4 Sub-Saharan Africa

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Notes

1 The countries that belong in each area can overlap in some cases (e.g., Chad). Some countries can be part of one of these areas but still have very distinct national drivers of conflict (e.g., Nigeria).

2 Timothy Lay, ‘ACLED Year in Review: Global Disorder in 2022’, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), January 2023.

3 For further information on jihadist insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, see the Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Spotlight essay, ‘From Global Jihad to Local Insurgencies: The Changing Nature of Sub-Saharan Jihadism’ in this book. See also Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Fatalities from Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Surge by Nearly 50 Percent’, 6 February 2023.

4 Global Network Against Food Crises and Food Security Information Network, ‘Global Report on Food Crises 2023’, 2023.

5 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2022’, 14 June 2023.

6 UNHCR, ‘Refugee Data Finder’; and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Global Internal Displacement Database’. Data is as of 31 December 2022.

7 The military coup in Niger that took place in late July 2023 does not fall under the reporting period for The Armed Conflict Survey 2023. An analysis of its full implications will be included in next year’s edition.

8 See Cedric de Coning and Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, ‘Ad Hoc Initiatives Are Shaking Up African Security’, London School of Economics, 8 February 2023.

9 Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and Mariana Llorens Zabala, A Quest to Win the Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2023), p. 37. The MNJTF website puts this number at around 10,000 troops.

10 See Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg, ‘Organized Violence 1989–2022 and the Return of Conflicts Between States?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 60, no. 4, 2023; and Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck and Joakim Kreutz, ‘Introducing the UCDP Non-state Conflict Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 2, 2012. According to UCDP/PRIO, ‘a state-based armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’. See Uppsala Universitet, ‘UCDP Definitions’.

11 See Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, ‘Organized Violence 1989– 2022 and the Return of Conflicts Between States?’; and Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 5, 2002.

12 Brian Katz et al., ‘The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2020.

13 See ‘The Salafi-jihadi Movement in Africa: As of July 2023’, map in Brian Carter et al., ‘Salafi-jihadi Movement Weekly Update’, Critical Threats, 5 July 2023.

14 See Davies, Pettersson and Öberg, ‘Organized Violence 1989–2022 and the Return of Conflicts Between States?’; and Gleditsch et al., ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, pp. 615–37.

15 See ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Analysis’, in IISS, The Armed Conflict Survey 2022 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022), pp. 200–203.

16 ‘UN Tells Russia to Leave Ukraine: How Did Countries Vote?’, Al-Jazeera, 24 February 2023.

17 See Jan Pospisil, Laura Wise and Christine Bell, ‘Untangling Conflict: Local Peace Agreements in Contemporary Armed Violence’, Report no. 5, Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 27 May 2020.

18 Nigeria is the only Sub-Saharan African country among those assessed in this volume which is classified as a ‘hybrid regime’. See EIU, ‘Democracy Index 2022’, 2022.

1 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Fatalities from Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Surge by Nearly 50 Percent’, 6 February 2023.

2 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement’, 2023.

3 UN Security Council, ‘Thirtieth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2610 (2021) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities’, S/22/547, 15 July 2022; and Wendy Williams, ‘Reclaiming Al Shabaab’s Revenue’, defenceWeb, 5 April 2023.

4 World Bank, ‘Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US$) – Somalia’; and World Bank, ‘Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current US$) – Niger’.

1 UN, ‘Moura: Over 500 Killed by Malian Troops, Foreign Military Personnel in 2022 Operation’, 12 May 2023.

2 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Mali: Humanitarian Dashboard’, 30 April 2023.

3 Baba Ahmed, ‘Mali: le business du cantonnement?’ [Mali: The Cantonment Business?], Jeune Afrique, 29 April 2016 (updated 5 September 2016); and Baba Ahmed and Christophe Boisbouvier, ‘Nord-Mali: guerre à huis clos’ [North Mali: War Behind Closed Doors], Jeune Afrique, 21 February 2012.

4 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ‘The Grey Zone: Russia’s Military, Mercenary and Criminal Engagement in Africa’, 16 February 2023.

5 US Department of State, ‘Potential Deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali’, 15 December 2021.

6 UNSC, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, S/2022/838, 16 November 2022.

7 A. Y. Barma, ‘G5 Sahel: l’Etat-major de la Force conjointe ramené à Niamey, 14 bataillons bientôt opérationnels (Ministres de la Défense)’ [G5 Sahel: Joint Force Headquarters Brought Back to Niamey, 14 Battalions Soon to Be Operational (Ministers of Defence)], ActuNiger, 12 January 2023.

8 MINUSMA, ‘Personnel’, June 2023.

9 MINUSMA, ‘Personnel’, December 2022.

10 MINUSMA, ‘History’.

11 UNSC, ‘Situation in Mali: Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2023/402, 1 June 2023.

1 Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism’, March 2023, p. 22.

2 ‘Burkina Faso Increases Defense Budget by Nearly 50 Percent for 2023’, North Africa Post, 6 April 2023.

3 AFP, ‘Jihadist-hit Burkina Extends State of Emergency by 6 Months’, Barron’s, 13 May 2023.

4 Rédaction Africanews, ‘Burkina PM Vows No Deal with Jihadists, Hints at Election Delay’, Africa News, 31 May 2023.

5 Ravina Shamdasani, ‘Burkina Faso: Killing of Civilians’, UN Human Rights Office of the High Comissioner, 25 April 2023.

6 Agnès Faivre, ‘Au moins 150 civils massacrés dans le nord du Burkina Faso’ [At Least 150 Civilians Massacred in Northern Burkina Faso], Libération, 23 April 2023.

7 ‘Forced to Eat Leaves: Hungry and Besieged in Burkina Faso’, Al-Jazeera, 12 December 2022.

8 ‘Pourquoi des activistes sont-ils enrôlés de force comme auxiliaires de l’armée au Burkina Faso?’ [Why Are Activists Forcibly Recruited as Army Auxiliaries in Burkina Faso?], BBC News, 30 March 2023.

9 ‘L’armée au Burkina mise sur les civils contre le terrorisme’ [The Army in Burkina Counts on Civilians to Fight Terrorism], DW, 30 December 2022.

10 Rédaction Africanews, ‘Burkina PM Vows No Deal with Jihadists, Hints at Election Delay’.

11 ‘L’armée au Burkina mise sur les civils contre le terrorisme’ [The Army in Burkina Counts on Civilians to Fight Terrorism].

12 Anna Schmauder and Annabelle Willeme, ‘The Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland’, Clingendael Institute, 9 March 2021.

13 UN Security Council, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, S/2022/838, 16 November 2022.

14 A. Y. Barma, ‘G5 Sahel: l’Etat-major de la Force conjointe ramené à Niamey, 14 bataillons bientôt opérationnels (Ministres de la Défense)’ [G5 Sahel: Joint Force Headquarters Brought Back to Niamey, 14 Battalions Soon to Be Operational (Ministers of Defence)], ActuNiger, 12 January 2023.

1 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www. acleddata.com.

2 International Crisis Group, ‘Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency’, Report no. 245, 27 February 2017.

3 Seidik Abba, ‘Sahel: What’s the Secret to Niger’s Security Resilience?’, 30 June 2022.

4 Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism’, March 2023, p. 14.

5 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www. acleddata.com.

6 European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, ‘Niger Factsheet’.

7 World Food Programme, ‘Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in West and Central Africa at 10-year High as Crisis Spreads to Coastal Countries’, 18 April 2023.

8 French Ministry of Armed Forces, ‘NIGER – Operation conjointe pour la sécurisation du Liptako nigèrien’ [NIGER – Joint Operation to Promote Security in the Nigerien Liptako], 25 April 2023.

9 UN Security Council, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, S/2022/838, 16 November 2022.

10 A. Y. Barma, ‘G5 Sahel: l’Etat-major de la Force conjointe ramené à Niamey, 14 bataillons bientôt opérationnels (Ministres de la Défense)’ [G5 Sahel: Joint Force Headquarters Brought Back to Niamey, 14 Battalions Soon to Be Operational (Ministers of Defence)], ActuNiger, 12 January 2023.

11 Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and Mariana Llorens Zabala, A Quest to Win the Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2023), p. 37. The MNJTF website puts this number at around 10,000 troops.

1 The deteriorating economic situation is in part attributable to the collapse of oil prices due to the coronavirus pandemic and subsequent borrowing by the federal government.

2 Chatham House, ‘Nigeria’s Election Results Put Disenfranchisement in the Spotlight’, 1 March 2023.

3 International Crisis Group, ‘Mitigating Risks of Violence in Nigeria’s 2023 Elections’, Report no. 311, 10 February 2023; and Beacon Consulting Limited, ‘December 2022: Nigeria Security Report’, December 2022.

4 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. In total, 4,173 people were reported to have been killed in 596 events involving jihadist groups (including airstrikes, clashes between jihadist groups and/or security forces, and attacks on civilians) across the reporting period, with the vast majority of such events being clustered in Borno State. This represents a slight increase in the lethality of violence involving jihadist groups, up from 3,781 fatalities across a similar number of events between May 2021 and June 2022.

5 Beacon Consulting Limited, ‘July 2022: Nigeria Security Report’, July 2022; and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

6 Beacon Consulting Limited, ‘May 2022: Nigeria Security Report’, May 2022; and Malik Samuel, ‘Kuje Prison Break: Is Nigeria Out of Security Options?’, Institute for Security Studies, 11 July 2022.

7 ‘Death Toll from Nigerian Air Force’s Accidental Bombing in Nasarawa State Rises to 56’, Sahara Reporters, 28 January 2023; ‘Military Airstrikes Neutralise 82 Terrorists in Zamfara’, Daily Trust, 30 June 2022; and Abubakar Ahmadu Maishanu, ‘Death Toll Rises in Zamfara Attack’, Premium Times, 21 December 2022.

8 Beacon Consulting Limited, ‘June 2022: Nigeria Security Report’, June 2022.

9 International Crisis Group, ‘Mitigating Risks of Violence in Nigeria’s 2023 Elections’, p. 7.

10 Stig Jarle Hansen, ‘The Fractious Future of the Islamic State in West Africa’, War on the Rocks, 3 November 2021.

11 International Crisis Group, ‘After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East’, Briefing no. 180, 29 March 2022.

12 Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, ‘Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and Its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), German Institute of Development and Sustainability, and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 8 December 2022; and Richard Assheton, ‘Boko Haram Chief “Killed for Trying to Defect”’, The Times, 7 April 2022.

13 Tomás F. Husted, ‘Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province’, IF10173, Congressional Research Service, 24 February 2022.

14 International Crisis Group, ‘After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East’.

15 Vincent Foucher, ‘The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad’, International Crisis Group, 29 October 2020.

16 James Barnett and Murtala Rufai, ‘The Other Insurgency: Northwest Nigeria’s Worsening Bandit Crisis’, War on the Rocks, 16 November 2021; ‘Matawalle: There Are Over 30,000 Bandits in the North’, Cable, 2 April 2021; and James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a

“Banditization” of Jihad?’, CTC Sentinel, vol. 15, no. 1, January 2022, p. 50.

17 International Crisis Group, ‘Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem’, Report no. 288, 18 May 2020.

18 ‘How Banditry Started in Zamfara’, Daily Trust, 10 September 2021; and Barnett, Ahmed Rufa’i and Abdulaziz, ‘Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad?’.

19 Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and Mariana Llorens Zabala, A Quest to Win the Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force (Olso: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2023), p. 37. The MNJTF website puts this number at around 10,000 troops.

1 Fanta Dada Petel and Thierry Vircoulon, ‘Les Peuls Mbororo dans le conflit anglophone: des luttes foncières locales au conflit régional’ [The Fulani Mbororo in the Anglophone Conflict: From Local Land Struggles to Regional Conflict], Institut français des relations internationales, June 2022.

2 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. Violent events include battles, explosions/ remote violence and violence against civilians.

3 Michelle Gavin, ‘From Bad to Worse in Cameroon?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 February 2023.

4 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

5 Ibid. Fatalities refer to battles, violence against civilians and explosions/violence.

6 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, ‘Cameroon Conflict Insight’, Peace and Security Report, vol. 1, March 2020, p. 8.

7 International Crisis Group, ‘Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?’, Report no. 272, 2 May 2019, p. 32.

8 Ibid.

9 Stig Jarle Hansen, ‘The Fractious Future of the Islamic State in West Africa’, War on the Rocks, 3 November 2021.

10 Maman Inoua Elhadji Mahamadou Amadou and Vincent Foucher, ‘Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin: The Bakura Faction and Its Resistance to the Rationalisation of Jihad’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), German Institute of Development and Sustainability, and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 8 December 2022; and Richard Assheton, ‘Boko Haram Chief “Killed for Trying to Defect”’, The Times, 7 April 2022.

11 Tomás F. Husted, ‘Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province’, IF10173, Congressional Research Service, 24 February 2022.

12 International Crisis Group, ‘After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East’, Briefing no. 180, 29 March 2022.

13 Vincent Foucher, ‘The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad’, International Crisis Group, 29 October 2020.

1 Human Rights Watch, ‘Chad: Scores of Protesters Shot Dead, Wounded’, 26 October 2022; and ‘Manifestations du 20 octobre au Tchad: la CNDH a rendu son rapport sur le «jeudi noir»’ [20 October Protests in Chad: CNDH Delivers Its Report on ‘Black Thursday’], Radio France Internationale (RFI), 24 February 2023.

2 Remadji Hoinathy, ‘Do Those Seeking Peace in Chad Need to Prepare for War?’, Institute for Security Studies, 27 March 2023.

3 Thomas Howes-Ward, ‘Libya’s Foreign Militias’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 April 2018.

4 Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha, Andrew E. Yaw Tchie and Mariana Llorens Zabala, A Quest to Win the Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2023), p. 37. The MNJTF website puts this number at around 10,000 troops.

5 IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023), p. 443.

1 Pauline Bax, ‘Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic’, International Crisis Group, 3 December 2021.

2 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. These figures refer to battles, violence against civilians and explosions/violence.

3 ACLED, ‘Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali’, 30 August 2022.

4 ‘Seeking a Way Out of Kremlin’s Embrace’, Africa Confidential, vol. 64, no. 7, 30 March 2023.

5 Cyril Bensimon, ‘Les Etats-Unis engagent une stratégie pour évincer d’Afrique les mercenaires du Groupe Wagner’ [US Embarks on a Strategy to Oust the Mercenaries of the Wagner Group from Africa], Le Monde, 20 February 2023.

6 Enrica Picco, ‘Ten Years After the Coup, Is the Central African Republic Facing Another Major Crisis?’, International Crisis Group, 22 March 2023; and Declan Walsh, ‘A “New Cold War” Looms in Africa as U.S. Pushes Against Russian Gains’, New York Times, 19 March, 2023.

7 Based on author’s interview with country’s analysts, April 2023.

8 Ibid.

9 As of February 2023. UN Peacekeeping, ‘MINUSCA Fact Sheet’.

10 Ibid.

11 UN General Assembly, ‘Seventy-sixth Session, Agenda Item 152, Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic’, A/ RES/76/282, 29 June 2022.

1 John Young, ‘A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM–IO’, Small Arms Survey, September 2015.

2 Joshua Craze, ‘Making Markets: South Sudan’s War Economy in the 21st Century’, World Peace Foundation, United States Institute of Peace, February 2023; and Dan Watson, ‘Surface Tension: “Communal” Violence and Elite Ambitions in South Sudan’, ACLED, 19 August 2021.

3 Joshua Craze, ‘The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile Since the Signing of the R-ARCSS’, Small Arms Survey, November 2022.

4 UN Security Council, ‘Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General’, S/2023/135, 22 February 2023, p. 3.

5 UN General Assembly, ‘Technical Assistance and Capacitybuilding for South Sudan’, A/HRC/52/82, 7 February 2023, p. 4.

6 ‘Twic, Ngok Dinka Agree to Cease Hostilities’, Radio Tamazuj, 1 November 2022; and Alhadi Hawari, ‘Gov’t Urged to Deploy Troops to Abyei–Warrap Border After Killings’, Eye Radio, 4 January 2023.

7 ‘South Sudan Rebels Kill Mayom County Commissioner’, Sudan Tribune, 22 July 2022.

8 ‘U.N. Condemns Execution of Four South Sudan Rebels’, Reuters, 10 August 2022.

9 Wol Mapal, ‘56 Killed in Ethnic Violence in Pibor Administrative Area’, Eye Radio, 27 December 2022; ‘Villages Destroyed as Fighting Intensifies in Pibor’, Radio Tamazuj, 26 December 2022; and ‘Attack on Civilians at Akobo–Ulang Border Leaves 15 Dead’, Radio Tamazuj, 19 March 2023.

10 Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Finance and Planning, ‘Approved Budget Fiscal Year 2022–23’, p. 15; and Flora McCrone, ‘Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria’, Small Arms Survey, June 2020.

11 Brian Adeba, ‘Oversight Mechanisms, Regime Security, and Intelligence Service Autonomy in South Sudan’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 35, no. 6, 2020.

12 Conflict Armament Research, ‘Weapon Supplies into South Sudan’s Civil War: Regional Re-transfers and International Intermediaries’, November 2018, pp. 30–3.

13 Joshua Craze, ‘Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War’, Small Arms Survey, March 2023.

14 ‘Facts and Figures’, UNMISS website.

15 Ibid.

1 For instance, in Benishangul-Gumuz region and along the border between Afar and Somali regions.

2 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia’, A/ HRC/51/46, 19 September 2022.

3 Gerrit Kurtz, ‘Sustaining Peace in Ethiopia’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 14 March 2023; and Alex de Waal, ‘Facing Famine, Tigray Concedes to Ethiopian Government, and Abiy’, Responsible Statecraft, 16 November 2022.

4 ‘Tigray Death Toll Could Be as High as 600,000, African Union Envoy Says’, The National, 16 January 2023.

5 Owiso Owiso, ‘The Ethiopia–Tigray Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Question of Accountability for International Crimes’, Just Security, 28 November 2022.

6 African Union, ‘Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)’, 2 November 2022; and African Union, ‘Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)’, 12 November 2022.

7 ‘Abiy Disarms Regional Forces and Riles His Old Backers’, Africa Confidential, vol. 64, no. 9, 20 April 2023.

8 Damena Abebe, ‘Conflict Trend Analysis: Western Oromia: March 2023’, Rift Valley Institute, 2023.

9 Amnesty International, ‘Ethiopia: Authorities Must Investigate Massacre of Ethnic Amhara in Tole’, 21 July 2022.

10 ‘Gov’t Forces Engaged With Gambella, Oromo Armed Groups in Ongoing Exchange of Gunfire in Gambella City; Gunshots Heard in Two Towns in Western Oromia’, Addis Standard, 14 June 2022; ‘At Least 50 Civilians Killed in Extra-judicial Execution by Security Forces, Armed Groups in Gambella: New Report’, Addis Standard, 29 September 2022; and Henry Wilkins, ‘What’s Behind Violence in Ethiopia’s “Other” Conflict?’, VOA, 2 September 2022.

11 Tsegaye Birhanu, ‘Conflict Trend Analysis: Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State: May–November 2022’, Rift Valley Institute, 2022.

12 ‘Ethiopia Says Military Action Against Al-Shabaab Continued “Accompanied by Victory”, Hundreds Killed, Weapons Seized’, Addis Standard, 28 July 2022; and Caleb Weiss and Ryan O’Farrell, ‘Puzzles Deepen in the Context of Shabaab’s Attempted Ethiopian Invasion’, Long War Journal, 28 July 2022.

13 IISS, The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023), pp. 420, 424.

14 Author interviews, 2023.

15 IISS, The Armed Conflict Survey 2021 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2021), p. 238.

16 European Institute of Peace, ‘The Special Police in Ethiopia’, October 2021.

17 IISS, The Armed Conflict Survey 2021, p. 238.

18 Abebe, ‘Conflict Trend Analysis: Western Oromia: March 2023’, p. 7.

1 Sunguta West, ‘Al-Shabaab’s Attack in Ethiopia: One-off Incursion or Persistent Threat?’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. 20, no.17, 9 September 2022.

2 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Somalia: The Cost of Inaction’, October 2022.

3 Mohamed Dhaysane, ‘Somalia’s President Vows “Total War” Against al-Shabab’, VOA, 24 August 2022.

4 Samira Gaid, ‘The 2022 Somali Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Making Enduring Gains Will Require Learning from Previous Failures’, CTC Sentinel, vol. 15, no. 11, November/December 2022, pp. 31–8.

5 UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Extends Drawdown of African Union Transition Mission in Somalia by Six Months, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2670 (2022)’, 21 December 2022.

6 ‘Islamic State Terror Banker Bilal al-Sudani Killed by US Special Forces in Somalia Mountain Cave Hideout’, Sky News, 27 January 2023.

7 Soufan Center, ‘IntelBrief: Somalia Continues to Deteriorate as al-Shabaab Gains Ground’, 18 March 2022.

8 European Institute of Peace, ‘The Islamic State in East Africa’, September 2018.

1 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

2 Ibid. Data retrieved 19 July 2023.

3 For more information on the nature and extent of Rwandan involvement in the DRC, see the ‘Rwanda’ chapter.

4 Congo Research Group and Ebuteli, ‘Majority of Congolese Reject East African Community Regional Force’, February 2023.

5 Oliver Liffran et al., ‘Diplomatic Cat and Mouse from New York to Paris over Rwanda’s Alleged Support for M23 Rebels’, Africa Intelligence, 1 July 2022; and Fred Bauma and Jason Stearns, ‘DRC: “We Know the M23 Is Backed by Rwanda, but France Has Looked the Other Way”’, Le Monde, 16 December 2022.

6 ‘Bilan revu des manifestations anti-MONUSCO en RDC : 36 morts’ [Revised Death Toll of Anti-MONUSCO Protests in DRC: 36 Dead], Radio Okapi, 2 August 2022.

7 In the reporting period, the ADF killed over 1,310 civilians and CODECO killed over 659 civilians. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. Data retrieved 19 July 2023.

8 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com; and ‘DR Congo: Rampant Intercommunal Violence in West’, Human Rights Watch, 30 March 2023. ACLED data retrieved 19 July 2023.

9 UN Security Council (UNSC), ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2022/479, 14 June 2022.

10 UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, p. 15.

11 Edith M. Lederer, ‘UN Envoy Warns Congo’s M23 Rebels Are Acting Like an Army’, AP News, 30 June 2022.

12 International Crisis Group, ‘A Perilous Free-for-all in the Eastern DR Congo?’, Hold Your Fire!, 13 May 2022; and UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

13 Adolphe Agenonga Chober and Georges Berghezan, ‘La CODECO, au coeur de l’insécurité en Ituri’ [CODECO, At the Heart of Insecurity in Ituri], Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security, 2 June 2021.

14 UNSC, ‘Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2022/967, 16 December 2022.

15 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. Data retrieved 19 July 2023.

16 Andrew Bagala, ‘UPDF Soldiers Abroad Surge Beyond 12,000’, Daily Monitor, 11 April 2023.

17 Congo Research Group and Ebuteli, ‘Uganda’s Operation Shujaa in the DRC: Fighting the ADF or Securing Economic Interests?’, June 2022.

18 ‘RDC : une compagnie de soldats burundais attendue au NordKivu’ [DRC: A Contingent of Burundian Soldiers Expected in North Kivu], Radio France Internationale, 3 March 2023.

19 Estimate. See Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

20 UN Peacekeeping, ‘MONUSCO Fact Sheet’. Numbers as of February 2023.

21 UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 30 June 2021’, A/RES/75/300, 8 July 2021.

22 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com. Data retrieved 19 July 2023.

1 For an overview of and update on the conflicts in the Central African Republic and Mozambique, see their respective chapters in this book.

2 UN Security Council (UNSC), ‘Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/22/967, 16 December 2022; and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

3 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Army Units Aided Abusive Armed Groups’, 18 October 2022.

4 Rwanda TV, ‘“What Have We Done?” – President Kagame Talking About the Accusations of the DRC Against Rwanda’, YouTube, 9 January 2023.

5 ‘Suspected Militants Shoot at Bus in Southwestern Rwanda, Kill Two’, Reuters, 20 June 2022.

6 UN Peacekeeping, ‘Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Country, and Personnel Type’, May 2023. Numbers as of 31 May 2023.

7 Congo Research Group, ‘Should We Talk About the FDLR Every Time We Talk About the M23?’, 18 August 2022.

8 UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2022/479, 14 June 2022.

9 Olivier Liffran and Joan Tilouine, ‘As Fight Against M23 Continues, Kigali and Kinshasa Wage War of Intelligence’, Africa Intelligence, 13 March 2023.

10 Rwanda Government Communications (@RwandaOGS), tweet, 9 March 2023.

11 UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2022/479, 14 June 2022.

12 UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2023/431, 13 June 2023, p. 15.

13 Edith M. Lederer, ‘UN Envoy Warns Congo’s M23 Rebels Are Acting Like an Army’, AP News, 30 June 2022.

1 Chris Harnisch, ‘Al Shabaab’s First International Strike: Analysis of the July 22 Uganda Bombings’, Critical Threats, 14 July 2010.

2 Max Security, ‘Uganda Alert: Islamic State Claims IED Attack Against Police Post in Kampala’s Kawempe Division on October 8; First Ever Attack Claimed in Country’, 10 October 2021.

3 Dino Mahtani, ‘The Kampala Attacks and Their Regional Implications’, International Crisis Group, 19 November 2021. For more information on ADF activity in the DRC, see the DRC chapter.

4 Liam Taylor, ‘In Uganda’s Karamoja, Rampant Rustling and a Militarised Response as Violence Returns’, New Humanitarian, 26 January 2022.

5 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

6 ‘Uganda School Attack: Dozens of Pupils Killed by Militants Linked to Islamic State Group’, BBC, 17 June 2023.

7 For more information on M23, see the DRC and Rwanda chapters in this book.

8 Defence Spokesperson (@UPDFspokespersn), tweet, 3 April 2023.

9 Liam Taylor, ‘“Hell Is Coming”: The Ugandan Army’s Heavyhanded Crackdown in Karamoja’, New Humanitarian, 1 December 2022.

10 Andrew Bagala, ‘UPDF Soldiers Abroad Surge Beyond 12,000’, Daily Monitor, 11 April 2023.

11 Congo Research Group and Ebuteli, ‘Uganda’s Operation Shujaa in the DRC: Fighting the ADF or Securing Economic Interests?’, June 2022.

12 International Crisis Group, ‘A Perilous Free-for-all in the Eastern DR Congo?’, Hold Your Fire!, 13 May 2022; and United Nations Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

13 Taylor, ‘“Hell Is Coming”: The Ugandan Army’s Heavy-handed Crackdown in Karamoja’.

14 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

15 Elizabeth Stites, ‘Conflict in Karamoja: A Synthesis of Historical and Current Perspectives, 1920–2022’, Karamoja Resilience Support Unit, October 2022.

16 Hesborn Etyang, ‘Governor Wants Turkana Herders Jailed in Uganda for Illegal Weapons Released’, Star, 14 May 2023; and International Crisis Group, ‘CrisisWatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide’, May 2023.

17 Raphael Lotira Arasio and Elizabeth Stites, ‘The Return of Conflict in Karamoja, Uganda: Community Perspectives’, Karamoja Resilience Support Unit, October 2022.

18 ‘Karamoja: UPDF Warns Turkana Pastoralists Against Supplying Guns’, Independent, 9 April 2022.

1 Giovanni Faleg, ‘Conflict Prevention in Mozambique’, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Brief no. 5, April 2019.

2 Emilia Columbo, ‘Stabilizing Mozambique’, Council on Foreign Relations, 29 August 2022.

3 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

4 Club of Mozambique, ‘Mozambique: More Countries Join Training Mission Against Terrorism’, 27 May 2022; and EUTM Mozambique – Press and information team, ‘EUTM MOZ Hosts the Portuguese Defense Policy Deputy Director’, European Union Training Mission in Mozambique, 24 March 2023.

5 Borges Nhamirre, ‘Rwanda Expands Its Protection of Mozambique’s Natural Resources’, Institute for Security Studies, 1 February 2023.

6 Republic of Mozambique, ‘Programa de Resiliência e Desenvolvimento Integrado do Norte de Moçambique’ [Integrated Development and Resilience Program for the North of Mozambique], 3 August 2022.

7 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, ‘Mozambique: Acute Food Insecurity Situation November 2022–March 2023’, 28 March 2023. Numbers refer to phases three and four, as of March 2023. International Organization for Migration, ‘Northern Mozambique Crisis: Mobility Tracking Assessment’, May 2023. Numbers for internally displaced people are as of April 2023, taken from data-collection round 18.

8 ‘The Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 22, August 2021.

9 Nhamirre, ‘Rwanda Expands Its Protection of Mozambique’s Natural Resources’.

10 ‘The Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique’.

1 International Crisis Group, ‘A Critical Window to Bolster Sudan’s Next Government’, 23 January 2023; and ‘History Won’t Repeat Itself, Africa Confidential, vol. 64, no. 2, 19 January 2023.

2 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), ‘Sudan: Clashes Between SAF and RSF: Flash Update No. 6’, 24 April 2023; and Ayin Network, ‘The Sudan Conflict Observer – May 10 Update’, 10 May 2023.

3 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Sudan: Türk Decries “Disastrous” Impact of War, Urges Accountability’, 15 August 2023; and UNOCHA, ‘Sudan Situation Report: 17 Aug 2023’, 17 August 2023.

4 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), www.acleddata.com.

5 Rift Valley Institute and Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends, ‘One Year After the Coup: What Next for Sudan’s Juba Peace Agreement?’, Sudan Rapid Response Update 5, November 2022; and Zeinab Mohammed Salih, ‘At Least 230 Sudanese Villagers Killed in Tribal Attacks over Disputed Land’, Guardian, 26 October 2022.

6 Jérôme Tubiana, ‘Darfur After Bashir: Implications for Sudan’s Transition and for the Region’, no. 508, United States Institute of Peace, April 2022.

7 Ibid.

8 UN Security Council (UNSC), ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan’, S/2023/93, 7 February 2023, p. 27; and Richard Kent, Mohamed Aboelgheit and Nick Donovan, ‘How the RSF Got Their 4x4 Technicals: The Open Source Intelligence Techniques Behind Our Sudan Exposé’, Global Witness, 5 April 2020.

9 Ibid., p. 12; and UNSC, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)’, S/2019/34, 10 January 2019, p. 30.