From Aquino to Marcos: political survival and Philippine foreign policy towards China

ABSTRACT

How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country’s stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. By examining the political calculus of, and the policy formulation by, the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines’ foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains the Philippines’ China policies. Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the prior administration’s China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. I interviewed officials in the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers.

KEYWORDS:

• Philippines
• China
• elites
• coalitions
• foreign policy

1. Introduction

How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country’s stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. While these works are able to highlight key factors in the Philippines’ response, they are unable to analyze the interaction of these factors with one another. By examining the political calculus toward China by the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines’ foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains their China policies. To explain these factors, I draw from the octagonal framework developed by Takahara¹ to illustrate how the Philippines formed its decision to work with or against the PRC. I find that regional alliance structures and internal security are rather insignificant in explaining the Philippine case.

Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. Specifically, I suggest that the regime change results in a new President and administration departing from the approach of their predecessors. Drawing from Bruno de Mesquita et al² I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the previous administration’s China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. It should be clear that this reversal of policies is not all-encompassing. For instance, economic policies cannot be reversed. However, economic gains are redirected toward newer approaches that stand separate from the prior administration. I summarize the empirical cases as follows. First, during the Aquino III administration, the political survival at that time encouraged an anti-China stance. Aquino III gained power due to the unpopularity of the previous Gloria Macapagal Arroyo III administration’s corruption scandals. Some of these controversies were linked with China. (2001–2010). To maintain his popularity and political power, it was therefore politically beneficial for Aquino to take a stance against China. Furthermore, China also moved into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, in particular the Scarborough Shoal incursion, which generated a critical response from Aquino III. At that time, the US Transpacific Partnership encouraged Aquino III officials to take greater initiatives against China. The Philippines also attempted to rally countries in the Association of Southeast Asian nations, which unfortunately failed due to Chinese influence. Economically however the Philippine economy was relatively disconnected from the PRC, which made Chinese economic coercion quite weak. Indeed, Chinese development finance was ruled out as a development strategy quite early. Aquino III focused on Public Private Partnerships, which relies on Philippine oligarchs taking part of building large-scale physical infrastructure projects.

Second, the Duterte administration took a pro-China stance. Duterte came into power by criticizing Aquino III’s regime, such as increasing within-country inequality, limited infrastructure financing, and the surplus-driven growth. Duterte’s victory created public furor and political encouragement to support these policies, which could be helped by stronger Philippine-China cooperation. In terms of geopolitics, the hesitance of the United States to help the Philippines in the South China Sea in far more direct terms generated public support for a pro-China diplomatic stance. Duterte targeted Aquino III officials through the drug war, effectively weakening the opposition at that time. Furthermore, the criticism of the West toward Duterte and the lack of international support toward the Hague PCA victory ignited the Philippines’ stance toward China. In terms of economic realities, several Philippine elites realized that working with China would generate economic returns, in particular in infrastructure and tourism. The Duterte administration also sought to bind China toward dependence on the Philippines, allowing officials to protect online gambling for example from Beijing’s interference. Specifically, Duterte and his cronies protected online gambling in order to accrue rent payments.

And finally, the Marcos administration (2022-) was expected to be pro-China due to their family’s prior links to the Chinese consulate. However, the decisions of the Marcos administration in 2022 exemplify moves that accommodate American interests. The Philippine government accepted four new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreements³ bases, began new military exercises and started buying more arms. Marcos also started expanding Philippine ties with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. This recent and more pro-Western move by Marcos is a puzzle to many. However, I argue that this move fundamentally goes back to political survival, particularly the desire to weaken the Duterte faction in the government. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. Specifically, I interviewed officials in the Aquino and Duterte administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers. More recent fieldwork was done between February and March of 2023 where the researcher interviewed members of the Marcos and Duterte families.

2. Literature review

Scholarship on Philippine foreign policy can be divided into two camps. First, the international relations literature extensively details geopolitical factors such China’s military buildup, the US activities in Asia, regional rivalries, and China’s economic capacities. For instance, Evelyn Gohposits Southeast Asia’s hedging strategy in-between the US and China,⁴ De Castro points out that the US-Philippine alliance and “middle power strategies” have allowed the Philippines to hedge or “balance” against China in the South China Sea,⁵ and Yamazaki and Osawa suggest that the relationship between the Philippines and China results from the asymmetry of power and status between the two countries.⁶ Other works such as Wen-Chih Chao’s analysis of Duterte’s policies toward China,⁷ Kreuzer’s analysis of Philippine-China trade,⁸ and Wu and Velasco's article on the evolving geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, integrate China further in the analysis.⁹ In sum, the IR literature primarily locates the main explanatory variables at the international level, leaving aside the domestic factors that may be involved.

Second, the literature on domestic politics focuses on the preferences of the Philippine President and the complex nature of Philippine politics as the main determinants of Philippine foreign policy. While these works generally do not ignore the structural factors of geopolitics or geoeconomics, they concentrate on identifying the domestic drivers that explain the foreign policy stance of each Philippine president toward China. Tran uses foreign policy analysis to situate the preferences, opportunities, and constraints of the various administrations,¹⁰ Lischin examines how Duterte has undermined democratic institutions in the country¹¹ and Glaser and Poling point out how popular politics forced Duterte to change his position regarding the US and China.¹² Other academic works locate the causal chains in domestic politics. In a comparative study of four countries, Wang and Fu argue that the type of politics in a country explains its approach toward China.¹³ Grossman, a RAND corporation analyst, argues that 2021 marked the end of Duterte’s dalliance with China.¹⁴ He points out that increased opposition against Duterte’s China policy and the lack of any meaningful substantive gains in cooperative relations with China explained the ostensible reversal.

I suggest that the first group of studies suffers from a misspecification problem while the second group is constrained by under-specification. For the former, the literature that looks at macro geopolitical or economic factors has failed to analyze the second-order effects of actors within the country. Listing the size and scale of China’s economic and political impact does not explain how smaller, host countries respond to China. Rather, these scholars conflate the macroeconomic structures and the causal mechanisms at the domestic level which push host country actors and elites to act. In other words, these works are unable to explain why and how actors make decisions. The focus on macrostructural factors takes away the agency of host country actors and also imposes rational choice, which assumes that there is a set of correct choices for the small countries. For the latter, pointing to the role of Presidents or domestic politics is an under-specified answer. This part of the literature is correct in identifying the scale but falls short of specifying the key factors that shape Philippine foreign policy. This approach is unhelpful because it does not explain why Presidents made the decision to work with China and also does not account for the multiplicity of other reasons that could explain a President’s actions.

If the analysis were pointing to domestic politics as the cause, it begs the question: what sort of domestic politics matter to Philippine Presidents and under what conditions? Which actors matter to the decision-making process, who does the President listen to, and what do these actors get from China? The inability to answer these questions results in inconsistencies in describing how domestic politics is used. In other words, host country actors for them have shifting notions of their capacities and importance. For instance, Grossman¹⁵argue that political elites and the military establishments pressured Duterte to reach back to the United States and step away from China. However, the same authors have also argued that Duterte himself was able to push for these pro-China engagement policies despite the existence of these same type of political and military elites in the early part of the regime. This is a contradictory view based on the existence of strong elites in the latter part of the Duterte administration but weak ones at the beginning. Furthermore, these works suffer from focusing on description and a reliance on newspaper data with little-or-no fieldwork. A proper theory of host country responses should identify how the various factors that shape the actions of actors are accounted for, the relative importance of these interests to the administration in power, and how these factors shaped the country’s approach toward China. The next section presents this framework; the subsequent sections illustrate the empirics; and the final section concludes the paper.

3. Theoretical framework

The conceptual framework for this study draws on several factors outlined in the special issue’s introduction. Most notably, Takaharaargues that four factors explain the host country’s bilateral approach toward the PRC.¹⁶ Kuik furthermore elaborates upon the concerns of domestic legitimacy.¹⁷ Drawing from Takahara in this special issue, I argue that three factors matter: (1) domestic politics, which refers to interaction of elites and non-elites at the host country level; (2) geopolitics, which points to international politics and security concerns between countries; and (3) the economic realities that refer to growth, trade, investment, and development finance in general and not just about the host country and the PRC. What is interesting with the framework is the interactions between factors that shape the decision of the administration. Regional alliances, which examine the relationship of neighboring states, and peace and security, which cover internal sovereignty concerns or terrorism, do not explain the Philippines’ stance toward China.

These three factors are shaped by the political survival of the leader in power. As Figure 1 shows, domestic politics and political survival interact. However, they difference is that while domestic politics refer to the interaction of elites and non-elites within the Philippines, political survival is the decision of the incoming administration to deviate from the China policies of the prior administration. I suggest that other policies that have strong institutional, political, and cultural roots in the Philippines often experience continuity. For instance, the Philippines’ stance toward the United States has often been very positive due to the institutional and historical roots of the two countries altogether. I forward that policy domains that lack consensus and generate asymmetric political or economic rewards, such as the Philippines’ stance toward China, will generate this deviation from one policy to another. Furthermore, in the Philippine context where bureaucratic structures are relatively underdeveloped and business or political elites hold so much power, Philippine Presidents and their administrations always need to capitalize on every possible political advantages. In this context, the political advantages brought by either criticizing or working with China give leaders the additional advantage they need over opponents. Presidents maintain power by criticizing the effects of the China policies of their predecessor and the effects of those policies. Subsequently, leaders capitalize by realigning with the West further. Conversely, the President can also criticize the West and move their country toward China, drawing in Chinese direct investments and development finance.

Figure 1. Interaction of political Survival and the three factors.

4. Empirical analysis

Table 1 summarizes the paper’s argument. During Aquino III, his confrontational approach toward China, the criminalization of Arroyo officials, and the successes of the Philippine economy resulted in decreasing the country’s reliance toward China. While the Philippine economy grew, within-country income inequality also increased, resulting in marginalizing elites and segments of the population, who supported Duterte. Duterte befriended China, which opened the country to Chinese economic projects. He then used large-scale Chinese physical infrastructure projects to reward his elites and leveraged online gambling to accumulate economic reserves for his family’s elections. These decisions during Duterte reverberated during Marcos Jr., who turned his back from both the Duterte factions and the Philippines’ friendship toward China in order to maximize his political advantages. Filipinos suffered from income inequality and limited economic growth during Duterte. Marcos capitalizes on criticizing Duterte. Overall, these regimes from Aquino III to Duterte all illustrate the logic of political survival, which illustrate the reversal of previous policies set about by the prior administrations.

Table 1. Triagonal analysis from Aquino III to Marcos Jr.

	Domestic Politics	Geopolitics	Economic Realities
Aquino III(2010–2016)	Defection of Arroyo officials toward Aquino’s faction Persecution of Arroyo and Arroyo officials.	Exploration of the South China Sea’s potential energy reserves Encouragement of some regional neighbors to take on South China Sea issue and Scarborough shoal.	Public Private Partnerships Improvement of the Philippines’ internal revenue system Philippine economic growth that relies on capital markets and BPO investments. Integration with the PRC was minimal
Duterte(2016–2022)	Linking the Aquino III officials to the drug syndicates Tying Beijing to online gambling to increased rent payments. Defection of Aquino III officials toward Duterte’s faction	Chinese economic power made countries ignore the Hague-PCA ruling. The Victory of trump made it impossible for the TPP and US activities in the Philippines to continue. Criticism by Obama toward the Drug war	PRC development finance to help Philippine infrastructure stock Increasing fruit exports to reward regional elites
MarcosJr. (2022-)	Bongbong inherited a strong relationship with China, but he also chose to move the Philippines to weaken the Dutertes. This opened foreign policy options for the Philippines Weakening online gambling to stifle the Duterte’s economic base.	Increased Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Ukraine-Russia and Taiwan	Post-covid 19 realities made it so that the Philippines will need Chinese and non-Chinese FDI

4.1. Aquino III (2010–2016)

Aquino III came into power due to excessive China- and non-China related rent-seeking and corruption controversies during the Arroyo administration. Following the “matuwid na daan” (or the straight road) slogan, Aquino III and his government went after the former Arroyo officials who were fully or partially involved in corruption controversies, which were enabled by the Chinese direct investment and development finance deals. Aquino capitalized on the criminalization of Arroyo officials who had strong relations with Chinese government officials, to clean up the government and maximize his political power. This criminalization of Arroyo officials created an unintended effect of rupturing Philippine-China relations.

These issues came as a backdrop to China’s imposition of the 9-dash line in 2009. The 9-dash line was a unilateral artificial boundary imposed by China in the South China Sea. While Vietnam and Malaysia protested against the announcement in the same year, the Philippines did not do so under Arroyo’s government.¹⁸ In stark contrast, Aquino III was vehemently against any Chinese assertion of historical rights and control over the maritime areas that fell within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.¹⁹ When the PRC refused to withdraw its ships in the contested maritime zones, the Philippines decided to criticize China further in international media. In response, China imposed fruit and tourism sanctions upon the country, resulting in a seemingly irreparable relationship between the two countries. Aquino III decided to make the day-to-day conditions of the State Grid Corporation of China, which comprise a 40% share of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, more difficult. These outcomes resulted in an intense relationship. At the same time, China decided to construct its maritime islands by terraforming these areas further. Aquino III took China to court, filing a case at the Hague PCA in 2014.

4.1.1. Domestic politics

There were two crucial factors in domestic politics. First, when Aquino III came into power, other Philippine political elites at the national and local levels jumped ship in order to avoid persecution and gain access funding at the national level.²⁰ In 2010, the Aquino government persecuted Renato Corona, an Arroyo-appointed judge and former chief justice of the Philippine supreme court, in 2011 for his previous role and dealings regarding several scandals.²¹ Aquino III’s government filed plunder and embezzlement cases against Arroyo appointees. Mid-level officials who were appointed by key figures in the Arroyo government were reshuffled and placed in further away positions. This so-called “witch hunt” against Arroyo officials resulted in the marginalization of officials who had little or nothing to do with the corruption controversies, resulting in greater resentment by these officials against Aquino III.²² Aquino’s Liberal Party dominated Philippine politics until 2016.

Second, since Arroyo was a good friend to China, the criminalization of Arroyo led to rupturing Philippine-China relations. Aquino III officials slapped electoral fraud and plunder cases against Arroyo in 2010. The Sandiganbayan Bayan, a special appellate court in the Philippines, ruled in favor of the Aquino III government. In 2012, Arroyo was placed under hospital arrest and was transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon city.²³ While Aquino III said arresting Arroyo was part of the broader anti-corruption campaign,²⁴ Arroyo said that Aquino III had a personal vendetta against her. Specifically, Corazon Aquino, Benigno Aquino III’s mother and President of the Philippines between 1986 to 1992, had called on Arroyo to resign when protest and mobilization intensified in 2007.²⁵ Arroyo refused and removed the Philippine Security Group, an agency tasked to protect current and former Presidents and their immediate families, around Corazon. Aquino III took this as a personal attack against his mother, holding a grudge according to former officials of his administration.²⁶ The impact on Philippine-China relations became stark. Chinese officials had created a strong working relationship with Arroyo herself and her regime. As argued by the former Vice President of ZTE in the Philippines:

When Arroyo was in power, we had projects with the government, and we could approach them for future ventures. Our colleagues at the embassy knew Arroyo’s own officials and many Chinese firms worked with those undersecretaries and assistant secretaries in various embassies. We invested time, money, and effort in getting to know them. We dined with them, sent gifts along the way like the Chinese calendar, and invited them to events at the company offices and embassy. When Aquino III came, we knew very little.²⁷

4.1.2. Geopolitics

These domestic political imperatives interacted with geopolitics in significant ways. With an eye on acquiring domestic energy sources and limiting international market reliance, the Aquino government sought to explore the oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea. In 2011, Aquino III’s government awarded a contract to Forum Energy, a UK-based oil and gas company, to explore the Reed Bank within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).²⁸ The Philippines believed that it was simply following the 2005 Joint Seismic Maritime Understanding, which was signed by Arroyo with the leaders of with China and Vietnam. When MV Veritas Voyager, Forum Energy’s own exploration ship, began exploring Reed Bank once again, two Chinese vessels appeared to order the exploration ship away.²⁹ In response, the Philippine government deployed OV-10 light attack aircraft and another aircraft observation units to the area. Two Philippine coastguard vessels were deployed to escort the Veritas Voyager to complete the survey. The survey result indicated that the Sampaguita Gas field, which is located within Reed Bank, contains 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas. However, China aggressively set its navy to intimidate the Philippines, resulting in a standoff where the United States had to mediate. With regard to the incident itself, Aquino III’s government filed a diplomatic protest against China in 2011, which was unfortunately ignored by Chinese officials.³⁰

Second, the neighboring countries of Japan, Australia, and South Korea and some ASEAN countries implicitly encouraged the Philippines in some ways to take on China.³¹ The Philippines sought to improve their naval and coastguard capabilities, seeking funding from Japan, Australia, and South Korea to enhance the Philippine Armed Forces.³² The structure of ASEAN rendered pursuing collective action against China untenable, notwithstanding the initial encouragement of surrounding nations. A decision must be unanimously approved by all member states because ASEAN operates on a consensus and noninterference structure. However, most ASEAN members refused to take sides.³³ Many ASEAN countries do not want to see US-China conflict affect them and see that the Philippines is simply representing American interests in this arena. Vietnam and the Philippines were ignored or outvoted by the other ASEAN governments throughout numerous ASEAN summits and sessions. These steps led to the Philippines’ decision to take China to the Hague-PCA.

4.1.3. Economic realities

Aquino’s III Philippines experienced an economic renaissance during his rule, resulting in multiple credit rating agencies – S&P Global Ratings (S&P), Moody’s, and the Fitch Group – upgrading the Philippines’ investment grade by one or two notches. The Philippines experienced 5 to 7% growth in total GDP during his rule. These successes can be explained because of the following strategies.³⁴ First, in economic sectors where the Philippines needed foreign financing, the Aquino government decided to enlist the help of other foreign investors prior to reaching out to China, leading to the pronounced involvement of the Japanese International Corporation Agency (JICA).³⁵ A key reason for this was fulfilling multiple goals: political survival of the Aquino administration, decreasing reliance on China in the event that issues occurred, and pursuing stronger political ties with Japan.

A faction of Aquino’s administration wanted to draw in Chinese financing for key infrastructural projects. As an adviser of the Aquino administration said, “in the initial agenda, China was targeted to fund more than 10 potential large-scale investment projects, particularly in railways, bridges, and powerplants. Some of us wanted to restart the North Rail project.”³⁶ However, China was deeply connected to key Arroyo allies and their rent-seeking activities, and thus was publicly tied to their crimes, making it politically impossible for Aquino to forge similar ties. By 2012, Chinese money was effectively ruled out as a development strategy. While some argued that the South China Sea issue killed Chinese financing, what they failed to see was that the Aquino government had already made Chinese financing a less necessary option. The economic situation of the Philippines and the relative consensus on seeking financing apart from China made it possible for Aquino’s government to act against China in the South China Sea.³⁷ Even at the cost of losing some potentially good projects, Aquino chose Public Private Partnership as an option in order to prosecute Arroyo and anyone closely related to her.³⁸ Adding to that, Chinese firms’ lackluster experience with the Arroyo administration had already made them wary of further engagement with the Philippines and it also effectively cemented their disappointment with Philippine politics generally.³⁹ These sentiments were exacerbated by the Aquino administration’s tough foreign policy stance against China in the South China Sea.

Second, Aquino III focused on increasing the capacity of the Philippines by strengthening the Philippine Internal Revenue Allocation, thus allowing members of the Philippine bureaucracy to accurately tax elite and middle-class citizens. Aquino’s administrations also passed several landmark bills that expanded their tax base. Of particular importance is the Sin Tax Reform Act, a bill designed to increase the Philippines’ excise tax on alcohol and tobacco, which was passed despite lobbying from the sin industries.⁴⁰ The law added US$1.10 billion to the government budget in 2014. On top of these reforms, Aquino’s Bureau of Internal Revenue Chief Kim Jacinto-Henares implemented the BIR Master Plan for 2013–2016.⁴¹ As a result of her work, key reforms on taxpayer service registration, audit, collection, enforcement, and revenue streaming were implemented. She also even singled out big corporations accused of evading taxes.⁴² Due to the reforms, the BIR increased its tax collection by 12.2% in 2012 and 13.3% in 2013.⁴³ Comparing 2006 and 2013, the IMF Global Financial Stability Report indicated the improvement of auditing, reporting, and the efficiency of the legal framework in the Philippines.⁴⁴

And finally, many of the Arroyo government policies that had been initiated blossomed during the Aquino administration.⁴⁵ While the Arroyo administration’s excessive rent-seeking practices had stifled and limited state capacity,⁴⁶ the Aquino administration benefited from previous key legislation that Arroyo herself had passed, such as the expanded value added tax, which led to an improvement of fiscal capacity.⁴⁷ Moreover, a key policy that blossomed was the liberalization of Philippine services, particularly in the business process outsourcing sector. In the 2000s, the Arroyo administration constructed the legal framework for the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector in the country, which led to an infusion of Western capital and demand for back-office service work for multinational corporations. The government established cyberparks, which gave foreign firms in the BPO sector key incentives. Some of these incentives included a tax holiday for 8 years, a 5% tax rate in lieu of national and local taxes, corporate exemption from import costs and VAT local purchases, and a 50% tax deduction of training costs.⁴⁸ Reforms coupled with cheap Filipino white-collar labor made the Philippines the “call center” capital of the world. Multinational firms began to offshore their back office – customer service, accounting, fraud detection, and others – to the Philippines.

4.2. Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022)

While the Philippine economy grew leaps and bounds during Aquino III, economic inequality also widened in the Philippines. Duterte’s regime capitalized on increased within-country economic inequality to create the narrative around the drug war and the Aquino III elites. As such, Duterte argued that he would take these officials to court and deploy the most punitive means possible. Duterte portrayed himself as a “strongman” who would punish his opponents using any means necessary when he first assumed power. He and his team announced that the country was being overrun by drugs as part of an ongoing operation run by an international Mexican cartel.⁴⁹ As the narrative goes, these substances were resulting in a massive increase in both violent and nonviolent crimes, jeopardizing the lives of Filipinos across the country. Growing numbers of Filipinos who recently ascended into middle class status connected with this story and bought into the idea that key Philippine politicians, particularly leaders of the Aquino III administrations, were heavily involved in protecting the cartel.

Duterte reversed the course of Philippines’ approach toward China. Duterte informally gave up the Philippines’ arbitration victory, backtracking on the Aquino government’s approach toward China, and placating Beijing’s worries. Duterte visited China in October 2016, stating in a speech in front of the Chinese National Congress that, “I [Duterte] announce my separation from the United States … there’s three of us [China, Russia, and the Philippines] against the world”.⁵⁰ Duterte followed suit by vocally announcing that he will kick out American troops in the Philippines. However, as months went by, Duterte’s administration and most Filipino elites preferred a more balanced diplomatic approach. Duterte’s administration resulted in modest diplomatic shifts, such as acquiring greater Chinese economic assistance in the country, in the form of FDI, development finance, grants, and no-interest loans, while also upgrading the country’s coast guard and navy.⁵¹

4.2.1. Domestic politics

Three factors of domestic politics matter. First, this anti-drug approach shaped Philippine foreign policy because members of the former Aquino III regime and Philippine Liberal Party members, who had taken China to court, were unfairly targeted by Duterte. Duterte used the full force of the Philippine state to incarcerate Leila de Lima, Aquino III’s former Secretary of Justice and ardent Duterte critic. So, inadvertently, these elites’ anti-China position lost ground. In other words, Duterte’s accusations of the involvement of Aquino III’s elites in the drug war became an excuse to turn away from the Hague-PCA position. In other words, the drug war enabled Duterte to discredit his most dangerous foes, allowing him to both strengthen his position and make clearer the Philippines’ approach toward China. Furthermore, this was also driven by the American criticism of Duterte’s drug war. A Duterte strategist reasoned, “if the Aquino III officials were compromised in some way or form, then what ground do they have to foster a foreign policy strategy in the Philippines? Attacking de Lima was deliberately done to secure a more moderate position for the Philippines.”⁵²

Second, Duterte apparently needed to make the Chinese government depend on him in order to protect online gambling firms. Online gambling firms are illegal enterprises in the eyes of the Chinese government.⁵³ The Chinese government has incarcerated officials and investors, punished workers, and forcibly coerced governments around the world into shutting down these firms.⁵⁴ As such, giving up the Hague PCA victory tied the Chinese government into needing Duterte, at least in theory. For China, the security and geopolitical implications of holding down the exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea appears to outweigh concerns on human trafficking, drugs, and money laundering. At the end of 2016, online gambling firms started to move to the Philippines. Between 2016 and 2020, around 126 firms established their operations. Some estimates have these workers at 500,000, and by and large, these workers were working in Metro Manila.⁵⁵

Attracting online gambling direct investments was both for political and economic gain. Politically, the Duterte family needed to acquire massive amounts of wealth if they were going to continue their foray into national politics.⁵⁶ As such, online gambling firms appeared necessary to create direct payments to the Duterte family and their allies.⁵⁷ The Duterte family set up a key social and physical infrastructure to protect online gambling firms.⁵⁸ According to an insider of the online gambling sector, firms were transmitting $5 million USD a month to the Duterte family and the key fraternity brothers.⁵⁹ By tying Beijing’s interests in the South China Sea to the Duterte administration, the Chinese government could not vehemently oppose the Duterte administration. There were quiet talks and promises on the part of the Philippines to police online gambling. However, the Philippine government was slow and clearly delaying their operations against online gambling companies.

Finally, the effective consolidation of Duterte’s status as a strongman deterred local and regional elites from mobilizing against the government. Since Duterte started marginalizing his opponents of supporting drugs, many of the regional and local politicians needed to illustrate their loyalty to the Duterte government or else be branded as opponents.⁶⁰ Without strong internal checks against the Duterte government, Philippine foreign policy toward China became uncontested. It should be clear that this statement does not mean that Duterte was able to move the Philippines toward China. Institutionally, culturally, and historically, the Philippines is firmly placed within the US political and cultural space. Indeed, there were clear limits on what Duterte could and could not do. While Duterte accommodated and appeased the Chinese government in public, his military also acquired Japanese, Australian, Korean, and American assistance in upgrading the Philippine navy, air force and army.⁶¹ While Duterte opened the floodgates for Chinese armaments and military deals to flourish, the actual institutional incompatibility and the interests of military elites resulted little change overall. The Philippine military institutions and leadership still preferred tried and tested American arms.⁶² Nonetheless, the Chinese made headway in appeasing the Philippine police and winning over local politicians. There is thus variation in the successes of the Chinese overall during the Duterte period.⁶³

4.2.2. Geopolitics

Aquino’s decision to pursue the South China Sea vehemently contributed to Duterte’s decision to reverse course for three reasons. First, the Aquino III government’s Hague PCA case became politically underwhelming to many Filipinos due to the lack of support from the international community. While many Western countries supported the Philippines, most countries in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East supported China. According to the CSIS Maritime Initiative:⁶⁴

7 countries that have publicly called for the arbitral award to be respected, 33 that have issued generally positive statements noting the verdict but have stopped short of calling for the parties to abide by it, 9 that have made overly vague or neutral statements without addressing the ruling, and 6 that have publicly rejected it. A few differences are clear between the level of support pre- and post-ruling.

While there is variation among these countries, there is a consensus that the ruling must be respected in some way or form. However, over a hundred plus countries who voted made no or neutral statements about the ruling, signifying some passive support to the status quo or refusal to act in favor of the Philippines. This is not surprising because China’s political and economic gravity makes countries protect their self-interest over some collective international good. The Hague PCA landmark case, which was filed by the previous Aquino government, was effectively shut down by China’s influence.

Second, a good number of Filipino elites felt that support from the United States, the Philippines’ closest ally, was starting to dwindle given domestic politics in the country.⁶⁵ The United States held its Presidential elections in 2016, resulting in the victory of Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton. The American initiative under Clinton, the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), was abandoned by the newly installed Trump administration in favor of “America first”.⁶⁶ The TPP would have created a transregional trading bloc among countries in the Pacific, such as North America, Latin America, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. This bloc would trade goods and allocate each other key treaties that would isolate the PRC. While the Philippines was not part of the TPP, some politicians in the Philippine Liberal Party thought that joining the initiative would be a good way to counter China.⁶⁷ Initial pronouncements from the Trump administration indicated that the foreign policy involvement of the American government would be limited in favor of a greater focus on domestic issues. Taking a similar position, Filipino influencers argued that the Duterte government should do the same, i.e. focus on resolving internal issues first rather than starting an international dispute with China.⁶⁸ As a result, the initial fervor to take China to court and fight for the South China Sea lost support among Filipinos and Filipino elites.

And finally, Duterte was heavily criticized by leaders of the West. Barack Obama (2009–2017) criticized Duterte for his appalling record on human rights before Donald Trump took office.⁶⁹ Duterte retaliated by accusing Obama and the US more broadly of previously unatoned for colonial massacres and exploitation. Duterte was also subsequently criticized by the European Union and other human rights organizations across the world. According to an informal adviser to the Duterte administration, Duterte turned to China for backing when the US and other traditional allies of the Philippines initially refused to back his anti-drug campaign. In fact, a US senator obstructed the delivery of weapons to the Philippine National Police during Duterte’s war on drugs.⁷⁰ Thousands of accused Filipino drug pushers have been killed as part of Duterte’s “War on Drugs” using Chinese ammunition and weapons. China has also promised to pay for drug addict rehabilitation programs more recently.

4.2.3. Economic realities

Duterte’s economic strategy relied on two factors. First, he changed from the previous administration’s focus on creating a surplus on budgets and sound fiscal management to deficit spending in order to expand infrastructure stock. Aquino’s Public and Private Partnerships, which capitalized on the Philippine oligarch’s ability to borrow from capital markets, relied on the private sector to pay for and even manage infrastructure.⁷¹ Aquino III’s “hands off” approach to construction resulted in institutional backlog and infrastructural fragmentation.⁷² The economic gains of most Filipinos and the number of people who have ascended to the middle class resulted in an increased within-country inequality.⁷³ Moving away from PPP alone to primarily using development finance to fund infrastructure projects resulted in an increased number of foreign loans. During the Beijing visit, Duterte was accompanied by more than 200 Filipino and Filipino Chinese business groups. These elites and groups negotiated with Chinese state-owned enterprises, private firms, and investors to fund key projects across the country. The Duterte government compiled these deals into one big “tranche” worth $24 billion, comprising both FDI and development finance.⁷⁴ Eventually, it became apparent that most of the deals needed to be canceled or modified due to the lack of due diligence. Nonetheless, the number of Chinese projects increased from 0 during the Aquino period to 5 during the Duterte period,⁷⁵ signifying a couple of billion USD worth of finished and ongoing projects.⁷⁶

Second, in October 2016 China lifted the ban on Philippine banana exports, committed to increasing Philippine agricultural imports generally, and encouraged its tour groups to conduct operations in the Philippines.⁷⁷ These outcomes have strong roots in Duterte’s regime. During the Aquino administration, China placed restrictions on Philippine bananas and discouraged Chinese tour groups from entering the Philippines. While these measures did little to harm the Philippine economy overall, some Filipino elites and sectors were nonetheless harmed. Specifically, banana exporters and other fruit exporters in Mindanao thought that the Aquino administration was negligent in dealing with China. Other Philippine politicians, particularly those who rely on tour companies, believed the same. Electing Rodrigo to become the President therefore represented a highly significant move for the Duterte family. This was the will of those provincial and regional politicians who voted and lobbied for Duterte.⁷⁸ After all, giving the local governments the power to decide on matters would prevent situations such as the Chinese sanctions from affecting these provinces in the future.

4.3. Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-)

Bongbong Marcos capitalizes on the unpopularity of Chinese online gambling investments and China’s maritime incursions in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zones, which were enabled by the Duterte administration. Online gambling created numerous social, political, and social problems to Filipinos. As hundreds of thousands of Chinese migrated and lived in Metro Manila, Philippine public services were severely constrained. Metro Manila, a city of 12 million people, had to absorbed 500,000 Chinese citizens, which resulted in intense anti-Chinese sentiments among Filipinos. Real estate prices surged and Philippine business process outsourcing jobs decreased. In addition, Filipinos were bombarded by news of China’s maritime incursions and abuses of Philippine fishers. All these gave Marcos the opportunity to create political capital by moving away from China and toward the United States.

Bongbong’s administration has signaled significant deviation from the Duterte administration. Bongbong has strengthened Philippine ties with the United States by welcoming four Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement bases.⁷⁹ Marcos has also sought stronger defense ties with the Philippines’ neighbors. Marcos signed an agreement with Japan to allow the Japanese Self Defense Force to conduct humanitarian assistance in the Philippines.⁸⁰ Marcos reaffirmed the Status of Forces and Visiting Forces Agreements between the Philippines and Australia, and the Philippines is also seeking stronger ties with South Korea. Unlike the Duterte administration, Bongbong has definitely accommodated American interests in the Philippines. These moves should not however be taken as a clear move to realign the Philippines to the United States. In September, Bongbong met with US President Joe Biden in New York to talk about Philippine-US cooperation. Bongbong then met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in January 2023 to talk about Philippine-China cooperation. However, the Philippines firmly took a stance by accepting the reestablishment of US military bases in the Philippines.

4.3.1. Domestic politics

In the 2022 elections, Bongbong Marcos defeated former Vice President Leni Robredo by a huge margin. Bongbong attained 31,629,783 votes or 58.77% of the total votes, beating Robredo by 16.5 million votes overall. This huge win in favor of Bongbong has been unprecedented, beating two previously held record by former Presidents – the former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, his father, only garnered 18,309,360 votes and former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay only scored a 38-point margin over his opponent. Bongbong formed a coalition with Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter and former mayor of Davao City. Sara became Bongbong’s Vice President and won handily against her opponent as well. Many argue that Rodrigo’s popularity helped both Bongbong and Sara.

The Dutertes and the Marcoses have historically been friendly to the PRC. First, there was a united front or a coalition between the Dutertes’ and Marcoses’, which mean that Liberal Party’s view – the remnants of Aquino III’s elites – on how to approach China have been or will be pushed out by both the Duterte and Marcos administrations. Many of Rodrigo’s officials either remain in power via Sara or have been carefully replaced by elites chosen by the Marcos faction. This so-called “political cartel” between both families signifies a long-term partnership that may mean a predictable China policy. In other words, with little political turnover and a relative monopoly of national decision making in the hands of both families, the more anti-China political elites are outside the levers of power. Both families have strong personal and working relationships with the Chinese Embassy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese government has established consulates in both Laoag, the capital of the Marcoses’ regional stronghold, and Davao City, the powerbase of the Dutertes. These consulates have created familiarity between the Chinese officials and both families. Chinese officials regularly attend local events, such as the opening of new buildings, medical missions, and donation drives. In other words, the Chinese embassy’s longer lifespan and activities in both regions have created a firm relationship between the members of both factions and the Chinese government.⁸¹

These moves by Bongbong actually show domestic politics at work. Specifically, Bongbong is expanding the Philippine’s ties with the United States and other powers in the region in order to weaken Sara and the Duterte faction.⁸² While an alliance between the two families is what is often shown to the world, there is actually mutual distrust between both factions.⁸³ Bongbong’s elites have slowly replaced the Duterte-appointees across different layers of the government.⁸⁴ There was also a dispute on the distribution of the cabinet positions between the families. Specifically, Sara asked for the Department of Defense which would have given the Dutertes a stronger grip over the military. Bongbong refused, opting to compromise with by giving Sara the Department of Education, which has one of the largest budgets among Philippine agencies. In the context of China, the decision of Bongbong to expand ties is partly related to weakening the Duterte’s elites.⁸⁵ US, Japan, Australia, and South Korean officials in the Philippines have had negative experiences with the Duterte elites. Strengthening the Philippines’ relations with other countries increases the power of Bongbong’s faction through the range of relations and connections they hold.

Second, during the COVID-19 years, many online gambling firms left the Philippines due to the lack of profitability and the depressed global market. Since direct rent payments from online gambling firms decreased, there was less of a reason for the Duterte administration to kowtow to Beijing. In 2020 and 2021, the Duterte administration began to voice its concerns about China, particularly its island reclamation actions in the South China Sea.⁸⁶ Marcos has also taken a more direct stance in relation to China’s dislike of online gambling by banning new investment in the Philippines. As pointed out by a Philippine Senator, a key reason here is that online gambling does not benefit the Marcoses directly; rather, it benefited the Duterte-aligned elites.⁸⁷

4.3.2. Geopolitics

Due to the domestic politics concerned covered in the previous section, Marcos has taken an accommodating stance toward the United States. While domestic politics matter, there are also geopolitical factors that shape the Marcos’ governments resolve to move the Philippines toward the United States. There are two reasons for this. First, China has actively terraformed islands in the South China Sea, resulting in the increased Chinese presence in the seas. In 2021, Chinese fishing ships amassed in the Julian Reef, alarming the Philippines as a whole. Despite Duterte’s proclamation of friendship between the Philippines and China, the Chinese government seems intent on informally occupying certain part of the seas. Increased public vigilance alongside the end of Duterte’s term resulted in a stronger voice by the Philippine military to pushback against China’s activities. The Philippine Navy and Coastguard took part in the “freedom of operation navigation operations,” which eventually drove the Chinese fishing ships away.⁸⁸ When Marcos came into power, his administration was alarmed by China’s gains during the Duterte administration. As pointed out by one of his family members in an interview, Bongbong is deeply concerned by China’s moves.⁸⁹ Geopolitics has affected China’s place in the Philippines. In October 2023, the Philippine Senate is reviewing the BRI projects in the Philippines.⁹⁰

Second, geopolitics above and beyond China have also hit the Philippines. Specifically, the Ukraine-Russia War, which has bolstered a unified Western response, has to be faced by the Marcos administration. Russia’s action has depressed the global energy markets and the blockade of Ukraine, which had been one of the world’s largest food exporters, hit food prices. The Philippines is a major importer of both commodities, resulting in price increases for both. At the start, Marcos has taken a neutral stance in the conflict, inviting greater military and security cooperative agreements with the United States while also continuing some of its existing partnerships with Russia and China. However, he has recently called for a withdrawal of Russia from Ukraine.⁹¹ Third, Marcos is concerned about Beijing’s moves in Taiwan.⁹² In a recent interview, he said that the trends are worrying especially if these moves impact the Philippines more directly.

4.3.3. Economic realities

The impact of COVID-19 on the Philippines has been severe. Just like most emerging economies, Philippine economic growth plummeted by a couple of percentage points despite efforts of the government to reinvest and restart the economy. The Marcos government’s decision to move the Philippines toward the United States goes back to the gamble that stronger ties with the Americans will not change the economic attraction of the Philippines to Chinese firms. First, Marcos has continued to attract Chinese FDI and development finance. In January 2023, Marcos visited Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. The two parties agreed upon new economic, political, and cultural imperatives. Marcos’ visit was not as hyped as Duterte’s 2016 visit to Beijing. However, these new agreements still signify the economic importance of China to the Philippine economy. It should be clear that these agreements still happened despite Marcos’ meeting Joe Biden in September 2022 and the more recent Philippine defense agreements with the United States. It shows that the Marcos administration is trying to maximize what it can get from both the US and Beijing.

Second, Marcos’ foreign policy approach, to be a “friend to everyone, enemy to no one” comes at a time when surging food and oil prices have hit the Philippines hard. Other problems outside of the Philippines’ control have thwarted efforts by the government to maintain economic activity. For instance, COVID-19 restrictions have limited economic activity in the West, East Asia, and Gulf States, which in turn restricts the ability of Filipino workers to return to their prior employment. The Philippines continues to rely on the BPO industry, whose growth has slowed down significantly. The Philippines’ economy is expected to benefit from fresh economic activities, which is why Marcos has taken a friendlier approach toward China. However, the Philippines is also further opening options from other countries, such as the United States, Japan, India, and Singapore. According to Bongbong’s DTI officials, China does not need to be the main investor or financier of projects.⁹³ As such, geopolitical considerations have become more important to the Marcos administration as tensions and encounters in the South China Sea intensified. The Marcos administration is considering taking back control of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines,⁹⁴ which is 40% owned by the State Grid Corporation of China. In 2022, Marcos has decided to renegotiate the three Chinese railway projects that were agreed upon under Duterte.⁹⁵ In 2023, these projects were fully canceled.⁹⁶

5. Conclusions

While Takahara examines the five factors of geopolitics, domestic politics, economic realities, internal security, and regional alliances, I suggest that only three factors mattered in the Philippines. Specifically, I argue domestic politics, economic realities, and geopolitics interact to shape Philippine politics. Peace and security and regional alliance factors appear largely irrelevant. All these factors are shaped and bound by the logic of political survival of the leader, which results in criticizing or working with China. Empirically, I illustrate that a combination of these two factors explain the Philippines’ foreign policy. During Aquino III, his coalition’s anti-corruption program led to the persecution of officials from the Arroyo administration who had close ties to the Chinese government and businesses. This was one of the main reasons why Aquino III never established strong connections with China. Between the two regimes, this change from officials with ties to China to those who had negative opinions of China resulted in a reduction in communication and made an already strained relationship more difficult. In other words, this study illustrates the importance of time on the elements that make up the octagonal framework. The interaction of domestic politics, geopolitics, regional alliance structure, and economic reality is crucial in the case of the Philippines. Internal security has not been as important a factor.

The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, while existing studies point to international factors as the main reason for the Philippines’ foreign policy position, our study argues that the interaction of numerous factors alongside political survival explains why certain administrations chose to be pro- or anti-China. This significantly alters the literature because the empirical material presented here is able to reconcile the different aspects – international and domestic – of previous studies that have remained unintegrated. Second, existing works on international relations ignore the agency of host country actors while other works that acknowledge agency exclusively focus on state institutions. In contrast, this paper highlights the numerous factors that bring together and integrate geopolitics, economics, and domestic politics. Future work should analyze other administrations in this light.

Third, the theoretical framework of the paper can be furthered by applying these concepts to other leaders. Specifically, political survival, which looks at how political survival shaped the decision of the current leaders, can be applied to other countries. For instance, to what extent do the policies of Jokowi Widodo (2014–2024) and Anwar Ibrahim (2022-) toward China depend on criticizing their predecessors. Some theoretical considerations regarding party institutionalization and regime type can also be used to nuance the discussions of political survival. Do party structures and regime type shape political survival? Furthermore, under what situations do leaders follow the strategy of their predecessors? All these questions can be explored in the future.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to the JICA Ogata Research Institute for inviting me to be part of this projcet. I am particularly thankful to Takahara Akio, Asada Ray, Imai Natsuko, Shiga Hiroaki, and Kitano Naohiro. I am also grateful to the research participants for sharing their time and knowledge of the subject matter as well as the participants of the round table workshop on ”The New Dynamics of Peace and Development in the Indo-Pacific: How Countries in the Region Proactively Interact with China.”

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the JICA Research Institute.

Notes on contributors

Alvin Camba

Alvin Camba is an Assistant Professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He received his PhD in Sociology from the Johns Hopkins University. He is a faculty affiliate at the Center for International Environment & Resource Policy and the Climate Policy Lab at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. His research has been awarded multiple best research paper awards by several academic networks (International Studies Association, American Sociological Association, GRADNAS), has been published in top development and political economy journals (e.g., Review of International Political Economy, Development and Change, Energy Research and Social Science, etc.), and has contributed to widely-circulated think tank policy papers (e.g. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the International Republican Institute, and Center for International Private Enterprise) on China’s activities in Southeast Asia. He has been cited and/or interviewed by The Financial Times, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal, NPR, and other news outlets, and invited to speak at The World Bank, the US State Department, AidData, etc. Most recently, Dr. Camba is part of the Carnegie Corporation of New York-funded Responsible Public Engagement project at the Korbel School. The project investigates, among others, China’s disinformation strategies and investments in rare earths.

Notes

¹ Takahara, “Introduction to the special issue on the comparative study.”

² de Mesquita, “Ruminations on Challenges.”

³ U.S. Department of Defense. Philippines, U.S. Announce Four New EDCA Sites.

⁴ Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge.”

⁵ De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy;” “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy on China and the Crisis in the Philippine – US Alliance.”

⁶ Yamazaki and Osawa, “Asymmetry Theory and China.”

⁷ Chao, “The Philippines’ Perception and Strategy”.

⁸ Kreuzer, “A Comparison of Malaysian and Philippine Responses.”

⁹ Wu and Velasco, “Examining the Philippines’ China Policy”.

¹⁰ Tran, “Presidential Turnover and Discontinuity.”

¹¹ Lischin, “The Future of the US-Philippines Alliance.”

¹² Glaser, and Poling, “China’s Power Grab in the South China Sea.”

¹³ Wang and Fu, “Local Politics and Fluctuating Engagement with China.”

¹⁴ Grossman, “China has Lost the Philippines Despite Duterte’s Best Efforts.”

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Takahara, “Introduction to the Special Issue on the Comparative Study.” Takahara adds one more factor and modifies the initial list in this special issue.

¹⁷ Kuik, “Asymmetry and Authority: Theorizing Southeast Asian Responses.”

¹⁸ Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”

¹⁹ Takagi, “The Politics of Grand Strategy in an Emerging State.”

²⁰ Interview, Political broker, Liberal Party, Quezon City, August 11, 2017.

²¹ Official Gazette, “The Prosecution’s Response to Chief Justice Corona’s Statement.”

²² Ibid.

²³ BBC, “Philippines Ex-leader Gloria Arroyo Arrested for Fraud.” November 18, 2011.

²⁴ Aquino III, “The Mission for Manila.”

²⁵ Interview, Former Arroyo official, August 20, 2017.

²⁶ Interview, Philippine Chinese Oligarch, Makati, August 13, 2027.

²⁷ Interview, Vice President, ZTE Philippines, Makati City, July 24, 2017.

²⁸ De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign policy.”

²⁹ Takagi, “The Politics of Grand Strategy in an Emerging State.”

³⁰ De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Appeasement Policy.”

³¹ Interview, Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ De Castro, “The Duterte Administration’s Foreign Policy.”

³⁴ Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”

³⁵ See NEDA, “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010);” “Overseas Development Aid List (2010–2016).”

³⁶ Interview, Adviser, Manila, August 21, 2017.

³⁷ Interview, Ex-Cabinet Member in Aquino III’s regime, San Juan, October 29, 2018.

³⁸ Interview, Ex-Cabinet Member during Aquino III, San Juan, October 29, 2018.

³⁹ Interview, Executive of Chinese SOE, Manila, November 3, 2018.

⁴⁰ Official Gazette, “The Prosecution’s Response to Chief Justice Corona’s Statement.”

⁴¹ Lema, “Philippine Tax Sheriff Takes Aim at Cheats to Hit Target.”

⁴² Official Gazette, Economic Development.

⁴³ Llanto, Adoracion and Ortiz, Development Finance and Aid in the Philippines.

⁴⁴ IMF. Global Financial Stability Report.

⁴⁵ Montecillo, “PH Credit Rating Upgraded.”

⁴⁶ IMF. Global Financial Stability Report.

⁴⁷ See Camba, “Inter-state Relations and State Capacity.”

⁴⁸ Mitra, “Leveraging Service Sector Growth in the Philippines.”

⁴⁹ Camba, et al., “Strongmen Politics and Investment Flows.”

⁵⁰ Blanchard, “Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, says U.S. has lost.”

⁵¹ Camba and Epstein. “From Duterte to Orbán: The Political Economy of Autocratic Hedging.”

⁵² Interview, Duterte’s Former Advisor, Davao City, March 8, 2023.

⁵³ Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”

⁵⁴ Camba and Li. “Chinese Workers and Their ‘Linguistic Labour’.”

⁵⁵ BI. Tourists and Special Work Permits.

⁵⁶ Interview, Duterte’s political broker, Quezon City, September 20, 2019.

⁵⁷ Interview, Philippine Senator, Manila, March 15, 2023.

⁵⁸ Camba, “The Sino‐centric Capital Export Regime.”

⁵⁹ Interview, Local Investor, Manila, January 18, 2020.

⁶⁰ Perper, “The Body Count of Mayors in the Philippines.”

⁶¹ Interview, Corporal, Philippine Coastguard, January 20, 2020.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”

⁶⁴ CSIS. Who is Taking Sides after the South China Sea Ruling.

⁶⁵ Interview, Philippine Senator, Manila City, March 14, 2023.

⁶⁶ Baker, “Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature Trade Deal.”

⁶⁷ Interview, Aquino III, Quezon City, January 18, 2020.

⁶⁸ Interview, Filipino political broker, Quezon City, February 28, 2023.

⁶⁹ BBC. “That ‘Awkward Moment’ when Obama Met Duterte after ‘whore’ spat.”

⁷⁰ Zengerle, “Exclusive: U.S. stopped Philippines rifle sale that senator opposed.”

⁷¹ Tahara-Stubbs, “Philippines: Aquino’s PPP Legacy is a Bulging Pipeline.”

⁷² NEDA. “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010).”

⁷³ Camba, “Cementing Development and (un) Steeling Decarbonization.”

⁷⁴ NEDA. “List of Active ODA Grants (March 2010).”

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Camba, “How Duterte Strong-armed Chinese Dam-builders but Weakened Philippine Institutions.”

⁷⁷ Ramirez, “Philippines expects 2 M Chinese tourists this year.”

⁷⁸ Interview, Local Politician, Davao City, March 8, 2023.

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. Philippines, U.S. Announce Four New EDCA Sites.

⁸⁰ Japan Times. “Marcos Takes Relations with Japan to New Heights.”

⁸¹ Camba, “How Chinese Firms Approach Investment Risk.”

⁸² Interview, Local Politician, Laoag, March 1, 2023.

⁸³ Interview, Political Broker, Pasig City, February 28, 2023.

⁸⁴ Interview, Poltiical Broker, Quezon City, March 9, 2023.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Mercado, “Duterte Says Biden Invited him, Other ASEAN Leaders for Summit in Washington.”

⁸⁷ Interview, Philippine Senate, Manila, March 13, 2023.

⁸⁸ Tomacruz, “Defense Chief Vows more Navy, Coast Guard Ships in West Philippine Sea.”

⁸⁹ Interview, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, March 1, 2023.

⁹⁰ Felipe, “6 other Philippines-China projects delayed; Senate reviewing deals.”

⁹¹ Bottolier-Despois and Revise, Philippines Joins UN Demand for Russia to Withdraw from Ukraine.

⁹² Martina, Durfee and Brunnstrom. “Marcos says Philippines Bases could be ‘useful’ if Taiwan Attacked.”

⁹³ Interview, Quezon City, March 11, 2023.

⁹⁴ Venzon, “Philippines” Marcos backs probe on China-owned power grid company.”

⁹⁵ Camba, ““Marcos should revive Chinese-backed rail projects on new terms.”

⁹⁶ Benar News Staff. “Philippines drops funding deal with China.”