De-mystifying problematics of Zimbabwe’s broadcasting frequencies spectrum allocation: case of free-to air digital terrestrial television licensing

Abstract

Although Zimbabwe opened its airwaves to private players in 2002, broadcasting spectrum frequency licensing has remained contentious with some stakeholders arguing the process lacks transparency and is deceptive to media reform. We therefore seek to answer two key questions in this article: What are the impediments encountered in liberating the broadcasting industry in Zimbabwe since independence? To what extent is Zimbabwe’s broadcasting frequency spectrum licensing regime transparent, open and participatory? The article analyses if the licensing regimen meets International Telecommunications Union (ITU), continental and regional benchmarks of transparency, openness, fairness and inclusivity in allocation and assignment of frequencies. It investigates and unpacks policies and principles concerning frequency spectrum allocation for broadcasting in Zimbabwe. Documentary analysis is employed in examining policy documents which outline terms of reference and requirements for frequency spectrum allocation. We also conducted in-depth interviews with broadcasting policy makers and industrial voices such as applicants who were denied licenses. Four stations (two awarded and two denied) licenses and were purposively sampled for in-depth interviews. Findings in this study reveal that the adjudication and scoring of the licensees is not transparent, neither is it open and bidders do not have a say in the licensing process. Whilst the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe and the Postal Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe admit that final adjudication is done by the authorities, they still claim that the Zimbabwean licensing model is open, transparent and participatory.

KEYTERMS:

• Allocation
• broadcasting
• license
• policy
• spectrum frequency
• terrestrial

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Lincoln Geraghty, School of Media and Performing Art, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom

SUBJECTS:

• Filmmaking and Postproduction; Media Communication; Photography; Broadcast Media; Film Studies; Media & Communications; Journalism & Professional Media

Introduction

The media landscape in Zimbabwe has been slop sided since the pre-colonial era and the country has had a single broadcaster for a lengthy period that has resulted in a broadcasting monopoly by the state. State monopoly over broadcasting has created lack of plurality and diversity. Zimbabwe’s broadcasting frequency spectrum licensing has been shrouded in controversy since the Southern African country opened its airwaves to private players in 2001 with the passing of the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) which provided for public, commercial and community broadcasting. But some media players, such as MISA-Zimbabwe (2020), argue the process lacks transparency and openness. Generally, the opening up of more frequencies for radio and television licenses was expected to open diverse voices in broadcasting. Consequently, this would lead to freedom of the media and access to information, enshrined in sections 60 and 61 of the Zimbabwean constitution. However, concerns have been raised over the composition of winning bidders of free-to-air digital terrestrial television stations granted licenses in November 2020. Since independence, broadcasting has been a monopoly of the state, justified on the grounds that it is a public service critical to development and fostering unity (Moyo, 2004). More so, television and radio news have a wider and simultaneous reach to audience than other means of mass media such as newspapers. This has seen a rise in the ignited debate on awarding of broadcasting licenses in Zimbabwe.

In spite of the changes in the dynamics of media policy and practices in Zimbabwe, broadcast media has remained undemocratic due to the hegemonic control by the state (Alfandika, 2020). Alfandika (2020) maintains that media reforms such as the promulgation of the BSA have largely resulted in incremental or plurality gains such as the opening of more commercial radio stations but did not democratise broadcasting. Moreover, Alfandika and Gwindingwe (2021) interrogate the genuineness of the Zimbabwean government in promoting media pluralism and diversity. Interestingly, radio stations that opened after the enactment of the BSA are Star FM, Diamond FM, Capi-Talk, and Nyaminyami owned by government controlled Zimpapers and Zi FM run by Supa Mandiwanzira, a former ZANU (PF) cabinet minister. This brings to question the transparency and openness that is expected of a democratic government in facilitating awarding of free-to-air digital terrestrial broadcasting licenses.

Similarly, television licenses were awarded to ruling ZANU-PF party sympathisers as well as to companies linked to the military that was involved in ousting long time ruler, the late Robert Mugabe, in November 2017 and paved way for the ascendency of Emmerson Mnangagwa to power (Matiashe, 2020). The government has allowed ‘independent’ radio stations to operate, yet at the same time, it controls licensing of media outlets and interferes on who gets an operating license (MISA-Zimbabwe, 2020). Mare and Matsilele (2020) aver that such a practice predicates elite continuities with very minimal policy and legal transformations that liberate and liberalise communication. Theoretically, there is plurality of commercial radio and the screen media, but will this bring diversity of voices with the state controlled regulatory authority, the BAZ, deciding on who goes on air? The government of Zimbabwe maintains the licensing of commercial radio stations and digital free to air television stations has brought diversity to broadcast media (The Herald, 2020). As we explore the openness and transparency or lack thereof of the licensing regime, we also try to de-bunk the myth surrounding Zimbabwe’s frequency allocation. Why, for instance, did BAZ license six free-to air digital terrestrial television stations and allocated four others to ZBC when the digital bandwidth can accommodate more channels? And with 2023 elections beckoning, could there be a method in the way BAZ assigned the frequencies? It is, therefore, the objective of this inquiry to make the public and spectrum bidders for digital terrestrial television broadcasting understand how frequencies are assigned. The paper questions and tries to knock the bottom out of the widely held argument that spectrum frequency is finite and therefore not everyone can be issued with a broadcasting license. Melody (1980) considers frequency spectrum a scarce resource which he argues there is not enough of it to give all potential users at any given time. The broadcasting regulator, BAZ, uses this argument to deny some applicants spectrum licenses. It is therefore critical to interrogate this and ascertain if indeed frequency spectrum is still scarce in the digital age. The legislation, policies and processes of assigning frequency spectrum by BAZ will be explored. We also aim to clear the air on criteria used for spectrum assignment as concerns for fair and equitable allocation of national spectrum are being raised by losing bidders. This paper’s endeavor to unknot the process can help explain some doubts about its fairness and transparency.

Frequency spectrum management and allocation

The spectral domain of communication could be the proverbial public pasture, a communal resource, managed and regulated by ITU, regional bodies and national governments on behalf of all societies in the world. ITU, founded as the International Telegraph Union in 1865 and became a specialised United Nations agency in 1947 (Massaro, 2017), regulates and allocates spectrum at international level. According to Massaro (2017), the other responsibility of ITU, apart from allocating places on the spectrum to member states, is to promulgate technical rules for the allocation of the resource at global level.

The explosive growth of mobile wireless communications in the past two decades, and more recently, the opening of the broadcast airwaves in Zimbabwe, has demonstrated the value of spectrum for which those services compete. Increase in the use of radio waves-based technologies highlights the importance of frequency spectrum and the need to manage its processes. Technological progress has continually opened doors to a variety of new spectrum applications that have spurred greater interest in, and demand for, the limited spectrum resource. Increased demand requires that spectrum be used efficiently and that effective spectrum management processes be implemented (ITU, 2015). To use it efficiently, it must be coordinated and regulated by both national regulatory authorities and the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2015). In that regard, ITU (2016), Article 19 and Global Campaign for Free Expression (2003) note that national regulators must be independent, transparent and should operate in an objective and non-discriminatory manner when issuing frequency spectrum licenses. They add, national regulatory authorities should be transparent in order for spectrum license bidders, other users, as well as the public, to trust them. Aitken (1994) insists that regulators should be professional and be competent as well as open about their work in order not to raise issues of mistrust and suspicion from those applying to use the spectrum, as is the case with Zimbabwe where some media constituencies are questioning the manner the BAZ assigned frequencies for digital terrestrial television broadcasting.

Though this paper tries to examine the extent to which Zimbabwe’s broadcasting frequency spectrum licensing is fair and transparent, it is paramount to understand its nature as this has a bearing on how it is licensed. Jackson (1980) defines radio spectrum as radio waves encompassing all forms of wireless communication, including television and all radio broadcasting and telephone calls sent by microwave radio. The radio spectrum is populated by frequencies of telecommunications including broadcasting. It is used in a number of services including the broadcasting sector, business and industrial communications, the military, aeronautical, navigation and maritime radio communications. Aitken (1994) avers that wireless communication would dissolve into chaos at national and international levels without some system for allocating the number of places on the radio spectrum to claimants of the resource. To improve spectral efficiency and avoid the chaos that comes with interferences or signal swamping which maybe local or cross border on frequency bands, national regulators limit the users that can be accommodated and can co-exist within an electro-magnetic spectrum space (Cave, 2006). Due to these technological limits, the allocation of frequency spectrum at both international and national levels should be controlled and not everyone can just broadcast (Aitken, 1994). Aitken states that since Heinrich Hertz’s experiments on frequencies in 1887, electro-magnetic spectrum has become an economic resource that is considered scarce. If wantonly distributed, there would be interference from different users on the frequency bands. It is a natural resource available for human use, which is limited and can be easily interfered with (ITU, 2015). It is therefore a very valuable finite asset that should be controlled by governments. But Miller and Allen (1995) cited in Chirume (2015) observe that this is no longer the case in the digital age. They state that digitization has replaced bandwidth scarcity with bandwidth multiplicity. The rapid development of digital technologies in the 1990s means more channel availability, which could in technical terms mean an end to the problem of limited spectrum availability. One of the respondents, a broadcasting transmission engineer explained that frequency is referred as a scarce resource because you can only fit a certain number of services within a bandwidth without causing interference between them. He, however, observes that digital broadcasting enables utilisation of the scarce frequency spectrum far more efficiently than analogue technologies and this allows many television services to be carried on one frequency, thus creating a multiplicity of bandwidth. He noted:

Due to the digitization regime BAZ has 2 multiplexes and consequently these can carry 12 High Definition Television services. This enabled BAZ to license 6 new players and ZTV was given another 4 channels and 2 more digital channels can be accommodated on the multiplexes. Efficient spectrum use allows different content providers to be carried in a single frequency channel. The same frequency channel that carries one analogue (ZBC) TV service can now carry up to 20 standard definition TV services or 6 high definition services plus 20 radio channels.

Compared with old analogue technology, digital compression allows more channels to be transmitted with better image quality and improved interactive applications (Adda et al., 2005). Roughly, six times as many channels can be broadcast with the same amount of transmission capacity as was used for one analogue channel (Adda et al., 2005). The switch off of the analogue signal has resulted in a large increase in the supply of television channels available to viewers or in bandwidth being freed up for other uses. Zimbabwe could therefore be sitting on under-utilised frequencies which, if fully utilised, can see more television stations licensed. MISA-Zimbabwe (2020) notes that compared to Tanzania, a SADC country that has increased free to air TV channels from 13 to 34 and TV population coverage from 14% to more than 50% after successfully completing migration from analogue to digitalisation in 2015, Zimbabwe, which is still to complete the process, lags behind in terms of providing a diverse broadcasting space that reaches to all segments of the population. Another SADC member state, Botswana, has switched off all the analogue transmitters in its northern region and has equipped 45 sites with digital transmitters. Botswana’s state broadcaster, BTV, is running an 8 multiplex channel and 6 channels are on air, (MISA-Zimbabwe, 2020)). It is against this backdrop that we locate this study in this existing body of literature that justifies transparency and openness in awarding free-to-air digital terrestrial broadcasting licenses for the realisation of diversity and plurality.

Methodology

This is a qualitative study which relies on document analysis and key informant interviews. Documentary analysis is employed in examining policy documents and a Statutory Instrument (African Charter on Broadcasting, 2003; Article 19, 2003; Government Gazette, 2001 (Broadcasting Services Act); Zimbabwe National Frequency Allocation Plan, 2016; The 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution and Statutory Instrument 26 of 2020). These documents outline terms of reference and requirements for frequency spectrum allocation and benchmarks. We also conducted conversations and in-depth interviews with purposively sampled key informants such as broadcasting policy makers, industrial voices including applicants who were denied and awarded licenses. Four stations (two denied and two awarded) applicants have been purposively sampled for in-depth interviews. The stockholders in the broadcasting and telecommunications industries such as Media Institute of Southern Africa-Zimbabwe (MISA-Zim) (one informant), Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) (one informant) and Postal Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) (one informant), are also interviewed. The informants were sampled based on their positions in their respective organisations and knowledge of broadcasting policies in Zimbabwe. Due to Covid-19 restrictions, interviews were conducted online. We also had a telephonic interview with one government official in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services which lasted for about 30 minutes. The informants were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. Selection of the target groups helped this article to unpack the controversy around the (un)willingness of the government of Zimbabwe to meet the international best practices in media operations.

Findings

A contested terrain? Zimbabwe’s DTTB frequency spectrum licensing

The licensing of free-to-air digital terrestrial television stations in Zimbabwe has meant more users who need space in the spectrum. As radio waves become a major vehicle for discourses in broadcasting and other telecommunications services, spectrum allocation seems to be a necessity. Zimbabwe’s Statutory Instrument 26 of 2020 provided for licensing of commercial television stations in terms of paragraph 4(3) of the First Schedule of the Broadcasting Services Act [Chapter 12:06], in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Television Broadcasting Band. BAZ followed this up by rolling out digital terrestrial television broadcasting services. But, first things first, allocation of radio frequency spectrum in Zimbabwe is done by POTRAZ in accordance with provisions of the Postal and Telecommunications Act [Chapter 12:05 of 2000], under the Zimbabwe National Frequency Allocation Plan, (ZNFAP, 2016). The Spectrum Plan divides the spectrum into a number of frequency bands and specifies the general purposes for which the bands may be used. POTRAZ allocates frequencies for other purposes and for broadcasting services to BAZ which manages and assigns the frequencies for all broadcasting systems in Zimbabwe.

At continental and regional levels, the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) and the Southern African Development Community Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation Plan provide guidance on management and allocation of frequency spectrum in Zimbabwe. The idea of telecommunications regulatory bodies took root in the SADC region at the beginning of the century and by 2001, all member states had regulatory bodies in place (Hueva et al., 2004). There are two categories of bodies that regulate both broadcasting and telecommunications on one hand, and those countries that have separate regulatory bodies on the other hand, one for broadcasting and the other for telecommunications (Hueva et al., 2004). The second category comprises bodies that regulate broadcasting only such as the Tanzania Broadcasting Commission (TBC) and BAZ. In the same category but regulating telecommunications only, is the Tanzania Communications Commission (TCC) and the Botswana Telecommunication Authority (BTA). In Zimbabwe, POTRAZ is a peculiar case responsible for all telecommunications frequencies.

After the consummation of the inclusive government by ZANU-PF and the two MDCs in 2009, there were attempts to free the airwaves. The power sharing government announced that a new Information and Communications Technology Bill would merge the BAZ and POTRAZ into a National Information and Communications Technology Authority of Zimbabwe akin to South Africa’s Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) that would provide for an independent licensing and regulation of telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services, (Chiumbu et al., 2009). But this did not see light of the day.

A single authority or agency is ideal, according to ITU (2015), as this simplifies the decision-making process and the greater the number of bodies with separate autonomous authority and responsibility over spectrum, the more difficult the coordination of the process of frequency management and allocation. ITU warns, in some cases, that statutory regulatory bodies may not be able to reach agreement among themselves on the use of the spectrum and may require a higher authority such as the minister or president to make a decision where there is an impasse over allocation or assignment of spectrum. Locally, radio frequency spectrum is a shared responsibility between national regulatory authorities, POTRAZ and BAZ. POTRAZ and BAZ are guided by Postal and Telecommunications Act and the Broadcasting Services Act respectively in management and allocation of the spectrum. POTRAZ is in charge of all types of frequencies in Zimbabwe (ZNFAP, 2016) and BAZ manages and allocates frequencies for broadcasting. POTRAZ’s mandate includes the administration and allocation of radio spectrum used by all telecommunications services, applications and systems in institutions such as wireless mobile (voice and data) telephony, WiFi, and satellite services. In an interview with these researchers, a POTRAZ engineer explained that responsibilities for POTRAZ and BAZ are specific and there is separation of powers with the latter responsible for the broadcasting spectrum and the former in charge of the rest of frequency bands. He notes that conflict does not arise as the mandates of the regulatory authorities are clearly delineated and distinct. He, however, concedes that there has been a disagreement regarding use and custodianship of the digital dividend, a portion of the radio frequency spectrum which previously was under broadcasting services under analogue, but has now been allocated to other telecommunication services during digitisation. The transition from analogue to digital broadcasting is not only creating opportunities for the provision of ICT applications and multimedia services, but is also contributing to the efficient use of spectrum through the digital dividend and the release of spectrum for other uses such as wireless broadband communications (ZNFAP, 2016). In addition, the POTRAZ engineer said:

There has been some sort of disagreement regarding use and custodianship of a portion of the radio frequency spectrum which previously was allocated to the broadcasting services (digital dividend), but has now been allocated to Telecommunication Services.

As noted by the respondent, a common understanding has since been reached with the digital dividend allocated to the telecommunications sector.

The problem of distributing spectrum equitably arises and regulatory authorities try to find ways to ration it. Rationing can be accomplished through markets (Melody, 1980), with highest bidders winning frequency bids. Some contemporary economists prefer a market solution to allocate frequencies (Aitken, 1994) as they believe it to be more efficient. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is still stuck in a system of allocating spectrum by government controlled regulatory authorities. However, there are several competing views of how the country may free up spectrum by moving away from a command and control system and adopt a market based allocation. Chiumbu et al. (2009) recommend that broadcasting and telecommunications regulation should remain separate to encourage the creation of an independent broadcasting regulator that can focus on the development of a diverse, vibrant and sustainable broadcasting industry in Zimbabwe.

It is the responsibility of each nation to do frequency planning at a national level and provide information to its citizens. Nyman-Metcalf (2003) holds that African countries should consider transparency, openness and fairness to ensure equitable allocation of frequency spectrum. This should be done within the ambit of a participatory and inclusive approach that consults spectrum license applicants in the decision-making process to frequency allocation and management. To achieve this, Nyman-Metcalf advocates the existence of independent regulators who operate in a clear policy context, to ensure equitable and fair sharing of frequencies among those who need the resource.

But, the Zimbabwe government allows some people to broadcast and excludes others. It therefore becomes necessary to explain the mechanism for allocation and allotment of frequencies in the country to see how the licensing policies are (de)linked with fundamental social and political activities of fairness and transparency. More importantly, the African Charter on Broadcasting recognises that frequency spectrum is a public resource, which must be managed in the public interest and decision-making processes (Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, 2003). The charter recommends an open, independent and participatory allocation to ensure a fair proportion of spectrum is assigned to three tiers of broadcasting namely public, commercial and community broadcasting. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (1987) states that the licensing processes to individual broadcasters should be fair and transparent and be based on clear criteria which include promoting media diversity in ownership and content distribution. The Commission encourages states to have a diverse and independent private broadcasting sector as state monopoly over broadcasting is not compatible with the right to freedom of information and expression. Despite calls for transparency and openness, frequency allocation remains a contested space in Zimbabwe with BAZ trying to ration it. BAZ licenses broadcasting outlets in terms of the Broadcasting Services Act [Chapter 12: 06] First Schedule, and claims to have made every effort to be as transparent as possible at every stage of the licensing process when it licensed the six stations. Prior to granting the licenses, BAZ published a notice in the Government Gazette as is required by the Act, inviting bidders to provide services for digital terrestrial television broadcasting. A senior BAZ official explained the licensing process:

Thus, the information on invitation of applications is (was) made available on the public domain. Furthermore, the information on how to apply is available on the BAZ’s official website. The Authority is also available to clarify any areas which may be deemed unclear by applicants before they submit their applications. Depending on the type of the broadcasting service being applied for, a Public Inquiry will be conducted to determine the suitability of the applicant for licensing. During the Public Inquiry, the public is given an opportunity to ask the applicant questions of public interest. Thereafter, the final adjudication will be done by the authority and licenses will be awarded accordingly. In the case of a refusal to issue a license, the applicant will be notified of the reasons thereof. Therefore, in as far as the licensing model used in Zimbabwe is concerned, the licensing process is transparent, open and participatory.

The above comment reveals that the process of licensing is impeccable. The implication drawn from this is that alternatives should be proposed, drawing from all concerned players in the broadcasting industry.

BAZ denied some applicants spectrum licenses on the basis that frequency spectrum is a scarce resource, but as discussed earlier in this paper, this is now a subject of contention in the digital age. Of note in this discussion is the fact that the response rate from our intended respondents was limited to two denied stations. Those who were awarded licenses played down the researchers’ calls for interviews. This probably justifies the suspicious relationship between the awarding authorities and the awarded licensees. One of the bidders who was denied a license had this to say:

Yes, we were given a reason why we were denied a license and also told to approach them for further clarification. It was highlighted that there were only 6 licenses available, so we felt that it was a dead rubber to go and appeal or raise our issues as licenses were already awarded.

The reason that ‘there were only six licenses available’ is neither technical nor professional. It still needs to be known how then the six deserving bidders were selected. The principle and policies guiding allocation of the spectrum must be adhered to at all costs. As guided by ITU, frequency spectrum is a public resource that should be distributed in a transparent manner.

POTRAZ states that frequency spectrum allocations and assignments for telecommunications and broadcasting services are done fairly and transparently. POTRAZ argues that they follow ITU guidelines which encourage telecommunications industry and interested parties to participate in the processes, including attending the World Radio Communication Conferences that make the allocations at international level. One official at POTRAZ said:

POTRAZ also conducts regular consultative workshops with all stakeholders where they contribute with inputs regarding frequency spectrum use in Zimbabwe. Consultations are conducted with a view to receive and where necessary, incorporate value additions and inputs from the process.

But, a respondent whose bid for a digital terrestrial television license failed observed that Zimbabwe’s broadcasting licensing regime ‘is to a very limited extent participatory and open’. The respondent added that government believes media can be used as a de-stabilisation tool or worse still, a regime change weapon by enemies of the state. With that in mind, government thinks it is prudent to keep the media closed and award ‘these sensitive licenses’ to friendly applicants. The respondent believes BAZ is not operating in a policy framework that ensures independent and equitable allocation of spectrum frequencies because applicants do not know the criterion used to award the licenses. Said the respondent:

There is a public hearing open to all and sundry, however that is where it ends. The adjudication and scoring of the licensees is not transparent, neither is it open. The public participated in asking questions to the applicants, but apart from that they did not have a say as regards the outcome of the licenses. To most participants, licensing is a pre-determined game, where the recipients are known in advance. They (BAZ) may have a technical framework (to award the licenses) but political considerations far outweigh all considerations.

In the same vein with the above, Matiashe (2020) notes that the licensing of the TV stations will further entrench media concentration rather than amplify diverse voices, as the licensees are either companies owned by the state or by people who believe in the same ideology as ZANU-PF. Among stations licensed are ZTN, owned by Zimpapers, a public company whose majority shareholder is the government of Zimbabwe. Other stations licensed are Rusununguko Media, Jester Media, Acacia Media Group, Fairtalk Communications and Channel Dzimbahwe. Rusununguko Media is reportedly controlled by the Zimbabwe National Army while Acacia Media is linked to former ZANU-PF parliamentary aspirant Sharon Mugabe. Channel Dzimbabwe is fronted by former ZBC Chief Executive Happison Muchechetere, a former member of ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU now ZANU-PF, during Zimbabwe’s war of independence. Jester Media are the owners of the 3KTV, a sister company of ANZ who runs Daily News and whose majority shareholder is reportedly a businessman with strong links to the government of Zimbabwe.

Media watchdog, MISA-Zimbabwe, observes that the process of licensing was not transparent as BAZ did not publicise how much the applicants scored during the selection process:

The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Information, Media and Broadcasting even called BAZ to appear before it to shed light on scoring but unfortunately BAZ highlighted that publishing of such scoring method would jeopardize future application processes. This aspect thus negatively impacts on the openness and transparency of the process.

Such a process goes against the policies and principles of spectrum allocation. The African Charter on Broadcasting recognises the fact that the frequency spectrum is a public resource, which must be managed in the public interest and decision-making processes, (Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, 2003).

MISA-Zimbabwe’s argument above concurs with majority scholarly views that the whole process of awarding licenses must be open, transparent, professional and competent (Aitken 1994; ITU 2015, Article 19). Aitken maintains that if regulators are not professional and competent as well as open about their work, this may raise issues of trust and suspicion from those applying to use the spectrum, as is the case with some bidders in Zimbabwe who are questioning the manner BAZ assigned frequencies for digital terrestrial television broadcasting.

Subject to part two of the Broadcasting Services Act, BAZ plans and advises on the allocation and distribution of the available frequency spectrum of the broadcasting service bands. The Act gives recognition to the radio spectrum as a national resource and spells out the need to govern it in the interest of all citizens. It establishes the right of the government to regulate the use of spectrum, including the enforcement of spectrum management rules. But the law is silent and does not require BAZ to provide the public with information on its decisions to select applicants for licensing.

Models of spectrum allocation

Cave (2006) observes that some governments have used regulatory authorities to assign spectrum as an auxiliary instrument for controlling the number and identity of broadcasters. Cave (2006) calls this technique of managing spectrum, ‘command and control’, essentially a system where government uses proxy regulatory authorities to license radio and television stations of their choice. However, Sutherland (2007) argues that management of spectrum, whether by ‘command and control’ or by market forces, serves broader policy goals, primarily of delivering the information society.

While Zimbabwe allocates spectrum through government-controlled bureaucracy, which gives little room for openness and transparency, there are several competing views of how the country may free up spectrum to move away from the ‘command and control’ system and adopt a ‘market-based’ allocation. Some of the administrative models used in assigning broadcast frequency spectrum rights are first-come first-served, the auctioning system and the beauty contest approaches (ITU, 2015). The ‘first-come first-served approach’ means that the applications are appraised individually in the order in which they are submitted and there is no comparison of one with the other. Spectrum is assigned in the order of receipt of applications and is based on the frequency being available and the applicant meeting the application criteria. ITU contends the first-come first-served model does not promote spectrum efficiency, as at times a more efficient applicant does not get a license because the application is submitted late.

In the case of the public tender or auctioning system, the national regulator looks at the highest bid where the bidder who assigns the highest economic value to the license will make the highest score, (ITU, 2015). The frequencies are assigned to the winning bidder and regulators have less control over the end result of the selection process. ITU favours the ‘auctioning system’ which it says is transparent and reduces the possibility of favouritism and legal challenges. Auctioning is used in the United Kingdom and Australia where the highest bidder gets the spectrum, (ITU, 2015). The philosophy behind this market approach is that the most efficient use will be made as those who have the financial and infrastructural resources are presumed to have a great interest in the spectrum.

The other model is the ‘beauty contest’ which focuses on quality of the bidder. This mechanism is used to determine which applicant should have access to spectrum. It is based on the competing applicants submitting their proposals for operating services and these would typically include information on population to be covered, speed of implementation of the project and operator’s business plan. For broadcasting, there would be information on programs to be offered. For example, the Government Gazette, Broadcasting Services Act (2001) requires that applicants for spectrum should state number of hours of children’s programs in their content. The service providers should also state the number of educational programs and news services they offer in order to be considered during the beauty contest. In a beauty contest or parade, a broadcaster that provides the most needed content will win the bid provided other criteria set by the national regulator are met.

POTRAZ and BAZ do not use same models in allocating and assigning frequencies. BAZ considers the ‘beauty contest administrative’ approach in which the licensing authority assigns the spectrum to the candidate that is considered to best meet a number of criteria such as industry experience, technology and rollout plans. An official at BAZ had this to say in an interview:

As an Authority we believe beauty contest is more applicable in awarding broadcasting licenses. Any broadcasting license applied for is assessed on four main areas which are; legal, Content (Programming), Technical (Specifications and Standards) and Finance. An applicant needs to provide satisfactory information in all these areas in accordance with the requirements prescribed on the application form (BS1 - available on the website). Generally, one needs to first meet the legal requirements before all the other areas are assessed. Failure to meet the legal requirements is an automatic disqualification. All the other remaining assessment sections become areas of competition where the best applicant is eventually awarded the license.

POTRAZ use the first-come first-served approach although they are considering beauty contest and auction regimens. MISA believes auctioning of frequencies to the highest bidder is not reasonable as it has the potential to limit the broadcasting licenses to a few elites. Mare and Matsilele (2020) argue that Zimbabwe has seen elite continuity and renewal in political and media regulation systems that stem from a ‘hybrid regime’ that is bent on gelling democratic and authoritarian governance practices. This has resulted in ‘continuity rather than complete transformation’ of ‘repressive colonial laws and practices’ (Mare & Matsilele, 2020, p. 149).

While the Second Republic government has made moves to license community television stations and community radios, these have been blamed for being plural but mean on diversity since most of these stations save the interests of the ruling elite. MISA-Zimbabwe wants BAZ to grant licenses to applicants with quality and relevant content that resonates with the public. MISA-Zimbabwe noted:

Reasonable fees should be set which allow for media diversity and plurality and also media startups to operate legally. The content aspect is very critical as this has been one aspect lagging behind in the programming of the public broadcaster ZBC. There is an urgent need for quality and relevant content.

While POTRAZ and BAZ responsibilities are specific and there is separation of powers, their adoption of differing models is a cause for concern, considering the consequential inconsistencies that result. There is therefore need for a consensus amongst all stakeholders to adopt a uniform model when awarding licenses to bidders.

Impediments to opening of airwaves

Zimbabwe remains one of the last countries in the region to liberalise its broadcasting system (Chiumbu et al., 2009; Hueva et al., 2004). For the better part of its post-independence period, broadcasting was dominated by the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and it needed the legal challenge from Capital Radio to change ZBC monopoly (Alfandika and Muchetwa, 2020). Despite a cacophony of calls for reforms that would open a plural and diverse broadcast media, government has kept a firm grip on radio and television (Saunders, 1999). But government claims to have ‘liberalised’ or ‘liberated’ the airwaves, although the BSA in many ways, constrain the communicative space for citizens (Moyo, 2004). At face value, the BSA is an excellent document that opens up the broadcasting sector to competition as one of its provisions is to establish the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe responsible for allocation and regulation of frequencies to broadcasters and the setting up of a three-tier broadcasting system comprising public service, community and commercial broadcasting. This was seen as a remarkable improvement from the colonial legislation which kept a tight leash on broadcasting. According to Moyo (2004), a closer look at the Act reveals that it, in many ways, impinges on the communicative rights of Zimbabwean citizens. The BSA contains several clauses that make it difficult for new players to enter the broadcasting market. Government has paid lip service to attempts to license alternative voices which have been shut out from speaking on ZBC. So long there is political contest in Zimbabwe, Moyo (2004) argues, government will not create independent radio and television stations. MISA-Zimbabwe states that interference by the executive in the appointment of board members of the BAZ is an impediment to liberalisation of the airwaves as there are no public nominations or public interviews that are done in the process to select the members:

The Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe is also accountable to the responsible Minister who is also a member of the Executive and this affects the independence of the authority. There is also a lack of editorial independence at the national broadcaster due to political interference. Public nominations and public interviews of persons appointed into the Boards of regulatory authorities should be done transparently. Independence of the regulatory body be ensured and reasonable fees for applications and licenses be set to allow more players in the broadcasting sector. The ZBC should be transformed into a public broadcaster, and it should not operate as a ‘state’ broadcaster.

The sentiments from MISA-Zimbabwe are a pointer to the janus-faced nature of a system that muffles media freedom by limiting players from partaking in information dissemination by regulating the licensing process. It has been highlighted earlier in this discussion that cronyism and party loyalty have been other major impediments in genuinely opening airwaves. Having BAZ accountable to the responsible Minister who is a member of the Executive has been a perennial problem that stifles freedom of expression and the media since early years of independence as argued by Nyahunzvi (2001) when he described the government-controlled Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) as an experiment that failed.

Conclusion

The legislation, policies and processes of assigning frequency spectrum by BAZ have been explored. Evidence from key informants interviewed revealed that there are disparities to frequency spectrum allocation. Frequency spectrum allocation in Zimbabwe requires a robust, inclusive and an all-stakeholder participatory approach. POTRAZ and BAZ should use similar models in Broadcasting Frequencies Spectrum Allocation. In this regard, we opine that Zimbabwe adopts a converged regulatory authority (Mare & Matsilele, 2020) to remove redundancies and duplication of duties. Chiumbu et al. (2009) advance the need to merge the BAZ and POTRAZ into a National Information and Communications Technology Authority of Zimbabwe akin to South Africa’s Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) that would provide for an independent licensing and regulation of telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services. While awarding of six television licenses is applauded, the lengthy period taken to accomplish this is a cause for concern and a call for deeper introspection into the Zimbabwean media laws. The television stations were licensed 18 years after the enactment of the BSA which liberalised Zimbabwe’s airwaves. A notable impediment in broadcasting frequency spectrum allocation is the subservient role played by BAZ which operate under, and is accountable to, the responsible Minister who is a member of the executive. This scenario has raised concerns about the key principles of openness, transparency and fairness in awarding broadcasting licenses to bidders. BAZ remains clipped if it operates under the Ministry of Information and its decisions remain questionable to the public.

Zimbabwe is forty-two years into independence yet there are very little attempts to license alternative voices which have been shut out from speaking on ZBC. This puts questions on the push for plurality and diversity in the Zimbabwean media terrain. The sluggish licensing pace militates the dictates of democracy, media freedom and freedom of expression as called for in the country’s constitution. This paper recommends the adoption of the models of allocation of frequency spectrum that extricate the media industry from the jaws of the government. The country must free up spectrum to move away from the ‘command and control’ system and adopt a market-based allocation.

The Zimbabwe government should no longer define the role of broadcasting as just nation building and development. Broadcasting should play a democratic role as well. But this role comes with the imperatives of respecting and upholding freedom of expression and a free flow of information and ideas. State regulation must give way to self regulation that is inclusive and transparent and which allows for minimal interference by the State.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tichaona Zinhumwe

Tichaona Zinhumwe is a Ph.D. student in Film and Television at the University of Johannesburg. He is a Lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University where he teaches Investigative Journalism, Television and Radio Journalism in the English and Media Studies Department. His research interests cover television and radio talk shows, news and current affairs programming and Investigative Journalism. His desire is to discover how television and radio talk shows can be harnessed to create a genuine democratic dispensation in Zimbabwe. He is also interested not only in linguistic research of broadcast discourses in genres such as news and current affairs, but would also want to unravel the semiotic pictorial and visual discourses of television images and how they contribute to telling the television story.

Gift Gwindingwe

Gift Gwindingwe (PhD) is a Media and Cultural Studies lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University, Mashava Campus. He holds a PhD in Communication from the University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He is a former member of the Research Committee and currently a member of the Great Zimbabwe University International Relations Committee. He has published papers in local (South African) accredited journals. On invitation by Zimbabwe Council for Higher Education, he has also done reviews for Media and Journalism programmes for local universities. His research interests are in the following areas: Cultural Studies, Post-colonialism, Politics and the pervasive nature of digital media in shaping today’s communication terrain.