an Owner,” “The Servant of the Two Holy Sites,” “The Supporter of Muḥammad’s Tradition,” “The Partner of the Commander of the Faithful (= the Caliph),” and other dazzling political and religious titles.³⁷

Regarding military and civil administration, Baybars adopted the principle of consultation (shūra), consulting and listening to his colleagues (khushdāshiyya), especially the emir Jamāl al-Dīn b. Yaghmūr (d. 1265). Ibn Taghrī Birdī notes that Baybars was influenced by the methods of the Mongols (yāsa) in managing his policy. Therefore, Baybars achieved good reputation and prestige until his kingdom extended from Nubia (Upper Egypt) to the Euphrates. To protect these vast areas, Sultan Baybars was interested in military affairs, in terms of numbers, weapons, organization, training and provision of expenses for the disbursement of clothing, food, and salaries, so that Ibn Taghrī Birdī estimated Baybars’ troops as equivalent to forty thousand, that is, four times the Ayyubid armies during the reign of the Ayyubid Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Najm al-Dīn.³⁸

Recent studies have shed further light on the development of succession to the Mamluk Sultanate. A. Fuess proposes a schedule of succession phases during this period, in which the first was the “Law of the Turk” phase (1250–1310), in addition to different aspects of administration and policy.³⁹ To obtain alliances with other forces, leaders, and high-ranking emirs of different origins, Baybars adopted a policy of political marriage. He married the daughter of the Mongolian Sultan Baraka Khān, the daughter of a Mongolian prince, Sayf al-Dīn Nūkāy, and others. He also married a Shahrazurian woman when he allied himself with the Shahrazūriyya before becoming Sultan.⁴⁰

1.2.3. Baybars and religious knowledge (ʿilm)

Religious knowledge is considered one of the main principles of medieval Islamic leadership. Baybars was relatively lacking in religious knowledge because of his slave origin and non-Muslim. Despite that, he was keen to apply Islamic laws and traditions to himself and others.⁴¹ Baybars was able to compensate for this deficiency in his concern for Islamic and religious affairs, respecting clergy (ulama), in addition to introducing administrative reforms on religious matters. It seems Sultan Baybars’ pilgrimage (ḥajj) in 667/1269 showed that he was enthusiastic to understand religious knowledge, when he had many of the ulama accompany him on his journey. The Hanafi judge Ṣadr al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq, who accompanied Baybars all the way, advised the Sultan, so he could understand religious matters: “ … murāfiquhu ṭūl al-ṭarīq, yastaftīhi wa-yatafaqqah minhu amr dīnihi.”⁴²

To ensure this aspect, Baybars showed full respect to the ulama and listened to their advice, as he did with the well-known scholars ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām and al-Nawawī. Moreover, Baybars implemented a reform in the jurisdiction of the four Islamic schools of law (madhāhib) to ensure enforcement of religious law.⁴³ In 1263, he ordered a judicial reform in Egypt, appointing four main judges representing the four Islamic schools of law to create a uniform legal system.⁴⁴ Each of the judges served in the position of qādī al-qudāt (judge of judges) of his school in Egypt so that everyone should judge independently according to his madhhab in all Egyptian regions. This way, Baybars treated the four schools of law equally.⁴⁵ Afterward, Baybars expanded this reform of religious administration in other provinces of the Mamluk state in Egypt and Syria. In Damascus, this reform was implemented in Muharram 664 (October 1265), when three judges from the other madhāhib were appointed, in addition to the main Shafiʿi judge.⁴⁶

Sultan Baybars had a special concern for Muslim pilgrims and the facilities they needed. In 1264, a sermon was delivered in Sultan Baybars’ name in Mecca, and his secretary Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn Ibn al-Mūṣilī received the key of the Kaʿba, indicating that the holy places in the Hijaz were under Mamluk control and authority.⁴⁷ Baybars ensured safe management of the holy places in Mecca and Medina by placing guards and making peace among the competing emirs in the holy cities. In 1267, a decree of appointment was written for the opponents to the emirate that arranged the management of the endowments dedicated to Medina in Syria and Egypt.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Baybars declared the Kaʿba (al-Bayt al-Ḥarām) in Mecca a charity (tasbīl) to facilitate its visit on pilgrimages (ḥajj and ʿumra), by reducing the expenses from paying the excise incurred by visitors.⁴⁹

Baybars took responsibility for maintaining the holy places and acted to rebuild them by sending builders and necessary materials for repairs.⁵⁰ The pilgrimage caravans with the maḥmal and the kiswa (cover of the Kaʿba) were ceremonially dispatched with a special and glorious celebration in Cairo, accompanied by officials and religious people, such as judges, ulama, Qur’an readers, Sufis, preachers, and others.⁵¹

The objectives of the waqf included various works of piety and welfare with religious and economic purposes, such as mosques, madrasas, Sufi institutions, in addition to other various welfare objects, like water supplies and highway facilities, roads, bridges, orphans, and so on.⁵² Baybars acted strictly to reform waqf conditions and its administration and was the first Mamluk ruler to organize a_nd streamline the waqf institution in Egypt and Syria.⁵³ The waqf devoted to Baybar’s madrasa in Damascus, known as al-Ẓāhiriyya after him, acquired much property that included agricultural land in the al-Ghuta Valley around Damascus and the nearby areas of the Jawlān and Ḥawrān. The waqf included entire villages, in addition to buildings and workshops, such as flour mills, two khans, and a shop.⁵⁴ Baybars placed waqf affairs in the hands of the main judges, together with the other religious administration, as he did with the judge Shams al-Dīn Ibn Khallikān when he was appointed in Syria (al-Shām). Ibn Khallikān was delegated to rule from al-ʿArish to the Euphrates and was responsible for preserving the waqfs of the main mosque and the Maristan in Damascus.⁵⁵

In Jerusalem also, Baybars acted to revive religious and commercial life after a period of neglect because of long conflicts with crusaders that encouraged other Mamluks of all ranks to contribute to many projects in the city. Baybars used to visit Jerusalem and Hebron (al-Khalīl) very often to oversee their affairs. He supervised the waqf and acted to preserve it and promoted the interests of the al-Ṣakhra and al-Aqṣā mosques.⁵⁶

Baybars contributed to several constructions in Jerusalem, for commercial and public use, as well as endowing them as charity, such as an inn (khān), bakery)furn), and a mill (ṭāḥūn), that were administered by the emir Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Nahar.⁵⁷ In al-Khalīl (Hebron) also, Baybars arranged and renewed simāṭ al-Khalīl (a charity providing food to the poor and visitors in the city) after a long time of neglect and interruption, paying salaries to residents and visitors of the holy places in Hebron.⁵⁸ It was customary for Sultan Baybars to help poor and weak people, as he had an interest in taking care of their matters. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir describes Baybars as one who was enthralled by the interests of the Muslims and who delighted in matters of religion: inna hādhā al-Sulṭān awqātuhu mustaghraqa fī maṣāliḥ al-Muslimīn, wa-ladhdhātuhu fī al-ihtimām bi-ʾumūr al-dīn.⁵⁹

1.3. Baybars’ sufficiency in stabilizing political situations

Several Muslim scholars and ulama discussed the subject of the ideal characteristics of Muslim leaders of different status.⁶⁰ Sufficiency (al-kifāya) is one of the characteristics of Muslim leadership that the leader should be able to implement the limits of Islamic law and that he is able to manage matters of war and jihad. As mentioned above, Baybars’ role against the Crusaders and the Mongols was strong enough to prove his adequacy and power, as well as to subject his internal enemies to obedience, and to enforce religious and social rules. For example, K. Stilt presented in her studies Baybars’ support for the role of the muḥtasib, which was one of the important policies and requirements of the Sultan in Mamluk Egypt. These rules derive from sources of authority that intersect with social, political, economic, and personal factors to create and espouse the practice of Islamic law.⁶¹

Regarding Baybars’ leadership style, the biographer Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, for example, describes the improvements made by Sultan Baybars in managing affairs and especially the postal service on all roads, which hastened communications and transportation between Egypt and Syria, saying “the news arrived in Damascus in four days, and back in four days …, and he (the Sultan) is in Egypt and no news are unknown from Syria, the coast and Aleppo” (… ḥattā ṣāra al-khabar yaṣil ilā Dimashq fi arbaʿat ayyām, wa-yaʿūd fī arbaʿat ayyām … wa-huwa fī Miṣr wa-lā takhfā ʿalayhi akhbār al-Shām wa-l-Sāḥil wa-Ḥalab …).⁶² Thus, Sultan Baybars proved his effective rule over the various countries politically, as well as administratively and militarily. Throughout his reign, Baybars worked hard to establish power and control over these vast areas under his domain.

During his reign, Sultan Baybars dealt with the bedouins in different ways, from tolerance to harsh punishments, according to their behavior. The Bedouin tribes in Egypt and in Syria exploited the political vacuum and the transition from Ayyubid to Mamluk rule and began rebelling and attacking their surrounding areas. In Upper Egypt and the Delta, the Bedouin tribes began cutting off roads by land and sea, claiming that they are the owners of the country, “aṣḥāb al-bilād,” saying: “we are more deserving to rule than the Mamluks,” because the Mamluks were strangers in the country. After Sultan Baybars took over the Sultanate, he acted against the bedouins to restore order and security along the roads, aiming to ensure their loyalty and preserve the borders in Egypt, Syria, and the Hijaz areas. Baybars even succeeded to oblige the bedouins to pay their duties of taxes (al-zakāt wa-l-ʿushūr), and they committed themselves to guarding and controlling the country.⁶³

Al-Maqrīzī describes fighting against the bedouins until they became obedient, saying “until the bedouins were dispersed and their revolt was suppressed. They were treated with violence and oppression until they were humbled” (… ḥattā tamma tabdīd shaml al-badw wa-ikhmād thawratihim, wa-muʿāmalatuhum bi-l-ʿunf wa-l-qahr ḥattā qallū wa-dhallū).⁶⁴ After the conquest of Karak in 1263, Sultan Baybars forced the Bedouin tribes secure the country and safeguard it as far as Hijaz.⁶⁵ In 1264, and because of the importance of the Hijaz and the way to Yemen, as well as for its location, the Sultan sent troops (khafar) to Khaybar to occupy it, thus guarding the area and the routes to the Hijaz.⁶⁶

By the end of Baybars’ reign, he succeeded in subduing the Bedouin tribes, after implementing a harsh policy against their actions. So, they were obliged to pay their duties of zakāt, as a religious tax and duty, from all his domains from the Maghreb and the Hijaz to Syria.⁶⁷

2. Conclusions

Being an Islamic leader in his status as a sultan, Rukn al-Dīn Baybars faced many challenges that led to controversial arguments regarding the legality of his position, accompanied by fierce military confrontations. Throughout his reign, he continued fighting against the Franks and Mongols, in addition to suppressing internal strife and opposition and acting to unify the country under his authority while implementing Islamic laws in all aspectsin particular, Baybars’ act of restoring the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo.

Despite Baybars’ background as a slave (mamlūk), he succeeded in implementing Islamic principles and reviving Islamic tradition after a period of weakness. Before his death in 1277, Baybars exploited his status as a charismatic Muslim leader with full authority under the restored Caliph. He acted fiercely to defend Islam from external enemies and inner conflicts, that helped him form a model of new Islamic leadership based on Mamluk's leaders in political and military affairs, and with the help of judicial reforms and supportive ulama in administering religious and civil affairs. Besides this, providing security, peace, and free worship in the Islamic holy places gave Baybars the status and title of protector of the two Holy Mosques, ḥāmī al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn.

Baybars implemented Islamic policy when enacting administrative arrangements in all areas. He fought strictly against innovations (bidʿa) to Islam and religion, on the grounds of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” Baybars’ qualities and characteristics as a model of Islamic leadership enabled him to achieve his goals in forming a unified religious and political image of authority during his reign that shaped the bases of Mamluk rule for many years to come.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Hatim Muhammad Mahamid

Dr. Hatim Mahamid had completed his doctoral studies in Tel-Aviv University. He is Specialised in Islamic Studies In late Medieval Syria. He has published Several researches related to Medieval Islam in Egypt and in Syria, focussing on Islamic Education, Politics and Administration.

Notes

1. On the sources relate to Sultan Baybars see the list of Bibliography.

2. See: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir (Riyad: n.p. ʿabd Al-Ẓāhir, 1976); ʿIzz al-Dīn Muhammad Ibn Shaddād, Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, vol. 31 (Wiesbaden, Franz Schteinz, Shaddād & Muḥammad, 1983). Historians considered Baybars to have a controversial image and had different views toward his characteristics and acts as an Islamic leader, see: Amina A. Elbendary, “The Sultan, The Tyrant, and The Hero: Changing Medieval Perceptions of al-Ẓāhir Baybars”, Mamlūk Studies Review 5 (Elbendary, 2001), 141–157.

3. See the discussion on Islamic leadership: Abbas J. Ali, “Islamic Perspectives on Leadership: A Model”, International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 2.2 (Ali, 2009), 160–180. On the argument for Baybars” legitimization of power and leadership, see: Anne Troadec, “Baybars and the Cultural Memory of Bilād al-Shām: The Construction of Legitimacy”, Mamlūk Studies Review 18 (Troadec, 2014–15), 113–147. See also regarding the formation of Mamluk political order in the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo: Jo Van Steenbergen, “Mamlukisation between social theory and social practice: an essay on reflexivity”, State Formation, and the Late Medieval Sultanate of Cairo, ed. S. Conermann (Bonn: Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg, Steenbergen, 2015), 1–44.

4. See some of Baybars’ titles and prerogatives: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 101–110; Taqiy al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat al-duwal wal-mulūk (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Al-Maqrīzī & Taqiy Al-Dīn aḥmad, 1997), 1: 531–534; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm al-zāhira (Misr: Wazārat al-Thaqāfa, Birdī & Al-Dīn Abū Al-Maḥāsin, 1963), 7: 111–113.

5. On the subject of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” in Islam see: Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cook, 2010).

6. On the significance of this, see: Yaacov Lev, “The Transition from the Ayyūbids to the Mamlūks: Ibn Wāṣil’s Account”, in: Egypt and Syria in the Fāṭimid, Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Eras — VIII, eds. U. Vermeulen, K. D’hulster & J. Van Steenbergen (Lev, 2015), 245–270.

7. On the authorities of such government see: Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli bin Muḥammad Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya wal-wilayāt al-dīniyya (Al-Māwardī & Abū Al-Ḥasan ʿali, 2006), 62–68; On the legitimacy of the Mamluks see: Albrecht Fuess, “Mamluk Politics”, in: Ubi sumus? Quo vademus?, ed. Stephan Conermann (Fuess, 2013), 96–99.

8. Many of Ayalon’s studies focus on the military slavery of the Mamluks, see as example: David Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War: Military Slaves and Islamic Adversaries (Variorum Collected Studies, 1st ed.) (Ayalon, 1994). Slave soldiers and their controversial status in Islam has attracted modern researchers, see for examples of important and comprehensive studies: Daniel Pipes, Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2^nd ed., Pipes, 1981); Linda S. Northrup, From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.) (Northrup, 1998); Koby Yosef, “The Term Mamluk and Slave Status during the Mamluk Sultanate”, Al-Qantara 34 (1) (Yosef, 2013), 7–34; idem, “Dawlat al-Atrāk or Dawlat al-Mamālīk? Ethnic Origin or Slave Origin as the Defining Characteristic of the Ruling Elite in the Mamluk Sultanate”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 39 (Yosef, 2012), 387–411.

9. See: Amalia Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Nāsir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (1310–1341) (Levanoni, 1995), 5–27.

10. See: Jo van Steenbergen, Order out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341–1382 (Steenbergen, 2006).

11. “sulṭān jāʾir sabʿīn sana khayrun min umma sāʾiba sāʿa min nahār”. See: Al-Qādī ʿIyāḍ b. Mūsā ibn ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik (ʿIyāḍ & Al-Qādī ʿIyāḍ, 1983), 3: 326.

12. “sittūn sana min sulṭān ẓālim khayrun min Layla wāḥida bi-lā sulṭān”. See: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Qāsim (ed.), Majmūʿat fatāwā Shaykh al-Islām Aḥmad ibn Taymiya (al-Madina: n.p., Qāsim & Abd Al-Raḥmān, 2004), 30: 136.

13. In her study, P. Crone examines the ideological aspects of medieval Islamic political thought and provides an understanding of contemporary Middle East politics and current global events, see: Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (Crone, 2004).

14. See: Reuven Amitai, “Dealing with Reality: Early Mamluk Military Policy and the Allocation of Resources”, in Stefan Leder, ed. Crossroads between Latin Europe and the Near East: Frankish Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (12th to 14th Centuries), (Amitai, 2011), 127–44.

15. Apart from archaeological finds in Palestine, others are known in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, while some others known from historical evidence. See: Uzi Greenfeld and Yuval Peleg, “Two Lion Reliefs from the Time of Baybars Found in Samaria”, in: Judea and Samaria Research Studies, vol. 20 (Miriam Billig ed.), (Greenfeld & Peleg, 2011), 97–104.

16. Ibn Shaddād praises Baybars’ qualities of tolerance and forgiveness, despite having a strong and powerful character that made people fearful of him. See examples of his characteristics: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 283–87, 305–309; See the study of Denise Aigle, “Legitimizing a Low-Born, Regicide Monarch: The Case of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars and the Ilkâns in the Thirteenth Century”, in: Representing Power in Ancient Inner Asia: Legitimacy, Transmission and the Sacred, ed. I. Charleux et al. (Aigle, 2010), 61–94.

17. See: Peter Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century, (Thorau, 1995).

18. See: Jerzy Hauziński, “The Syrian Nizārī Ismā̔īlīs after the Fall of Alamūt. Imāmate’s Dilemma”, Rocznik Orientalistyczny 64.1 (Hauziński, 2011), 180–82.

19. Yehoshua Frenkel, “Baybars and the Sacred Geography of Bilād al-Shām: A Chapter in the Islamisation of Syria’s Landscape”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25 (Frenkel, 2001), 153–70.

20. Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-Arab fī funūn al-adab, (Al-Nuwayrī, 2004), 30: 126.

21. On Baybars’ travel to Syria, for example, in Shaʿbān 667 H (1269), see: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 56–58, 63. He managed state affairs on his own both political or military, dealing with correspondence and preparing the campaigns against his external or local enemies, see: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 311–19.

22. See al-Maqrīzī’s description of Baybars’ travel that year (1272), and his acts administering state and provincial affairs in Karak, Damascus, Hamat, Aleppo, Homs, and reconciling between Bedouin tribes in the area. Administrative officers accompanied Sultan Baybars on this visit, such as the famous historian Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, see: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 75. During Baybars’ visit to Jerusalem in 1274, he disguised himself as a monk accompanied by a small group of his own officials (maʿ jamāʿa yasīra min khawāṣṣihi), see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 163.

23. See: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 127–28.

24. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 182. Ibn Taghrī Birdī has lengthy comments on Baybars’ characteristics, actions, and behaviors, see: ibid., 177–200.

25. See: Mustafa Banister, “Naught Remains to the Caliph but his Title: Revisiting Abbasid Authority in Mamluk Cairo”, Mamlūk Studies Review 18 (Troadec, 2014–15), 219–45.

26. See: Mona F, Hassan, Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History (Hassan, 2016), esp. 20–141; on the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo, see: Peter M. Holt, “Some Observations on the Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 47.3 (Holt, 1984), 501–507; Stefan Heidemann, Das Aleppiner Kalifat (A.D. 1261): Vom Ende des Kalifates in Bagdad über Aleppo zu den Restaurationen in Kairo (Heidemann, 1994).

27. Banister, “Naught Remains … ”, 221, 245; Annemarie Schimmel, “Kalif und Kadi im Spätmittelalterlichen Ägypten”, Die Welt des Islams 24 (Schimmel, 1942), 6–26.

28. Sherman Jackson, “The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Ibn Bint al-Aʿazz and the Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in Mamluk Egypt”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 115 (Jackson, 1995), 58–59. Holt identified different functions that the caliphate performed for the Mamluks, despite the Abbasid caliph in Egypt seeming to be a puppet under the Mamluk sultans, see: Holt, “Some Observations … ”, 501–503; see also: Matthew B. Ingalls, “The historiography of Islamic law during the Mamluk Sultanate”, in: The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law, eds. Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed (Ingalls, 2018), 460–461.

29. On the conquest of Baghdad (Iraq) and Syria by the Mongols, and its effect, till the appointment of the new Abbasid Caliph in Cairo, see: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 499, 500, 507–30; Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 99–100.

30. Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 530. See also the celebration outside Cairo; ibid., 531–33; Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 101–10; ʿImād al-Dīn Ismāʿīl ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wal-nihāya, (Kathīr & Al-Dīn Ismāʿīl, 1988), 13: 232; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 109–13; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 13–18.

31. See: Banister, “Naught Remains … ”, 219–45; Heidemann, Das Aleppiner Kalifat, 91–107, 177–92; Hassan, Loss of Caliphate, 123–35, 267–90.

32. See, for example, the complete text of appointments given to Baybars by the Caliph: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 101–10; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 531–34; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm 7: 111–13.

33. See, for example, Lane-Poole’s statement that “Baybars was determined to be a second Saladin”: Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (Lane-Poole, 2013), 242–75. See more on Baybars: Thorau, The Lion of Egypt. See also: Anne-Marie Eddé, “Baybars et son double: de l’ambiguïté du souverain idéal”, in: Le Bilād al-Šām face aux mondes extérieurs: la perception de l’Autre et la représentation du souverain, ed. Denise Aigle (Edde, 2012), 33–46.

34. See chapters 3 and 4 in: Reuven Amitai, Holy War and Rapprochement. Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260–1335) (Amitai, 2013), 63–108.

35. See, for example, Denise Aigle, “Les inscriptions de Baybars dans le Bilad al-Sham: Une expression de la légitimité du pouvoir”, Studia Islamica 96 (Aigle, 2003), 87–115; idem, “Legitimizing a Low-Born”, 61–94.

36. See: Troadec, “Baybars … ”, 113–47.

37. See some of Baybars’ titles mentioned in the deed issued to the Mamluk emirs after the conquests in Palestine: Al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 175. For the whole decree, see ibid., 174–79.

38. On the details noted during Baybars’ reign, see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 182–86, 190, 197–99, 219. Y. Rapoport argues for the symbiotic relationship between Islamic law and Mamluk siyāsa. He has discussed the suitability and modification between “siyāsa and shariʿa” (politics and religious law) under the Mamluks, see: Yossef Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siyāsah and Shariʿah under the Mamluks”, Mamluk Studies Review 16 (Yosef, 2012), 71–102.

39. Fuess, “Mamluk Politics”, 99–117.

40. Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 178. Baybars’ son al-Malik al-Saʿīd was also married to the daughter of Sayf al-Dīn Qalāwun, before becoming sultan.

41. On Baybars’ religious policy, see: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 299–303; For more information on Mamluk origins see: Reuven Amitai-Preiss, “The Mamluk Officer Class During the Reign of Sultan Baybars”, in Yaakov Lev, (ed.), War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th-15th Centuries, 267–300. On the Mamluks: military slavery in Egypt and Syria, see: Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War..

42. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 355; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 61. See also: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 107.

43. See: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 98–99. On religious policy in general under the Mamluks, see: Donald P. Little, “Religion under the Mamluks”, The Muslim World 73 (Little, 1983), 165–81.

44. See: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 544, 562; On this subject, see: Jackson, “The Primacy of Domestic Politics”; Joseph H. Escovitz, The Office of Qadi al-Qudat in Cairo under the Bahri Mamluks (Escovitz, 1984), 23; Yossef Rapoport, “Legal Diversity in the Age of Taqlid: The Four Chief Qadis Under the Mamluks”, Islamic Law and Society 10.2 (Rapoport, 2003), 210–228; Jorgen S. Nielsen, “Sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars and the Appointment of Four Chief Qāḍīs, 663/1265”, Studia Islamica 60 (Nielsen, 1984), 167–76; Jonathan P. Berkey, “Mamluk Religious Policy”, Mamlūk Studies Review 13.2 (Berkey, 2009), 12–13; ibid., “The Mamluks as Muslims: The Military Elite and the Construction of Islam in Medieval Egypt”, in: The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Phillip and Ulrich Haarman (Berkey, 1998), 163–73.

45. Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 27–28; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, 49: 21; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 121–22; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 75–79, 93–94. See the decree of appointment of the Shafiʿi judge Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Bint al-A‘azz, with his extensive authority to supervise the funds of orphans and endowments in Egypt: ibid., 77–79.

46. See: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 79; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 137; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 31–32. On the judges of the four schools of law in Egypt and Syria who served under Sultan Baybars, see: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 235–38; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, 13: 246.

47. Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 4; Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 183.

48. See: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 44; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 146–47.

49. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 183–84; See also: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 95.

50. On repairs in the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, see: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 10; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 526–27.

51. See: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 562. On the materials sent to the holy places in Mecca and Medina in 662/1264, see: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 200, 247; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 74; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 9, 32, 60.

52. Abdul Azim Islahi, Muslim Economic Thinking and Institutions in the 10th AH/16th CE Century (Islahi, 2009), 127–140.

53. See: Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā (Al-Qalqashandī & ʿAlī, 1987), 11: 248–49.

54. See on al-Zahiriyya madrasa in Damascus: Gary Leiser, “The Endowment of the al-Zahiriyya in Damascus”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 27.1 (Leiser, 1984), 33–55. On Baybars’ endowments and contributions in Syria (Bilād al-Shām) in general, see: P. M. Holt, “The Virtuous Ruler in Thirteenth-Century Mamluk Royal Biographies”, Nottingham Medieval Studies 24 (Holt, 1980), 27–35; Frenkel, “Baybars and the Sacred Geography of Bilad al-Sham”.

55. See: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 538–39, 544; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 28; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, 48: 75. On Baybars’ generous treatment and respect for the ulama and judges of the different schools of law, see: Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 274–75.

56. Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 556; Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 162. See: See: Hatim Mahamid, “Developments and Changes in the Establishment of Islamic Educational Institutions in Medieval Jerusalem”, Annales Islamologique 37 (Mahamid, 2003), 329–354; idem, “Waqf, Education and Politics in Mamluk Jerusalem”, Islamic Quarterly 50.1 (Mahamid, 2006), 33–58; See also: Reuven Amitai, “Islamisation in the Southern Levant after the End of Frankish Rule: Some General Considerations and a Short Case Study”, in: Islamisation: Comparative Perspectives from History, ed. Andrew Peacock (Amitai, 2017), 156–186; Nimrod Luz, “Aspects of Islamization of Space and Society in Mamluk Jerusalem and its Hinterland”, Mamluk Studies Review 6 (Luz, 2002), 133–154.

57. On Baybars’ constructions in Jerusalem for commercial and public use, see: al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 14.

58. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 89–90, 183–84; See also on the waqf of the khān in Jerusalem and rearranging the simāt and other expenses in Hebron: ibid., 220–21; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 4; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 71.

59. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 224–25, 229. Baybars arranged the needs and requirements, charity and waqf for the poor, orphans, and Sufis and for the burial of dead strangers in Cairo, see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm, 7: 180, 213–14; Ibn Shaddād, Taʾrīkh, 299–303; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 2: 5–6, 9.

60. On appointing Muslim governors and officials with authority, see: al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām; Ibn Taymiya, al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya; Abū Yaʿlā, al-Aḥkām; Ibn Jamāʿa, Taḥrīr (see References).

61. See: Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt, (Stilt, 2011).

62. See: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 95.

63. See on some of the struggles against the Bedouins (ʿurban) in Egypt and in Syria until Sultan Baybars succeeded in bringing them to obedience: Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 51, 120; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 479–81; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, 49: 23; for more about Baybars’ actions against the bedouins: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 33–34, 68–69.

64. Al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 479–81.

65. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 165; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk, 1: 557.

66. Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 220; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 152.

67. See: al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat, 30: 96.