America and China in the Asia-Pacific: A new regional Cold War?

Abstract

One of the possible scenarios in Asia-Pacific is a bipolar order of two great powers, the United States and China. In this situation, alliance commitments will likely remain fixed rather than flexible. This scenario is also known as “a new kind of cold war” because both actors have many social and ideological differences that will often be emphasized in the competition for the geopolitical position. Three main questions are addressed in this study: 1) What are the roles the United States plays as the status quo in the Asia-Pacific?; 2) What approaches does China take to challenge the United States-centred security order?; 3) What are solutions for the United States and China to avoid the Lose-Lose Situation in the New Cold War?. This paper goes into view on the roles of states as either status quo or revisionist and introduces the happening of a New Cold War in the Asia-Pacific. China has made much progress in recent years, but the United States still has relatively significant advantages over a traditional power in economic size, technological capabilities, and military systems. The research will analyze whether the United States could strengthen the existing order by shifting from a strategy of engagement to a confrontation against China. However, the new Cold War, the “real” of new stability and stability derived from the bipolar order is still in significant doubt. Therefore, the United States and China should find solutions to avoid the “Lose-Lose” situation for all of them.

Keywords:

• United States
• China
• Asia-Pacific
• New Cold War

1. Introduction

The United States (U.S.)-China tensions have risen since Xi Jinping (习近平) took power as head of the Chinese Communist Party at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in late 2012. As the world’s second largest economic power (2010), China believes that its power has increased dramatically and its diplomacy could turn out from Deng Xiaoping’s “Hide your capacities and bide your time” (韬光养晦) strategy to Xi Jinping’s “Big Country Diplomacy” (Major Country Diplomacy) (王 毅 [Wang, 2015). At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (2017), Xi Jinping declared that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered “a new development stage” and “moving closer to the center of the world stage” (South China Morning Post, 2017; Xi, 2017, p. 2). In a second term, Xi unveiled a two-stage plan to transform China into a “great modern socialist country” by mid-21st century. Under the plan, China will realize a moderately prosperous society by 2020 and socialist modernization by 2035. China would become a modern socialist power that was “prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful” by 2050 (Xi, 2017). These included China becoming “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence” (综合国力和国际影响力领先的国家) (Xi, 2017, p. 25).

After taking office in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump launched a campaign of comprehensive strategic competition with Beijing in several fronts. President Trump declared China as a “long-term strategic competitor”¹ to the U.S. and implement tough policies against China, pushing the U.S.-China competition to a new form of comprehensive confrontation, where every aspect of the relationship—economic, diplomatic, military, political—is defined by intensifying rivalry (Hass, 2018; Ratner & Campbell, 2018). At the beginning of his term, the Trump administration has made a consistent effort to defy the Chinese threat. In the 2017 National Security Strategy, China [and Russia] is considered as primary strategic competitors of the U.S (White House, 2017). As can be seen, the Trump administration’s main focus is a rising China, the power believed to pose the greatest threat to America’s long-term strategic interests. As a result, Washington’s focused on China—“strategic competitor” as an important point in U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Policy in 2019 (U. S. Department of Defense, 2019). On 20 May 2020, President Trump signed a document titled “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” (National Security Council, 2020). This document is considered as the new U.S. strategy towards China. In which, the U.S. acknowledge the policy of contact with China over the past 40 years as a failure. The U.S. decided to adjust its policy with tough measures to counter China in all fields in order to protect vital U.S. interests.

Since 2010, China’s growing power, its military modernization, its bold regional and ultimately global ambitions pose enormous challenges to the American superpower and the post-Cold War era, rules-based world order. At present, China’s power has not yet surpassed that of the US, but through aggressive moves towards neighboring countries [especially in the South China Sea], threatening to use force to recover Taiwan (Buckley & Horton, 2019), non-transparent economic activity and many other activities that mark the nation’s rise are seen as a potential threat to US security. Thus, a real strategic competition is taking place between the U.S. (the Status Quo power) and China (the revisionist state). In the strategic approach, the competition of the U.S. and China—two major powers with important influence in Asia—Pacific, will affect the rest of the Indo-Pacific strategic space, which has become increasingly central in international affairs.

1.1. United States—the status quo in the Asia-Pacific

On 10 November 2011, at the Summit of Cooperation (APEC) in Honolulu and Hawaii, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that “The 21st century will be America’s Pacific century, a period of unprecedented outreach and partnership in this dynamic, complex, and consequential region” (Clinton, 2011). Since that time, the US has always considered itself as a “Pacific Power,” President Obama described himself as the first “Pacific President,” (Shafiq, 2014) and began implementing the “Rebalance,” and “Pivot” strategy to the Asia-Pacific region. The US has increased its diplomatic, economic, and military engagement in the region in the face of growing uncertainty about China’s rise (Ratner, 2013). The B. Obama administration pursued not only the interests of security and power but also political peace, economic prosperity, and liberalism (Pham, 2019). These strategic adjustments have become one of the prominent trends of geopolitical movement in the Asia-Pacific region. On the one hand, these US strategies and China’s development contribute to raising the importance of Asia-Pacific in world politics. On the other hand, the competition and involvement of superpowers could turn the region into a security hotspot, a buffer zone for competing influence.

In the previous period, the US repeatedly asserted itself as a member of the Asia-Pacific region, but US President Donald Trump announced his withdrawal from the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP), and China stepped up the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) have raised many concerns in the countries involved. The temporary weakening and vague commitments of the US to traditional Asian allies and partners appear to contrast with the seemingly low-binding multi-billion dollar infrastructure investment offered by China. Starting to weaken after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the US has always affirmed its global leadership position. However, China’s rise could gradually disrupt the existing US-led order in the Asia-Pacific region. Even though, behaviors by China have contributed to maintaining US influence in Asia since 2008 despite its decline in the international arena. The main reason is China’s neighbors feel worried and tighten ties with the US.

The fact that Donald Trump promoted the “America First” Policy and focuses on internal issues made allied and partner states more worried and wanted to adjust their international relations. The case of the Philippines and the Scarborough issue made it loosen its ties with the US and move closer to China. Moreover, through the BRI’s infrastructure development assistance, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia also moved closer to China. Therefore, it would influence the geopolitical orientations of ASEAN countries. In addition, the Trump administration tended to adopt a mindset of a comprehensive confrontation when dealing with China, intensifying Sino-US competition (Arezina, 2020), and strong statements by Joe Biden could eventually lead to a new Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. If the states make a strategic mistake, the Asia-Pacific risks falling into the “Thucydides Trap” - the battlefield of an emerging power rivaling a ruling power (Khurana, 2018).

1.2. China—a revisionist power challenging the United States-centred security order

A rising China has been making serious changes in the regional security in Asia-Pacific since the early twenty-first century. Even this rise is considered one of the significant challenges for the region in the short-term and long-term. The temporary weakening of the US is an excellent opportunity for China that changes the Asia-Pacific security architecture. Reducing US influence and increasing power in China’s periphery is very complicated, and easy to turn Asia-Pacific into a security hotspot. The rise of China may be the main reason to marginalize the US in Asia-Pacific issues, although the US has been the world’s leading superpower with its interests (Johnston, 2004).

China has become a world factory with international sales and production networks, meeting the strict requirements of developed countries. Besides the large-scale development of infrastructure, China has emerged among the leading countries in the production of steel and metals, cement, ships, automobiles, electronics, and textiles. It is also a large consumer of raw materials in the world. In Asia-Pacific, China is the leading trading partner with neighboring countries such as Korea, Japan, and several Southeast Asian countries. China establishes and builds closer relationships with neighboring countries to narrow differences of opinion and expand activities of mutual benefit. However, China’s behaviors related to maritime sovereignty with some neighboring countries still make them worry. Overall, China’s approach has some positive signals but is not uniform across regions. China’s “win-win diplomacy” (双赢外交) focuses on common ground, which has received a great positive response but fails to resolve differences or difficult issues (Sutter, 2006). China is now exerting economic and political influence to weaken the US in Asia-Pacific (McDevitt, 2003). Chinese leaders believe they can effectively deal with the regional security order without competing with the US (Sutter, 2006).

China’s re-engagement has had implications for the global economy in general and China and its neighbors in the region in particular. The above activities contribute to the economic reconstruction of East Asia and individual regional economies. Therefore, China’s regional leadership will become a reality if conditions are favorable to the surrounding environment. However, China still faces significant obstacles to building a China-led system in East Asia. The future forecast of China’s imminent rise to the status of a superpower and a challenge to the hegemony of the US has not yet materialized shortly due to the development gap between the two countries still widening.

1.3. The New Cold War that threatens to turn hot in the Asia-Pacific region

Asia—Pacific is inherently a geopolitical and geostrategic region and has always been the choice of great powers in the global and regional power competition. Entering the twenty-first century, Asia—Pacific will likely continue to be caught up in a contest for political dominance, military power, and economic influence. The future global order will be affected by the Asia—Pacific order. Geopolitics and geoeconomics are multidimensional and create complex patterns of competition, conflict, cooperation, and integration happening all at once. Therefore, the Asia—Pacific region would be a hotpot conflict in the future with the involvement of many great powers such as the US, China, Russia, Australia, the European Union, and India in a competitive situation with interests of influence. According to Liu Zhemin, the legacy of World War II, the Cold War era, and territorial and maritime disputes continue to affect the security of the Asia-Pacific region (Zhenmin, 2013).

The emergence of the Asia—Pacific as a new strategic center in the current international political context is an objective fact. Meanwhile, the region is a large area starting from the Indian subcontinent to the west coast of the United States, stretching across two oceans—the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and holding the bustling maritime trade routes of the world. It is also home to about half of the global population and has many emerging economic centers rivaling the West. Three of the world’s most important straits, including the Strait of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, are located in the Asia—Pacific. The three coastal states in the region (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) adjacent to these straits are capable of controlling a significant proportion of the world’s maritime trade. Besides, the area has pushed the interest of the US due to the dependence of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)² and the proximity to China on the border. Therefore, the main goal of the US is to counter the predominance of an Asian power—China - a potential opponent to challenge US leadership in the world. The US, along with its allies and partners in the hub-spoke system, wants to encircle China. The recent US political-military relationship and economic ties with the ASEAN states have undermined China’s growing penetration into Southeast Asia. In his work “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives,” American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized the key to domination of Eurasia relating to the control of two of the world’s three most advanced economic producing regions that would naturally win the submission of Africa, gain the support from Western in the field of geopolitics (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 31). Concerns for the Asia—Pacific security relate to worrying about an uncertain future for the region. The area also has many internal factors with security risks rooting from many complex reasons. All factors of the security dilemma, the risk of conflict always lurking, territorial disputes, nationalism… can become factors leading to military conflict, even war. As an important component of world politics, confrontation and competition in the Asia—Pacific region bring several serious problems. The main actors here are China and the US. The US was the dominant power during the Cold War (1945–1989) but is being challenged in the post-Cold War era as China has grown stronger and stronger. China is a power that is simultaneously transforming domestic politics and economy, expanding its influence in the region, and demanding respect and recognition from others. In other words, the US is the dominant power and significant presence in the Asia—Pacific region, although some doubt its long-term commitment in the absence of a Soviet threat or equivalent global challenge. However, the desire for peace and stability for the Asia—Pacific region is what all countries expect.

The main movement trends that have taken place in Asia-Pacific will still be prominent in the global future. Strategic competition in the region is inevitable. This fact will lead to a security dilemma for countries. Deep economic interdependence also affects relations between “developed” and free states. Besides, stability challenges in Asia-Pacific continue to be a big concern. The overlapping economic and security interests and the legacies left by history could spark an escalation of tensions, outbreaks of conflicts, and even wars in the region. Unresolved territorial issues continue to make regional cooperation more difficult.

In Figure 1, the strategic goals of the US and China change over time, leading to a change in policies and strategies. China is proactive due to the desire to become an influential country. Meanwhile, despite identifying China as a strategic rival, the US has put forward many measures to contain China, but for coexistence.

Figure 1. Policies of United States and China about the Asia-Pacific (2000–2021).

Source: Figure is compiled by the authors based on U.S. and China’ documents

One of the possible scenarios is a bipolar order of two great powers between the US and China. In this situation, alliance commitments will be fixed rather than flexible. This scenario is also known as the new cold war because both actors have many social and ideological differences in the competition for the geopolitical position. Thus, regional strategies can be “interpreted” within the “logic” of the cold war, thereby hindering regional security cooperation according to the logic of realism conflict, while post-Cold War idealism implies cooperation (Doyle & Rumley, 2019b).

A bipolar order is likely to happen as China maintains the level of economic growth and shift resources into a more modern military capability. Although China has made many strides in recent years, the U.S. still has relatively significant advantages over a traditional power, including economic size, technological capabilities, and military systems. China can close that gap, but it will take time to catch up. As China seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S.-dominated regional system and propose an alternative, it needs to gain the support of other countries in the region. In response, the US could strengthen the existing order by shifting from an engagement strategy to a confrontation against China. However, the “real” stability and sustainability of the bipolar order is still a big question and even a danger for the region (Khurana, 2018).

To build a new cold war, China needs to grow stronger and the US to weaken in the region. However, in the context of the US emphasizing the return not only in the Asia-Pacific but expanding into the “Indo-Pacific” to create a counterbalance to China’s “Two-oceans” Strategy, China’s development is increasingly difficult. Through the above strategy, China emphasizes the importance of the region’s grand geopolitics and geostrategy (Kyaw, 2020). However, to form a “turning point” in the situation in Asia-Pacific, China needs more effort, even making a change to become a “real” opponent to the US. In the case of Russia contributing to the formation of the “Pax Sinica” - an economic-political system led by China in which Russia plays a significant role, the US will face great difficulty (Grishin, 2021). According to Tchakarova (2022), DragonBear³ - two symbols of Russia and China—is Putin’s choice now and in the future (Tchakarova, 2022). If China decides to cooperate and build the DragonBear with Russia (Johnson et al., 2022, p. 16), a new political-economic—“Pax Sinica” with the role of Russia, the Asia-Pacific situation will have many changes, and possibilities for shaping a new cold war would be more likely. Doyle and Rumley (2019a) mentioned a “New “Multiplex” Cold War in the Indo-Pacific, even launching the Indo-Pacific New Cold War Matrix in Asia-Pacific (Doyle & Rumley, 2019).

1.4. Solutions for the United States and China to avoid the lose-lose situation in the New Cold War in the Asia-Pacific

“Like-Mindedness” became the key attribute of the China Containment Strategy. The US wants China to become a responsible member of the international community. Because the New Cold War would be complicated and unpredictable, the principal feature is the outcome. America and China in the Asia-Pacific is not a zero-sum game. It is a “win-win” or “lose-lose” situation, and the US and China want to reach the former. However, they also hope to have a higher dominance and leading position in the region. Regardless of the change or competition in the Asia-Pacific security order, it will considerably affect the entire area. Peace and prosperity in the context of globalization remain a top priority for the world today.

In strategic competition, the US and China tend to openly attack each other in the political-diplomatic field and to a high degree of conflict in the economic area. Through the trade war, the US strives to regain its leading position in the region to assert its power as the only superpower in the world. Meanwhile, China is also trying to realize the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦) and prepare for the transition, show its dominance in the region, and even occupy the power vacuum left by the US in the previous stage. Therefore, the US and China are not afraid to clash to maintain, protect and win their core interests. At the same time, the very outcome of the trade war shows that this does not lead to any positive effects for both countries but also damages the relationship between the two sides. Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, small countries in the area had adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S (Fang & Li, 2022). Therefore, this competition can do more harm than good for both powers. Cooperation is an ideal that benefits both sides, while competition leads to many conflicts and problems. However, it is inevitable because both countries want to be the leader.

Strategic competition is inevitable when both the US and China are aware that their core interests threatening by the opposing side. A state of competition is when the interests of the parties conflict, threatening the achievements of the other party (McDonald, 2020). If we want to “win-win” in strategic competition, the first thing that the US and China need to do together is to change their strategic perception. The field of competition for mutual development should be in the field of economics and technology instead of competition on security and defense. If both sides identify this as a “competition” or a “game” to jointly make efforts to develop in all fields, the optimistic scenario of the Asia-Pacific will happen. Although the complicated regional situation and many factors are intertwined, it will be stable because all countries gain benefits. For example, in the economic field, the competition between the two powers promotes the development of the high-tech industry bringing benefits to the region. Moreover, it can help to narrow the development gap for developing countries. The richness and interweaving of institutions will increase the multilateral dialogue channel for mutual development. Small countries do not have to fall into a spiral of strategic choices about security but can have many selections for cooperation channels.

At the same time, to achieve a “win-win” situation, the US and China need to gradually reduce barriers to politics. Cooperation and competition that respect diversity and differences will be the ideal environment for competition. The two sides cannot “win-win” situation if cooperation brings suspicion and hostility. Promoting democracy and human rights is predominant for human progress.

The issue of sovereignty is a challenging problem to solve, making the US-China strategic competition lead to security and defense instead of economics. While economics is a “win-win” solution, the security instability related to sovereignty will cause all to “lose-lose.” To minimize the escalation of security tensions, China should stop its artificial activities in disputed areas and become a responsible member of the region and the international community. Besides, the US should be a mediator between China and countries with disputes to work out a step-by-step roadmap to discuss and resolve related issues by international law. It is not an easy solution, especially for China, but it is the right way to not push the region into a security dilemma and an arms race. Once security hotspots continuously escalate tensions, reaching the threshold of military conflict, the damage to all countries in the region. The result would be a pessimistic scenario that no one wants. To avoid a “lose-lose” situation, the US and China can promote a “win-win” or “maintain the status quo” strategy.

The current status and solutions for the “win-win” situation, “maintain the status quo”, and “lose-lose” situation can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The US and China in the “win-win”, “maintain the status quo”, and “lose-lose” situation.

2. Conclusion

Asia-Pacific has been facing direct risks of escalating competition between a rising China and the US with its allies. Although most potential security hotspots, such as the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, and some US-aligned Pacific islands such as Guam, the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, FSM, and Palau are directly related. The most significant effects of the escalation of great power competition on small Asia-Pacific countries are not military or political but economic, commercial development, increased support, and investment (V Wesley-Smith, 2021). In other words, the new Cold War will create the anxieties of Asia-Pacific leaders. It is identified as “the single greatest threat to livelihoods, security, and welfare of peoples in Asia-Pacific” (Doherty, 2018).

The scenario of a new cold war that wants to take place requires many conditions from different actors, so, if any, it will be possible in the distant future. Meanwhile, the scenario that the US will play a central role in Asia-Pacific still prevails. In this case, the US will ensure the peace and stability of the region through bilateral security relations and multilateral economic relations. The presumption concerns that the US remains fully engaged in regional affairs, fulfills its commitments well, and has a significant military presence, diplomatic intervention, and even, in many situations, military intervention to reduce tensions related to territorial disputes. The shaft-spokes system will continue to strengthen and expand to new partners, in which the US is the center. This means that the US will maintain and strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and US bilateral security relationship with South Korea, Taiwan, and countries in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the US also needs to strengthen its strategic partnership with China to make it easier to control it. To maintain its leadership position, the US needs a combination of measures, such as deterrence, engagement, and reassurance to deter the revisionist challenge and encourage active cooperation. In particular, the US must convince China to maneuver under the US-led security architecture. The difference in power is a favorable condition for the US to assert its voice and maintain the order of the world superpower. The US needs to make countries in the region, especially China, think its development is positive and ready to be influenced. If the US uses unilateral measures that are too tough, arbitrary, or coercive, it can make countries suspicious and divert. Not only that, but the US needs to demonstrate that support and leadership can lead to shared prosperity and the best-guaranteed security through participation in the mechanisms US-led. Even the US needs to become a peacemaker, a mediator, and a good restrainer of the countries involved.

In effect, a “rules-based order” is established as a set of “common procedures and appropriate rules” of state behavior“in response to pervasive threats. The above orders reflect the nature and interests of the countries that establish them (Farley, 2016). Since the rules-based international system is essentially the embodiment of Western liberal values, disputes with non-Western countries will inevitably arise because of “old and antiquated values” and concerns about issues of fairness and legitimacy in international relations (Chatham House, 2015).

At the same time, emerging powers are competing, clashing on how to understand international law and that compliance with pre-existing global norms is inevitable. Small countries in the region worry about “proxy war” when a new cold war unfolds like the story of the Soviet-American cold war that happened in this region. In particular, countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

They use the Monroe Doctrine or their own “ocean” geopolitical sphere of influence, e.g., the Indian Ocean in the case of India (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008); the North Pacific, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in the case of Japan, the South China Sea in the case of China. Even some of the middle powers in the region make claims to the Monroe Doctrine “oceans” of their own, e.g. Australia in the South Pacific (Rumley, 1999). Those are the reasons why the real stability and sustainability of the bipolar order—a new Cold War order—remains in great doubt.

In fact, the future of security order in Asia—Pacific is always a big question and a topic that attracts the attention of many researchers. It is not only an ongoing international relations phenomenon but also has a powerful influence on world political life. Forecasting scenarios of strategic competition in this region makes an enormous contribution to research and practice. Besides, the strategic competition between the U.S. and China also reminds us of historical events such as power transition, Cold War… Historical legacy relating to sovereignty disputes is recalled while smoldering for a prolonged period when countries focus on economic development. To avoid a “lose-lose” situation in this strategic competition, the US and China should change their overall perception of the competition. Eliminating hostility, ideological barriers and promoting competition in the economic field instead of defense and security is a peaceful solution for the region.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The U.S. government began to name China a “long-term strategic competitor” in its National Security Strategy in 2017 (Perthes, 2020, 2021).

2. Sea-lane is a term that describes the major maritime routes between ports used for commerce, logistics, power, and naval quantity.

3. The term “DragonBear” was proposed by Velina Tchakarova in 2015 to describe a new model of Sino-Russian bilateral relations aimed at shaping the global order in the 21st century.