Russian intervention in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict: A history of tensions and turmoil

Abstract

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, which began in the early 1990s, has been marked by the tensions and violence between the government of Georgia and the breakaway region of Abkhazia. This paper takes Georgian-Abkhazian relationships as a case study to probe the devastating political, economic, and military involvement of Russia, which has had a hand in inciting these conflicts by supporting the Abkhazian separatists, making false claims about the attitude of the central government of Georgia towards the Abkhazian language and ethnicity. The presented article provides a historical analysis of several debatable questions related to the so-called historical independence of Abkhazia, the influence of the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and the role of the Russian Federation in the relations of the two ethnicities, and the most paramount point—how Russia manipulated Abkhaz actors and fueled the ignition of the conflict.

Keywords:

• Interethnic relations
• Georgia
• Abkhazia
• Russian occupation
• War

1. Introduction

Georgia, a country at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, has a troubled history with Russia. Russia’s disregard for agreements, borders, internal or external politics, and infringement on the sovereignty of the country can be seen in the list of its wrongdoings. This paper will present a historical overview and analysis of Russia’s direct involvement in the history of Georgia, based on the case study of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict. The historical data and analysis will help us understand the history of Abkhazia, its land, and its people within the context of Georgian history. The paper will give insights about several debatable aspects based on various historical sources regarding the historical independence of Abkhazia and the significance of the lowland for the development of a whole Georgian history. Following a chronological timeline, we will discuss the Georgian-Abkhazian relationship during different historical eras, from ancient times until modern days. We will attempt to answer several questions, including but not limited to: What were the main causes of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, and how have they evolved over time? How has Russia’s support for the Abkhazian separatists affected the dynamics of the conflict? What role has ethnicity and language played in the conflict, and how has Moscow used this specific aspect to incite protest, tensions, and hatred among Abkhaz ethnic representatives? Russia’s direct and negative impact on Georgia has had a devastating effect. This part is particularly important as Russia’s presence in Abkhazia becomes even more pronounced, and as Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell say, the region has become a province of Russia, with Russia getting away with the de facto occupation of these territories (Cooley & Mitchell, 2010, pp. 73–91).¹

2. Methodological approach and literature review

The fundamental component of the methodological basis of this paper is the principle of contextualism which permits the exploration of the issue in the context of various historical events. To examine the issue comprehensively, the methods of retrospective, complex, and comparative analysis are employed. In working with sources and documents, an established methodology is utilized, including their identification, selection, authentication of facts, and validation through sources. Additionally, this research employs popular methods in political science, particularly for the analysis of recent periods, such as content analysis, comparative analysis, and event analysis.

The availability of data related to the ethnic demography of a region provides an opportunity to perform significant statistical analyses. By utilizing these rigorous and well-established methodologies, the research targets to provide a thorough and accurate analysis of the issue at hand.

Furthermore, the research topic aims to undertake a comparative analysis of Abkhazia’s contextualism past utilizing multiple documentary sources and applicable scientific literature. The study delves into the evolution of the historical situation in Georgia and identifies the political and geopolitical factors that triggered these changes. A key objective of this research is to investigate the origins of Russian intervention in relation to the conflict and assess the extent to which this involvement contributed to the occupation of Abkhazia. Additionally, the study seeks to demonstrate the historical perspective on the role of Russia in the tensions. By accomplishing these objectives, the research aims to offer valuable insights into the complex dynamics that shaped Georgian-Abkhazia historical trajectory.

The Post-Soviet and contemporary political context hold the utmost relevance concerning the research question at hand. However, a comprehensive investigation of the issue necessitates the utilization of historical resources relating to several key historical issues. To facilitate historical comparative analysis, this research is segmented into several main periods that span from ancient times to the present day, with an emphasis on the modern conflict region of Abkhazia. By adopting this approach, the study endeavors to provide a holistic understanding of the issue that accounts for both contemporary and historical perspectives.

To reconstruct the historical past of the conflicts in Abkhazia, this research relies on various historical sources and documents that are currently available. These sources include Flavius Arrianus’ Black Sea Variations (Kechakmadze, 1961); Zhamtaagmtsereli’s History of Georgia (Kaukhchishvili, 1959); Proqofi Qesarieli’s Georgika (Kaukhchishvili, 1965); Arcangelo Lamberti’s Description of Samegrelo (Arcangelo, 1938) and others. A valuable source of information regarding the political objectives of the Soviet government towards Georgia is A. Ganin’s publication, “Soviet Military Intelligence in Georgia in 1920–1921: Pavel Sitin’s Mission” (Ganin, 2014).

Collection of the documents provided by the Regional Research Center are valuable resources for studying the Abkhazian conflict. These documents offer comprehensive insights into the historical development of the conflict in Abkhazia and represent a crucial source for in-depth scholarly analysis of the issue (Diasamidze, 2002).

Prof. Zurab Papaskiri’s two-volume publication “Essays from the Historical Past of Modern Abkhazia” (Papaskiri, 2003, 2007) is a significant contribution to the study of the history of Abkhazia. The work provides a comprehensive examination of critical issues in the history of Abkhazia. Jemal Gamakharia’s and Badri Gogia’s “Abkhazia—Historical Part of Georgia” (1997) is another noteworthy publication that provides a wealth of documentary material about Abkhazia’s historical past as an integral part of Georgia. The book’s comprehensive approach and extensive use of primary sources make it a significant scholarly resource, essential for those seeking to understand the historical complexities of Abkhazia’s relationship with Georgia.

Research incorporates reports prepared by the International Crisis Group. Founded in 1995, the International Crisis Group is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization devoted to preventing, mitigating, and resolving deadly conflicts. The valuable information provided by these reports enables a comprehensive assessment of the post-conflict environment in Abkhazia.

Article builds the discussion by bringing the work of Abkhazian historians such as Stanislav Lakoba (1999), Oleg Bghazhba’s (Bgazhba & Lakoba, 2015), Aslan Avidzba (Avidzba, 2012) Yurih Voronov (N. Voronov, 1993) and Igor Maryhuba (Maryhuba, 1994; Marykhuba, 2016). These works offer insights into Abkhazian perspectives on their history and relationship with Georgia. It is worth mentioning the collection of articles published in 1999 under the editorship of the British researcher George Hewitt, titled “The Abkhazians. A Handbook” (Lakoba, 1999). It should be emphasized that this collection displays a bias against Georgians and portrays the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict from a strongly separatist-Abkhazian viewpoint. It is important to critically evaluate the information presented in these works and consider them in conjunction with other sources to arrive at a well-informed and nuanced understanding of the issues.

3. Uncovering the truth: the historical independence of Abkhazia - fact or fiction (from Colchis to Ottomans)

The United Nations Security Council adopted 32 resolutions reaffirming the respect for the sovereignty of Georgia and territorial integrity and recognized Abkhazia as integral part of Georgia. The issue of Abkhazia’s independence has been a contentious topic, with separatist writers arguing for it, and Moscow playing a significant role in manipulating the narrative since the early days of the connection between the Georgian kingdoms and the Russian Empire. Above mentioned historical sources are proving that northwest of Georgia, Abkhazian land has always been component of Georgia and always had a vital role in the development of the country.

Before the unification of Georgia in 978, the western and eastern regions had distinct but closely interconnected historical developments. Despite this, some separatist authors, like Stanislav Lakoba, tend to ignore historical facts and even the historical unity of Georgia. However, by examining various sources, which include Flavius Ariane, Proqofi Qesarieli, Arcangelo Lambert etc. it can be determined that Abkhazia has always been an integral part of Georgia, both politically and geographically. The history of western Georgia starts with the Colchis Tribes. The earliest known information is available from ancient Greek sources. During the VI-I centuries, BC modern Abkhazian territory was part of the Colchis kingdom. Authors Hekateos of Miletetus (VI century BC) and Scylax of Caryanda (VI—V centuries BC) described a detailed picture of ethnic groups of the lowland. Both mentioned that the Koli and Korax tribes lived on the southern part of the Caucasus ridge (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, p. 161; Papaskiri, 2003, p. 24). In I-II centuries AD new sources by Pliny and Ariane mentioned Apsils (The Elder P, 2022) and Abazgs (Kechakmadze, 1961, pp. 11–18). Between II-VI Centuries AD Abkhazian territories are under the authority of Egrisi (Lazika), the successor of Colchis kingdom (Kaukhchishvili, 1965, p. 47). Notably, the authority of Egrisi kings was nominally recognized by Abazg rulers as they had a partial sovereignty. Apsils were under the direct control and leaders appointed by Egrisi kings were governing these lands (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 34).

With the growing power of the Byzantium Empire towards the end of VI century influence of Lazika over Abazgia became nonexistence (Muskhelishvili, 1988, pp. 383–386). Byzantine Emperor recognized the leadership of royalties Mir and Archil over Kartli kingdom and gave Abkhazia to Leon I. Subsequently, due to Arab invasions Abkhazia became the shelter for Mir and Archil (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 44). Mir held control over Egrisi, while Archil established his authority over Kartli (Kaukhchishvili, 1955, pp. 139–144). Matrimonial marriage of Leon I and Gurandukht, daughter of Mir, meant symbolic unification as Leon I inherited Egrisi after death of Mir (Lortkipanidze, 1990, p. 5). By the end of VIII century, Leon II, nephew of Leon I, used internal crisis in Kartli leadership and conquered Abkhazia and Egrisi (Kaukhchishvili, 1955, p. 251). Thus, a new West Georgian political union, the Kingdom of Abkhazia was born. XVIII century Georgian historian Vakhushti Batonishvili noted that it was Leon II who gave the name Abkhazia to his kingdom (Kaukhchishvili, 1973, p. 742).

The unification of the Georgian lands culminated in 978. Bagrat III, crowned in Kutaisi, became the King of all Georgia. His title included King of Abkhazian and Kartvelian, which signified the official merger of the two royal thrones of Georgia: Abkhazian (West Georgian) and Kartvelian (Tao-Klarjetian). However, this unification was only achieved after the death of King Gurgen, the father of Bagrat III (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 56).

The following centuries continued to follow a similar pattern. The people living in this land were actively involved in every event that occurred in Georgia. They participated in Lasha-Giorgi’s (1207–1222) military campaign against Gandza (Kaukhchishvili, 1959, pp. 152–153). The Abkhazians were also active during Rusudan’s reign (1222–1245), who called upon them to fight against Jalal Ad-Din (Kaukhchishvili, 1959, p. 82). When the Mongolians divided Georgia and established eight military-administrative entities, known as Dumans, Abkhazia was within the duman controlled by Tsotne Dadiani. Contrary to the assertions made by certain separatist historians (e.g., Voronov), Abkhazia did not possess any form of autonomy (N. Voronov, 1993) within the unified Georgian state during the XI-XII centuries.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire launched its first military campaign against the Sokhumi region (1454). The last king of united Georgia, George VIII (1446–1466), attempted to resist but was unsuccessful (Papaskiri, 2003, pp. 82–83). The United Georgian Kingdom partitioned into several smaller units due to internal and external factors. The newly established Imeretian Kingdom included Guria and Odishi Principality, in its turn Odishi Principality also included Abkhazian Principality (Lortkipanidze, 1990, p. 11). Georgian historian Beri Egnatashvili noted that the Sharvashidzes governed Abkhazia, but they were under the control of the Dadiani’s Odishi Principality. It is important to mention that the Sharvashidzes fought against the Odishi and in this fight, they used the JIQ-Abkhazians (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 89). Around the same time, the Abaza-Adighian people began to migrate from the western Caucasus (Arcangelo, 1938, p. 116). At this time the goal of Abkhazian leaders was not to separate from Georgian reality, but rather to expand their territory, integrate further and increase their influence in local politics. These struggles cannot be considered as the beginning of modern Abkhazian separatism since Abkhazian Principality was under the authority of Imereti Kingdom. Later centuries confirm this statement. For instance, in 1757, Abkhazian leader Khutunia Sharvashidze fought alongside Imeretian King Solomon I in the Khresili Battle against the Ottomans, despite their increased influence in Abkhazia.

4. Appearance of the Russian Empire—the origins of the modern historical-political turmoil in Georgia

At the start of the XVIII century, the Georgian political reality underwent a change. The Russian Empire had an interest in the Caucasus and aimed to overcome the influence of the Islamic Empire and increase its own. Abkhazia immediately became a sphere of attention and Russian Emperor used internal crisis to his own benefit. During the 1768–1774 Russo-Turkish War, Russia sent out a military expedition corps at the request of Erekle II (Heraclius II, King of Kakheti 1762–1798) and Solomon I. This was the first military campaign against Turkish invaders. During this historical event, Abkhazian leadership and nobles supported the Georgian kings and had a positive attitude towards Georgian-Russian interaction (Dzidzaria, 1960, p. 130).

During this period, the Russian Empire sought to expand its territory and influence in the region, often at the expense of the sovereignty and autonomy of the Georgian kingdoms. This was evident in their repeated attempts to annex the Georgian territory and subjugate the Georgian people, often through military force and manipulation of internal political affairs. The Russian Empire also disregarded the agreements and treaties it had made with the Georgian kingdoms, betraying their trust, and undermining their ability to govern themselves independently.

Due to a royal disagreement, Abkhazia got an official protectorate of the Russian Empire. On 2 May 1808, supported by Ottomans, Aslan-bey killed Anti-Ottoman Abkhazian Leader and his father Kelesh-bey. He occupied the Sokhumi fortress and declared himself the leader. His brother, George, who was chosen as heir to the throne by his father, decided to go against Aslan-Bey (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 122). George saw that he would not be able to capture Sokhumi fortress, therefore, he approached Russian Emperor with the request. On 17th of February, 1810 Emperor Alexander I approved his requests and with a special document recognized the Abkhazian Principality under Russian protectorate (Dzidzaria, 1960, p. 138). Soon General Dimitri Orbeliani, the leader of the Russian army liberated Sokhumi Fortress. In October, he presented a special deed and declared George Sharvashidze as the leader of Abkhazia (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 124). This event marked the entrance of Abkhazia under the protectorate of the Russian Empire together with the rest of the Georgian kingdoms. A new political reality has started for the Georgian establishment. The beginning of XIX century marked one of the defining and tragic historical moment for Georgia. Russian Empire abolished Georgian Kingdoms and integrated them into the administrative unions of the Empire. In XIX century, Abkhazian leaders were joining the resistance against both Russian politics and the Ottoman influence. Namely, in 1813 Giorgi Sharvashidze fought against Ottomans with Leaders of Guria and Samegrelo. In 1819–1820, Abkhazians took part in anti-Russian demonstrations, in 1832 and 1840 they took active initiative against Russian occupation and were helping out the Gurian Principality (Papaskiri, 2003, pp. 131–154).

During the Crimean War (1853–1856) between an alliance of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, France, Sardinia, and the Russian Empire the last leader of Abkhazia Mikheil Sharvashidze followed a flexible policy. He used Ottoman occupation and decided to expand his borders by adding Samurzakhano to his lands. Russians did not like his politics; he was seen as a traitor who works against the Russian interests in the Caucasus. Obviously, Russians wanted to punish Sharvashidze, but the end of the Crimean war and the Treaty of Paris decided his fate (Treaty of Paris, 1856).² Eventually, the Russian Empire abolished the Abkhazian Principality in 1864. Initially, it was called the Military Department of Sokhumi and by 1883 Abkhazia turned into Sokhumi Okrug (Administrative division) which was under Kutaisi Province.

In the years 1866 and 1877, Abkhazia experienced uprisings against Russian Empire due to administrative and political issues. Policies of Russification and unequal treatment of the Abkhazian lands compared to the other Georgian principalities played a role in these uprisings. These occurrences ultimately led to the tragic historical event known as the “Mohajir Displacement,” in which thousands of Abkhazians were forcibly relocated to Ottoman lands (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 209). Logically, Abkhazians took the side of the Ottomans in another Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Russians declared Abkhazians as “Guilty People” which only changed in 1907 (Basilaia, 2008, p. 52).

In the second half of the 19th century, the control of the Russian Empire over the region became stronger. In 1862, a Russian General Peter Uslar created an Abkhazian alphabet using the Russian Cyrillic script. The first Abkhazian alphabet was published in 1865 (Papaskiri, 2003, p. 225). The Georgian society took this fact very positively. Jacob Gogebashvili, prominent Georgian educator and writer noted that the creation of the Abkhazian alphabet is an important event, as it enriches language (Gvantseladze, 2011, pp. 8–9).

According to the Russian geographer and historian Yevgeny Weidenbaum (1845–1918), the creation of the Abkhazian script based on the Russian graphics was, first of all, a weakening lever for the Georgian language in Abkhazia. Otherwise, according to Weidenbaum, along with the Georgian and other autonomies, the Abkhazian autonomy would also be promoted, which was not included in the political goals of the tsarist empire (Papaskiri, 1998, p. 53). Despite this fact, the Abkhazian author Igor Marikhuba asserts that the Georgian Script, Asomtavruli inscriptions, found in Abkhazia, is the evidence of the existence of the “Old Abazgian” script and therefore confirms the existence of Abkhazian writing in the medieval Abkhazian kingdom (Marykhuba, 2016, pp. 8–27). Due to obvious reasons such conclusion cannot be accepted as valid.

There is belief, that the fact ofthe use of the Russian script in the creation of the Abkhazian alphabet was a way for the Tsarist government to exert more control over the region and its people. This move was seen as an attempt to divide the two groups and to weaken their connection to each other. Furthermore, the use of the Russian script in the Abkhazian alphabet was also seen as a way to distance Abkhazia from its historical and cultural ties to Georgia. The impact of this decision would be felt for decades to come, as it would become one of the defining moments in the relationship between the Abkhazians and the Georgians. It would be used as a point of tension and a source of conflict between the two groups, and would play a role in shaping their relationship for many years to come. Despite Weidenbaum’s “sincere” statement about the goal of creating the Abkhazian script by the Tsarist administration, George Hewitt, a professor at the University of London, accuses in his report the Georgian side of suppressing the Abkhazian language (Hewitt, 1997) without mentioning the fact of creating the Abkhazian script based on the Russian graphics. Hewitt also neglects to reference the report of Petre Uslar, where the creator of the Abkhazian script himself stated that using the Georgian graphics for the script would complicate the process of spreading the Russian script throughout the Caucasus (Uslar, 1887, pp. 1–30). These omissions demonstrate the highly subjective nature of Hewitt’s views, which lack scientific reasoning.

In the 1890s, new settlers including Estonians, Germans, Russians, and Greeks were brought into Abkhazia by the decision of the Empire. This was a deliberate move to weaken the Abkhazian-Georgian ethnic population. The Georgian language was targeted and repressed in schools and churches. In 1907, L. Voronov published a brochure titled “Abkhazia is not Georgia” in which he argued that Abkhazia had never been a part of the Georgian lands or a political life (L. Voronov, 1907, pp. 12–13).

When considering the historical events outlined in this paper, Voronov’s statement appears to be uninformed and unjustified. However, this was just the beginning. Newly emerged Soviet government implemented policies that further weakened the relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians. They also applied policies that promoted separatist sentiment among the Abkhazians and were aimed at creating a sense of separation and mistrust between the two groups. In addition, the Soviet government also used propaganda to further promote the idea that Abkhazia was not a part of Georgia. The next section of this article examines the actions and policies of the Soviet government towards Georgia and the negative impact they had.

5. Divide and conquer: the impact of soviet policies on Georgian-Abkhazian relations

During the 20th century, Abkhazia’s desire for separation increased and caused tension in their relationship with Tbilisi. In 1917, two groups advocating for separatism were formed: the National Security Council of Abkhazia, led by Alexander Sharvashidze, and the Abkhazian People’s Council. It’s important to note that these groups only represented the views of a small portion of Abkhazians and did not take into account the perspectives of other ethnic groups. According to separatist author Stanislav Lakoba, the goal of the “Abkhazian People’s Council” was to join “the Mountainous Republic of Norther Caucasus.” (Lakoba, 1999, p. 90).

In 1918, as Georgia was preparing to declare its independence, Menshevik Social-Democratic government led by Noe Zhordania, aimed to create a democratic state. The Declaration of Independence of Georgia incorporated multiple provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic minorities within the country. Namely: “1. The Georgian Democratic Republic shall ensure within her borders civil and political rights to all of its citizens equally, irrespective of their ethnicity, faith, social station and gender. 2. The Georgian Democratic Republic shall provide a wide field of free development to all nationalities that inhabit it. 3. Until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the governance of Georgia shall be conferred to the National Council, with additional representation of the national minorities, and the Provisional Government responsible to the National Council” (Civil.ge, 1918). The political establishment sought to alleviate tensions with Abkhazians. The agreement of 9 February 1918 established that the future of Abkhazia would be determined by the “Founding Council of Abkhazia” through the democratic means. The advocates of separatism, such as Lakoba, regard this measure as a proclamation of Abkhazia’s independence (Lakoba, 1999, p. 90). However, they are missing out on one of the most important aspects of the agreement: if one party would decide to have a foreign relationship with another country, it had to be agreed with each other first. Hence, to claim that with this document Abkhazia got independence loses its sense (Papaskiri, 2007, p. 11). After declaring its well-deserved independence, another document was signed with Abkhazia. Dated 11 June 1918, a Minister of Abkhazia was appointed within the Georgian Democratic Republic. The role of the Minister was to lead the internal affairs of Abkhazia, which in turn was financed by the Georgian Democratic Republic. In case of need, military assistance had to be granted to the Abkhazians (Papaskiri, 2007, p. 16).

The Bolsheviks opposed this agreement. They continued to incite military provocations. In accordance with the aforementioned agreement, Abkhazians requested military assistance from the Georgian government. On June 19, Georgian General Giorgi Mazniashvili was appointed as the General-Governor of Abkhazia. He fought against the Bolsheviks with 300 Abkhazian soldiers and on June 28th, they liberated the city of Gagra from Bolshevik occupation (Papaskiri, 2007, p. 18). Lakoba articulates a contrary perspective, characterizing the Georgian government’s actions as an occupation of Abkhazia (Lakoba, 1999, p. 90). However, this assertion can be refuted by the previously mentioned evidence that Tbilisi intervened at the behest of the Abkhaz people to combat the Bolshevik forces.

In 1918, the Abkhazian People’s Council was dismissed and reorganized twice. The first reorganization was in response to a request from the Council. The second dismissal was due to the threat posed by Alexander Sharvashidze and his anti-governmental actions. In an effort to fight against the Georgian National Guard, he sought help from the Bolshevik volunteer military units of Alekseev and Denikin. Bolsheviks agreed to assist Sharvashidze (Papaskiri, 2007, pp. 26–29). Some members of the Council sent a decree to Tbilisi, requesting the dismissal of the Council and the establishment of an effective control over Abkhazian territory until the Council’s elections in February of 1919 (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, pp. 424–425). Stanislav Lakoba views the period between October 1918 and February 1919 as an undisguised occupation of Abkhazia by Georgia (Lakoba, 1999, p. 90). However, the facts show that Lakoba’s declaration is just another attempt of separatism without any logical basis.

The elections took place as scheduled. The Abkhazian People’s Council was made up of 12 ethnic Abkhazians, 10 ethnic Georgians, and 5 members from other ethnic backgrounds. Simultaneously, the Constituent Assembly of Georgia also held its elections, and as a result, the Georgian Parliament had five representatives from Abkhazia: three Abkhazians, one Russian, and one Greek (Papaskiri, 2007, pp. 33–34). Another historical evidence that contradicts Abkhazia’s independence during this period is the May 1920 agreement between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. This document clearly states that the border between the two countries was located along the river Psou (Rossisko-GruzinskiiDogovor, 1920). Given this information, it can be inferred that Russia acknowledged Abkhazia as an integral part of the Georgian Republic.

Shortly after the Moscow agreement, the Soviet Red Army invaded Georgia from February 15th to March 17th, 1921. Prior to this devastating event, Georgia had adopted a constitution that granted Abkhazia the status of an Autonomous Republic (1921).

On March 31st, 1921, Abkhazia declared the formation of the Abkhazian Socialist Soviet Republic. However, this republic was not acknowledged by Moscow (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, pp. 470–472). Pavel Sytin, Tsarist General, who after the revolution of 1917 joined Bolsheviks and became a commander in the Red Army, recorded notable information about the approach of Moscow towards Georgia. He acknowledged that separating Abkhazia from Georgia was a crucial aspect of diminishing the country both politically and economically. Generally, he believed that dividing Georgia was the best strategy to maintain control over the occupied territories. The plan included not only separating Abkhazia from Georgia but also Samegrelo (Ganin, 2014, pp. 238–239).

Following the various documents and agreements, we see that Abkhazia is never mentioned as an independent entity. Abkhazia was not a member of the Caucasian Economic Union, which was founded in August 1921 (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, p. 118), and it is not mentioned in the Treaty of Kars, which was signed on 12 October 1921, between Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia (Documents of Internal Politics of USSR, 1960). The Abkhazian representatives held 1/3 of the seats in the legislative body of Georgia (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, pp. 483–484). The same can be proven by the Constitution of Soviet Georgia, which was adopted on 2 March 1922. Three Autonomous Republics: Adjarian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian were part of Georgia (Diasamidze, 2004, pp. 73–77). The Soviet Constitution of 1924 mentioned Abkhazia as an Autonomous Republic (Diasamidze, 2004, pp. 72–83). Abkhazia is not mentioned as a separate entity even in the Transcaucasian Federation Constitution of 13 December 1922 (Gamakharia et al., 2011, p. 425). The part of Abkhazians tried to disregard all the given facts and, on 26 February 1925, created a new document, which many separatism followers consider as the Constitution of the Abkhazian Socialist Republic (Bgazhba & Lakoba, 2015, pp. 356–357; Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, p. 118). The above-mentioned was published only in 1960, but it never came into effect (Gamakharia et al., 2011, p. 425). This document was so controversial that even Nestor Lakoba, the 1st Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, criticized it and said that the constitution was written foolishly (Gamakharia & Gogia, 1997, pp. 489–491). Notably, according to a statistical data, ethnic Georgians were in the majority at this time − 33.6% compared to ethnic Abkhazians, who were seeking independence − 27.8% (Union population census, 1929).

In March of 1927, the fourth Abkhazian Congress adopted a new constitution. Abkhazia was defined as the SSR of Abkhazia, which was connected to the SSR of Georgia via a special agreement and became part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic through Georgia. In government institutions, the official languages were Abkhazian, Georgian, and Russian. The budget of the SSR of Abkhazia was part of the budget of the SSR of Georgia (Papaskiri, 2012, pp. 178–179). In February 1931, the Sixth Congress of Soviets of Abkhazia endorsed a decision to modify the Constitution, which led to Abkhazia’s transformation into an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Georgian SSR (Papaskiri, 2012, p. 179). In 1936, a new constitution of the USSR was adopted. Based on this document, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was abolished and Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan became direct members of the USSR. In this document, it was written that the SSR of Georgia consisted of the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia, the Autonomous SSR of Adjara, and the Autonomous SSR of South Ossetia. The constitutions of both the SSR of Georgia and the SSR of Abkhazia were amended in 1937. In both documents, Abkhazia was declared an Autonomous Republic within the SSR of Georgia. The whole purpose of abovementioned can be understood within the broader context of the centralization policy that Stalin pursued across the Soviet Union. Stalin aimed to strengthen the central authority of the Soviet government, consolidate power, and maintain control over the diverse ethnic and national groups within the vast territory of the Soviet Union. The continuation of Stalin’s centralization policy was indeed manifested in the Russification process, which included changes to the alphabetical scripts of various ethnic groups within the Union. One of the key objectives of this policy was to impose the Cyrillic alphabet on non-Russian nations, replacing their existing scripts and further promoting the Russian language and culture. During this time the Georgian Alphabet was introduced in Abkhazia, as the Russian one was already in dominance (Papaskiri, 2010a, 2010b, p.226).

The Separatist literature often raises the issue of the so-called “colonization” of Abkhazia by Georgians, which allegedly occurred between 1937 and 1953. This accusation is directed against the Georgian side (Coppieters, 2002, p. 92). While it is implausible that Georgians massively invaded Abkhazia, it is undeniable that there was a trend of settlement during this period, just as there were instances of Russian, Armenian, and other ethnic groups settling in Abkhazia. One of the key elements of Stalin’s nationalities policy was the population transfers and resettlement of the ethnic groups. As part of the Soviet Union’s centralization process, the objective was to weaken nationalist dissent among the various ethnic and national groups. According to the 1939 census, ethnic Abkhazians constituted 18% (56,197 people) of the population of the Abkhazian SSR. In addition to Georgians, who made up 29.5% (91,967 people) of the population, Russians also formed a significant portion of Abkhazia’s population, accounting for 19.3% (60,201 people) (Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya, 1939, p. 72).

During the 1950s, any political or cultural movement in Georgia led to protests. In 1957 and 1966, Abkhazia saw two such protests. The cause of both was the same: in the first instance, a Georgian scientist Pavle Ingorokva wrote a book in which he proposed the idea that the ancestors of modern Abkhazians had migrated from the northern Caucasus in the 17th century (Coppieters, 2002, p. 93; Ingoroqva, 1954). The second protest occurred when another scientist advanced the same theory. On both occasions, Abkhazians sent letters to Moscow requesting to incorporate Abkhazia into Communist Russia and separate it from Georgia. Both times, Moscow did not comply with their request (Coppieters, 2002, p. 94; Izoria, 2015, pp. 248–252; Songhulashvili, 2007, pp. 16–36).

In 1977, the people of Georgia organized a significant protest against changes to the constitution that would give official language status to Georgian and other languages (Constitution Basic Law of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1978, pp. 1–3). An agreement was reached between Eduard Shevardnadze, at that time the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, and Moscow, under which the Georgian language would remain official. In response, Abkhazians organized counter-protests. Despite this there was no intention to oppress Abkhazians in Georgia, in December, they sent letters to higher institutions of the USSR requesting protection from what they perceived as Georgian imperialistic policy. They again called for separation from Georgia and unification with USSR (Songhulashvili, 2007, p. 148). In 1978 Abkhazian Constitution was also renewed and Abkhazian and Russian languages were granted the status of the official language in the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia Georgian (1978). Yet another proof that no one was willing to disregard the aspirations of the Abkhazian people in Georgia. It is noteworthy that the SSR of Georgia decided to liven up political-economic-cultural life in Abkhazia. For Example, Abkhazian State University was founded, which had Abkhazian, Georgian, and Russian departments. Its own Television and Radio were also established (Coppieters, 2002, pp. 95–96).

In the 1980s, the movement for Abkhazian separatism grew stronger. One reason for this was the Georgian national movement’s efforts to achieve independence for all of Georgia. In 1988, sixty members of Abkhazian culture and science published a letter in which they demanded separation from Georgia (Maryhuba, 1994, pp. 383–450). On 18 March 1988, Abkhazian separatists produced a “Likhni Letter” in which they developed the idea of separation from Georgia and unification with the USSR (Maryhuba, 1994, pp. 452–460).

On 15 August , the SSR of Georgia adopted a law on the Constitutional Rights of the Georgian Language to ensure its official status (Diasamidze, 2002, p. 7). Abkhazian separatists responded by creating the same type of the law about the Abkhazian language (Diasamidze, 2002, p. 10). This was done even though Georgians never intended to change or modify the 1978 constitution of Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia, which declared the Abkhazian language as an official language in the Abkhazian Territory.

On 9 April 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia declared state sovereignty based on the referendum of 31 March 1991 (Act of Restoration of State Independence of Georgia, 1991). National movements were getting stronger. To cope with the situation Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the law that if Autonomous Republics of the USSR wanted to stay in the Union, they could decide their fate based on the referendum (On the procedure for resolving issues related to the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR, 1990). The situation in Abkhazia was already tense when, on 25 August , the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia issued a “Declaration of Independence.” However, this declaration was in opposition to the constitutions of both the SSR of Georgia and the ASSR of Abkhazia. It was later revealed that the declaration had been approved without the required quorum; only 68 out of 138 members of parliament were present at the meeting (Gamakharia, 2009, p. 534). On August 26 above-mentioned document was declared outlawed (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 24–25).

On 17 March 1991, a referendum was held in the Soviet Union on whether to preserve the USSR. Georgia did not participate in the referendum as the country was preparing to declare long awaited independence, but the non-Georgian population of Abkhazia did participate and voted in favor of preserving the Soviet Union. The primary reason for this was the Abkhazian Supreme Council’s aspiration to maintain the “equal status” of nations within the framework of the USSR and restrict Georgia’s legislative authority over the Abkhazia region (Avidzba, 2012, p. 175).

One might argue that Abkhazians were practicing their right to self-determination. The concept of self-determination includes internal self-determination, which allows for the creation of legal mechanisms within a state’s territorial limits to protect the national identity of minorities from the majority, and external self-determination, which involves the secession of the minority or the creation of an independent state. Since the establishment of the United Nations, all documents recognize the unrestricted right of external self-determination, especially for colonial peoples. However, the sovereignty of a state cannot be undermined by any group of national minorities unilaterally seceding from it. One of the main principles of self-determination, namely the lack of political representation of minority groups in government, was completely violated in the case of Abkhazian separatists. This is because they not only had representation in the Supreme Council of the Abkhazian SSR but also held the majority as highlighted in the below chapter. Furthermore, the Abkhazian language has not experienced suppression historically. From 1973 to 1990, 73 schools operated where teaching was conducted in multiple languages, including Abkhazian. Numerous research centers and higher education establishments were also active during this period, supporting the development and preservation of the Abkhazian language and culture (Aleksidze, 2012, pp. 10–11).

6. Frozen in time: the origins of the post-independence conflict

In April of 1991, Georgia declared independence based on a national referendum (Act of Restoration of State Independence of Georgia, 1991). Abkhazians did not take part in this referendum. The majority of the Georgian population agreed to become sovereign. Unfortunately, the country found itself entangled in an internal crisis. The Georgian government attempted to maintain control over the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. On 9 July 1991, the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia made constitutional changes and defined the number of seats in the Supreme Council based on ethnicity: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 seats for Georgians, and 11 for other ethnicities. Notably, Georgians at that moment were 46% of the population, in contrast to Abkhazians, who were only 17% (Aleksidze, 2012, p. 11). Scholars with separatist views, such as Avidzba, frequently argue that this was done on the basis that Abkhazians constituted the most ancient population in these regions (Avidzba, no date a). Despite this imbalance, the Georgian government did not take any actions.

Meanwhile, as the Georgian government struggled with internal conflicts, President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was forced to leave office. Power was then transferred to the Military Council, which was led by Georgian Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani and the leader of the military organization “Mkhedrioni”, Jaba Ioseliani. At the same time, various armed military groups were actively working against the centralized government and the future of the country.

On 7 March 1992, Military Council invited the Former Foreign Minister of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze, who soon became the leader of the “State Council of Georgia” and later was elected as the First President of independent Georgia. Abkhazian separatists reacted to these changes and on 23 July 1992, they abolished the constitution of 1978 and restored the constitution of 1925, which in its turn has never been taken into effect (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 74–75). These steps were directed towards the attempt to leave the jurisdiction of Georgia but had no legal and legitimate power. At the time Vladislav Ardzinba, the first de facto President of Abkhazia, clearly indicated intentions by mentioning: “We will use any means to force Georgians to open fire against Abkhazians” (Gvaramia, 2007).

As the situation in the region became more unstable, criminal activity saw a significant increase. The railroads and transportation systems were particularly targeted. In response, the State Council of Georgia issued a decree and declared a state of emergency on this sector of the transportation system on 10 August , in an effort to combat the rising threat (Diasamidze, 2002, p. 79). The Georgian Government later decided to send the National Guard, under the leadership of Tengiz Kitovani and the military organization “Mkhedrioni,” to restore a state control. It’s worth mentioning that even at this point, the Georgian government made a verbal agreement with Ardzinba, as stated by Alexander Ankvab, the de facto Minister of Internal Affairs of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (Papaskiri, 2010a). On August 14, the Abkhazians broke their agreement and initiated hostilities by opening fire with their military formations. This marked the beginning of the Abkhazian conflict, which continued until September,1993.

Ardzinba received support from outside forces like ethnic Abkhazians from Turkey and Syria, but the most crucial and fatal role was exclusively reserved for the Russians. Despite never living in Abkhazia, hundreds of Russians joined the fight against Georgia (Gamakharia, 2015, pp. 58–59). This military action was not taken without the Kremlin’s approval. The Russians even deployed Su-25 bombers to bomb Sokhumi. Thomas Goltz, an American Journalist was present in Sokhumi during the bombing, witnessed Su-25 dropping a 500 KG bomb on the city (Gamakharia, 2015, pp. 60–61). The Russian navy participated in the operation of 2 July 1993. Around 300 Russian and Abkhazian soldiers with minimal military equipment managed to damage Georgian positions (Gamakharia et al., 2011, p. 476).

On 3 September 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russian Federation, signed the Moscow Agreement. The agreement stipulated that Georgian territorial unity was to be preserved, and all parties involved in the conflict were to cease fire starting at 12:00 PM on September 5th. The ninth article of the agreement authorized the deployment of Russian soldiers as neutral forces on Georgian territory (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 80–81). Unfortunately, this agreement did not prevent Russian, Abkhazian, or other forces from attacking and defeating the city of Gagra by the end of October. Unimaginable acts of terror and crime were committed against the Georgian ethnic population, such as cutting off heads and playing football with them, burning people alive, cutting out tongues, blinding, raping, and around 30 Georgian police officers were shot dead in Gagra, among other atrocities (Gamakharia, 2015, pp. 63–64).

A new ceasefire agreement was signed on 14 March 1993, in Moscow. However, only the Georgian side adhered to it, while the other parties continued to advance their own agenda. This suggests that these agreements were intended to weaken the position of Georgia (Gamakharia et al., 2011, p. 475).

The final ceasefire agreement was signed in Sochi on 27 July 1993, by representatives from Georgia, Russia, and Abkhazia. Abkhazia participated in these negotiations as a separate entity, only at the insistence of Russia. The agreement stipulated that both Abkhazian and Georgian sides had to disarm and Georgian military forces were to withdraw from Abkhazia (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 89–90). The Georgian side fulfilled the conditions of the previous agreement, but in contrast, the Russians and Abkhazians built up their military power and launched another offensive. 27 September 1993, marks the fall of Sokhumi, the center of Abkhazia, as the separatist forces were able to gain control over a significant portion of Abkhazia.

As per the data from 1989, the population of Abkhazia consisted of 93,267 ethnic Abkhazians, while ethnic Georgians numbered 239,872. The war resulted in the death of around 10,000 people, and about 300,000 Georgians were forced to leave their homes and become internally displaced within their own country (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1995, p. 42).

Russia quickly achieved one of its objectives, and Georgia became a member of The Commonwealth of Independent States on 8 October 1993. On 14 May 1994, Georgian and Abkhazian sides signed a ceasefire agreement. The agreement required Georgian military units to withdraw from Abkhazian territory, and CIS peacekeepers were deployed to oversee compliance with the agreement (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 108–110).

The Abkhaz Supreme Council adopted a new constitution illegally, and on 26 November 1994, declared Abkhazia an independent state (Gamakharia, 2015, pp. 57–58). However, the Georgian Constitution, which was adopted on 24 August , recognized the territorial unity of Georgia, including the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, within the borders of 21 December 1991 (Constitution of Georgia, 1995). It’s worth noting that the separatist constitution was also condemned by the Budapest Summit Declaration of 6 December 1994. The Summit acknowledged the facts of Georgian Ethnic Cleansing (CSCE Budapest Document, 1994, pp. 18–19; Lisbon Document, 1996, p. 8). By the initiative of the United Nations, representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia signed an agreement to gradually return internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, these agreements were never fulfilled as the separatists violated the agreement and organized riots and arson.

On 22 March 1995, the Defense Ministers of Georgia and Russia, Vardiko Nadibaide and Pavel Grachev, signed an agreement to deploy Russian peacekeepers in Georgia for a period of 25 years with the aim of preventing future conflicts (Dvali, 1996). On 19 January 1996, The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) took steps to resolve the conflict. The members agreed not to acknowledge separatist movements and actions and to refrain from any political, financial, or military association with them. They also decided to put in place measures to exert influence on Abkhazians (Diasamidze, 2002, pp. 132–133). On 14 August , Abkhazian separatist leader Vladislav Ardzinba and a delegation visited Tbilisi with the involvement of Russia. This meeting highlighted the role of Russia as a “positive” force in the ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict. Though the document was signed by the majority of the members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) condemning separatist movements and actions, representatives from Belarus and Turkmenistan did not sign it (Diasamidze, 2002, p. 159). The separatist historians viewed Ardzinba’s visit to Tbilisi negatively. Avidzba explains that Ardzinba had no other options as the self-proclaimed “Republic” of Abkhazia was isolated internationally. During his visit, Ardzinba’s “inviolability” was guaranteed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov (Avidzba, no Datea, b). On 3 October 1999, Abkhazian separatists held a referendum to measure the satisfaction of the population with the “Constitution” of 1994. Of course, 97% of the population had a positive reaction. The “Act of the State Independence of The Republic of Abkhazia” strengthened the results of the referendum (Akt oGosudarstvennoi Nezavisimosti Respubliki Abhazii). On 3 October 1999, Abkhazians held a referendum to gauge the population’s satisfaction with the 1994 Constitution. Unsurprisingly, 97% of the population had a positive reaction. This further strengthened the results of the referendum and the “Act of the State Independence of The Republic of Abkhazia.”

These actions were again condemned by the Georgian government and international bodies. The Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe supported Georgian territorial unity and highlighted the importance of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. According to the agreement between Georgia and Russia, peacekeepers had to leave the Gudauta and Vaziani bases by 1 January 2001. The decision and timeline for the withdrawal from the Batumi and Akhalkalaki military bases were to be agreed upon in 2000 (Istanbul Document, 1999, p. 49). By 2001, Russia had completely withdrawn its base from Vaziani and stated that it had fully withdrawn its military base from Gudauta, but in fact, this never happened (Kavtaradze, 2018).

Almost 30 years have passed since the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict began. Despite several attempts and proposed scenarios, the conflict remains frozen and bears devastating effects on the most affected people: IDPs and Abkhazians. The gap between former neighbors seems to be growing, while Sokhumi is increasingly becoming attached to the Russian Federation. In the past, it could be said that Russia was establishing a “Silent Annexation” (Manutscharjan, 2008, p. 1) of Abkhazia, the situation has dramatically changed after the Russian occupation of Georgia in August, 2008. In April of 2008, after the NATO summit in Bucharest confirmed the possibility for Georgia to become a member of the alliance, Russia intensified its policy. Foreign Secretary, Sergei Lavrov even declared that Russia would do everything to prevent the accession of Georgia to NATO (Manutscharjan, 2008, p. 2). The culmination of this policy was the launch of a full-scale attack on Georgian territories on 7 August . By the end of August 2008, the Russian Federation recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (DE Waal, 2018, p. 23).

The situation has become increasingly tense in terms of the presence of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Several missions have ended and have been closed. One reason for this can be found in the approach of such NGOs. The EU has always committed to the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Such an approach provides political boundaries for all interested parties who want to engage with Abkhazia (and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali) (Fischer, 2010, p. 3). Another reason for the decline in international missions in Abkhazia is the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, which restricts free movement in the occupied territories (Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, 2008). Very recently, Inal Ardzinba, the de-facto head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, declared several projects as unacceptable during a meeting with NGOs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Abkhazia, 2022).

One of the prime components for Abkhaz people is the passportization process of the local population. In 2002, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin took advantage of the uncertain situation to begin issuing Russian passports to the local Abkhaz population. This was done as Soviet passports were about to lose their validity and around 150,000 Abkhaz citizens were eager to receive them (DE Waal, 2018, p. 23). This move by Russia was opposed by the Georgian government as it meant de facto integration with Russia and Abkhazians ignored attempts by the Georgian government to offer identification documents that would be recognized by Georgia and by the international society. After the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, forced passportization was initiated in the Gali region of Abkhazia (International Crisis Group C, 2013) where almost 50,000 ethnic Georgians are residing.

While internationally recognized borders are inviolable for Georgia, however, efforts have been made to reconnect with the Abkhazian people through the use of forged documents. The State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation proposes the creation of a mechanism that would allow for freedom of movement across borders (State Strategy on Occupied Territories, 2010, p. 2). Action Plan for Engagement proposes the creation of a new Neutral Identification Card and Travel Document which will allow residents of Abkhazia (and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia) access to social services and the freedom of movement (Action Plan for Engagement, 2010, p. 4). Under Prime Minister Nika Gilauri, a regulation called “Modalities for Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of Georgia” was established. It states that people living in occupied territories can travel using either a foreign passport of Georgia or a Neutral Travel Document. This is outlined in Article 7 (On Approval of Modalities for Conducting Activities in the Occupied Territories of Georgia, 2010, p. 5). A new identification mechanism for residents of Abkhazia (and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia) with a personal number and simplified processes was proposed by the document of 2018 “A Step to a Better Future” (A Step to a Better Future, 2018, p. 5). The Georgian Government is offering Abkhazia a strategy that would allow for connections to be made outside of their region through non-governmental organizations. The only condition is that Abkhazian people agree to participate in mutual delegations or programs with Georgian IDPs (internally displaced persons) (Cooley & Mitchell, 2010, p. 79). The de facto government of Abkhazia denied all the opportunities offered by the Georgian government. In contrast to this, Russian passports were accepted quite keenly. In light of the 2022 Russian occupation of Ukraine, the European Union banned the use of Russian passports issued in occupied territories of Georgia (Gabritchidze, 2022). This leaves the Abkhaz people locked and Russian Federation to be the only path away from Sokhumi.

Talks between Georgia and Abkhazia (and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali) are usually conducted through the Geneva International Discussions since 2008. These meetings are particularly important, but unfortunately, there has not been a dynamic approach towards resolving the conflict or returning the IDPs (International Crisis Group D, 2018, p. 2). Abkhazians are sensitive to any such attempt, and at one point, they tried to boycott the Geneva talks in December 2012, demanding that the Abkhaz side be recognized as a formal representative, but they backed down without any explanation (International Crisis Group B, 2013, p. 14).

Another crucial issue that has recently become evident is related to property and land in Abkhazia. Since 2008, as the Russian presence in Abkhazia has significantly increased, Abkhazians have not allowed Russians to purchase any property. They feared that if they were to allow Russians to buy property, their real estate market would be flooded with Russian money, which could have a negative impact (International Crisis Group A, 2013, p. 8). Recent developments in Abkhazia suggest that the approach is shifting towards Russian interests and complete dominance. The most recent example of this is the transfer of the famous beachside resort, Bichvinta (Pitsunda), to Russia. On January 19, the de facto government of Abkhazia and Russia signed an agreement transferring the property to the Russian government. The document was not made public until July, when it was presented for ratification to the de facto parliament of Abkhazia (Eurasianet, 2022). It is worth mentioning that not all Abkhazians were in favor of this transfer. There were some protests mainly by young people, but they did not achieve any response or result. The de facto government will ensure a peaceful transfer of this controversial territory to Russia.

Occasionally, de-facto Abkhaz leaders are demanding Georgia to sign an agreement on the non-use of force. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its failure has led to another wave of fear and Inal Ardzinba has once again brought up this topic (Interpressnews, 2022). Such demands by the de-facto government of Abkhazia for Georgia to sign an agreement on the non-use of force are illogical. The Georgian government has repeatedly emphasized in all the documents previously mentioned that any relationship with Abkhazia will be pursued through peaceful means and diplomacy. This is a clear indication of the Georgian government’s commitment to finding a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict. However, it is unfortunate that the leaders of Abkhazia are not accepting any of the proposals put forward by the Georgian government which has consistently endeavored to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict, although without any tangible progress thus far.

7. Conclusion

The introductory part of this article outlines several debatable questions that from time to time becomes matter of harsh discussions amongst historians, both from the Georgian and Abkhazian side. These questions pertain to the historical independence of Abkhazia, the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia, and the influence of external powers on the region.

The analysis presented in this paper leads to the conclusion that Abkhazia has always been an integral part of the Georgian historical-political development. An examination of historical patterns of resettlement of ethnic groups within the territory of Abkhazia leads to a significant conclusion. Between the VI and I centuries BC, a consolidated Western Georgian political formation—the Kingdom of Colchis—was present, which was inhabited by the ancestors of Georgians. Greek authors, such as Hecataeus of Miletus and Scylax of Caryanda, provided information about these peoples. In the I-II centuries, Apsils and Abazgs were occupying the lands. The Egrisi kingdom, the successor of the Colchis kingdom, held authority between II-VI centuries AD. As evidenced by historical records, the people who inhabited the territory of Abkhazia coexisted within a shared Georgian political landscape since the ancient times.

By the end of the VIII century, the Western Georgia was united into the “Abkhazian” kingdom, facilitated by the Abkhaz kings-principals. This “Abkhazian” kingdom can be viewed as a precursor to the unified Kingdom of Georgia that emerged in the X and XI centuries. Abkhazia became the synonymous with Georgian statehood throughout antiquity and the medieval period. Later, at the beginning of the XIII century, people residing in Abkhazian lands were actively participating in political developments and military campaigns.

At this point, inquiries regarding the independence of Abkhazia may arise. Namely, if Abkhazia was not part of Georgia, how were they involved in the most important processes of the kingdom? Why were they standing alongside the kings of united Georgia? Above discussed historical evidence suggests only one answer to these questions—the land in question was an integral part of Georgian reality.

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, Georgian history develops between the interests of firstly Ottomans and later the Russian Empire. Expectations for the awaited positive wind of changes from Russia were never met. Abkhazia was not a constituent part of any other state-administrative unit except the Georgian kingdom-principalities, which were abolished one after the other from 1801 and integrated them into administrative unions.

The Abkhazian and Georgian peoples jointly confronted the emerged invader, Russian Empire. During this period, Abkhazia, as a resettlement area, did not serve as a point of argument between them. Rather, two factions joined forces in their opposition to the Empire, emphasizing the common goals of the wider Georgian nation.

Analysis demonstrates, the roots of Abkhazian separatism can be traced back to the influence of the Russian Empire and subsequently the Soviet Union. The Russian administration strategically cultivated an ideological foundation among the Abkhazian people to fuel protests against Georgia. A prime example of this manipulation is the creation of an Abkhazian script based on the Russian graphics in 1862 and the publication of Voronov’s book, “Abkhazia is not Georgia,” in 1907.

Policy towards Abkhazia became more aggressive following the ascension of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia. The Soviet Union tried to “legitimize” its unlawful actions within the territory of Georgia by capitalizing on the separatist inclinations that had already been significantly incited among the Abkhazian people. During this era, the revolutionary-separatist activities within the Republic of Georgia aligned with the state interests of both Russia and the newly established USSR.

Freshly emerged independent Georgian Republic and its declaration of independence granted freedoms for development of the ethnic minorities. But the political developments and overall situation in Abkhazia were firmly under the control of the Kremlin. Starting from the 1920s, apparent anti-Georgian separatist protests emerged, aligning with Moscow’s interests and, as such, were orchestrated by them. Pavel Sitin’s mission serves as a vivid illustration of Soviet Russia’s imperial ambitions within Georgian territory. Joseph Stalin’s centralization and nationalities policy had imminent effect on the processes unfolding in Georgia. Russification and forced migration is the proof of aforementioned.

The 1950s and 1970s were a crucial period for Abkhazians as any changes in Tbilisi led to negative reactions in Abkhazia. For the Abkhazian SSR, a constituent part of the Georgian SSR, the 1970s epitomized the zenith of its authority and privileges. Nonetheless, in response to the constitutional reforms of 1977–1978, separatist factions continued to express their discontent with the Georgian SSR and demanded that Abkhazia separate from the Georgian SSR.

During the 1980s, Georgia fought to gain independence and free itself from the oppressive control of the Soviet Union. As the 20th century progressed into the 90s, the situation in Georgia became increasingly strained, heaving a circumstance that was largely attributable to the ongoing disintegration of the USSR. When Georgia declared its independence, the Abkhazians also sought to become sovereign, and the Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia adopted a “Declaration of Independence.” However, this document was not approved by the required quorum and was soon declared illegal.

The independence of Georgia began with an internal political crisis. Separatist movements fueled an armed military conflict within the country. Despite the relatively moderate politics of the government in Tbilisi, the desire for increased autonomy and independence among the people of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic led to a political agenda for separation. The leaders of the separatist movement were not hesitant to make bold statements, including the use of force as a viable option. When the government in Tbilisi attempted to establish control and combat crime in coordination with the local government, Abkhazian separatist forces opened fire, leading to the outbreak of the war in 1993.

As observed, the Russian side engaged not only in direct military intervention during the conflict in Abkhazia but also demonstrated its influence in the diplomatic arena with respect to Georgia. This involvement was evident through the signing of agreements between 1992–1993. These agreements facilitated the disarmament of the Georgian side, laying the groundwork for the military victory of the Abkhazian separatists and the Kremlin. Following the war, the Russian side solidified its military presence in Abkhazia through the agreement of 14 May 1994. The Kremlin tried to preserve and strengthen its political influence over the Georgian state. By joining Georgia into the CIS, Moscow managed to achieve this objective to a certain degree. It is worth noting that during this period, Moscow disregarded one of the fundamental principles of international law pertaining to the inviolability and sanctity of a state’s territorial integrity.

One could argue that Abkhazians exercised their right to self-determination, which encompasses internal and external aspects. While the UN recognizes external self-determination, a state’s sovereignty cannot be compromised by minority secession. In the Abkhazian separatist case, political representation was not lacking, and their language and culture were historically supported through schools and institutions.

It has been nearly 30 years since the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. During this time, the Russian presence in Abkhazia has continued to grow. Despite this, the divide between the two sides has remained unchanged or even increased. Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) continue to live in shelters, hoping one day to return to their homes. The de facto government of Abkhazia has shown little interest in reconciliation or reestablishing ties with Georgia, citing the need for independence as a justification. Notably, Russian influence is viewed positively by officials in the Abkhazian government. Reports prepared by the International Crisis Group provides valuable insights regarding contemporary situations in Abkhazia. Such documents demonstrate increasing presence of the Russian Federation in Sokhumi.

Tbilisi has made several proposals for resolving the conflict and allowing both sides to coexist, but these proposals have been repeatedly declined. A number of attempts to create a plan for reconciliation have also been ignored. Tbilisi has prepared several documents outlining a strategy for reconnecting with Abkhazia, including proposals for peace agreements, policies for crossing borders, and possibilities for trade. However, the de facto government of Abkhazia has shown no interest in these official proposals. In contrast, Russian economic domination is not seen as a concern by the leadership in Sokhumi. Recently, property issues have been resolved in favor of Moscow, such as the transfer of the famous dacha Bichvinta. It seems that the administration of de facto President Bzhania is working against the will of the Abkhazian people and ignoring protests on this matter.

The prospects for the Georgian-Abkhazian relations remain indeterminate, with such ambiguity persisting insofar as Russian political and military presence continues on the Georgian historical territory. The main obstacle to a potential cooperation is Russia’s interest in keeping the region destabilized.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Shalva Kikalishvili

Shalva Kikalishvili is an Assistant Professor in the Liberal Arts Department at The American University of the Middle East in Kuwait. He obtained his doctoral degree from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in 2015. Shalva’s research focuses on militarism and political development, historical events, education, and innovations. His doctoral thesis was on the policy of the United States of America in Iraq after the Second Gulf War. His academic publications include: “Participation of Georgian Military Forces in International Iraq Peace Building Operation (2003-2008),” “Paul Bremer and the U.S. Policy towards Iraq in 2003-2004,” “President George Walker Bush and the Second Gulf War,” “The Origins of the Second Gulf War,” and “Origins of the Informational Warfare.”

Notes

1. It is noteworthy that Cooley and Mitchell somehow managed to have factual mistakes in their article. The most important mistake is the claim that Georgia attacked South Ossetia 6^th of August, 2008. When it is proven fact that Russian militaries started attacks by 7^th of August and Georgian government responded to these aggressive actions.

2. Treaty of Paris. Paris: “Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of All the Russia, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, grant a full and entire Amnesty to those of their subjects who may have been compromised by any participation whatsoever in the events of the War in favor of the cause of the enemy.“