Dissemination of disinformation on political and electoral processes in Nigeria: An exploratory study

Abstract

Increasingly, social media has become a major source of fake news, with disinformation used as a tool in manipulating public opinion and delegitimizing opposing voices. This study explores the influence of the content of social media on traditional media, and the proliferation of disinformation in the context of elections and accountability in Nigeria. Data were collected from 60 interviews and 18 focus group discussions with key stakeholders across Nigeria’s geo-political zones. The result shows the content of social media as shaping traditional media in addition to exacerbating pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions. The study recommends strengthening the positive elements of social media to weaken the threat posed by digital disinformation.

Keywords:

• Disinformation
• fake news
• social media regulation

1. Background

Nigeria is a West African presidential federal republic with a large multiethnic and multireligious population of over 218.5 million people (World Population Review, 2022). However, this diversity has been mismanaged, limiting Nigeria’s ability to foster harmonious development. Since its independence in 1960, the political scene has been replete with ethnic rivalry, religious conflicts, fragile social contexts, depressing human conditions, inflation, systemic and widespread corruption, debilitating poverty, illiteracy, and a weak economy (Akanji, 2019), as well as perceived marginalization, anger, hatred, and economic challenges (Harsin, 2018; Pate, 2018). The Nigerian media has played a significant role in the country’s political evolution since its independence. All of these issues are “offensively, progressively, and relentlessly destroying relationships, heightening animosities across communities, and threatening democratic survival in the country” (Pate, 2018). They are further exaggerated by the spread of disinformation on religious, ethnic, and political platforms.

“Disinformation” or “fake news” has been defined by McGonagle (2017, p. 203) as “information that has been deliberately fabricated and disseminated with the intention to deceive and mislead others into believing falsehoods or doubting verifiable facts; it is disinformation that is presented as, or is likely to be perceived as, news.” The news plays an important part in democratic societies; however, fake news poses a serious challenge to democratic societies as it misinforms people and significantly affects the deliberative process. Although the dissemination of disinformation was prevalent before the recent advancements in information and communications technologies (ICT), the revolution in ICT has simplified its access and spread across space and time (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). The advent of the Internet, especially social media, has significantly accelerated the spread of disinformation, aided by the expansion of the mobile data subscriber base and the growing availability of affordable smartphones. Social media platforms present new opportunities for engagement through the ease of two-way communication. More than half of the Nigerian population are internet users, and over 20 million people use social media platforms, making the problem of the dissemination of disinformation in Nigeria significant (The Nigerian Communications Commission, 2022).

However, in Nigeria, due to the many actors involved in news dissemination, the line between new online media sources and conventional offline media platforms is blurred, with disinformation being spread across multiple outlets in many languages. On radio and TV broadcasts, political consultants, often referred to as “soldiers of mouth” (or “Sojojin Baci” in Hausa), spread a mixture of truth and falsehood in favor of their political party (“Nigerian political parties are weaponizing fake news,” 2019). Online and offline disinformation are intertwined, shaping and influencing each other. An online rumor started on social media networks can easily influence conventional media output and programs and reach the offline audience in a few hours through well-established rumor networks. For instance, one of the most pervasive rumors that spread across many social media platforms during the 2019 Nigerian general election was that “Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari is a clone and is in fact a man named Jubrin from Sudan.” This fake news was backed up by tampered photos. Likewise, another piece of fake news widely circulated on social media suggested that the President would take another wife in October 2019 (Edwin & Yalmi, 2019); to substantiate this rumor, invitation cards were also circulated.

The circulation of disinformation, particularly about the spread of weapons during elections, can have deadly consequences. During the 2019 elections, a CNN report on weapons being smuggled into Nigeria that was filmed during the 2011 elections was shared on a social media platform as if it were a current story (Busari, 2019). Such disinformation can plague public discourse and decision-making, hindering the process of finding common ground and even threatening public safety. These incidents demonstrate the destabilizing effect of the viral spread of disinformation, which can lead to political instability. Disinformation can incite people to violence and lead to the weakening of public confidence in the government. Considering the serious consequences of the dissemination of disinformation, the Director-General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA), Dr. Garba Abari, has lamented the spread of disinformation and fake news, especially by political elites before the 2023 general election (Nnabuife, 2022).

An increasing number of people rely on social media as a source of news. This has led to concerns that fake news can manipulate public opinion and delegitimize opposing voices. However, research on the dissemination of fake news in Nigeria is scarce (Apuke & Omar, 2020; Pate & Ibrahim, 2019; Pate et al., 2019). The existing studies have mainly focused on the consequences of the spread of disinformation during elections on individual and group decisions, contextual factors, and outcomes of fake news, in addition to identifying the motivations behind disinformation campaigns. However, to the best of our knowledge, no existing study has attempted to understand how social media content enters offline spaces through traditional media and word of mouth (Hitchen, 2018). Against this background, this study aimed to explore how online social media is shaping offline print media in the context of elections and accountability and to examine social media regulation in Nigeria.

2. Methods

2.1. Study design and settings

This exploratory study was conducted between December 2019 and January 2020 with various stakeholders in Nigeria, West Africa. Nigeria has a total of 36 states. For this study, six states—Bayelsa, Lagos, Imo, Kano, Kogi, and Borno—were selected to obtain nationally representative data. These states represent Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones and were selected in order to highlight any regional differences among the zones.

2.1.1. Study population

A total of 60 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted (10 per state). Participants were government officials such as the editors and deputy editors of newspapers and media houses, staff of the NOA, media professionals, online social influencers, civil society activists, mass communication students, and, in some instances, security personnel. They were selected using a purposive sampling technique with maximum diversity in terms of age, occupation, and the type of social media used to acquire various opinions. The inclusion criteria were as follows: resident of a selected state, willingness to participate in the study, ability to respond and participate in the study, and use of social media networks. This sampling strategy was applied to increase the comprehensiveness and richness of the data and the transferability of the study.

The KIIs were complemented by three focus group discussions (FGDs) per state with around eight deliberately selected participants. The first FGD was conducted with journalists from the Nigeria Union of Journalists, the second with social-media-savvy students from Federal University, and the third with young women who were social influencers.

2.2. Study tools

The data were collected using a semi-structured interview guide and an FGD guide. The interviews focused on the following topics: type of social media platforms and type of content shared; initiatives involving the use of social media to promote accountability and to deepen it between the government and the governed; barriers to social media use for deepening accountability; political parties’ use of social media to engage the electorate; the shaping of print media content by social media; actors responsible for reducing disinformation; and potential regulation of social media. As recommended for qualitative studies, the interviews continued until no new information regarding the topics was received (Bengtsson, 2016; Streubert & Carpenter, 2011).

For the FGDs, the following questions were used: How do you use social media and for what purpose? How do you know whether the information you receive or share on social media is true or false? Do you receive information about elections and government work on social media? What kind of election-related information do you receive from social media? Do you believe social media should be regulated and by whom? A major newspaper reported that the chair of the Independent National Electoral Commission ran away from a meeting in Kogi; would you repost this story because a major newspaper reported it? Do you get information on security risks through social media?

2.3. Data collection

The KIIs were initiated using several interview guide-based open-ended questions, followed by exploratory questions to reach more clarity. All KIIs were conducted in person by an experienced qualitative researcher, and the FGDs were conducted by two researchers with one acting as a notetaker. The interviews and FGDs lasted from 30 to 50 minutes and were conducted in English. A digital recorder was used to record them, and consent was obtained beforehand.

2.3.1. Data analysis

The data were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using thematic content analysis. A deductive approach was taken with predefined themes that involved scrutinizing data collected through individual interviews in search of common meanings and patterns regarding the phenomenon under study. Two researchers independently familiarized themselves with the data, categorized the data by identifying meaningful and relevant quotes, placed the quotes under the appropriate category, and met to discuss their interpretation of the quotes iteratively to reach an agreement on key themes. In cases of discrepancies, a third researcher was consulted, and the discussion continued until an agreement was reached. Emergent themes related to categorical constructs were synthesized into descriptive narratives with examples wherever appropriate. Data accuracy and strength were increased by carefully selecting eligible participants; having close, continuous, and long-term contact with them; and engaging all researchers during various stages of the study, such as extracting codes, conducting final reviews, and determining reliability (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

2.4. Ethical considerations

Participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation, their right to withdraw from the study at any time, and the confidentiality of their personal information, following which, informed consent was obtained from all participants. Furthermore, ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board of the authors’ institution.

3. Results

A total of 60 KIIs and 18 FGDs were conducted with more than 250 participants from 6 selected states. Participants’ ages ranged from early 20s to late 50s, with their educational qualifications ranging from a first degree to a master’s degree. WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, followed by Instagram were the most widely used social media platforms. The type of information shared on social media depended upon users’ personal or professional interests, such as the social movement “Stop Violence Against Women,” the Sustainable Development Goals, trending events in the country, and educational and interesting articles. The platforms were also used to obtain national and international news and updates and to connect with friends and family. We broadly identified the following five themes:

1. Overlap between social media and conventional media sources

2. Ethnoreligious and political fault lines entrenched by disinformation

3. Security threat posed by disinformation

4. Growing online influence of disinformation

5. Countering disinformation

3.1. Overlap between social media and conventional media sources

All respondents agreed that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between content shared on social media and information reported by print media, radio, and television. Social media content increasingly shapes the functioning of conventional media. Traditional media outlets are modifying their engagement practices. Most outlets also have an online platform and rely on social media sources for their content, which they investigate further. This also highlights their desire for virality, which is a feature of social media platforms.

Every time I conduct live interviews, I go on social media platforms to feel the pulse of the people, to know what they are saying and what they are thinking. My questions are always based on the questions that people ask on social media. (KII, Lagos)

However, this opens up the possibility of broadcasting unverified rumors to a wide offline audience, a concern raised by a few participants:

A lot of the political [radio] programs, especially in Hausa, are unapologetically partisan, sectarian, and filled with hate speech. While traditional media are aware of sanctions for infractions, they cannot resist the lure of picking up unverified stories from social media. (KII, Kano)

A political analyst mentioned the following:

In a bid to keep up with social media, print media have been forced to find creative new ways to share information or to create an online presence for themselves. For instance, when rumors of President Buhari’s forthcoming marriage to another woman emerged, many traditional media houses carried the story. (KII, Lagos)

These examples illustrate how false content, created and shared on social media, can largely shape print, television, and radio content.

However, participants also argued that the merging of information from citizen journalists on social media and its reporting in traditional media can help strengthen accountability. It can also support better coverage of issues, especially in remote areas. For example, Channels TV produces a program called iWitness News, which encourages people to report happenings in their local area through the platform. One participant mentioned, “with social media, just a snapshot dropped on Facebook can make people aware of what is happening, and they do not have to travel long distances to see things that are happening.” Social media campaigns can also create space for the coverage of sensitive issues, as noted by a Lagos-based respondent.

3.2. Entrenching pre-existing divisions

Social media disinformation with an appeal to emotion is exacerbating existing ethnoreligious divisions that threaten the peace and stability of the nation. This concern was raised by respondents across all geopolitical zones. One academic stated the following:

There are dangers inherent in all the distortions, fake news, and misinformation circulating on social media. Many crises are fueled by these distortions that are accompanied by a photoshopped scene or an old image portraying members of one ethnic group attacking those of another ethnic group. … without putting too much thought into it, people may decide to act and take the law into their own hands. (KII, Kano)

A related example was given by a prominent social media user who recalled seeing a false video circulating on Facebook and WhatsApp. The video showed a farmer from the north sprinkling insecticide on his beans to protect them from pests such as weevils before the produce was transported to the south-east of the country. However, it was claimed that instead of insecticide, he was in fact sprinkling poison. “The people believed the story without verifying it, shared it on social media, and before you knew it, there was a clash between the Hausa and Igbo” (KII, Imo).

Moreover, media professionals shared that social media has taken away the media’s ability to act as a gatekeeper of information. They said that they are pressured by the government to de-ethnicize their content or underreport the numbers of those affected by ethnic violence. However, at the same time, politicians are increasingly using social media platforms not only to attack their opponents but also to make false claims of their success. As one participant noted in the FGD at Kogi, “I discovered that the government built only a few meters of road in my village, took pictures of it, and then shared it on social media, stating that the governor had constructed 1,500 kilometers of road around that axis.”

3.3. Disinformation, a security threat

Participants agreed that disinformation can potentially foster insecurity and violence in the country. However, this was discussed more often in Borno than in other states, which are less affected by armed insurgency. The lack of online engagement by Nigerian security services was highlighted by participants across all six zones. The absence of impartial voices provides fertile ground for the spread of disinformation.

In addition, online disinformation regarding elections also posed a security risk. One respondent noted the following:

I was at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) Elections Centre. Someone called to inform about an attack at Adankolo Clinic. I called [the clinic] only to find out that the information was fake and that it was peaceful everywhere. If voters obtain such information, they will not want to go out; or worse, they will take retaliatory action. (KII, Kogi)

Such rumors persist or flourish because Nigerian state authorities do not deny them. “The police and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps are not active on social media. We obtain security information from other citizens” (KII, Bayelsa). Most security-related information is shared by ordinary citizens in Bayelsa.

“With the absence of security agencies from online platforms, groups such as Boko Haram and IPOB [Indigenous People of Biafra] use these platforms to talk directly with their supporters, foment mistrust, spread disinformation, and recruit followers” (KII, Kano). They “release videos of atrocities [particularly of the capture and killing of Nigerian soldiers] and post targeted threats” (FGD, Borno).

3.4. Growing online influence

Respondents believed that the information available on social media is becoming increasingly influential. Social media has opened avenues for citizens to engage with authorities and hold them accountable by raising their voice against or responding to false and misleading content. This was not previously possible. However, the volume of false information circulating online can also lead to citizen actions based on incorrect assumptions.

Social media provides real-time interaction between the government and the governed, unlike in the past when citizens had to wait for a longer period for government agencies or representatives to respond to their key concerns. (KII, Kogi)

It can checkmate their [government] activities. (KII, Bayelsa)

A related instance was shared by a civil society activist:

In Ekuri, Cross River State, a social media campaign was successful in stopping the devastation of a forest. An offline campaign was already in progress before people went on social media to protest, but its online presence provided necessary additional support in hindering the plans of the government to destroy the entire forest in that region. (KII, Lagos)

Respondents also expressed frustration over the government’s/political figures’ use of social media being primarily reactive. On the few occasions when it is proactive, the content is often politicized and about what they have seemingly done for the community.

When you do not give out information, you are creating space for rumors and fake news. Our leaders should be talking to us more about what they do for us. They should tell us about their budget, their plan for the people, and how they will generate the money required to execute their plan. (KII, Kogi)

Inaccurate information on social media is not a significant problem because accurate information can easily be shared; the problem is that the government is not putting out enough useful information. (KII, Imo)

3.5. Countering disinformation

Respondents held a wide array of views on the necessary steps to be taken to address the threat posed by online disinformation. While some argued for greater regulation, others were skeptical about the government’s ability to establish impartial regulations. Some others focused more on ensuring social media platforms take more responsibility to curb the spread of disinformation. A significant number of respondents argued that, despite the challenges and issues caused and exacerbated by disinformation, the spread of malicious content online can be reduced by increasing awareness of disinformation and means of verification and by educating citizens on core media literacy concepts. While discussing the negative uses of social media platforms, we should not forget to highlight their accountability and positive uses.

A person spreading fake news can be countered by other citizens who can call out that person’s information as false if they have the knowledge to do so. (KII, Imo)

The focus should not be on the regulation of fake news but on people’s receptivity to such news. How do you handle information of uncertain veracity? Is there any other source that can corroborate the information? Evaluate the credibility of that information and eventually reach an objective position. This is related to how rationally we can address the issues. (KII, Lagos)

Everyone has a role and responsibility. The government should promote news literacy and professional journalism. Technology companies should invest in developing tools to identify fake news, reduce financial incentives to spread disinformation, and improve online accountability. Educational institutions should prioritize teaching students about news literacy. Overly restrictive regulation of internet platforms sets a dangerous precedent, encourages authoritarianism, and increases censorship. We should instead focus on how to stop the prevalence of disinformation on social media. (KII, Kano)

4. Discussion

This study shows that disinformation is most effective when it employs existing narratives and contexts to sharpen prevailing social and religious divides. The disinformation campaigns discussed here—designed and led by Nigerians as well as international firms—aimed to delegitimize institutions, groups, or personalities; glorify a leader; or, during elections, confuse voters, instigate apathy among people, or marginalize women and other vulnerable groups.

People who spread disinformation use various strategies and methods such as the selective deployment of facts, use of unsourced content and false visuals, undermining of facts, creation of confusion, misattribution of quotes, and promotion of conspiracy theories, all of which lead to serious consequences. Disinformation campaigns are not limited to Nigeria or Africa but are prevalent throughout the world. During the 2019 UK general election, high-level disinformation and false polling reports were widespread across social media during the final week (Skopeliti & Morrish, 2019). During the 2018 Brazilian general election, Bolsonaro supporters delivered an onslaught of daily misinformation to millions of Brazilians’ phones through WhatsApp (Belli, 2018). In India, “disinformation and hate speech are drowning out truth on social media networks in the country” (Patil, 2019). While more prominent during elections and within high-stakes political contexts, the increased flow of disinformation is also influencing more everyday events and interactions, reinforcing pre-existing beliefs and biases in potentially divisive ways.

Furthermore, this study demonstrates that the reach of social media in Nigeria extends far beyond those with direct access to social media platforms. Traditional media and pre-existing structures for information dissemination, either intentionally or unintentionally, play an important role in the spread of rumors. Online content, whether accurate or false, is not confined to digital settings. During the 2019 Nigerian general election, a survey conducted in two states highlighted the use of newspapers, TV, and radio in verifying content shared on WhatsApp (Hitchen et al., 2019). This overlap of information between online and offline media complicates the process of ascertaining the truth. In Sierra Leone, the line between online and offline content is frequently blurred; in Ghana, journalists need to strike a delicate balance when selecting social media content for broadcasting as they try to gain a reputation for breaking news while simultaneously attempting to build and maintain a reputation as a reliable and trustworthy source of information (Gadjanova et al., 2019). Similarly, Africa Independent Television ran the “Kakaaki Socials,” a 10-minute social media segment, as part of its flagship morning program during the 2019 general election. In this segment, unverified user-generated social media content, including pictures and memes, was shared to discuss current political issues (Ogundipe, 2019).

Our study also highlights the potential exacerbating effect of disinformation on existing ethnoreligious divisions and long-standing tensions. The cultural and racial categorization and fabrication of myths by the public can destroy Nigerian society (Soyemi, 2016). As different ethnic groups live across Nigeria, a single act of violence fueled by such disinformation can spark several violent reprisals. Similar incidents have been reported in India: False WhatsApp rumors accusing individuals of being child kidnappers resulted in violent attacks and the death of 17 people between April and July 2018 (Bathini, 2018). The print journalists interviewed in this study noted the dangers posed by reporting on ethnic violence. The ethnic violence after the 2013 Kenyan elections resulted in the death of several hundred people and the displacement of several thousands (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In 2015, political consulting companies, such as Cambridge Analytica, produced video content that sought to entrench religious divisions (Cadwalladr, 2018). Politicians have come to understand the wide reach of social media, and they employ social media platforms to push election propaganda and trade insults with or spread false stories about their political rivals.

At the same time, this study also highlights the influential nature of social media. Creating a unified online voice can be particularly powerful. Various campaigns have been able to draw on a strong digital presence to amplify or complement pre-existing offline campaigns, such as #EndSARS, #NotTooYoungToRun, #BringBackOurGirls, and #FollowTheMoney. The #NotTooYoungToRun campaign raised the issue of reducing the age limit for political aspirants. The movement’s Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter posts bypassed the bias of official mass media sources and gave a voice to ordinary youths, helping them quickly and inexpensively establish a sense of community with a shared objective (Salaudeen, 2018). The government saw the political benefits of passing the #NotTooYoungToRun bill, which certainly helped, but without the movement’s sustained online advocacy, the campaign would not have been successful. Those in power have started to recognize the growing influence of online debates and discussions on offline political interactions. They are responding by hiring increasingly large social media teams tasked with creating a positive online image of their party and themselves. These teams flood social media with disinformation hashtags and amplify contradicting narratives, thereby disrupting the dissemination of accurate information online and further obscuring efforts to uncover the truth (Singer & Booking, 2018). Therefore, the challenge is to find ways in which the more positive elements of social media can be enhanced, which can reduce the threat posed by digital disinformation.

Our KIIs demonstrate that the dissemination of disinformation is undeniably a major threat to Nigerian national security. The risk posed by disinformation was apparent after the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, when the uncontrolled dissemination of fake news related to the election results ultimately led to a bloody confrontation in the heart of Jakarta in May 2019 (Idris, 2019). Therefore, countries worldwide are grappling with the issue of overcoming disinformation, hate speech, influence campaigns, and other negative content on social media. In the UK, a parliamentary committee report on disinformation argued that companies like Facebook should be subject to strong government regulation and should proactively identify fake news on their platforms (Busby, 2019). In Finland, a multi-pronged, cross-sector approach has been designed to prepare citizens for the current complex digital landscape. The program has a key educational component that prioritizes teaching students how to spot disinformation (Mackintosh, 2019). In Nigeria, those who see regulation as a key part of curbing disinformation online recognize the need to adopt a regulation that does not clamp down on vocal citizens who are merely enjoying their freedom of expression guaranteed by Section 39 of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution. However, the Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill (popularly known as the Social Media Bill), which is currently before the Nigerian Senate, is seen as problematic even by those in support of new regulation. The proposed legislation grants an excessive amount of power to the government and security agencies. If passed into law, it will infringe upon not only freedom of expression and press freedom but also the digital rights of Nigerians, thereby conflicting with existing laws (Mabika, 2022). In Singapore, a similar movement intends to prevent the spread of disinformation online with the passage of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill into law in 2019. The law gives authorities sweeping powers to police online platforms as well as private chat groups (Wong, 2019). As noted by our informants, much work has to be done to develop proper solutions to tackle this issue as there is currently a lack of suitable tools to contain the dissemination of disinformation in Nigeria.

Disinformation is not only shared by individuals with vested interests, political parties, and bots; ordinary people have also become a part of this new trend. Guess et al. (2019) revealed that low media literacy, particularly among those who have just started using social media, contributed to the spread of fake news on Facebook. People are more inclined to share posts that align with their personal opinions and avoid content that opposes their views and beliefs (Guess et al., 2018). This allows cyber armies to play with public sentiment. Low media literacy among citizens, paired with strong political support for certain parties, has allowed political parties to advance in information warfare on social media. Thus, the best way to combat fake news is to increase media literacy among social media users.

Most studies on the impact of disinformation on elections have focused on the 2016 US presidential election. In the context of African politics, this study is the first to highlight the disruptive influence of online disinformation on civic space in Nigeria. Our study has a representative sample and provides sub-national and national examples to further strengthen relevant points that have emerged from media coverage and the existing literature. However, due to its exploratory nature, this study has inherent limitations. Purposive sampling was used to select participants; the selection criteria were based on personal and lived experiences and were, thus, prone to bias. Nevertheless, we made every effort to include diverse respondents from each state in terms of age, social media usage, and professional and educational experience.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Our findings reveal intriguing perspectives of different stakeholders on the influence of disinformation on Nigerian political and electoral processes. Nigeria’s insecure political and ethnoreligious landscape provides fertile ground for the spread of disinformation on social media platforms, which have an increasing number of users. Tackling online disinformation requires addressing some broader challenges such as insecurity and a lack of trust in government officials. However, at the same time, online information can be used to clarify facts that can promote government accountability and transparency. Moreover, it is important to recognize that online disinformation can influence offline content in newspapers or on television and radio. It is, therefore, imperative to strengthen the more positive elements of social media, thereby weakening the threat posed by digital disinformation.

Government regulation of social media to curb the spread of disinformation has been proposed and implemented in some countries; however, it entails serious risks to citizens’ freedom of expression. In countries like Nigeria, social media companies can play a far more proactive regulatory role by moderating content, particularly in local languages, and by creating a more digitally informed and educated citizenry capable of discriminating between true and false information. Continued support should be provided to the media to improve the quality of reporting. Leading media houses should employ fact-checkers to reduce the reproduction or reporting of misleading online content across traditional media. Further, social media platforms should raise awareness among their users about how to report disinformation. In addition, technical support should be provided to government bodies to help them convey accurate and apolitical information using their social media handles. Thus, we call for future research that explores more mediation and moderation pathways for the control of disinformation on social media platforms and the impact of providing media literacy to the public on the spread of disinformation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Idayat Hassan

Idayat Hassan is director of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), an Abuja-based policy advocacy and research organization focusing on deepening democracy and development in West Africa. Idayat is a lawyer and has held fellowships in universities across Europe and the United States. Her interests span democracy, peace and security, transitional justice, and information and communications technology for development in West Africa. As the director of CDD, she oversaw its rise from being unranked in 2013 to ranked 11th out of 94 think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa in 2020, according to the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index. Idayat has strengthened CDD’s position as a civic tech leader with a portfolio of projects—including analyses of the nexus between social media platforms, election processes, and electoral outcomes, using an app to identify electoral fraud and analyzing the use of personal data in political campaigning in Nigeria. Idayat has consistently provided thought leadership at different phases of Boko Haram’s development. She was involved with Operation Safe Corridor from its inception, providing foundational ideas and operational advice. She provided conceptual clarity on the Boko Haram phenomenon during its heyday, presenting analyses of the group’s motives and methods at conferences in Nigeria and internationally. Idayat frequently appears in international and local media as an expert on the region and is regularly quoted in the BBC, China Central Television, Radio France Internationale, Voice of America, Bloomberg, Washington Post, Financial Times, Economist, Guardian, and Deutsche Welle.