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As one year ends and another begins, people often take stock of the past year, and some even dare to make hopeful forecasts about the immediate future. Of course, they do so at their own risk. Throughout history, humans have practiced various forms of divination: reading tea leaves, looking at crystal balls, scrying, and rune casting. Given the many unforeseen events we are currently confronting, perhaps we would have been better off had we not abandoned those age-old practices.

Of course, in contemporary geopolitics, forecasting future events involves more than a crystal ball or tea leaves: It takes a combination of political analysis, an understanding of history, consideration of current trends, and special skill in the brand of ornithology that studies Anatidae—especially the rare black swan. Analysts often focus their efforts on international relations, economic indicators, leaders’ personal motivations, internal social dynamics, and regional conflicts. Planning scenarios, mapping general trends, and intelligence assessments contribute to a broader and more informed decision-making process. Alas, this did not enable us to steer clear of the dangerous situation in which we find ourselves today.

The celebrated Arab poet Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbi (919–65) wisely noted that all men would be noble and mighty masters in the world were it not for the obstacles and difficulties in our everyday journey. The same applies to geopolitical forecasts, which are often discredited by unforeseen events. Those who seek to make sense of the chaos around us appear to be lost souls in a stormy ocean rather than “noble masters in the world” as al-Mutanabbi portrayed them. This holds true particularly after the barbarous Hamas assault on Israel on October 7 and the heavy retaliatory strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza, which devastated the strip and caused many civilians deaths.

In this hour of hopelessness and haplessness, predictions on the future of Israel and the Middle East tend to oscillate between what is obvious and probable, and what may come as a surprise. At this juncture, fortune tellers are very cautious and circumspect. Few have the gumption to look far beyond the horizon, let alone ask the key question of whether there is hope for a different and better future or if this part of the planet is forever condemned to a Hobbesian hell of endless wars and confrontation. Is it the “Forever War” as it was somberly characterized in a Reuters piece.Footnote1

Take, for example, the Stratfor forecast on the current war in Gaza and Israeli–Palestinian relations, which, inter alia, foretells that Israel will occupy Gaza and face an insurgency, regional instability, diplomatic pushback, and domestic political uncertainty. Israel will struggle to find a civilian partner that can govern Gaza, whereas the Palestinian Authority (PA) will demand a restart of the negotiations for a two-state solution. At the beginning of the year, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant presented the government's first plan for postwar Gaza, which consists of four phases: first, the reoganization of Gaza’s civil administration; second, the creation of an international coalition to step in to support the transition with aid; third, the assumption of control by Egypt of the Rafah border crossing; and fourth, the reintroduction of PA governance over the strip. Such an ambitious proposal is unlikely to be realized, as conditions on the ground are hardly conducive to such arrangements.Footnote2

Uri Dekel, who today heads the research program on the Palestinian arena at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, notes:

The Israeli government vehemently opposes the position of the United States, the international community, and the pragmatic Arab countries, which see a revitalized Palestinian Authority as the only element able to rule the Gaza Strip following the defeat of the Hamas government. Israel's objection has three possible ramifications: Israel will be forced to govern the Gaza Strip; there will be chaos in the Strip leading to Hamas's renewed growth; or the United States and the international community will impose on Israel a reality of restored PA control over the Gaza Strip.Footnote3

Stratfor predicts that although both Hezbollah and Iran will seek to constrain Hamas so as to prevent it from perpetrating future attacks that might spark a major regional war, future incidents could compel Israel to think about stepping up its overt and covert military activities in Syria and Lebanon in order to reclaim deterrence. This would result in a low-intensity, protracted conflict in which Israeli resources would be stretched to the limit for a considerable period of time. According to an INSS assessment, the war’s overall cost could account for up to 10 percent of the country's GDP, fluctuating between NIS 150 billion and NIS 200 billion. It is unclear for how long Israel can afford to carry this staggering burden, even with supplementary funding from the US Congress. The resources on the other side of the fence are not infinite either; the “Axis of Resistance” also has not one but several Achilles’ heels.

It was probably part of an intricate Hamas plot that Israel enter into a costly war of attrition that leads to exhaustion and, ultimately, to perdition. That may sound exaggerated, but it must give us pause. Israel does not have, and thus far has not identified—especially after the apparent collapse of the Oslo process—a clear and long-term strategy for the resolution of the Middle East conflict. The Abraham Accords were a pacifier but not a real substitute for a peace process,Footnote4 and they are now at their nadir. Peace with Saudi Arabia now seems to be a shimmering mirage in the endless desert.

Operation Swords of Iron does not appear to have any real objective beyond the eradication of Hamas and to therefore the elimination of the threat it poses to Israel. However, as the ancient Romans used to say, “verba volant”—spoken words fly away. What Israelis need is a clear path forward, because while the physical threat of Hamas may be eliminated (at least for the immediate future), its radical religious-irredentist ideology will remain, and the terror organization will reincarnate into something new and even more dangerous. It is a genie that has been let out of the bottle. Alternatively, what we might witness is yet another validation of the idea that the pen is mightier than the sword, even when the latter is forged out of iron.

Unfortunately, Israeli political elites eschewed the idea of developing any coherent strategic vision. In his Bar-Ilan speech in June 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu begrudgingly acknowledged that the two peoples could live together side by side in amity, dignity, and mutual respect. Once again, however, verba volant. As was explained by Efraim Inbar and Menachem Bacharach in a recent article in The Jerusalem Post, Israel has frequently acted with prudence and “opted to contain provocations against it, rather than choosing responses with potential for escalation and for attaining decisive victory.”Footnote5

Fortuna audaces iuvat—fortune favors the bold, counsels an old Latin proverb. Israel, however, has not displayed any boldness or out-of-the-box thinking in attempting to solve this existential problem once and for all. As John Jenkins, a former British ambassador to several Middle Eastern states, has said, Israeli policy was based on an occasional “mowing of the grass” (periodically debilitating Hamas and Hezbollah during small-scale flareups). To use another metaphor, this was essentially a policy of keeping the milk from boiling over. On October 7, however, the bankruptcy of this notion was revealed.Footnote6 The milk did reach its boiling point and surged out of the pot; the mowed grass suddenly morphed into a dangerous jungle with ferocious, bloodthirsty beasts trampling upon it. Future generations of Israelis now must await a solution—one that will be impervious to the storms of geopolitics, the erosion of time, and the perversions of radicalism and misanthropy.

Ariel Sharon was probably one of the first Israeli politicians to state that the Middle Eastern problem could not be resolved but only managed. This sentiment was expressed after it became evident that the Oslo process would fail irrevocably. One can manage a conflict on a moment-by-moment basis, but this does not often lead to a permanent remedy. What is needed is an enduring solution, lest things spiral out of control. Furthermore, Sharon was the one to engineer Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 as a strategic option, just as Ehud Barak had done in Lebanon in 1999. However, Sharon’s bold decision set in motion a series of tragic events that culminated in the massacre of October 7, while Barak’s withdrawal enabled Hezbollah to entirely absorb the fragile Lebanese state, thus leaving the country in its present condition. Bereft of a head of state, the “Switzerland of the Middle East” has been in a political coma for three straight years. It is a kind of political zombie, to describe it less politely. Of course, what would the alternative have been—an endless Israeli occupation of Lebanon or Gaza? That would have been a real Catch-22.

All things considered, the main dilemma is how to sustain democracy in a brutal and authoritarian jungle. How does one respect the rules when defending against savage irredentists waging a campaign ultimately aimed at annihilation? How should a country cope with the international opprobrium arising as a result of the enormous destruction its armed forces have wrought, including vast numbers of civilian casualties, when waging that defensive war? While some of that condemnation is perhaps justifiable, where is the condemnation of the horrifying acts perpetrated on October 7 that precipitated the war? Months after the fact, the crimes of Hamas are hardly mentioned, and, in the Middle East, they often go unaddressed, presumably due the prevailing spirit of political correctness.

There is an old proverb according to which only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches. In other words, if, God forbid, an act of bloody violence emanates from a predominantly Middle Eastern neighborhood in a European city, such as Molenbeek in Brussels, humanism is unlikely to be a guiding principle in the response.

If this were really a jungle only inhabited by wild beasts, and in which the laws of the jungle trumped democratic principles, Israeli leaders could have listened to (and adopted) the words attributed to the late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein that sound brutal but also prophetic:

I know that there are scores of people plotting to kill me, and this is not difficult to understand … .However, I am far cleverer than they are. I know they are conspiring to kill me long before they actually start planning to do it. This enables me to get them before they have the faintest chance of striking at me.Footnote7

However, many do not understand that the only common denominator between Israel and Saddam Hussein was the fact that they were both in the Middle East, though at different ends of the neighborhood.

Today, we can say with certitude that the vaunted Israeli intelligence apparatus was aware that Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and their associates and fellow travelers—the “scores of people” as Saddam called them—were planning a terrorist assault. Alas, it did little to prevent it. Obviously, Israelis do not have a monopoly on intelligence failures and are not the only ones to display an inability to read the writing on the wall. For example, on August 6, 2001, the CIA presented the Bush administration with a now-infamous Presidential Daily Brief entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US,” in addition to other previous warnings, but the Bush administration did not react. It is reasonable to assume that such intelligence failures will occur again.

When Israel’s policy of mowing the grass imploded so painfully and dramatically, it became clear that no easy solutions lay ahead. The senior editor of this journal, Prof. Chuck Freilich, recently wrote, “[T]he absence of any definition of Israel’s endgame when the fighting is over and its longer-term vision for the period thereafter is glaring.”Footnote8 Israel is wounded, and the desire to retaliate and remove Hamas as a threat is natural. However, the question of what will happen the day after the war ends has yet to be satisfactorily addressed, and that lacuna is glaring indeed. Strategic decisions made under stress and or when emotions are running high do not always produce desirable results.

In classical literature, there is an evocative vignette that illustrates how, at such a moment, deep contemplation and reflection are required. In Leo Tolstoy’s 1869 War and Peace, Prince Andrei Nikolayevich Bolkonsky lies wounded on the battlefield and enters such a state while peering at the endless sky above him (Israel, too, is wounded but has yet to begin its process of contemplation). Bolkonsky decides to radically change his life and pursue a more meaningful existence, which entails the rejection of societal expectations. Some of the important decisions he makes include rejecting his previous pursuits of social success, focusing now on his personal development, and seeking spiritual fulfillment. Ultimately, Prince Andrei becomes more introspective and philosophical in his outlook on life. Is it possible that this transformation could be emulated by Israel in its vision for the future? There are some points of reflection that may be publicly debated. However, if we accept that Israel could be in a state of mind similar to that of Bolkonsky, this opportunity should not be missed.

First, Israelis should beware of the shortcomings of the Agranat Commission, established to investigate the intelligence and military failures that contributed to the surprise attacks by Egypt and Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Although it found fault with the Israeli military and intelligence leadership, which led to the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff David “Dado” Elazar, its findings highlighted systemic issues rather than assigning blame to specific individuals. Inter alia, blunders and all acts of omission or commission should be properly attributed to those responsible. For that reason, US President Harry S. Truman famously kept a sign on his desk in the Oval Office that read “The buck stops here.” In contrast, some past and present Israeli leaders wait instead for the buck to pass over them. Indeed, the future of Israel, the Palestinian people, and the entire Middle East now rests on where the buck stops and who will step in to replace the failed politicians. This certainly applies to Palestinian officials, whose ineptitude is legendary, as well to Israelis, whose leadership of late is certainly lacking in prudence.

Second, it is high time for segments of Israeli society to come to grips with the idea, however painful, that the territorial integrity of the Land of Israel [shlemut ha-aretz] is an entirely delusional notion and a very dangerous one at that. Palestinians reside in many of the territories that they claim as part of the state to which they aspire and will always cling to the land they inhabit regardless of the circumstances. However difficult, both sides must internalize the idea of “safe sharing,” which rejects the use of violence—if not for the current generation then for the next one. A culture that includes knowledge of the other will eventually lead to empathy and a common purpose. When that is achieved, the prosperity of Gaza could surpass that of Singarore.

Third, any solution should be thought of as a generational project, not a short-term fix. Those who participated in the Oslo process envisaged a short road to peace—culminating in August 1998—without understanding that what they proposed was overly optimistic and idealistic in the face of the harsh realities on the ground. Today, economic opportunities are needed for young Palestinians along the lines of those provided by the Ma’arag program in northern Israel, which promoted economic development and reduced disparities between Israeli and Arab communities. Of course, material well-being or even prosperity cannot be waved like a magic wand to eliminate radicalism, but it is an important prerequisite for its gradual decline.

Fourth, imaginative, out-of-the-box thinking is a prerequisite to identifying and taking the next bold steps. In other words, at this juncture, the foundation for a solution should be laid, enabling future generations to build upon it. Something must be done to ensure that the process becomes irreversible, preventing it from suffering the same fate as the abruptly halted Oslo Accords. Another step would be to let Israeli Arabs have a stronger voice in shaping Israel’s common future, as they are the natural link between Israelis and Palestinians.Footnote9 As some sociological snapshots have indicated, very few Israeli Arabs identify with Hamas, and many have demonstrated compassion for the suffering of the Israelis. In fact, on October 7, some Israeli Arabs also fell victim to Hamas, which treated them with the same brutality to which Israeli Jews were subjected.

Meanwhile, we must do what we can to alleviate suffering and to provide greater economic opportunities for all. The model of the tripartite agreement between Jordan, Israel, and the UAE according to which solar energy would be used to desalinate water was a good one, but it collapsed after the outbreak of the present war in Gaza. It is no wonder that Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi told Al Jazeera, “Can you imagine a Jordanian minister sitting next to an Israeli minister to sign a water and electricity agreement, all while Israel continues to kill children in Gaza?”Footnote10 It is important to make sure that whatever model is chosen is impervious to ideological, political, or military considerations. Ministers must stand boldly by such projects without fearing the repercussions on the domestic political landscape. This strategy, easier said than done, will pay off in the long run.

Fifth, Israel must facilitate the creation of a future Palestinian state governed within clearly defined principles close to those of liberal democracy, perhaps taking the form of five indispensable and mutually connected characteristics proposed by several EU foreign affairs councils: a sovereign, independent, democratic, contiguous, and viable State of Palestine adjacent to Israel and existing in peace and security. This alone, however, will not suffice if it does not enjoy the backing necessary to ensure its existence, which can only be guaranteed if certain principles are adhered to from the get-go. If these are rejected, there will be no Palestinian state at all. It cannot take off let alone fly on autopilot if capable hands don’t guide it. Even if it gets off the ground, without that kind of guidance, the Palestinian state will wind up in the despotic clutches of authoritarian Islamists, becoming yet another failed Middle Eastern country.

In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza, leaving behind a gray area similar to that created when the US pulled out of Afghanistan more than four decades ago. In both cases, the lethal boomerang returned. In order to avoid making the same mistake, Israel must play a constructive role in helping the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) build a new, comprehensive platform for the post-Abbas period. It must cooperate with a new Palestinian leadership that one hopes will include a moderate Islamist element such as the Ra’am party of Mansour Abbas in Israel. However, whatever the music, it takes two to tango.

Sixth, in order to pave the way for such an approach, the campaign in Gaza—and especially the collateral deaths—must be minimized. Such are the clear indications from the Security Council and the UN General Assembly, and no matter how many reservations Israelis may have about them, these bodies are charged with regulating crises and conflicts. Unfortunately, at the present time, there is no perfect alternative. It is worth noting the advice of Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr to the US government in a Foreign Affairs article: “The United States will need to persuade Israel to stop engaging in what many see as the collective punishment of Palestinian civilians.”Footnote11 In responding to the Munich massacre and the earlier Black September in the 1970s, Golda Meir chose a path that also encountered great opposition on the world stage, but it did not cast the heavy shadow on Israel that current Israeli actions in Gaza are. That shadow will remain for a long time to come.

Seventh, the Palestinian population in Israel, Gaza, and the territories occupied by Israel, whatever one thinks of those people, are not budging, and Israel certainly doesn’t want to see a one-state solution—the inevitable outcome of the status quo. Instead, policy planners in Jerusalem should start outlining clear political boundaries between Israel and the future Palestinian state while addressing the ongoing conflict. This will require great sensitivity and acumen. The proposal of “political separation” that was discussed by President Isaac Herzog some time ago is a rational basis for further thinking if it is viewed as a gradual process, having well-calibrated phases, and, unlike Oslo, not being rushed to completion in a five-year period. At the end of the day, although “separation” may have extremely negative connotations, it can also mean disengagement, divorce, and the freedom to follow an independent path.

Finally, the Palestinian question—this potential casus beli of the region—should be excised by Israel once and for all, because sooner or later, Iran will have real nuclear potential. Additionally, the confrontation with Tehran will clearly not abate. Recent clashes with and military strikes against Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias are worrying signs of a highly volatile environment that could easily erupt into full-scale regional conflict. Any nuclear incident on Israeli soil, even the most limited one, will likely be fatal to the Jewish State. If there is no Palestinian raison d’être, Iran will have no justification for hovering in a predominantly Sunni area, and its presence would be seen in religious terms—an attempt to proselytize.

In and alongside the pursuit of the defeat of Hamas, Israel’s policymakers ought to gaze up at the sky, as Prince Bolkonsky did, and draw definitive conclusions pertaining to strategic matters and the future of the Jewish State in the vortex that is the Middle East. In order to emphasize this point more clearly, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the medium- and long-term strategic threat facing Israel.

Viewed from such a perspective, how the current “endgame” to which Freilich referred is accomplished seems less important. What matters more is how Israel will deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran over the next twenty or thirty years (and Israelis have always been loath to think that far ahead). Will the current escalation spiral into a regional conflict with an unpredictable outcome, or will swords be beaten into plowshares with a change that could lead to a more stable and predictable future? If the Palestinian issue is resolved and the Middle East moves toward economic development and cooperation, a different Iran may emerge, one that is ruled by a less belligerent regime. After all, the Jews and the Persians are two ancient peoples with a historic bond.

The fact is that many in Israel, led by Mr. Netanyahu, live only in the present and focus on the war with Hamas without giving much thought to the coming years. For them, the most pressing priorities are the release of all hostages and the demilitarization of Gaza along with the deradicalization of its population. Of course, the immediate release of the hostages is a must, but the other two conditions are part of a longer process that can only take place within the framework of a comprehensive solution.

Israel's internal problems cannot be fixed nor regional tensions reduced unless the Palestinian question is resolved. Left unaddressed, it will continue to fester and the situation will become increasingly dangerous. Pointing the way, Hillel the Elder (110 BCE to 10 CE) famously wrote in the Ethics of the Fathers, “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? .… And if not now, when?”

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Michaela Domingo

Michaela Domingo is the pen name of a foreign diplomat and scholar who specializes in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Notes

1 Samia Nakhoul, Humeyra Pamuk, and Matt Spetalnick, “Insight: Forever War? Israel Risks a Long, Bloody Insurgency in Gaza,” Reuters, November 20, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/without-post-war-plan-israel-risks-bloody-insurgency-gaza-2023-11-17/.

2 “Israel, Gaza: Defense Minister Offers First Formal Plan for Gaza Occupation,” Rane, January 5, 2024, https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-report/israel-gaza-defense-minister-offers-first-formal-plan-gaza-occupation.

3 INSS Insight No. 1802, December 21, 2023.

4 The English language reveals a telling quibble with the similarity of the words “pacifier” and “peacemaker.”

5 Efraim Inbar and Menachem Bacharach, “The Myopia of Containment” JISS Policy Paper, February 6, 2024, https://jiss.org.il/en/inbar-bacharach-the-myopia-of-containment//.

6 Katie Stallard, “The Israel–Iran endgame,” The New Statesman, November 18, 2023, https://www.newstatesman.com/international-content/the-international-interview/2023/11/the-israel-iran-end-game-john-jenkins.

7 “Saddam Hussein Quote,” LIBQUOTES, https://libquotes.com/saddam-hussein/quote/lbg4m3f.

8 Chuck Freilich, “Israel Must Win Decisively,” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, XVII:3 (November 2023), 2.

9 David B. Green, “This Palestinian-Israeli Lawmaker Still Believes in the Two-state Solution,” Haaretz, January 11, 2024, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-01-11/ty-article-magazine/.premium/ayman-odeh-still-believes-in-the-two-state-solution/0000018c-f3f1-da04-a7df-f3f54f5a0000.

10 “Jordan says it won’t sign energy and water exchange deal with Israel,” Al Jazeera, November 16, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/16/jordan-says-it-will-not-sign-energy-and-water-exchange-deal-with-israel.

11 Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr, “The War That Remade the Middle East: How Washington Can Stabilize a Transformed Region,” Foreign Affairs, CIII:1 (January/February 2024).

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