John Paul II and the three phases of his leadership in Poland

Abstract

The purpose of the text is to analyze the leadership of Pope John Paul II in Poland from the 1970s to the present, showing the changes in the perception of the pope’s leadership during three different phases. In the communist period the papal leadership focused on social justice issues; during the transitional period on religious issues; and in the final, contemporary phase, it is perceived as part of Polish identity. The change in the perception of the papal leadership was linked not only to political changes, but also to processes in Polish society, including increasing secularization.

Keywords:

• John Paul II
• secularization
• JPII generation
• the church in Poland

1. Introduction and methodology

Poland is often referred to as a ‘papal country’. The central streets, hospitals, schools, and, recently, the temples named after the Pope John Paul II confirm that the figure of the Polish pope remains central to understanding Polish history and the national identity, regardless of confessional commitment. Karol Wojtyła immediately after his election as pope became the uncrowned leader of the Poles. However, Wojtyła’s leadership is also inextricably linked to social change and historical circumstances. His talent as an actor, polyglotism and willingness and ability to be understand and connect with participants in mass gatherings amplified his impact on Poles and shaped not only religious attitude of listeners, but also influenced the ethical and political attitude. The aim of this text is to address the following questions: how was John Paul II's leadership perceived in the Polish perspective? How did it build the identity of Poles? The hypothesis of the text is as follows: the perception of John Paul II's leadership in Poland changed under historical and social circumstances. It is proposed to distinguish three time periods, corresponding to three historical eras, in which three images of John Paul II's leadership are covered. The first, between 1978–1989, the communist period, where the determinant of social leadership was the Solidarity social movement in Poland, and the figure of leadership was a pope who emphasized the main issue of that time: social justice. The second period, 1989–2005, was the transformational, or more precisely, post-communist period, where the guiding direction provided by the pope was that of a global spiritual leader, allowing the world to read the new values in a Church in new circumstances of freedom for Polish Catholics. And the third is the contemporary period, which began after the pope’s passing away. This period includes the milestone of John Paul II's canonization, where his papal leadership is already influencing a generation born after his death and who do not share the religious and social experience of his pontificate.

The methods used in this article are as follows: it is an interpretative case study (Vennasson 2010) and a critical analysis and interpretation of surveys. A form of storytelling is also used; the history of the social presence of John Paul II is also a history of emotions and public awareness, which cannot always be translated into strict research language, but are not devoid of cognitive value. The perception of the figure of the Polish pope extends beyond the period of his life, and therefore this division also applies to the period after the death of the pope. It is therefore proposed to assume the three successive periods mentioned above: the fight for justice, religious leadership, and posthumous. This last period has corresponded with a period of secularization. In the initial thesis, it is assumed that the leadership of the Polish pope changed along with the historical processes of Polish society, which shaped the nature of the papal leadership.

2. The pope in the age of solidarity: leadership for justice

After John Paul II's death, he was described with reference to his interview with Messori (John Paul II and Messori 1994) as a ‘witness to hope’ (Weigel 2009). The reference has to do explicitly with the role the Polish pope played in the deconstruction of Communism. The election of Karol Wojtyła in October 1978 was treated as a disaster by the Polish Communist government. The reactions of the authorities, including the only very brief mention of the election of John Paul II that was all that was permitted in the regime’s press, was an expression of panic on the part of the communists (Królak and Szuplewski 2003). From the perspective of ordinary Poles in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the image and social expectations of John Paul II in the general consciousness were not focused on defeating Communism; moreover, the collapse of Communism appeared very unrealistic in the 80s, if not impossible. The pope, as a spiritual leader, was treated as one who would help realistically help transcend social injustices in Polish society, help overcome misery, mistreatment, poverty, etc. In fact, Karol Wojtyła’s negotiating position was unique not only in Poland, but also in the entire Soviet bloc: he had to be accepted by the communists, not only as a leader, but also as a spokesman of the will of the Polish people. Paradoxically, the communists’ hostility towards John Paul II exceeded the hostility of the conflict between the Vatican and Moscow. A particularly difficult fact for the communists was the Polish pope’s powerful sway over the masses. It is worth noting here, however, some interpretation problems about relations between the pope and the Polish Communist regime. In his biography of John Paul II, Tad Szulc (1994) shows that the dictator of the late PRL, Wojciech Jaruzelski, had good relations with the pope, even pointing to a hidden alliance. Of course, in their official agenda, the pope and the Church in Poland never undermined the legitimacy of Communist rule – which would have had disastrous consequences for society. However, the issue of this cooperation between the pope and the dictator is note entirely confirmed by the actions of the authorities, which included the murder of priests, among the others, the political assassination of Blessed Jerzy Popieluszko.

Understanding the pope’s position as a ‘justice-carrying leader’ requires outlining the international context. Not only in communist Poland, but also in the West, there was a conviction about the persistence of the USSR and the division of the world into East and West. In the context of the West’s policy toward the system, the key event was the Declaration of Helsinki, initiated by Cardinal Casaroli. The Holy See assumed that in an almost completely atheized USSR with only residual underground Church, the reset of relations would be a step forward, allowing to build a foundation of cooperation for the future. The West, including the Vatican, began to treat both the USSR and countries in ten terra sovietica as included in the dialogue (Kościelniak 2021). The rationale for this was the belief in the permanence of the division of the powers in the world and the longtime conflict between the East and the West. John Paul II's attitude to the question of Communism evolved. At first it was in line with the strategy of the West, that is, focused on attempts to build maximum freedoms in the system, and later, after the attempt on the pope’s life, and after the Solidarity movement, this attitude became more acute, which resulted in a correction of the Vatican’s Ostpolitik designed during the pontificate of Paul VI.

In Western politics, the turning point was the launch of Ronald Raegan’s Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983 and the arms race that led the USSR to economic failure. This was the turning point of the political rapprochement between the White House and the Vatican, which Carl Bernstein called later as the ‘Holy Alliance’ (Bernstein 1992). The political influence of great personalities is questioned in favor of systemic premises, primarily the economic inefficiency of the system (Goddeeris 2008). Both the war in Afghanistan and the brutal suppression of workers’ revolts in Poland were a delusion of USSR Realpolitik for the West.

Poland in the 1970s and early 1980s was riddled with workers’ revolts, bloodily suppressed by the communist authorities. The aim of the workers’ revolts was to demand the improvement of social conditions, but also the expansion of freedom, primarily to express union opinion (Goddeeris 2008). In 1970, protests broke out in the north metropolitan area of the Tri-City (Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia), ending with the murder of several dozen workers. The same thing happened in 1976, when workers’ protests were suppressed in Radom, the industrial city about 100 km from Warsaw. These protests were a prelude to the creation of Solidarity, and the nationwide ‘festival of freedom’ in 1980, which ended with restrictions in the form of martial law introduced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

The leadership of John Paul II is devoid of the character of struggle or striving to weaken the communist authorities, but it is the leadership of conscience, which was intended to stimulate the society to be sensitive to justice, and to inspire to ethical changes in both individual and collective relations. The pope, in the bold words of his sermon in Warsaw in 1979: ‘Let Your Spirit come down and change the face of the earth, of this earth’ referred to the improvement of the ethical standards in Polish society. A. Goivagnoli (2004) notes the distance towards the pope’s political struggle at that time, pointing to the driver of realism in international relations: Vatican diplomacy was convinced that the USSR could increase the scale of terror if it felt politically threatened. In 1980, Solidarity breaks out, the whole world circulates a photo of John Paul II on the gate of the Gdańsk Shipyard named after Lenin. The postulates of the Solidarity movement can be read as an attempt to combine the ethics of dignity with Marxist class ideology, where workers would receive privileges that would allow them to live better, but also create space for partial self-governance and freedom of speech.

The papal leadership of conscience and justice was proved by the encyclical Laborem exercens, a work published in 1981, which stands out from the capitalism-liberalism dispute by presenting its own, independent Catholic ethic of labor. The text of the encyclical develops and explicates terms such as ‘vocation’, ‘meaning of work’, ‘participation in the work of creation’, absent from the economic discourse, but referring to the real experience of working people. In Polish circumstances, its social reading takes place at the level of the epistemology of dignity: the crisis begins with an incorrect reading of human dignity, which directly affects Polish workers living in very poor conditions. Laborem exercens becomes an intellectual guide through the papal leadership in Poland during Communism, harmonizing with the postulates of the Solidarity party. The employee problem resulted from the economic inefficiency of the People’s Republic of Poland, which was hidden in the 1970s and revealed in the last decade of Communism. In the encyclical, point 8 directly addresses the issue of solidarity:

The Church is firmly committed to this cause, for she considers it her mission, her service, a proof of her fidelity to Christ, so that she can truly be the ‘Church of the poor’. And the ‘poor’ appear under various forms; they appear in various places and at various times; in many cases they appear as a result of the violation of the dignity of human work: either because the opportunities for human work are limited as a result of the scourge of unemployment, or because a low value is put on work and the rights that flow from it, especially the right to a just wage and to the personal security of the worker and his or her family. (John Paul II 1981, 8)

Solidarity, signifying a commitment to care for working people and reading their expectation of improved social conditions as a matter of dignity, is central to the reading of social expectations of John Paul II. The Polish phenomena of Solidarity in the 80s is not only a social movement, but also philosophically and theologically conceptualized ethical thought, that becomes a constant reference point in social reflection (cf. Ash 2022). A key figure in the process of philosophical categorization of the community and solidarity is the philosopher, professor, and Karol Wojtyła’s friend from Cracow, Jozef Tischner, who published the book Ethics of Solidarity (Tischner 1984). The intellectual, theoretical categorization of the experience of social solidarity gives it the range of a philosophical challenge. According to Tischner, solidarity is linked to freedom and a well-functioning conscience, which allows for a conscious and free choice of the good. Freedom in this context is expressed as not only a privilege but a duty, and as an act of free will. Solidarity thus tied together two moral directives: treat your neighbor with dignity, and act in the freedom of your conscience. In this theoretical context, John Paul II's leadership for justice gave Polish society the impetus to build an ‘infra-community’, independent spiritual structures happening outside the official Communist circulation of ideas. The Church becomes a refuge for Solidarity movement members and supporters by extending an invitation to people of conscience, including non-believers, to participate in the real world of freedom, which, thanks to the Church, could be present. It can be said that, thanks to the leadership of justice of John Paul II, the ideological influence of Communism is neutralized. John Paul II’s thought, although mainly operating in the Church circuit and absent from public media and official academic publications, is unrivaled when it comes to social influence against Marxist proposals. Undoubtedly, the superimposed structural economic troubles in Poland in the 1980s further weakened the message of real socialism, but already after 1989, social and economic transformations rapidly led to a permanent change in the situation, not only in the economic market, but also in the market of ideas.

3. Political transformation and papal axiological leadership

After the overthrow of Communism in 1989 in Poland and in other European countries, along with the reunification of Germany in 1990, neoliberal economic solutions appear very quickly in all post-communist countries, including Poland, bringing powerful social consequences. The Polish transformation is a disappointment for a large part of society: factories are being closed down, privatization processes often end with the closure of production, and the unemployment rate is dramatically increasing. Giving official data from the Central Statistical Office: in January 1990 there were 0.3% of workers unemployed, and in January 1991 already 6.5%. In 1992 it was 12.1%, and reached over 16% in 1994–1995. A very difficult situation occurred between 2003 and 2004, when the unemployment rate officially exceeded 20% (GUS 2022). After Poland’s accession to the EU, emigration to the countries that lifted the embargo on work, mainly to Great Britain, is increasing, until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the arrival of approximately 1 million Ukrainians (in 2023 the number of Ukrainians in Poland is estimated to be around 5 million refugees and migrants). Poland was going through a social change, building a welfare state and focusing on economic aspirations was the most important development of the 1990s. The Church also found itself in a new situation, including that of having to criticize the liberalizing of moral issues. John Paul II visits Poland six times: twice in 1991, then in 1995, 1997, 1999, and finally during his farewell pilgrimage in 2002. Every time huge crowds came to meet him, and millions more listeners and viewers gathered around the radio and television. John Paul II and his concept of reconciling nations and incorporating the freedom of small nations into the European family also resonate as a key driver for Polish transformations in the 1990s (Sowiński and Zenderowski 2003). What milestones shape John Paul II's leadership in Poland after 1989?

The encyclical Centessimus Annus, published in 1991 by John Paul II, is the first official Church document to praise the social market economy. This encyclical includes ethical assumptions such as the postulate of securing dignity, good pay and good social solutions that guarantee development, but also postulates the free market. The pope points out that competitiveness and the free market are the best factors supporting development. The papal encyclical is the closing of the door on the stage of history characterized by Marxism and its ethical and economic program, which has been the great loser of history. Centessimus Annus is the first encyclical in the history of the papacy to affirm entrepreneurship and competitiveness as natural features of human creativity that require support. The economic point of reference for the encyclical was the social situation of the post-transformation countries of Central Europe, which faced the challenge of transforming the system from a state-regulation-driven economy to a market-driven economy adapted to European models. This encyclical acted as a meta-ethical and meta-political guide for Christians in the new reality. The beginning of the 1990s was a period in which numerous fundamental questions were asked, with the question of freedom and its use at the forefront.

Despite the Vatican’s natural interest in this part of the world, after 1989 the papal focus shifted to other places in the world. In the 1990s and following, the pope focuses on the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, and criticism of the Iraq wars. Keeping his attention on the latter event, John Paul II strongly rejects the alliance with George Bush Jr. and calls for not going to war with Iraq. In a speech to the diplomatic corps just before the outbreak of the Second Iraq War, the pope says: ‘War is never another means that one can employ for settling differences between nations. War cannot be decided upon […] except as the very last option and in accordance with very strict conditions’ (John Paul II, 2003).

Poland, a NATO member since 1999, joins the US-UK alliance in the second Iraqi war in defiance of Germany and France, hoping for offsets and an increased US military presence on its territory. Poland’s participation in this alliance has the support of the majority of the public. And although the media did not emphasize the difference of opinion between the US and the Vatican on this issue, the pope’s peaceful message did not affect Polish support in participating in the Iraq war. The case of the Iraq war shows that the relationship between John Paul II and Polish foreign policy has not always been complementary. This issue is the backdrop of the change in the model of papal leadership after the overthrow of Communism. First of all, it is an axiological leadership, which aims to rebuild the axiological tissue in new conditions and with new challenges, first of all, the entry into European structures that guarantee security. In this context, it is worth noting selected but significant papal speeches. There is an emerging thought that can be called as a hermeneutic of service, a social extension of Christian caritas. During his visit to the Polish Parliament in 1999, John Paul II reminds us of the political ethos: power is identical with the duty of service. ‘The exercise of political power whether in the community or in institutions representing the state should be a sacrificial service to man and society’. The pope warns against relativism and detachment of democracy from the axiological sphere: ‘Indeed 'if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism’ (John Paul II 1999).

One of the most inflammatory and emotionally discussed topics in Polish public life has been the issue of religion in public life. Basically, three models of state-Church relations clashed: secular, which emphasized neutrality and separation of religion from the state; centrist, defining religiosity as a part of Polish identity, which allowed for the presence of religion in schools, positions for chaplains in hospitals or the army, and for the co-financing of selected sectors run by the Church, with schools at the forefront; and finally, clerical, postulating the complete inclusion of the Church in the financial system and building Catholic politics. The centrist model was introduced into Poland with the signing of the concordat between the Republic of Poland and the Holy See. However, John Paul II's homily in Zakopane in 1997 seems to be of key importance in the matter of defending the symbol of the faith in the public sphere, in which the call to ‘defend the cross’ appears, which should be interpreted as a retreat from secularism as neutrality, and a transition to the concept later called by Benedict XVI in a dialogue with Nicolas Sarkozy ‘laïcité positive’. John Paul II said in Zakopane: ‘Dear Brothers and Sisters, do not be ashamed of this Cross. Try every day to accept it and to return Christ’s love. Defend the Cross; do not offend God’s Name in your hearts, in family or social life. We thank Divine Providence that the crucifix has returned to the schools, public offices and hospitals. May it ever remain there! May it remind us of our Christian dignity and national identity, what we are and where we are going and where our roots are. May it remind us of God’s love for humanity, which on the Cross found its deepest expression’ (John Paul II 1997).

The key moment in the formation of the papal image occurs between the date of his death on April 2, 2005, and the papal funeral. In Poland, for over a week, mass pro-pope manifestations of commemoration appear spontaneously, national mourning is accompanied by national reconciliation. There is no doubt that the pope was a figure who shaped Polish identity, but also showed the way. With his death, there was an emotion of fear after the loss, uncertainty in the further course of the proceedings. The death of John Paul II takes place at another key moment for Poland: since 2004, Poland has been a member of the European Union, and since 2007 it has been admitted to the Schengen agreement. The key processes of political transformation were accomplished.

4. The secular turn in Polish society and reinterpretation of John Paul II

The third period in the formation of papal leadership is the contemporary one. It can be assumed that its importance is crucial, as it will build the memory of John Paul II in the long term. Polish society can be characterized as a ‘late secularization society’. The processes described by J. Casanova (1994), such as de-privatization of the religious sphere or an increase in participation in the Church was flourishing in the 80s and 90s in Poland; the Catholic Church was acting as a powerful social institution, a free state opposed to the Communist regime. This can be associated with the effect of John Paul II. Secularization processes in Poland became more dynamic after 2004, and after the death of the pope new secular tendencies increased, including social criticism on the part of the citizens.

It is proposed to assume that the closing year of the previous periods of leadership is 2014 and the canonization of John Paul II by Pope Francis, along with the canonization of Pope John XXIII. Given the vox populi at the funeral of the Polish pope and the loud cry of ‘santo subito’ (‘saint immediately!’), the canonization was a response to the expectations of the Catholic community. In Poland, apart from the denominational aspect, it was the sealing of the era of John Paul II. It is noteworthy that earlier, a year after assuming the papal office, Pope Benedict XVI came to Poland. The pilgrimage was a homage to his predecessor and followed in his footsteps. Never before in the history of papal pilgrimages had such a program appeared. Benedict XVI followed in the footsteps of his predecessor by, for example, appearing at the papal window in the Palace of the Archbishops of Krakow, which was the site of John Paul’s informal evening short speeches to young people. Polish Catholic identity, however, is changing. In the second decade of the 21st century, generations for whom John Paul II is already only a historical figure are coming to the fore. Polish society, as well as the Church, is radically changing, with the following being among the most significant aspects of change:

• A progressive secularization of Polish society. Taking participation in the sacramental life as the key factor, it is worth noting that the dynamics of baptisms coincides with the dynamics of births, but the key indicator is the number of dominicantes, Catholics who attend Mass every Sunday. In research conducted by the Institute of Statistics of the Catholic Church, in 2021 the number of dominicantes was 28.3%. For comparison, in the year of the last papal pilgrimage in 2002, it was 45.7%, in the year of John Paul II's death in 2005 it was 45%, and a year later, 2006 it increased to 45.8%. After that, it began to decline. It is therefore very likely that within a decade the number of dominicantes will become similar to, for example, the German one (Annuarium 2022).

• The youth protests. The secularizing moment came in 2021, when, following a proposal to tighten abortion regulations, protests by hundreds of thousands of young people appeared on Polish streets, viewing the tightening as an imposition of religious policy on the state. Parallels can be drawn in this event to Ireland, or Malta, where a strong conservative agenda was interpreted as the Church’s influence on society. It is also a sign of a shift towards secularization in the younger generation.

• Declining trust in the Church. A significant aspect affecting the decline in trust toward the Church has been the bishops’ very restrained responses to cases of sexual abuse. The only one of these was the case of Archbishop Juliusz Paetz, metropolitan of the city of Poznań, who was ousted following accusations by seminarians and priests of sexual abuse. The case was never fully cleared up, and the ecclesiastical side did not admit mistakes in the handling of the case. Even after being removed from office for many years, the former Metropolitan of Poznan appeared at official church events and did not shy away from the media. In 2019, after the archbishop’s death, a group of laymen and priests issued a letter against the archbishop’s burial in Poznan Cathedral. This resulted in the imposition of a months-long ban on the signed priests from speaking to the media, while effectively refusing to comment on the matter. Archbishop Paetz’s case was a test of the effectiveness of the Church’s response in dealing with moral issues.

• In 2019, a documentary by the Sekielski brothers titled Tell No One was aired, showing cases of pedophilia in the Church. It featured victims of well-known clergymen, such as Father Machulski, famous builder of one of Poland’s largest Marian shrines, in Licheń, or a public figure, the chaplain of former Polish President Lech Walesa, Father Franciszek Cybula, recorded on a hidden camera as he admits to acts of pedophilia. The film is a record of a conversation between victims who met with their perpetrators. The film caused shock among lay Catholics, as the mechanisms of hiding cases and keeping them secret, as well as victims of sexual abuse by clergy being ignored, were exposed. It can be hypothesized that the decline in trust in the Church has occurred as a result of the exposure of the inaction, or ineffectiveness, of protective mechanisms within the Church. This is indirectly evidenced by the decline in dominicantes: before the pandemic in 2019 it was 36.9%, and already in 2021 it was 28.3%, a decline of 7%. Although this does not provide definitive proof, the decline may have been due to pandemic constraints, but two dynamics, the mass Black Protests and the social consequences of the film Tell No One can be considered the driving wheel of secular change in Poland. According to research, in the Polish media reporting on abuses has become a tool for shaping the image of the Church, and the type of narrative was correlated with the political preferences of individual media (Leśniczak 2020).

The background outlined is relevant to the question of the role and the acting of Pope John Paul II in the cases of sexual abuses. Cases from the US, such as that of Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, for example, showed that John Paul II made decisions collegially, based on opinions, and was not involved in covering up or concealing pedophilia. In the spring of 2023, the TVN channel published a documentary titled Franciszkańska 3 (in English: ‘Franciscan Street 3’), based, among other things, on material gathered by Dutch journalist Ekke Overbeek (Overbeek 2023). In the film, it is presented that Karol Wojtyła, as archbishop of Krakow, did not react properly to reports of child molestation by three priests in his archdiocese that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. The film shows the insinuation that Cardinal Sapieha committed sexual molestation, and Cardinal Karol Wojtyła must have known about it and adopted an attitude of silence. However, the chief allegation was that Cardinal Karol Wojtyła did not react appropriately toward the perpetrators. This thesis was denied by two investigative journalists from the leading daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita, editors Tomasz Krzyzak and Piotr Litka. They worked on documents from the Institute of National Remembrance, showing that the allegations against Cardinal Sapieha are not credible, and may even have been falsified (Krzyżak 2023). Earlier, in the autumn of 2022, it was reported that the Holy See was screening Archbishop Wojtyła’s activities in Krakow, and no irregularities were revealed afterwards (Krzyżak 2022). At the same time, there were insinuations that John Paul II was involved in the abduction and disappearance 40 years ago of Emanuela Orlandi. These revelations, reported without evidence or analysis, were directly countered by Pope Francis (Vatican News 2023). Pope Francis defending John Paul II tweeted on the Feast of Divine Mercy in Spanish: ‘En este domingo de la Divina Misericordia, seguro de interpretar los sentimientos de los fieles de todo el mundo, dirijo un pensamiento agradecido a la memoria de san Juan Pablo II, en estos días objeto de acusaciones ofensivas e infundadas’, officially distancing himself from the accusations.

The insufficient evidence for the thesis given in the document, and the strong media reactions from the circles of historians pointing out the research and methodological deficiencies presented in the material, caused Polish society to come out en masse in defense of John Paul II. The unbelievable accusations against John Paul II paradoxically revived his memory. The bronze monument to the pope was demolished, and a monument to the living identity of which John Paul II is a component appeared.

How do Poles evaluate John Paul II after this issue? Starting with an IBRIS (an opinion poll Institute) survey conducted in 2020 on behalf of the Rzeczpospolita newspaper: 86% rate the pontificate of John Paul II positively, 6% negatively, and 8% chose the answer ‘difficult to say’. As many as 96% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29, i.e. those who either did not know the pope or remembered him from early childhood, evaluated him positively (Krzyżak 2020). Even after the discussion of John Paul II's role in 2023, the same studio conducted another poll, 77% of respondents gave a positive assessment of John Paul II's pontificate. For 15.6%, his evaluation worsened, while for 4.5% it improved.

A similar double poll was conducted by Social Changes and was published on April 16, 2023 (Polish Radio 2023). To the question ‘Is John Paul II an important figure to you’, 47% answered ‘definitely yes’, 27% ‘rather yes’, 8% ‘rather no’, and 9% ‘definitely no’. 9% answered ‘difficult to say’. In the same survey conducted in 2020, a positive answer to the same question was given by 70%, which is 3% less than previously. Although this is not a significant percentage, it allows us to draw the conclusion that the positive perception of John Paul II is stabilized in Poland. In the debate about John Paul II, there was also a claim that attitudes toward Karol Wojtyła correspond to the Polish political divide. The 2023 survey pointed this out: among supporters of the right-wing PiS party, the percentage was 94%, among supporters of the center-left KO party: 61%, and Poland2050, also center-left party: 65%. The positive attitude of the majority of the party’s electorate toward the figure of the pope would indicate that the division hardly corresponds to the party divide.

5. Conclusions

Moving on to the conclusion, it is worth making a few comments on trends affecting the image of John Paul II in Poland in the future.

First, the image and leadership of John Paul II in Poland has been shaped not only by his religious influence, but also by his social and political influence. The papal leadership in Poland has been transformed along with the course of history. In fifty years, the social structure in Poland went through a radical change. First of all, the size of the working class decreased, and a new educated middle class was formed after Communism. The percentage of people with higher education during Communism was less than 10%, and now it reaches more than 50% in the working-age generation. Social teaching in the 1970s and 1980s was directed to the working class, while towards the end of John Paul II’s pontificate the message to future generations becomes more important. Civilizational, ethical-economic, bioethical, but also European issues become an important aspect – John Paul II directly supports Polish aspirations to join the structures of the European Union.

Secondly, the phenomenon of secularization, especially the growing category of those who no longer identify with religion, the so-called ‘a-religious’, or ‘sans religion’ also co-shapes the contemporary attitude toward John Paul II, or more broadly, toward the papacy as a whole. As in the West, a phenomenon that Bishop Robert Barron calls the ‘cut flower’ effect is also emerging in Poland: the lack of reference to the sources of faith and the maintenance of only tradition without faith has a side effect, one of which is, for example, the politicization or sociologization of the Church, including the ‘secularization of the image’ of the papacy. It is worth noting that for Polish religiosity, the pope was first and foremost a spiritual guide, and in this lay the strength of his leadership.

In addition, although the papal image is not negatively represented, as the indicated survey shows, there is an emerging polarization and change in the perception of religion in Poland, which is approaching Western models, such as those of countries with a post-Catholic culture. It can be assumed that in the near future, the Polish secularization trend will equal the Western one. In Poland, however, one notices an increased scale of aggression against the Church, primarily in the verbal sphere and on social media. It could be hypothesized that Polish secularization will resemble the Spanish way more than the German or Austrian way, where, despite secularization and indifference, there remains a high esteem for religion, but also a relative neutrality towards the clergy. If ‘oppressive secularization’ sharpens, the figure of John Paul II will be a dividing line between supporters and opponents of the Church, however it is less likely to be the future in the Polish case.

Finally, it is impossible to ignore the role that geopolitics has played in the perception of John Paul II, especially since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. The Polish pope led the new Ostpolitik based on the condition of the sovereignty of small nations and departure from the rule of great powers (Kościelniak 2021). Russian aggression brought back to the forefront the themes of sovereignty and freedom with which the Polish pope is unequivocally and positively associated in Central Europe.

Acknowledgements

The text was created with the support of KAAD [Katholischer Akademischer Ausländer-Dienst].

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cezary Kościelniak

Cezary Kościelniak. Philosopher, and culture scientist, Dr. habil., professor in the Faculty of Anthropology and Cultural Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. His latest book is The Transformations of the Idea of University (in Polish, PWN Publishing). Visiting scholar at LMU Munich in Germany in 2022 and 2023.