Nexus of political tensions and cross-border contraband trade between Ethiopia and the Sudan, 1974–1991: evidences from Metema-Humera corridor and its environs

Abstract

Based on a critical examination of untapped provincial archives, contemporary periodical sources, and extensive field interviews conducted with selected local elders in the border areas, this study explores entanglements between regional diplomacy, political tensions hampered by the violence of various armed factions in the Metema-Humera border regions, the dynamics of cross-border contraband trade that involved a diverse array of actors, state failures in enforcing law in the border areas, and enduring impacts on the border regions, 1974–1991. The study also explores the patterns and dynamics of cross-border contraband trade, major actors in the contraband trade, routes, networks, types of contraband items, and the profound impact on borderland communities and state building projects. Cross-border contraband through Metema-Humera has been practiced for longer periods, but the situation was more complicated during the Derg regime (1974–1991) due to entanglements between regional diplomacy, fragile border governance, state failures in enforcing laws in the border areas, armed resistance in the border areas, and the involvement of a diverse array of actors in the contraband trade. The entangled regional diplomacy, mistrust, and suspicion that characterized inter-state relations between Ethiopia and Sudan in the post-1974 period created an enabling environment for cross-border contraband trade, which ultimately contributed to fragile border governance, social and economic crises in Metema-Humera borderland communities. These were exacerbated by the presence of armed movements in the border areas and the involvement of various interest groups.

Keywords:

• Tensions
• mistrust
• cross-border
• contraband trade
• networked actors

Reviewing Editor:

• Samuel Adu-Gyamfi, History and Political Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology College of Arts and Social Science, Kumasi, Ghana

Subjects:

• History
• African History
• By Subject

1. Introduction

Cross-border contraband trade refers to the unauthorized movement of goods across international borders in violation of customs laws and regulations. The informal cross-border contraband trade involves circumventing customs duties and taxes, disguising the formal nature of the goods, employing illicit routes or means of transportation (World Economic Forum (WEF), 2012). In the Ethiopian context, contraband trade is defined as ‘ኮንትሮባንድ ማለት ጉምሩክ ሳያውቅና ሳይፈቅድ ማንኛውንም ዕቃ ከውጭ አገር ወደ አገር ውስጥ እንዲገባ ማደረግ ወይም ወደ ውጭ አገር እንዲወጣ ማድረግ ወይም ዕቃዎችን ከውጭ አገር ወደ አገር ውስጥ ለማስገባት ወይም ከአገር እንዲወጡ ለማድረግ መንግስት ያወጣቸውን ደንቦች መጣስ ነው’¹ (Contraband trade refers to importing or exporting any type of goods without the knowledge of customs or violating regulations set by the government to determine import-export rules).

Cross-border contraband trade is practiced by unregistered traders violating requirements set by a state. It is the exchange of items between the nationals of sovereign countries across international boundaries. It is practiced in areas outside the control of the government and is a means of income generation for societies settled in inaccessible areas where alternative economic opportunities are limited (Ali, 2013, p. 4; Healy, 2011, p. 23; Kaminski and Mitra, 2010). Contraband could be exacerbated when the government bureaucratized/complicated license offer, traffic control, tax, and customs payment systems. It could be caused by a lack of trade facilities, inadequate infrastructural development, limited access to finance, a lack of market information, corruption, insecurity, and limited business management skills (Bogale et al., 2015). Indeed, personal desires, policy weakness, and institutional factors precipitate the contraband trade. Personal desire may arise from an interest in generating quick business and accumulating wealth. To this end, contraband traders could use different opportunities such as gaps in the demand and supply of items, price fluctuation, and social and kinship relationships. Institutional factors are associated with corruption, insecurity, weak local governance, poor coordination among the stakeholders, and the wrong location of customs and check points (Bogale et al., 2015, p. 72).

In the Horn of Africa, various state and non-state actors networked by invisible chains and organizations engage in cross-border contraband trade. In the Horn of Africa, where borders are porous and fragile, cross-border contraband trade was practiced not only by small-scale business owners but also by different actors. In supporting this argument, Asnake Kefale explains that ‘much of the cross-border trade in the Horn of Africa operates’ without the knowledge of the governments (Kefale, 2019, p. 5). In the post-independence period, several African countries had deployed police forces in their respective frontier territories, but they were less effective in controlling cross-border contraband trade (Benjamin et al., 2015). Entangled regional relations, the involvement of different actors, weak inter-state relations, and state failure in effective border governance exacerbated cross-border contraband trade in the Horn of Africa in the second half of the twentieth century.

The borders of Ethiopia in all directions are politically fragile, less protected, and porous, where the movement of people, goods, and currencies has been largely practiced for centuries. Among its border regions, the Metema-Humera corridor, which shares a long stretch of boundary with Sudan, is the major contraband trading border region, where various interest groups and state and non-state actors use it as a heaven zone for contraband trade. Historically, cross-border contraband through the Metema-Humera corridor and social interdependence between the borderland communities settled on both sides of the border has been practiced for longer periods, but the magnitude of cross-border contraband trade was more complicated during the Derg regime (1974–1991) due to entanglements between regional diplomacy, fragile border governance, state failures in enforcing law in the border areas, political mistrust between Ethiopia and Sudan, and armed resistance in the border areas. The escalation eventually complicated border relations and disrupted economic ties between frontier communities settled on both sides of the border. These multifaceted dynamics in Metema-Humera border regions that appeared during the Derg period (1974–1991) are overlooked in academic discourse. Scholarly works produced so far on the nature of cross-border contraband trade have focused on the Ethio-Kenya, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Djibouti border regions, while the case of Metema-Humera is overlooked. For instance, scholars such as Kefale (2019), Tazebew and Kefale (2021), and Bogale, et al. (2015) produced insightful works about the dynamics of cross-border contraband trade through the Ethio-Kenya, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Djibouti border regions, but the case of the Metema-Humera corridor and the dynamics of the Derg period have received no scholarly attention so far.

Apart from these, the Metema-Humera border regions are still flash points of contact, cooperation, and dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan. In spite of an age-old economic and social interdependence between frontier communities settled on both sides of the border, the Metema-Humera border regions are still politically fragile, porous, and contested, causing intricate consequences for relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. A series of studies done so far show that conflicting positions between the two countries emanated from the boundary demarcated by the one side in 1903 (Erkihun, 2021, 2020. p. 82; Hassan, 1971, p. 106; Puddu, 2017; Rahman, 1983, p. 47; Sellasie, 1999, p. 146; Wubneh, 2016) Successive regimes in Ethiopia have declined to recognize one-sided demarcation, arguing that resource-rich and strategic border regions were left to the Sudanese side disregarding the treaty signed between Menelik II and Harrington in May 1902. On their side, the Sudanese have very different justifications; contradictory positions prevail on the Ethiopian side, and they argue for the validation of the Gwynn line. These contesting claims and the border issue has not been settled so far.

Historically, the Metema-Humera and Quara border regions placed under three administrative units: Wogera Awraja, Gondar Awraja, and Chilga Awraja of Begemidir and Simien Governorate General, were scene to several historical processes and political dynamism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Contemporary administrative division of the study area. Source: ‘Growth and Development II Workshop in Begemǝdǝr and Sǝmen Governorate General’, Gondar, 1964.

Marked by ‘a complex mosaic of ecosystems formed by the continuous intermingling of lowlands and mountains’, the Metema-Humera border region served as a temporary station for Sudanese, Darfurian, and West African Muslims during their annual pilgrimage to the Holy Land of Mecca in the eighteenth century (Baker, 1868, pp. 344–345; Fattovich, 1984). Likewise, Metema-Galabat was one of the famous meeting points for Ethiopian, Sudanese, and Egyptian merchants in the nineteenth century. Harell in his study reported that Ethiopia exported about 13,000–17,000 slaves through the Metema–Gallabat route per year in the mid-19th century (Moore-Harell, 1999). More importantly, the Metema-Humera corridor served as a defensive buffer zone for successive generations in Ethiopia to defend territories from Egyptian and Mahdist attacks in the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Sudanese considered Metema a sacred site and one of the Islamic shrine centers as it was a place where several Ansar troops and their religious leader, Sheik Endris Wad al-Arbab, were buried during the battle of Metema in 1889.²

As Metema-Humera border regions were less inhabited until the late 1950s and 1960s, border areas were safe havens for local bandits and anti-government insurgents for longer years (Beke, 1867, pp. 31; Garretson, 1982; Margery, 1947, p. 325; Mekuria, 1981, p. 67; Sanderson, 1969; Simpson, 1996).³ The bandit raids and the insurgent movements seriously affected the frontier administration on both sides of the border. As stated above, fragile governance and cross-border contraband trade through Metema-Humera corridor was an age-old phenomena, but conflicting political interests between Ethiopia and Sudan and the magnitude of cross-border contraband trade were very complicated during the Derg regime, 1974–1991. So, this paper explores interplay between political violence in the border area hampered by the violence of various armed factions in the Metema-Humera border and cross-border contraband trade, entanglements between regional diplomacy, pattern, actors, networks and multifaceted consequences of the contraband trade on the border communities during the Derg regime, 1974–1991.

Methodologically, this paper is produced based on critical examination of untapped provincial archives of the Derg period, contemporary periodical sources and field data collected through interviewing purposively selected informants in Quara, Metema, West Armachiho, and Setit-Humera. The researcher has consulted untapped archival records housed at Gondar Town and the Debre Markos University Archive Center. These records, which are essential to understanding contemporary political dynamics in the border areas, were intelligence sources produced by security offices, customs officials, diplomatic communities, local governors, border patrolling forces, etc. Besides, local informants interviewed by the researcher in the study area were direct witnesses to the events. Informants were purposefully selected based on their local knowledge and proximity to the subject of this study.

2. The post-1974 scene

In the post-1974 period, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan were pigeonholed by opportunities and uncertainties. In the immediate years of the Ethiopian Revolution, both countries reiterated cordial interests to maintain friendly relations and cooperate on common issue such as regional political issues, cross-order contraband trade, and security threats. As part of cooperation, customs posts situated on both sides of the border areas were closely working. The Sudanese custom posts such as Gallabat, Tiha, and Lominat were working closely with the Ethiopian Metema, Dubaba, and Matebia custom posts until early 1976.⁴

However, this cordial relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan could not last long. Tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan appeared when they started hosting anti-government forces in their respective border areas. On its side, the Sudanese government provided training grounds and a logistic corridor to ex-regime officials who founded the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). In response, Derg provided training grounds to the Sudanese Ansar insurgents and retired army officers in the Metema and Humera border regions, who were fighting to remove the regime of Nimeiri. On 24 April 1975, a group of Sudanese army officers led by Mohammed Mahdi and Kedir Osman entered Metema. A year later, on 11 September 1976, 300 armed Sudanese troops led by two army officers left for Metema.⁵ The incident shocked the Sudanese government. Moreover, Derg hosted Libyan army officers who were blamed for training militant Ansars in Humera and Metema. The Sudanese government accused that old army officers, who received military training in Ethiopia by Libyan military personnel, masterminded an attempted coup d’état in July 1976 (Erlich, 2010 p. 108).⁶ When mistrust and suspicion crested, Derg banned cross-border trade with Sudan and officially closed the border in March 1976. The official state letter explaining the closure of cross-border trade was read as ‘ማንኛውም የሀገር ውሰጥ ምርት ወደ ሱዳን እንዳይሄድ’⁷ (any kinds of domestic product should not pass to the Sudan).

This political measure, however, affected the economic interdependence of the frontier nationals settling on both sides of the border. Several Sudanese traders who had licensed relish and cereal crop stores in the Ethiopian border towns of Metema, Abderafi, and Humera were forced to leave the country. More importantly, the closure of the cross-border trade caused an immediate economic and social crisis on the Ethiopian frontier communities. Several local traders in Metema, Abderafi, and Humera who had sesame and cereal crops were forced to sell agricultural products at a fixed price to the government. Besides, frontier communities that were dependent on the Sudanese markets for daily consumption goods such as salt, kerosene, sugar, batteries, dry cells, cloth, and other items suffered from the closure of the cross-border trade. Due to access road and banking service problems, Ethiopian frontier communities were dependent on Sudanese frontier markets.

By 1977, tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan had assumed an open conflict. Supported by heavy tanks providede by the Sudanese government, the EDU bombarded the historic town of Metema Yohannes in April 1977. In addition, the Sudanese forces fired the Ethiopian farmers in Setit-Humera and Abderafi and the custom posts of Kulit, Serferedi, and Wede Berzin, while Eritrean insurgents’ controlled the northern section of the River Setit, such as Um-Hajar, Täsänai, Nakfa, Keren, and Afabet in February 1977.⁸

The escalation eventually complicated border relations, disrupted safe economic ties between frontier communities settled on both sides of the border and created buffer space for smuggling contraband items. Efforts made by the Derg, including the closure of the border posts, did little to minimize cross-border contraband trade. As most sections of border areas such as Setit-Humera, West Armacheho, Metema, and Quara were politically fragile, cross-border contraband trade was widely practiced by different interest groups.

3. Actors, routes, and items of contraband trade

Cross-border contraband trade through Metema-Humera corridor was practiced by systematically networked chains, where suppliers, brokers (middlemen), and recipients are connected by invisible cells. In this regard, anti-government insurgents, particularly EDU and EPRP, who founded logistic corridors and training grounds in the border areas of Quara, Metema, West-Armachiho, and Setit, were the major actors in receiving and exporting cattle, pack animals, sheep, and goats from Ethiopian contraband traders to Sudan through the porous border region.⁹ The Ethiopian refugees settled in the border areas of Sudan were very active in receiving contraband items from contraband suppliers. These refugees were displaced from Metema, Abderafi, Humera, and other frontiers due to wars fought between the EDU and the Derg in 1977. Contemporary eyewitnesses interviewed by the researcher at Gendawuha, estimated that about 15,000 Ethiopians displaced from Metema Yohannes and Kokit alone were camped in Gallabat, Doka, Kunina, Tiha, and Bassonda.¹⁰ Located near the Ethiopian border, Tiha in particular was one of the major contraband destination sites where several Ethiopian refugees, rebels, and Sudanese frequently practiced marketing until the demise of Derg in 1991. A secret letter reported in January 1987 states that about 37,000 cattle were brought to Tiha within a single Saturday-day market (Figures 2 and 3).¹¹

Figure 2. Partial view of Tiha Town in 1978. Source: In possession of private individual, German Abate who spent years at Tiha as refuge.

Figure 3. Ethiopian animals at Sudanese border market in 1978. Sources: Yekatit Metsihet (Bulletin) No 9, (4), 1978.

More importantly, the Sudanese and Eritrean pastoralists who used to spend grazing seasons in the frontier areas extending from Setit-Barka lowland to the Shinfa-Ayema River valleys were serving as instruments in smuggling cattle into the Sudan. In return, Ethiopian contraband traders paid them money. These pastoralists were said to have strong personal attachments to butchers in Humera and Abderafi towns in particular. Butchers who had licenses in the cattle trade bought cattle from the rural areas, but they dispatched these cattle to the Sudan in the form of contraband through personal attachment with the pastoralists.¹²

On the Sudanese side, frontier societies and local authorities were recipients of Ethiopian cattle. As cattle, goats, and sheep were demanded in the Sudan for the local meat market, they were encouraging Ethiopian contrabandists to supply them with more animals. This created informal business opportunities for the Sudanese frontier communities. Several Sudanese opened abattoirs and butcher shops in Hamdayet, Medhane, and Atbara that were supplying meat products to Gedarrif and Kassala.¹³

The Sudanese frontier towns, situated near Ethiopian border areas, were the major immediate destination sites. Towards Um-Hajar (north of the River Tekeze), Hamdayet, Medhane, and Atbara were immediate contraband destinations, where several Ethiopian contraband traders supplied cattle to the Sudanese daily and weekly. Likewise, towards the Setit-Humera, Abderafi, and West Armachiho border regions, several Sudanese towns located about 15-20 km from the common border, such as Sufawa, Bahre Selam, Derabil, Gedarrif, Hashiba, Wad Al-Halawi, Bereket Nuri, Bahire Sindus, Midereya, Himbirayet, Barkila, Rigana, and Asira, were the immediate cattle markets attended by Ethiopian contraband traders daily and weekly.¹⁴

Contrabandists shipped cattle to the Sudan through different alternative routes. For instance, the cattle population came from Welkait Tegedie and was largely shipped through the Humera-Gediba-Hamdayet route, while towards the West Armachiho border region, Abderafi, Shimelagara, and Girar Wuha were the major smuggling routes to the Sudan. Towards the Metema and Quara frontier districts, Gallabat, Tiha, Bassonda, and Kunina were immediate Sudanese market centers known for receiving Ethiopian cattle.¹⁵ Cattle came from Chilga, Alefa, Takusa, and Quara and were shipped to the Sudan through Das, Gundo, Lominate, Tiha, Kulit, Serferdi, Dubaba, and Wede Berzin gateways, while animals came from west Gojjam, including Agaw Medir and Alefa-Taqusa, and were shipped either through the Dangila-Qunzila-Zibist-Nefes Gebeya-Tiha route or Ashuda-Qunzila-Alefa-Quara-Matebia-Qulit-Tiha route. Similarly, cattle brought from Bichena, Motta, Bahir Dar, and Debre Tabor Awrajas were shipped through the Yifag-Dembia-Alefa-Taqusa-Matebia-Kulit-Tiha route.¹⁶

Towards Metekel (north of the River Abay), Omedla, Bambudi, Bamiza, and Almahal were the major contraband gateways, while the Sudanese border towns such as Aware, Abechir, and Bardeng were immediate destination sites. Cattle brought from different areas of the western section of Gojjam, such as Qolla Dega Damot and Agew Medir, were massively shipped to the Sudan through these gateways. A local intelligence report shows that in the early 1980s, about 600–700 heads of cattle were exported to Sudan per year through Omedla alone.¹⁷ Contraband trade depopulated cattle resources in the districts of Gondar and Gojjam provinces. Among other animals exported to Sudan, cattle resources took the lion’s share. In the late 1970s, 200–300 heads of cattle were exported to the Sudan by contraband traders per month through the Humera, Abderafi, and Welkait Tegedie routes. Through Metema, 160–210 heads of cattle are shipped to the Sudan per month, while towards Matebia-Quara-Alefa-Dangila, more than 400–600 heads of cattle are exported by illegal traders.¹⁸

In 1980, the volume of cross-border contraband trade grew at an alarming rate. A secret field survey report collected in 1980 shows that contraband trade in cattle, practiced through the Matebia, Metema, Abderafi, and Humera routes, expanded at an alarming rate than ever before.¹⁹ It was reported that about 1500–200 heads of cattle were exported to the Sudan through the Delgi, Dubaba, Shinfa, Matebia, and Tiha routes per week, while towards Armachiho, about 1500 heads of cattle were shipped to the Sudan through the Shimelagara and Girar Wuha routes per week.²⁰ Likewise, towards Welkait and Tegedie, about 1500 heads of cattle were said to have been exported to the Sudan through the Angereb River Valley and Mechach per week.²¹

Marketing between Ethiopian and Sudanese contraband traders in the border area was practiced in barter and the currencies of both countries. However, barter trade was the first choice because of the absence of banking services and the inadequate availability of hard currency in the border areas. In addition, as the Sudanese pound had a weak monetary value on the black market exchange, it was less demanded by Ethiopian traders. For instance, in the early 1980s, 100 Sudanese pounds were exchanged for 15–20 Ethiopian birr.²² From the Ethiopian side, cattle, pack animals, sheep and goats, and animal products were exchanged with coffee, sugar, home utensils, cloth, salt, cosmetics, soaps, perfume, pharmaceutical products, jewelry, firearms, ventilators, and electronic items such as radios, batteries, dry cells, watches, and tape recorders.²³ In 1982, a single ox was exchanged for two tape recorders in the Sudanese border market, while the price of a single tape recorder in Gondar Town was about 800–1000 birr (Table 1).²⁴

Table 1. Price variation of ox in the highland districts and the border areas in the early 1980s.

No	Marketing areas	Price
1	Gayinet, Debre Tabor and Libo Awraja	400–600 birr
2	Chilga, Gondar, Wegera and Semien	700–900 birr
3	In the Ethiopian border market	1000–1200 birr
4	In the immediate Sudanese border markets	1200–1600 birr

Source: GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975), 5.

On the other hand, the price of 100 km of salt and 1 kg of coffee in Humera was 50 birr and 5–7 birr, respectively, while in Gondar town it was about 110–150 birr and 10–15 birr in the early 1980s.²⁵ Thus, noticeable differences in the price of items in border areas and highland markets encouraged contraband trade. In some cases, marketing exchanges were made between the nationals of the two countries over the products of Ethiopia. For instance, the coffee produced in Wellega, Keffa, and Illubabor was massively shipped to southern Sudan by contraband traders through their respective border territories. Surprisingly, this coffee product was exported to Gojjam and Gondar, northwestern Ethiopia, in exchange for cattle, sheep, goats, pack animals, and animal products.²⁶ As trade was practiced between the nationals of the two sovereign countries over the products of Ethiopia, it affected the national revenue of Ethiopia.

4. A shift in Ethio-Sudanese relations: from clamor to cooperation

Relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan temporarily improved in 1980. Because of a shift in political alignment and the growing domestic protests against the regime of Nimeiri, Sudan revised its policy towards Ethiopia. The relationship between Sudan and Egypt declined when Sadat signed the Camp David Agreement in 1979 and recognized Israel as a state. At home, students, teachers, health workers, and old cabinet members who were disappointed by the rising cost of living and financial crisis masterminded a public protest in Sudan.²⁷ As a result, the Sudanese government re-oriented its foreign policy towards Ethiopia and called for peace initiatives. On its side, Ethiopia declared the ‘Red Star Campaign’ in Eritrea and sought the cooperation of Sudan to close border gateways, hand over the rebel leaders, and close rebel offices and media centers.²⁸

In March 1980, a Sudanese delegation led by Abdul Mejid H. Khalil, Vice President, made a ground-breaking visit to Addis Ababa and discussed it with state officials, including Mengistu Hailemariam. He expressed the Sudanese interest and readiness to work on common issues. Consequently, Mengistu Hailemariam paid a state visit to Khartoum from 24 to 30 May 1980.²⁹ In the meantime, Mengistu Hailemariam and Nimeiri signed bilateral treaties to control cross-border trade, revise broadcasting policy, and respect territorial unity and non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs. In the agreement, reopening common borders and controlling cross-border contraband trade and security complexes were emphasized. They agreed to open borders and resume cross-border trade in barter (Figure 4).³⁰

Figure 4. Mengistu and Nimeiri signing a joint communiqué in Khartoum. Source: Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Genbot 21 and 29/1972.

A year later, in January 1981, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a new trade agreement in Khartoum. After critically examining the challenges facing frontier communities and the effects of contraband trade, both countries revised their trade policies. The treaty was planned to control cross-border contraband trade, stimulate investment, and eliminate trade barriers on both sides of the border.³¹ The new trade agreement, however, did little to reduce the rate of cross-border contraband trade.

In July 1981, both countries also signed a new frontier trade protocol.³² They agreed to close major contraband gateways and consolidate inspection systems at major checking points and cross-border routes. Besides, they agreed to exchange information, take corrective measures against contrabandists, and practice export-import trade respecting the principles of the international customs administration (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Zewdie, Chief of Ethiopian Custom, Excise and Tax Administration briefing objectives of new frontier trade protocol. Source: Addis Zemen, newspaper, Hamile 7/1973.

At last, both countries had given due attention to barter trade between their respective frontier communities. The Ethiopian government legalized barter trade for two major reasons. One was to reduce the rate of cross-border contraband trade, which was supposed to cause a multifaceted crisis at national and local levels, while the second objective was to solve the marketing problems of the frontier communities.³³ However, barter trade could not run effectively. The travel restrictions imposed by the Derg along routes affected the flow of items from the highland areas to the border sites. For instance, Delgi town and other localities in Alefa, Takusa, and Quara districts that were known for supplying spice products suffered from travel restrictions. Secondly, access road problems, rebel movements in the border areas, and the license-offering system affected barter trade. The license-offering system was bureaucratic and restrictive. A license was offered to those who were not engaged in other sectors of trade and had no permanent job. Applicants were required to bring a supportive letter from their respective districts that states his/her personality, willingness, personal initiatives, absence of a permanent job, and non-engagement in other sectors of trade. Every trader was required to renew their license every three months. ³⁴Licensed traders had no right to directly export imported items; rather, they were obliged to sell them at a fixed price to the state. The command economic policy does not allow traders to directly export any items.

More importantly, the Ethiopian government drafted a series of action plans to reduce the practice of cattle theft and contraband trade in the border areas. To promote public awareness, Derg declared the national call read as ‘ሁሉም ለእናት አገሩ ዘብ ይቁም!’³⁵ (Everyone should stand for his/her mother land.) Derg also established the task force known as ‘ye enisisat nigid teqotatari committee’ (cattle trade inspection committee), composed of selected delegates from the kebel peasant association, the woreda agricultural office, the local council, and the police office.³⁶ The task force was responsible for monitoring contraband trade, illicit movement of cattle, monitoring checking points, providing pass cards to the traders, and inspecting customs posts. In addition, the government established local spies and paid thirty percent of the sale of confiscated contraband items.³⁷ To consolidate inspection, Derg opened new checking points along the following major gateways (Table 2).

Table 2. Checking points.

No	Awrajas and respective woreda sharing boundary with the Sudan	Major gateways and checking points
1	Chilga Awraja
1.1	Metema Woreda	Kokit, Das and Kumer
1.2	Quara Woreda	Serferedi and Gezir
1.3	Matebia Woreda	Mendoka, Minjugjug, Meriterahid, Kulit and Shukria
2	Gondar Awraja
2.1	West Armachiho Woreda	Abderafi, Shimelagara, Girar Wuha, Abraha Jira and Bahre Selam (Angereb)
3	Wogera Awraja
3.1	Welkait Tegedie Woreda	Adiremetse and Adigoshu
3.2	Setit Woreda	Bahiker, Hilagen, Bebewal and Qabiteya

Source: GAC, Folder No. 174–175, field survey report, Gondar 1975), 14.

Besides, the government attempted to settle peasants in the border areas. Settling peasants in the frontier territory was supposed to organize famers to control contraband flow and close border gateways. Accordingly, peasants from drought-affected areas of Gayint and Belessa districts were relocated to Maicadra and Mechach (Setit Woreda) in 1985, while peasants relocated from Wollo settled in Metema Woreda along the River Gendewuha valley extending from Kumer to Sendelti Mountain.³⁸ Furthermore, Derg attempted to cease the seasonal grazing of the Sudanese and Eritrean pastoralists. As pastoralists were the major instruments in smuggling cattle from Ethiopia to the Sudan, the government attempted to change the lives of pastoralism to sedentary agriculture. A series of discussions were held at local and national levels to change the lives of Eritrean pastoralists into sedentary agriculture. Secondly, local security units were drawn to patrol border areas, close the grazing zone gateways, and expel the Sudanese pastoralists from any sections of the Ethiopian frontier districts.

Practically, political and administrative measures, independently and jointly taken by Ethiopia and Sudan, were less successful in controlling cross-border contraband trade. Cattle flow from Ethiopia to Sudan was continued. For instance, an intelligence report shows that in 1982, about 15–30 cattle were exported to Sudan per day through Humera and Abderafi alone, while the rates of export per week and per month reached 70–90 and 200–300, respectively.³⁹ Similarly, about 5–10 cattle or pack animals are shipped to Sudan per day through Metema, while the rate of flow per week and per month reaches 40–50 and 160–120, respectively.⁴⁰ More importantly, about 25–35 cattle are exported to the Sudan through the Alefa-Quara and Matebia routes per day. In a week and a month, about 180–250 and 400–600 cattle were exported to the Sudan through these routes, respectively. The saddest was that from October 9–February October–3 February 1987, within 115 days alone, about 23,000 heads of cattle were exported to the Sudan through Humera by contrabandists, while through Abderafi, about 28,250 cattle were exported.⁴¹ This intelligence report shows that about 200 cattle were exported to Sudan through Humera alone per day, while through Abderafi, about 250 cattle were exported per day. The same report reveals that along the Matebia-Kulit-Tiha route, about 17,250 cattle were exported to the Sudan within 115 days.⁴²

5. Uncertainties and challenges

Ethiopia and Sudan held a series of discussions and signed treaties to settle their differences, but relations between both countries had shown no basic improvement. Although state-owned media reported that new rapprochement brought improvements, the practice of cross-border contraband was continued at an alarming rate. A secret letter reported by Humera, Abderafi, and Matebia Custom offices in April 1982 shows that cross-border contraband trade ran out of control and caused a tremendous crisis on the national revenue and local livelihood of border communities.⁴³

Plans drafted to control cross-border contraband trade were insignificantly implemented on the ground due to security problems, topographic challenges, corruption, and a lack of commitment from both Ethiopian and Sudanese governments to respect the treaties signed in 1980 and 1981. Small police forces deployed at border gateways, checking points, and customs sites were frequently attacked by insurgents and armed contrabandists. As border areas were politically fragile, the government could not provide effective security protection. Organized and well-armed contraband traders also unconditionally attacked police and local security units. Numerically, insurgents and contraband traders outnumbered police/local militia forces deployed at particular sites. Police members deployed at customs were not more than 4–9, while contrabandists networked in groups were better organized. For instance, in 1981, there were only nine and four policemen at Humera and Abderafi customs posts, respectively.⁴⁴ Few police members could not effectively patrol open frontier territories. In some cases, contrabandists employed armed individuals to steer cattle while crossing border areas. They paid 50–70 birr per cattle and 10–15 birr per goat/sheep.⁴⁵

In addition, contraband traders possessed better-quality (automatic) firearms such as FN, M13, M14, G3, and clashinkove, while police/local militias owned outdated weapons such as guandie, Czechos, carbin, and detifer.⁴⁶ For instance, a group of armed brigands, who were steering 54 heads of cattle and 33 pack animals, stole from Derikaho Kebele. Alefa Woreda killed two police members and one local militia (Melkie Dessaw, Teshome Endeshaw, and Siraw Ayalew) at Wede Berzin, Matebia customs post on 5 January 1983.⁴⁷ The contraband traders took the guns of two dead police members and escaped shortly.

The topography of the Ethio-Sudanese border areas created challenges in controlling cross-border contraband trade. As the topography of the border region is open and plain land, it was hardly possible to deploy security units at each border gateway. Hence, contraband traders easily cross the border between each customs post. More importantly, corruption exacerbated the cross-border contraband trade. In the absence of effective border administration, local chiefs/custom officials were blamed for letting contrabandists pass checking points after receiving money/items. Military vehicles and truck drivers were blamed for smuggling salt, coffee, firearms, and electronics items from the border areas to Gondar and Gojjam provinces.⁴⁸ Military vehicles that were frequently passing through the Azezo-Chilga-Metema, Gondar-Tikil Dingay-Abderafi, and Gondar-Tikil Dingay-Humera routes to dispatch logistic items to the security forces deployed in the border areas were accused of smuggling contraband items.⁴⁹ As military vehicles were not inspected at checking points, drivers used the opportunity to smuggle contraband items.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the frontier territories extending from Western Eritrea to the Abay were predominantly occupied by the rebel forces. Most sections of Wolkait, West Armacheho, and Metema were controlled by the TPLF insurgents, while the border areas of Quara and Metekel, such as Serferdi, Dubaba, Nefis Gebeya, Almahal, Omedla, Bambudi, and Belaya Mountain were in the hands of the EPRP. As border areas became politically fragile, the volume of cross-border contraband trade grew at an alarming rate. A secret state source reveals that on the eve of the collapse of the Derg, about 150–300 heads of cattle and pack animals were exported to the Sudan per day through Metema alone.⁵⁰

In 1990, Ethiopia faced a crisis in foreign currency exchange. In the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 28 January 1990, Wale Chekol, Minister of Finance, reported that state revenue declined at an alarming rate due to contraband trade and the expansion of lawlessness in the border areas. In the discussion, contraband trade was taken as a critical national problem that needs immediate intervention.⁵¹ Considering the intensity of the problems, the Council of Ministers revised Ethiopia’s foreign trade policy. The Council of Ministers decided to directly purchase items that were inadequately available in the domestic markets, such as edible salt, sugar, adhesive chemicals, electronic products, cotton, soap, and detergents, from the border areas of neighboring countries.⁵²

Secondly, the government placed frontier areas under military administration. When authorized customs officials, district chiefs, local militias, and other stakeholders were corrupted, the army deployed to the respective frontiers with the mission to take action against the contrabandists.⁵³ An official state order explaining the mission given to the army is read as ‘የኮንትሮባንድ ቁጥጥር ከሀገር ድንበርና አንድነት ጥበቃ ተነጥሎ ሳይታይ አስፈላጊው ትብብር ወዲያዉኑ እንዲሰጣቸው [ለወታደሩ] በጥብቅ አስታውቃለሁ፡፡’⁵⁴ (I urge that very strict direction be given to them [the army] that contraband control is part of protecting the border and national unity). Accordingly, the 115th and 113th Infantry Army Brigades deployed in Metema and Humera, respectively, were given missions to hunt down contraband traders.⁵⁵ Moreover, a special mission was given to the 603rd Core to close the contraband route that passes through the course of the River Angereb Valley, where cattle and pack animals came from Gayint, Belesa, Sanja, and Wegera and were massively shipped to Sudan.

However, army units seemed less successful in controlling and hunting down contrabandists. The project faced opposition from army units themselves, who were deployed in the border areas. For instance, the commander of the 113^rd Infantry Army Brigade, Colonel Demeke Gebre Michael, responded that giving regular missions to army units to hunt down contraband traders created gaps in defending and counterattacking insurgents.⁵⁶

Derg drafted several plans to control cross-border contraband trade, but smuggling continued until the collapse of the regime in 1991. Although challenges emanated from multifaceted directions, the institutional weakness and economic policy of the Derg encouraged contraband trade in the border areas. As command economic policy restricted the price of items, the amount of capital, and the movement of traders, items unfortunately disappeared or were insufficiently available in the market. Shortages or disappearances of items on the market lead to the contraband trade. When state-monopolized markets control the price of items, traders choose contraband for buying and selling.⁵⁷ or instance, as a part of the command economic policy, salt was distributed through the Domestic Wholesale Corporation. However, when the Domestic Wholesale Corporation, a state-controlled agency, failed to meet the demands of the domestic market, traders imported salt from Sudan through the contraband system. When salt was inadequately available in the market, contrabandists imported it from Gallabat and Tiha and smuggled it to Gojjam and Gondar provincial localities. From Tiha, salt was smuggled to Gojjam through the Matebia, Quara, Alefa, Qunzla, and Dangila routes by pack animals, while from Gallabat, it was smuggled into Gondar through the Metema-Chilga-Azezo route.⁵⁸

6. Repercussions of the cross-border contraband trade

As Metema-Humera was an isolated border region and inaccessible, where banking transaction and alternative economic opportunities were limited, cross-border contraband trade was a means of income generation and livelihood practices for borderland communities. It uses to meet local demands and sustain the lives of communities in the remote border areas such as druges, electronics, and clothing. On the other hand, cross-border contraband trade practiced during the Derg period (1994–1991) has caused multifaceted effects. It caused the proliferation of illegal goods that affected public health and safety. I undermined local economies by engendering unfair competition with legitimate businesses and reducing government tax revenues. It caused a loss of public revenues, handicapped local public institutions, and exacerbated mistrust between the government and the local people living in the border areas. It also affected economic growth and income distribution. As contraband traders were working to generate money and accumulate private wealth, violating established state laws, national revenue reached a critical juncture. It also affected licensed traders because it made them incompetent in the market. Items imported through contraband caused price inflation. It caused social unrest. Ethiopia lost more national revenue than Sudan. As border areas on the Ethiopian side were fragile, its domestic products were exported illegally without generating customs revenue.

Cross-border contraband trade depopulated the cattle population in Gondar and Gojjam provinces. By the early 1980s, Ethiopia had the largest number of cattle in Africa. A survey report shows that Ethiopia had 27 million heads of cattle, 24 million sheep, and 18 million goats, while Sudan had 19 million heads of cattle, 18 million sheep, and 14 million goats in the early 1980s.⁵⁹ However, foreign exchange rates earned from cattle sales in Ethiopia and Sudan never match. For instance, in 1983, Sudan earned 27,000.00 US dollars from cattle sales per year, while Ethiopia generated 979.00 US dollars from the cattle market in the same period.⁶⁰ Although other factors such as technology application and quality farming determine revenue, contraband trade affected Ethiopia and did not generate the expected revenue from the cattle market.

The rise of cattle demand in the Sudan caused an expansion of cattle theft in the highland areas of Gondar and Gojjam. Cattle shipped to the Sudan through Matebia, Metema, Abderafi, and Humera were largely stolen from Gayint, Debre Tabor, Libo, Gondar, Chilga, and Wegera Awrajas.⁶¹ The decline of friendly relations between Ethiopia and Sudan worsened cross-border contraband trade. As Sudan was hostile to Ethiopia, it took no measures against the contrabandists, who were very active in encouraging the flow of contraband items from Ethiopia to the Sudan.⁶² In explaining the volume of cattle shipped to Sudan through contraband, a secret letter reported by Solomon Muluneh, deputy governor of the Gondar province, to the Minister of Interior states that ‘ሱዳን ከኢትዮጵያ ተሰርቀው ለሚነዱ ከብቶችም ሆነ ለሌሎች ሀብቶቻችን የደራ ገባያ ናት’⁶³ Sudan is a fresh market for cattle theft from Ethiopia and other resources.

More importantly, contraband trade caused a social and economic crisis in the districts of Gojjam and Gondar provinces in the 1980s. Contraband trade exacerbated cattle theft in the rural areas of Gojjam and Gondar provincial districts and was one of the most evil social problems during the last years of the Derg period. Armed brigands kidnapped cattle keepers at night and took the cattle population. As contraband was practiced by armed individuals, insecurity expanded not only in the frontier districts but also in the highland areas of Gondar and Gojjam in the late 1980s. When the state fails to provide effective social security, both rural farmers and urban residents need to have firearms to protect themselves and their cattle resources from theft. Firearms proliferation from border areas to the highlands of Gojjam and Gondar was widely practiced. In stating the volume of firearms trade at Robe Gebeya (later renamed Kidame Gebeya), Alefa-Takusa, an intelligence source, reported that ‘የጥይት ንግድ በገበሬው በኩል የጧጧፈ ነው፡፡ ጥይት በይፋ በገብያ ውስጥ በብዛት ይሸጣል፡፡ እንዲያውም የጥይት ገብያ ብቻ ነው ብሎ ማስቀመጥ ይቻላል’⁶⁴ The firearms trade is widely practiced among farmers. Openly, bullets are widely sold at markets. It is possible to conclude that bullets alone are sold in the market.

Contraband trade caused a decline in agricultural products and a shortage of food crops in the border areas. These appeared because of the shift in occupation from crop production to contraband trade and the shortage of oxen for plowing in rural areas. As societies engaged in contraband trade, crop production declined at an alarming rate, which eventually caused a shortage of food cops in the market.⁶⁵ In the late 1980s, seventy percent of communities in Setit-Humera and Abderafi were said to be dependent on contraband trade, while in Metema, Matebia, Alefa, and Quara districts, eighty percent of the people lead their lives based on contraband trade, of which 90 percent engaged in exporting cattle to the Sudan.⁶⁶

Cattle theft and the resultant shortage of oxen for plough in the rural areas caused shortages of food crops in the border areas. As a large number of cattle were shipped to Sudan through the contraband trade, an acute shortage of oxen for plowing appeared. This caused a shortage of food crops in the border areas. In explaining the shortage of oxen and its effect on the agricultural product, a local report states that ‘የእርሻ በሬዎች እጠረት በምርት ሂደት ላይ ተፅኖ በማስከተሉ ከእለት እለት የምርት አጥረት አሰከተለ’⁶⁷ (As a shortage of oxen caused an effect on an agricultural process, a shortage of products appeared from day to day.) As compared to other animals, oxen constituted the largest portion of exports. Among the cattle population exported through Metema, Matebia, Alefa, and Quara, 80–85 percent were oxen, while cows and heifers constituted 5–10 percent, respectively.⁶⁸ Similarly, among sheep and goats exported to the Sudan, 60 percent were sheep and 40 percent were goats. In conclusion, among the total animals exported to the Sudan through the Setit-Humera, Abderafi, Metema, Matebia, and Quara frontier regions, 60 percent were oxen, 20 percent were cows, 5 percent were heifers, and 15 percent were bulls.⁶⁹ Border towns such as Humera, Abderafi, and Metema are potentially rich for agricultural production, but the local communities faced shortages of food crops. As a temporary solution, the government lifted the customs charge and declared tax-free entry of sorghum from the Sudan.⁷⁰

Likewise, contraband trade and resultant cattle theft caused shortages of milk and milk products in the border areas. As cows were massively exported to Sudan, shortages of meat, milk, and milk products appeared in the domestic markets. In explaining the effect of the contraband trade on the lives of the border communities, local reports stated that ‘ከእንስሳት የሚገኙ ተዋጽኦች (ሥጋ፣ወተት፣ ቅቤና ሌሎችም) እጥረት በመድረሱ ሕብረተሰቡ የፍላጎቱን በቀላሉ ለማግኘት ስላልቻለ የኑሮ ውድነት በአከባቢው ይንፀባረቃል’⁷¹ (because of the shortage of animal products (meat, milk, butter, and others), local communities could not easily satisfy their demands, and hence, the increasing cost of living is reflected in the local environment.

7. Conclusion

Located in the northwestern Ethiopian borderlands, sharing a long stretch of boundary with Sudan, Metema-Humera is a politically fragile and porous border region where cross-border contraband trade by various state and non-state actors has been practiced over the last centuries. Cross-border contraband through Metema-Humera was an alternative source of income for frontier societies and created social interdependence between the borderland communities settled on both sides of the border, but informal trade was more complicated during the Derg regime (1974–1991), attributed to entanglements between regional diplomacy, fragile border governance, state failures in enforcing law in the border areas, political mistrust between Ethiopia and Sudan, and armed resistance in the border areas. In the post-1974 period, tensions between the Derg and the regime of Nimeiri became complicated when both countries provided training grounds to anti-government forces in their respective border areas. When Sudan declined to reframe providing training grounds and the logistics corridor to the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and the Eritrean insurgents, Derg responded by providing the same to the Ansar and the South Sudanese insurgents in Metema and Gambela respectively. The escalation eventually complicated border relations and disrupted economic ties between frontier communities settled on both sides of the border. Political tensions hampered by the violence of various armed factions in the border areas of Metema and Humera created an enabling space for cross-border contraband trade, leading to widespread illicit activities. The practice of cross-border contraband trade involved a diverse array of actors and complex routes for smuggling cattle and other goods across the border. Anti-government insurgents such as the EDU, EPRP, and Ethiopian refugees camped in the border areas of Sudan played a significant role in facilitating the movement of contraband items such as cattle, pack animals, sheep, and goats from Ethiopia to Sudan through different gateways. Refugees who were displaced from Metema, Abderafi, and Humera due to devastating wars fought between the Derg and the EDU in 1977 and camped in the border areas of Sudan such as Gallabat, Doka, Kunina, Tiha, and Bassonda were actors in smuggling contraband items. On the Sudanese side, frontier communities and local authorities received Ethiopian cattle, which were in demand for the meat market. Cattle were exchanged for currency and various goods in barter, such as coffee, sugar, electronic goods, firearms, and pharmaceutical products. The intricate web of actors involved in contraband trade underscores the pervasive nature of illicit activities in the border region during this period. In 1980, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan temporarily improved. High-level diplomatic visits took place, with leaders from both countries engaging in discussions to enhance bilateral relations. Agreements were signed between Mengistu Hailemariam and Nimeiri to address cross-border trade regulation, broadcasting policies, territorial integrity, and non-intervention in internal affairs. Despite efforts, political situations in the border areas and cross-border contraband trade continued to escalate, causing significant economic and security challenges in the border areas of the Metema-Humera corridor. The inability to effectively enforce control measures was affected by various factors such as security complexes, topographical challenges, corruption, and a lack of commitment from both governments to uphold agreements. In the late 1980s, rebels controlled significant portions of border territories, leading to further destabilization and an increase in cross-border contraband trade. The volume of cross-border contraband trade, specifically involving cattle, had grown significantly, and Ethiopia suffered a greater loss of national revenue as the border areas experienced the illegal exportation of domestic products. In sum, cross-border contraband trade caused social unrest, handicapped local institutions, precipitated unfair income distribution, and exacerbated mistrust between the government and the people.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alemayehu Erkihun Engida

Alemayehu Erkihun (PhD) is an Assistant Professor of History at Wollo University, Ethiopia. He did his PhD on Boundary, Borderland, and Frontier Issues between Ethiopia and the Sudan, 1898–1991: From the River River Setit in the North to the Abay (Blue Nile) in the South. His research interest area is on boundary, and borderland dynamics in Africa.

Notes

1 Gondar Archive Center (Hereafter, GAC) Folder No. 174–175, File No. ኩ215/445/1985.

2 Informants: Muket Belay, Zewdu Asresie, Sisay Yimer and Wolelaw Teshome.

3 A letter written by Emperor Menelik II to Colonel Harrington, dated on 30 Tähesas 1891 (8 December 1998) in Pawolos Gnogno, 104–105; A letter written by Menelik to Colonel Harrington, dated on 4 Ter 1891 (12 January 1899) in Pawlos Gnogno, 105–106.

4 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 716/567/68/1968.

5 GAC, ሀ-1969 ዓ ም በጠረፍ ወረዳዎች ስላለው የወንበዴዎች እንቅስቃሴ/Folder No. ሀ/5/5, File No. 5/2/69/1969; GAC, Folder No. መ/5/19/2/2, File No. 33/1046/62/1967.

6 Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Hamelé 28/1968; GAC, ኢትዮ-ሱዳን ድንበር ጉዳይ (በሰቲትና መተማ በኩል ስላለው የሥራ አፈፃፀም መመሪያ) Folder No. ረ/7/35; File No. ኢወ/1576/4633/1963); Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Hamelé 2/1968; Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Hamelé 10/1968

7 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 1075/1037/72/1972.

8 GAC, Folder No. ሀ/5, File No.1637/4/13/1970; Addis Zemen Newspaper, Miyazeya 4 &7/1969, Addis Zemen Newspaper, Genbot 5/1969.

9 GAC, 1975 የጎንደር የጭልጋ አውራጃ የ24 ሳዓት ሪፖርት ኢህአፓ ኢዲዩ/ጎንደር አውራጃ ፀጥታ/Folder No. አ. 2.ጎ/File No. 374/55/12/1975; GAC (ኮንትሮባንድ), Folder No. 174–175, File No.ለሰ/ጉዛ 82/1991; GAC, የሱዳን ወታደሮች ድንበር (ወሰን) ጥሶ መግባት/Folder No. አ. 11, File No. 5/369/74/1974.

10 Informants: Issa Bogale, Radiya Hassen and German Abate.

11 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975).

12 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

13 Ibid.

14 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975)

15 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

16 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975).

17 Debre Markos University Archive Center (hereafter DMUAC, Folder No. ዞን አስ/3438, No File number and date; .DMUAC, Folder No. ዞን አስ/3438, No File number and date.

18 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, File No. ጎክ47/ጠ/1975.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 554//መ/መ20/1974; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

22 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 554//መ/መ20/1974; GAC (ኮንትሮባንድ), Folder No. 174-175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975), 9; GAC, የሱዳን ወታደሮች ድንበር (ወሰን) ጥሶ መግባት/Folder No. አ. 11, File No. 5/369/74/1974; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975), 4; GAC, የ1974 ዓ ም የፀጥታ ጉዳይ (የጭልጋ አውራጃ የፀጥታ መፃፃፊያ/, No Folder number, File No. 6033/25/5/1974.

23 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975.

24 Ibid.

25 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

26 Ibid, 4; GAC, የ1970 ዓ.ም የጎንደርና ጭልጋ አውራጃዎች የፀጥታ ሪፖርት/Folder No. ሀ/5, File No. 1630. 4/13/1970.

27 Addis Zemene, Tir 9/1981.

28 Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Megabit 2/1972; Addis Zemen, newspaper (Genbot 5/1972, Genbot 16/1972, Genbot 17/1972, Genbot 19/1972).

29 Addis Zemen Newspaper, Ţekemet 13/1973; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, File No. ጎክ 59/469/1974.

30 Addis Zemen Newspaper, Ţekemet 13/1973; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, File No. ጎክ 59/469/1974.

31 Addis Zemen, Tir 20/1973; Addis Zemen, Ginbot 1/1972; Addis Zemen, Hamile 7/1973.

32 Addis Zemen, Hamile 7/1973.

33 Addis Zemen, Hamile 7/1973; DMUAC, Folder No. ዞን አስ/3438, File No. ጠረ/74/005/1975.

34 DMUAC, Folder No. ዞን አስ/3438, File No. ውን-ጠ54/69/1975; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 1075/1037/72/1972.

35 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 86/8/2/1975.

36 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/, Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975).

37 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 1075/1037/72/1972.

38 Addis Zemen, Newspaper, Megabit 27/1971.

39 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975)

40 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975)

41 Ibid.

42 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975).

43 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 951/210/74/1974.

44 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 427/567/73/1973.

45 GAC (ኮንትሮባንድ), Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975), 7.

46 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 427/567/73/1973.

47 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 648/808/75/1975; Folder No. 174–175, File No. 685/808/75/1975; Folder No. 174–175, File No. 1863/12/75/1975; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 278/217/1975.

48 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 8325/15/158/1981.

49 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 648/808/75/1975; Folder No. 174–175, File No. 685/808/75/1975; Folder No. 174–175, File No. 1863/12/75/1975; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 278/217/1975.

50 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 973/4/114/1983.

51 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. ወን-ጠ56/21/1973; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 11/ወ/ም1/23/82/1982.

52 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

53 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 2/8/113/151/023/1973.

54 GAC, Folder No. 174–175, File No. 2/8/113/151/023/1973.

55 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 11/ወ/ም1/23/82/1982.

56 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 427/567/73/1973.

57 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 2/8/113/151/023/1973.

58 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 675/2256/82/1982.

59 Ibid.

60 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Report of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1975).

61 Ibid

62 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975), 5; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 98/1-2/89/1976.

63 GAC (ኮንትሮባንድ), Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

64 GAC, የሱዳን ወታደሮች ድንበር (ወሰን) ጥሶ መግባት/Folder No. አ. 11, File No. 5/369/74/1974.

65 GAC,/Folder No. 174–175, File No. beye qetenaw kilil selalew Hige-wot Ye enisisat nigid yetekahede tenatawi Report, 1975), 5; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, File No. 98/1-2/89/1976.

66 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975), 5; GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174-175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975), 11.

67 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

68 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).

69 Ibid.

70 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, File No. 466/557/72/1972.

71 GAC, ኮንትሮባንድ/Folder No. 174–175, Field Survey Report, Gondar 1975).