How does the development frontline view the major powers? A perception survey toward China in Zambia

ABSTRACT

In general, perception surveys toward foreign countries tend to focus on urban populations with consistently high levels of education during the analysis phase. This is because they are considered more important in influencing domestic and international politics. This paper seeks to counter these traditional perception surveys and focus on those at the frontline of development. It aims to identify the perceptions of those at the frontline of China’s long-standing mining development projects in Zambia toward China and how they view development in the region. Perception surveys and focus group interviews with various social groups were conducted in Chambishi in the Copperbelt, where mining development has long been taking place. The study then identified differences in perceptions and underlying factors among those who are considered to have a high level of education. The survey results show that the public’s perceptions toward China are nested. Chambishi residents, who are at the frontline of development driven by China, were found to have a favorable perception toward them. People are acutely aware that China is essential for Zambia’s development. On the other hand, the high favorable perception toward China does not mean that they feel that China is psychologically close to them. Although people appreciate the diverse contributions that Chinese companies make to the region, they strongly hold the view that these contributions are “insufficient” when compared to the mining resources in the region that China is enclosing.

KEYWORDS:

• Public perception
• China
• development frontline
• Zambia

1. Introduction

In recent years China has been engaged in development assistance and investment projects in many parts of the world, establishing its political and economic influence particularly in African countries, among others. Some countries benefit economically from accepting Chinese development and investment, while others see this combination resulting in a worsening economic situation. One of these, Zambia, recently found it difficult to repay the 40% of its external public debt owed to China, declaring default in 2020, ahead of other countries in Africa in comparable situations.¹ Similarly, Sri Lanka in South Asia claimed a default in 2022 as its borrowing from other international financial markets as well as China swelled, and revenue from tourism and overseas remittances due to the global spread of COVID-19 declined. These situations led the international community to further portrayed in a negative light and promote the narrative that China is leading global south a “debt trap.”

However, there is also a positive assessment of Chinese investment in emerging economies. This recognizes the improvements in people’s access to basic infrastructure² and the acceleration in the development of local manufacturing industries³ that creates jobs in local communities.⁴ On the other hand, while China emphasizes win-win in its relationships with emerging economies, this state-led capital export model is more likely to invite suspicion due to its all-encompassing geopolitical motivation, and criticism due to its strong commercial incentives.⁵

According to the Pew Research Center, a US research firm that has been conducting surveys of people’s perceptions of foreign countries for many years, perceptions toward China differ significantly between developed countries such as those in the OECD and the emerging economies. The trend in perception toward China is negative in developed countries and positive in emerging countries. Specifically, it is negative or increasing in Japan, South Korea, the USA and Canada, whereas it is favorable in South American and African countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.⁶ Local perceptions toward the involvement of foreign countries in their economies are becoming more important than ever in steering domestic politics in addition to the political stances, including foreign policy, of political leaders across the globe. Indeed, rising public dissatisfaction toward China in African countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Sierra Leone has enabled politicians to win elections by being explicitly anti-Chinese and criticizing their opponents⁷ if they are not.

Nationalist sentiment and perceptions of a foreign country are subject to different reactions depending on individual experience, ideology and personal qualities. They can also be altered by government rhetoric, and by misinformation and disinformation, where the media is a significant factor in this process. These perceptions have been studied for many years by a number of institutions, including the Pew Research Center, in a variety of countries. The public opinion surveys often used to obtain data in this situation, emphasize representation, and enables the establishment of respondent demographics, such as gender, education, income and place of residence, which can shed light on overall patterns and trends.

On the other hand, the adverse effects of “averaging” and “generalizing” from data that are inherently disparate are also considerable. The data collected by major research institutions, which provide countries’ sufficient information on trends, are not sensitive enough to reveal differences in perceptions between urban and rural areas, or between educated who are considered to be more interested in foreign affairs and political issues and ordinary citizens whose education background is lower than the other. Also, In many cases, the rural residents in particular have been neglected by urban political elites.⁸

Recognizing these challenges, Xie and Jin,⁹ who studied perceptions toward China using the Pew Research Centre data and their own, employed Converse’s argument that ordinary citizens are less educated and inconsistent in their opinions compared to elites, and limited their analysis to the more educated elite group.¹⁰ However, globalization and progress in information technology have enabled low-cost access to all kinds of information, even for low-educated people in rural areas. The development of social media has also contributed to providing people with a greater variety of information than ever before.

In other words, lack of knowledge should not necessarily be related to the presence or absence of formal education, long or short. Many development projects also take place in rural areas and their boundaries rather than in urban areas. It is a misconception that those at the frontline where development occurs have not been considered a valuable opinion on the basis of their low level of education.

This study therefore focuses on public perceptions of domestic politics, one of the components of the pentagonal model that forms the main analytical framework of this special issue, by using Zambia as a case study. We shed the light on general public living near the sites where Chinese development projects are being implemented. In contrast to traditional perception surveys, where the country has been the unit of analysis, this study focuses on ordinary people at the frontline where development is taking place. Chinese development and investment projects in Zambia have historically concentrated on mining. These mines are located in rural rather than urban areas. The largest of these mines in the country are located in Chambishi, Copperbelt Province, in the north. Not surprisingly, development and investment that takes place in rural areas is determined by senior central government officials in the capital Lusaka, and the politicians and a few influential actors in the Copperbelt, and does not reflect the concerns of the people who actually reside near the mining sites where the resources lie.

However, it is the people living on the front line who experience the impact of development and investment first-hand. Urban residents, who are far from the frontline of rural dwellers have different perceptions, views and perceptions toward China, and it is difficult to take averages of the two groups and try to understand them in terms of “generalized perceptions.”

This study therefore questions the traditional perception surveys that have often neglected the people on the frontline of development, and focuses on them. It distinguishes between urban residents and educated people who are involved in some way in policy-making or have a high level of knowledge and interest in politics in general, including international relations, but who are distant from the actual development frontline, and ordinary citizens who are on the frontline, dealing with the impacts of Chinese development on a daily basis.

The survey was conducted in Chambishi in the Copperbelt, where mining development has long been practiced, through perception surveys and focus group interviews with different social groups, including traders selling vegetables and other products at markets, football team players, former mining workers, farmers and others. In addition, interviews were conducted with local politicians and other government officials to gather information about the area. Based on the findings, this paper analyses how people perceive the mining development by China and the regional developments that have taken place in connection with it.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section looks at how the presence of China in Zambia and people’s perceptions of it have changed, along with previous research. Section 3 provides an overview of the perception survey on China conducted in Zambia, followed by the results and analysis in Section 4. The final section reflects on how people view the state of affairs now that China’s presence is essential to Zambia’s development, in the light of the findings of this survey.

2. Has Zambia and its perception toward China been changing?

2.1. Background of bilateral relationships

The relationship between China and Zambia is not something brand new. Even before Zambia gained independence from the British in 1965, China was often mentioned as a key agent in supporting Zambia’s political liberation struggle, both financially and materially.¹¹ Qiang¹² has organized the bilateral relations between Zambia and China into three distinct phases – the first from 1949 to 1979, the second from 1979 to 1999, and the final phase from 1999 to the present – to illustrate the strengthening of economic and political ties. For example, according to Johns Hopkins University SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative, Zambia has the second highest FDI flows from China in African countries in 2021, after Congo (John Hopkins University).¹³

Among these, the Tazara railway, which was completed during the first phase and remains China’s largest project in Africa to date, is something that Zambians invariably emphasize in their relations with China. The development of a transport network was an urgent issue for Zambia, a country that needs the maritime route for the export of mining resources, its main industry, but the mines are located inland from the ports. The construction of the Tazara Railway linking Tanzania and Zambia with Chinese support continues to be a symbol of Zambia-China friendship to this day. In addition, the first special economic zone on the African continent was built by China in Chambishi, Zambia (2007), followed by a similar one in Lusaka, and the Chinese population, which is increasing year by year through economic activities, is also increasing its appeal with large advertisements placed everywhere, making the Chinese presence very visible indeed. The Chinese presence is also becoming increasingly visible in the form of large advertisements placed all over the country.

Although the Chinese presence is increasing visibly, there are no accurate statistics on the Chinese population in Zambia. The total has been estimated at between 13,000 and 22,000, although some claim between 80,000 and 100,000, and it appears to be one of the largest Chinese populations on the African continent.¹⁴ The absence of data has caused political tensions and contributed to unfounded views that China is trying to build a new empire in Africa.¹⁵ For example, in 2006, the late President Sata claimed in his election campaign that Zambia was “infested” with 80,000 Chinese nationals, leading to the exclusion of Chinese people in many parts of the country. The veracity of this figure of 80,000 is not clear, but it has been singled out and used in the literature as if it were true.¹⁶ On the other hand, with over 600 large and small Chinese companies known to be engaged in economic activities in 2020,¹⁷ it is easy to imagine that China’s influence in Zambia is not small.

2.2. Chinese investment in mining sector

One of the main reasons for China’s commitment to Zambia stems from the country’s rich mining resources. As the world’s largest consumer of copper, China is active in developing mines in Zambia, with 88% of its investment in mining or related activities. The heart of this is in Chambishi, in the Copperbelt Province, in northern Zambia. Among Chinese companies operating in Zambia, the Chambishi mine owned by Non Ferrous Company Africa Mining (NFCA) is the largest, and several other Chinese companies engage in mining development in Chambishi.

Small and medium-sized enterprises are also involved in copper mining as well as in processing and transport, while restaurants and retail outlets for Chinese nationals have also set up in and around Chambishi. However, it is difficult to ascertain the number of these enterprises and their intimate details. In many cases, the Chinese have not disclosed such information, and even officials in the Chingola Administrative District, which has jurisdiction over Chambishi, do not hold accurate information.¹⁸

Historically, Zambia’s copper mines have been operated by India, Canada, Switzerland, China, and South Africa, but many foreign companies scaled back production or ceased operations during the 2008 global financial crisis.¹⁹Green estimates that each employee in the mining industry in Zambia supports 20 service sector jobs, and that the loss of mining sector jobs has had a severe negative impact on Zambia’s economy and local communities.²⁰

China responded in the exact opposite way during this period. Nonferrous China Africa (NFCA), operated by China Nonferrous Metal Mining Co Ltd (CNMC), announced that it would “not reduce investment by a penny, not reduce production by a tonne, and not lay off a single employee.”²¹ It also expanded its operations by acquiring the Luanshya mine in the Copperbelt, which was originally owned by India (1997–2000) and Switzerland (2003–2009) and had ceased production during the crisis.²²

In the past, non-Chinese multinational companies had participated in mining development in Chambishi. South Africa and Canada, for example, withdrew due to the fall in the international price of copper around 2000, resulting in many unemployed workers. Then came China as a savior,²³ for a company that had been closed for 14 years just prior to the NFCA’s acquisition of the Chambishi mine. These seemingly unattractive sites, which were abandoned by the West due to lack of profit prospects, have been actively re-opened or entered by China.²⁴ An important aspect of Chinese entry, not only for Zambia but also for Africa, is that participation in economic activities that capitalize on investments that Western countries are not interested in or willing to provide is a potential source for national development.²⁵

2.3. Chinese investment in human resources

The relationship is not only about infrastructure. Focusing on human resources and intellectual exchange is another feature where China shows its influence. For example, the Zambian Government has officially included Chinese as one of the second languages in the higher education curriculum set by the Ministry of Education from 2018. In parallel with this, Chinese teachers have been stationed in schools in 10 provinces across the country to provide language education as a pilot project.

In addition, the Confucius Institute, based at the University of Zambia since 2010, nurtures Chinese language students and provides opportunities for them to study in China (the course exchange system is called two plus two; 2 + 2), facilitates employment opportunities in Chinese companies in Zambia and aims to make the above pilot project a permanent formal program dispatching Chinese-speaking Zambian teachers with the aim of making it permanent as a formal program. More recently, there has also been a growing need for the Zambian Government to employ Chinese-speaking Zambians to improve communication between Chinese companies and the Zambian Government. These activities are aggressively undertaken not only to expand China’s presence in the business environment, but also to promote understanding of the Chinese way of life and culture through school education and the general public.²⁶

2.4. Perception towards China and its issues

With the ever-increasing presence of China, what are Zambians’ perceptions toward China and the Chinese? While some surveys of perceptions toward foreign countries, such as those conducted by the Pew Research Center and Afrobarometer, take larger sample sizes to achieve greater accuracy, an increasing number of NGOs and researchers have in recent years used their own methods and a more limited geographical area to reveal more localized perceptions. For example, Shi and Seim, who shared the same research site as the present study, conducted their own survey in 2013 among 800 households in Zambia’s Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces and found that there is a “reputation deficit” for Chinese investment in Zambia.²⁷ They found that the Zambian population is overall less favorably inclined toward Chinese investment, mainly due to a lack of “localization” on the part of Chinese companies to be more accommodating to the conditions in Zambia.²⁸

Based on the use of official statistics and household surveys, there is a high appreciation of the positive impact of Chinese investment on the Zambian economy and job creation. On the other hand, the absence of persons speaking Zambian compared to investment companies from other countries and the absence of an understanding of the Zambian way of life, for example, the difficulty in giving employees leave to attend weddings and other family, community and cultural/religious occasions, are significant problems.

This lack of understanding of how the local way of life works has also been identified by Brautigam²⁹ as a serious human rights violation. However, despite the fact that the Shi and Seim³⁰ study covers the capital city of Lusaka and the Copperbelt Province, which has a large amount of foreign investment that is not just Chinese, the results have been standardized by mixing the findings from the two regions. This makes the survey similar to that used in the present study as seen below.

Distinctions in perceptions and reactions between urban and rural areas, and between the elite and the ordinary citizens, have not been adequately addressed to date, although the importance of clarifying them has been noted.³¹ In a study of perceptions of China in Peru, Ratigan³² found that where large Chinese investment projects are implemented, they are more likely to have an impact on daily life, such as improving the economic situation of individuals. She identifies that non-elite groups in rural areas, who have more daily contact with China when compared to urban areas further away from the project implementation sites, play a sufficient role in shaping public opinion. However, this type of survey, which places value on generalization and emphasizes the data to be collected, has been committed in the past to providing results that are useful for policymaking, to the neglect of rural opinion.

3. The survey design

This study is a perception survey toward China, targeting the general public on the frontline where Chinese investment is taking place. It was conducted in February 2023 in Chambishi, the most densely mined area of Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. The design and methodology of the survey was as follows.

First, the survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with respondents using questionnaires originally developed. Ten graduates of Copperbelt University with experience in community-based research were employed and the interviews were conducted in a format where they read the questions in this questionnaire and the target group answered them. There were 40 questions in total, each of which was optional.

With a research collaborator from the University of Zambia, we made a preliminary visit to Chambishi Township (administrative division) and interviews were conducted with the seven councillors (elected politicians) responsible for the seven administrative divisions. Four groups were then selected to represent the general public. They were: people selling mainly vegetables at the market in the center of Chambishi; the official Chambishi football team; small-scale farmers; and former mineworkers. These include those living around Chambishi town center and those living deep in the mountains, 30 minutes to an hour away by bus. Some do not have public transportation so that uses bicycle.

The breakdown and respondents is shown in Table 1. 27 are from the market, 14 are from the official football team, 19 earn their living from agriculture and 22 are former mineworkers. It should be noted that 14 members of the football team are professionals who earn their income from being part of the team.

Table 1. Number of respondents and its group.

	Market	Football Team	Farmer	Ex-miner	Total
Number of repondents	27	14	19	22	82

The income and educational background of these individuals is presented in Tables 2 and 3. For income, the average monthly income in the previous year 2022 was asked. Overall, 40% of the respondents had less than ZK 2,999, the lowest of the options. Our data is probably reasonable as the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflect, which conducted a Satellite Home Survey in Zambia in 2022, gave an average income of ZK 1,000–3,000.

Table 2. Monthly salary of 2022, Chambishi.

Salary they claimed	Number	Percentage
~2,999 ZK (135 USD)	33	40%
3000~5000 ZK (136–226 USD)	13	16%
5001–7000 ZK (226–317 USD)	10	12%
7001–9000 ZK (318–408 USD)	4	5%
9001–11,000 ZK (409–499 USD)	3	4%
More than 11,002 ZK (more than 500 USD)	14	17%
No response	3	4%
Do not Know	2	2%

Table 3. Education background.

Education completed	number	Percentagr
Primary School	16	20%
Secondary School	20	24%
High School	36	44%
Techinal college	6	7%
University graduate	2	2%
University drop-out	2	2%

Looking at educational background (Table 3), 20% of all respondents had graduated from primary school only, followed by 24% who had graduated from secondary school only, and the largest proportion (44%) had graduated up to high school. Note that two university graduates were included, one was a man who was in charge of management in the market and the other was a woman who was a farmer.

In order to understand what features contribute to the public’s perception toward China in Chambishi, some comparative data is needed. For this reason, a survey was also conducted with Chambishi school teachers and students at Copperbelt University. University students were included in the survey because it was necessary to have some comparative information on how people in more urban areas than Chambishi and with higher levels of education view China. A breakdown of these is shown in Table 4. 30 of the school teachers had university degrees and 3 had postgraduate degrees. All university students were still in school.

Table 4. Breakdown of the people with highly educated background.

	Chambishi School Teather	Copperbelt University students
Number of repondents	33	25

The questionnaire was prepared in English. Zambia has a diverse ethnic composition and therefore a large number of languages are spoken. Accordingly the official language is English and many people can understand English. In many cases, interviews could be conducted in English, but students translated them into the local language when necessary. The questions were initially arranged to collect basic information such as birthplace, educational background, income and so on. This is followed by a line of questions asking about perceptions toward several foreign countries. Although the original purpose of the survey was to reveal perceptions of China, it was designed to avoid bias and misunderstanding among respondents by including several other countries as well.

Two different questions were used to ask about perceptions of foreign countries: the first asks about closeness. This asks which countries people psychologically feel closest to. Two different questions were used to ask about perceptions of foreign countries: the first asks about closeness. This poses the question of which country people psychologically feel closest to. The choice of countries was based on the following countries that are relevant to Zambia, also in consultation with co-researchers at the University of Zambia. 1. the USA; 2. China; 3. the UK; 4. Japan; 5. Russia; 6. South Africa; and 7. other.

Another question asked respondents to answer how they felt about each country on a four-point scale. The scale is: 1. very favorable, 2. somewhat favorable, 3. somewhat unfavorable, 4. very unfavorable. These results will be looked at in detail in the next section. This perception is based on whether they have a favorable impression of the country or, in extreme cases, do not like it. When considering whether one likes or does not like a country itself, it is difficult to define how they think of a country. Some people may think of the country’s political leaders, while others may think of the culture, food or friends from the country. In principle, we asked them how they perceive the country as a “country”,’ taking all of these things into account.

Apart from perceptions toward foreign countries, the survey also asked how people see development within the region. For example, which countries they consider to have contributed the most to the development of the region, and whether they consider China to have contributed to the development of the region, as China’s presence is clearly the largest in Chambishi. Furthermore, the questions also included which country they think is the development model that Zambia should aim for as various foreign investments and assistance come into Zambia. These responses and analyses are examined in more detail in the next section.

4. The result

4.1. Highly favorable is not the same as a sense of closeness

This section present analysis and findings from the survey result. First of all, we discuss about the perception which respondents have given the level of favors in each countries. They were asked to indicate their perception toward several countries on a four-point scale (1. very favorable, 2. somewhat favorable, 3. somewhat unfavorable, 4. very unfavorable). Firstly, China. The selected data are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Perception toward CHINA, JAPAN and USA.

Copperbelt ordinally:1: Market, 2: Footballer, 3: Farmer, 4: Ex-miner Copperbelt educated:5: Teacher, 6: Copperbelt University Student.

Apart from the market group (group 1), more than 80% of the four Chambishi groups selected level 1(very favorable) or 2(somewhat favorable). The market group had the highest percentage of those who chose level 3 (somewhat unfavorable) or 4(very unfavorable) (31%). About 20 years ago, when the local Chinese population was still small, Chinese people came to the market in Chambishi to shop and there was a lot of interaction with local residents. However, as the number of Chinese companies increased and the population grew at the same time, markets for Chinese people began to be built in the city. Chinese people now spend their money in these markets created exclusively by and for the Chinese, and their money is no longer spent in the local markets.

When it comes to school teachers (the group is stated as 5 in the figure 1), 37% responded with 3 (somewhat unfavorable) or 4 (very unfavorable) to the same question, indicating that they have a lower favorable perception toward China than the other groups. However, none of the students at Copperbelt University (the group is stated as 6 in the Figure 1) selected 3 or 4, making their high sensitivity by far the highest. This may arise from the difference between the four groups in the Copperbelt province that are closest to the mine site, and the group in the same province whose campus is located in Kitwe, the provincial capital, and who have few family and friends in the vicinity who travel to and from the work site. Alternatively, they are better informed about domestic politics and international relations and are more aware of the positive impact that China is having on Zambia’s economic development.³³

It is also worth noting that a smaller proportion of urban elites have a very favorable perception toward China compared to the Copperbelt public. This may be a result of politicians using such statements as China “colonizing” Zambia in their election campaigns, or being more susceptible to negative campaigning due to the greater visibility of the central government’s actions.

Overall, it is clear that the highest percentage of respondents, irrespective of location and social group, chose the very or somewhat favorable perception toward China, compared to their perceptions toward Japan and the USA. On the other hand, perceptions toward the USA and Japan are somewhat lower than the high favorability toward China.

The next question was which country they felt most close to, having been provided with the options of the USA, China, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and “others.”³⁴ Figure 2 shows a variation in responses indicating that having a favorable perception of China, as mentioned above, is not synonymous with feeling a sense of closeness. The groups that chose China as the country with which they felt closest to were, in order, ex-miners (51%), market operators (42%), farmers (39%), and football teams (27%).

Figure 2. Closeness of the countries.

Copperbelt ordinally: 1: Market, 2: Footballer, 3: Farmer, 4: Ex-miner Copperbelt educated: 5: Teacher, 6: Copperbelt University Student.

This result is not particularly surprising considering that 80% of ex-miners worked in Chinese mines. These groups, with the exception of the football team, also had the highest proportion placing China as the country they felt closest to, only the football team attracted the highest proportion who chose Japan (27%). According to the students questioned, this was partly influenced by Japan’s good performance in the World Cup football tournament three months before the survey was conducted.

More interestingly, this is the same as the percentage of former mineworkers who were the most likely to say they felt close to China when it came to teachers (51%). This is despite the fact that the proportion having a favorable perception was the lowest among all groups, at 57%. Similarly, the highest proportion of respondents had an either somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable perception toward China (43%). Nevertheless, this is not a clear explanatory factor.

Regardless of whether perceptions are favorable or not, and regardless of the scale of their closeness, there appears to be a certain degree of common understanding of China’s contribution to the development of the region. Figure 3 shows the responses on whether they think has contributed to the development of the region China (rather than the country as a whole) in which they live. 100% of farmers (group 3) agree with this, while a smaller proportion of school teachers agree that China has played a role in the development of the region. When asked in which areas in particular China’s contribution to regional development can be seen, the construction of infrastructure facilities and the creation of jobs were the most frequently agreed upon reasons for this.³⁵

Figure 3. Chinese contribution to the regional development.

Copperbelt ordinally 1: Market, 2: Footballer, 3: Farmer, 4: Ex-miner Copperbelt elite 5: Teacher, 6: Copperbelt University Student.

On the other hand, some respondents did not agree with any of China’s contributions when answering the questionnaire. For example, one footballer commented that “China may have contributed to the development of Chambishi, but it is China itself that benefits from it,” while two teachers commented that “China uses Chambishi to lubricate its own economy. One example of this is the China Mall, which China has built for itself. That is of no benefit to us Zambians,” was a criticism heard.

Despite these audible critical voices against China, it seems that people support China to a certain extent as a model of development for Zambia to aspire to. Figure 4 shows the responses on which country out of the USA, China, Japan and the UK would be a suitable future development model for Zambia to pursue. With the exception of footballers, the highest proportion of people in all groups chose China as a development model. For footballers, many seem to have a favorable impression of Japan, whereas many others, as seen in the other questions, say they do not know much about Japan.

Figure 4. Model that Zambia should follow for future development.

Copperbelt ordinally 1: Market, 2: Footballer, 3: Farmer, 4: Ex-miner Copperbelt elite 5: Teacher, 6: Copperbelt University Student.

Japan’s presence in Zambia is not as large as in China. There are less than 100 Japanese living in Zambia and only one Japanese expatriate working for a Japanese company, which is not comparable to the 80,000 Chinese. For this reason, when a survey of ordinary people in Chambishi was conducted, even when Japan was mentioned as an option, many respondents said that they found it difficult to answer the question because they knew nothing about Japan. China is a major public relations player as an implementer of investment and development projects. The presence of large billboards with Chinese writing, Chinese malls and Chinese restaurants seen in many places are good at making people aware of China’s presence and integrating it into their daily lives. Japan, on the other hand, has not been active in this kind of publicity. In many cases, infrastructure and other projects implemented by Japan were mistakenly thought to have been carried out by China. It is no surprise that China, with its overwhelmingly large population and number of projects, maintains a stable presence in a situation where it is difficult for many foreigners to distinguish between Chinese and Japanese characters and people.

4.2. China’s contribution to regional development vs. perceptions towards China

There is no doubt in anyone’s mind about China’s significant contribution to Zambia’s economic growth. Widespread perceptions toward the increased Chinese investment creating employment are frequently mentioned in studies.³⁶ It is likely that people are aware of the increased employment opportunities because they have family members, relatives or friends close to them who are employed in Chinese companies, even if it was not themselves.

Apart from this job creation, Chinese companies also contribute to Chambishi. This is the input brought to the region through CSR in exchange for access to local resources in Zambia. Normally, the central government (Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development) is the first point of contact for foreign capital to develop mines, not only in China, and must be regulated and obtain licenses for development and operation. Furthermore, as approximately 94% of land in Zambia is owned by traditional authorities, even though the Ministry of Mines issues permits and licenses, consultation with local authorities and consideration of customary law is necessary prior to implementation.³⁷

Despite these regulations, it appears that some Chinese companies do not follow the normal procedures and negotiate directly with farmers. Interviews with farmers in Chambishi revealed that Chinese companies have negotiated with and expropriated land from farmers who farm on land that is suitable for mining. The companies had of course purchased the land and paid the farmers. The money was apparently enough for the farmers to live on for six months, but not enough to buy new farmland and a house and continue farming.³⁸ In recent years, land prices have skyrocketed and it is often impossible to find suitable land for farming within a good distance from where they live. This is of course not without fault on the part of the farmers, but it is illegal to negotiate and obtain land by offering what can be described as a temporarily high price. However, there are no penalties or control measures in place for such interactions.

The persistent view that Chinese companies exploit Zambian workers, and the fact that resistance to China is growing stronger year by year,³⁹ means that Chinese companies need to work harder to avoid opposition and gain the understanding of local people in order to expand their own interests. Similarly, there is growing domestic condemnation of foreign mining companies using Zambia’s resources to contribute to their own growth, while Zambia receives no commensurate benefits.

Corporate CRS in Chambishi included improving local school facilities (building more school buildings), providing equipment to local medical facilities (deploying ambulances) and building water supply facilities. Chinese companies seem to be active in providing such infrastructure facilities in their own way, as they are easily visible to local residents and their benefits are easily received in everyday life. However, interviews in Chambishi Township revealed the opinions that the Chinese mining development in the area was “not worth it” and “inadequate” when compared to the resources offered by Chambishi and the sacrifices made. Main reasons were given such as environmental pollution as well not many areas receive benefit out of the CSR. The CSR has been done by couple of Chinese companies, however, it is not significant enough to impact the change of perception.

The Government has also mandated that at least 30% of economic activities in which foreign companies intervene must utilize local goods and resources from local companies, not only to appease frustrated voters, but also to ensure that the local mining sector and its supply chain are able to benefit more widely in their economic activities. However, this is imposed as a duty of effort and there are no penalties if it is not implemented.

Interviews with chambers of commerce and industry in Ndola and Kitwe in the Copperbelt indicated that less than 10% of all local companies have actually engaged in business with Chinese investment projects in mining development based on this government call. Across Africa, Chinese companies accounted for 69% of local construction projects in Zambia, compared to an average of 34%.⁴⁰ Considering these figures, it is clear how local companies in Zambia are unable to participate in construction projects. Interviews with local companies that actually do business with the Chinese companies also indicated that Chinese companies and Zambian companies are never equal and are sometimes treated inhumanely. Chinese companies employ Zambians, but never in management positions. All management positions are held by Chinese. This also makes it difficult for technology transfer from Chinese companies to occur in Zambia.

Another opinion heard at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry was that the government’s formulation of rules was not sufficient, and that there was a need to impose restrictions and penalties on investment activities for companies that do not comply. Doing business with Chinese companies is a costly affair, especially for small local companies, as Chinese companies speak only minimal English and local firms have difficulty communicating with them and are forced to sign contracts at prices that can only result in losses when quotations are given. But when they were asked, “Would you prefer Chinese companies to be gone?” they replied: “It is better than no business at all. We are being treated very harshly and badly, but we will continue to fight and appeal to the government about this situation. This is the way for local businesses in Zambia to become stronger.”

5. Conclusion: is Zambia becoming Chambia?

This paper focuses on public perceptions of domestic politics, one of the components of the pentagonal model that forms the main analytical framework of this special issue. Whereas many previous studies and surveys have tended to exclude non-elite groups when dealing with perceptions, the focus is on the ordinary people who face the frontline where Chinese investment and economic activity is taking place. Previous studies have broadly summarized the perception toward China in Africa as favorable when compared to other western countries, for example.

While it is clear from the government’s view and people’s perceptions that Chinese companies are beneficial to Zambia’s overall development, they may not be recognized as positive for those who work there and those on the frontline who witness the treatment of Zambian society by China. A survey of public perceptions toward China conducted in Chambishi, Copperbelt Province, where China is actively investing in mining development, identified nested perceptions.

Many people have a positive perception toward China because they have first-hand experience of China making some contribution to the development of the neighboring regions. These can be job creation, or infrastructure development that Chinese companies bring to the local area as part of their CSR in exchange for mining development. However, job creation was also influenced by negative perceptions, such as inhumane treatment of workers, lack of respect for Zambian society and customs and absence of interest in localization.⁴¹ Much of the criticism from Zambians in general centers on the terrible working conditions in Chinese companies and the fact that they enter businesses that Zambians are responsible for (e.g. selling chicken) and market them at a lower price than shops run by Zambians. A concern raised in interviews at the Chamber of Commerce was that the participation of these Chinese companies in the Zambian market would not bring about the technological upgrading and technology transfer itself that Zambia needs for its own growth, but rather keep Zambia in place.

One of the central themes of this paper is that perceptions of foreignness often emerge from lived experience, rather than solely from events familiar to the urban elite, such as foreign affairs and domestic politics. It was found that the non-elite segment of the Chambishi population had more favorable perceptions toward China than the urban elite segment. In other words, the data used in this study shows that urban elites have less favorable perceptions toward China. The question of closeness to China showed a different aspect from the perception. Having a high favorable impression of China was not an indication of a high degree of familiarity. There were many cases where even those with a high favorable perception toward China had a different country to which they felt close. Further research is needed into the background and factors behind this.

People are aware, painfully, that China is essential to Zambia’s development. However, they do not feel as close to China as they would like. Zambia was for a long time a British colony until independence in 1964. Since its finally gained independence, the country has maintained peace without civil conflict, which is unusual on the African continent. Against this backdrop, there have been many arguments that China is trying to colonize not only Zambia but also Africa through its economic activities.⁴²

Additional focus group interviews conducted with students from the University of Zambia provided some interesting insights. That is, the idea that Zambia is becoming Chambia has been a hot topic of discussion in recent years in a Facebook group of Zambian university students, where they discuss political and other issues. ⁴³ They were amusingly stories, which were, of course, ironic to Zambia itself.

The sneer had meaning. At least the younger generation understood that China was never trying to colonize or politically dominate Zambia, but was investing in the country because it was economically beneficial. In contrast, the US and other western countries and international organizations have interfered in Zambia’s internal affairs by denying its political ideology and identity and refusing to support it unless it gives in to their plans. This is what colonization is all about. People were afraid of this, they said. Although China’s economic activities in Zambia have also caused sacrifices, there seems to be no fear or shame of becoming a Chambia compared to this wariness and antipathy toward the West.

As China’s economic activities become more prominent in African countries and other parts of Asia, a narrative that put China as an enemy has been everywhere, as its ways do not conform to the rules of the Western world. However, this view of China as an enemy and the “debt-trap diplomacy”⁴⁴ that made it famous are now beginning to be established logically and with evidence by leading scholars of China’s international politics in Washington and elsewhere in North America that they are myths.⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, the analysis of perception surveys biased in favor of the elite and urban areas has played a part in supporting these narratives that cast China in a bad light. This is not to say that perceptions toward China in Zambia are stellar and that people are welcoming of Chinese companies and Chinese people. People’s perceptions vary. It depends a lot on what they see, hear and experience. The danger is to lump together people from these different experiences and perceive their perceptions toward China as representative of one country.

The number of data that could be gathered in this study is not comparable to those that have been conducted by major research firms. Nevertheless, there is a certain degree of value in focusing on people in the frontline of development and being able to uncover the perceptions of these people. Who can say that the perceptions of people far from the policy frontline are often honest and unclouded enough to often confuse us, but that they are not as important as the perceptions of a very limited elite group involved in policy-making?

It is my own fault that I have not used in this paper all five of the analytical measures that this special issue has made common to all of them. However, national sentiments, which seem the furthest and smallest when discussing agency in a country, are bound to become increasingly influential in the future. It is no longer possible for anyone to imagine what triggers it to become the spark that could move a country to the point where, thanks to the exponential development of information technology, people can access social networks no matter what rural village they are in, and where, for better or worse, it is easier to express their opinions in that place of anonymity. The perception survey in Zambia was inadequate for the regression and cross-analysis that should have been done, due to the design of the questions and the method of collecting responses. However, similar perception surveys have now begun in Sri Lanka and Laos, using a much-improved questionnaire based on the reflections of this survey. We hope that this will help us to better understand these countries, where China’s presence is significant. How much longer can the West, which has been considered a major power, including Japan as well as China, feel like a major power? Understanding the other side will help let us know where our country is headed.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Godfrey Hampawawe, research team from Copperbelt University and University of Zambia, councillors of Chambishi township, and JICA Zambia Office who helped my survey in Zambia. The author is also thankful to JICA Ogata Research Institute for the funding to conduct the research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

Notes on contributors

Ray Asada

Ray Asada is an Associate Professor at the Yamaguchi University, Japan. She also serves as a Visiting Fellow at JICA Ogata Research Institute for Peace where she was a research fellow before joining the current position. Her research examines the long-term effects of development policies, particularly the interactions between growth, urban and rural life, and the meaning of development. She mainly focuses on Sri Lanka’s development path and conducts in-depth fieldwork. Her most recent research explores how people on the frontlines of development projects perceive regional development as well as its impact. She received her PhD in Public Policy from the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo.

Notes

1. Then in 2022, Ghana, followed by Mali, declared default.

2. Alden and Alves, “History & Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa Policy;” Cissé, Chinese Telecom Companies Foray into Africa; Schiere and Rugamba, Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration; Urban et al. “An Analysis of China’s Investment in the Hydropower Sector in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region.”

3. Brautigam and Tang, “China’s Engagement in African Agriculture: Down to the Countryside”.

4. Kubny and Voss,The Impact of Chinese Outward Investment: Evidence from Cambodia and Vietnam; Wang et al., “Overseas Impacts of China’s Outward Direct Investment”.

5. Ye, “Fragmented Motives and Politics: The Belt and Road Initiative in China.”

6. Laura et al., “How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era.”

7. Shi and Seim, “A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of Chinese Investment in Zambia.”

8. Walsh, “Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness and the Power of Perspective.”

9. Xie and Jin, Sekai no Taichuninshiki-Sono Keikou to Kanren Yoin.

10. Converse, E. The Nature of Belief System in Mass Publics (1964).

11. Rapanyane, “China – Zambia Political and Economic Relations in Historical Context.”

12. Qiang, China-Africa Relations Since Introduction of FOCAC.

13. Zambia receives Chinese FDI 582.8 million US$ in 2021 (Johns Hopkins University).

14. Postel, Moving Beyond China in Africa: Insights from Zambian Immigration Data. According to Johns Hopkins University SAIS China-Africa Research Initiatives’, the highest number of Chinese laborers in Zambia between 2009 and 2021 was 8906 in 2019 (Johns Hopkins University).

15. French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa.

16. French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa.

Carmody, Hampwaye, and Sakala 2012, “Globalisation and the Rise of the State? Chinese Geogovernance in Zambia;” McNamee et al., Africa in Their Own Words: Study of Chinese Traders in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola.

17. International Institute for Trade and Economic Co-operation, “Department of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce Country (Region) Guides for Outward Investment Co-operation Zambia (in Chinese).” https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/gbdqzn/upload/zanbiya.pdf.

18. According to interviews with Chingola administrators conducted by the author and documents obtained from them, there are approximately 24 Chinese companies associated with the mining industry.

19. Whalley and Weisbrod (2012) identify that the contribution of Chinese investment to growth in sub-Saharan Africa was significant during the financial crisis.

20. Green, A Copper-Bottomed Crisis? The Impact of the Global Economic Meltdown on Zambia.

21. Zhong, “Zhongguo Youse Jituan: Weiji Zhong Bawo Jiyu Fazhan Zhong Buwang Zeren.”

22. Shi and Seim, “A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of Chinese Investment in Zambia.”

Interviews with CNMC executives indicate that the rationale for continued production and expansion in the face of downsizing and withdrawal by multinationals was not entirely due to economic reasons alone (Shi Seim, 2021). They describe the Luanshya takeover as a helping hand to Zambians when Zambia’s economy was in dire straits. Similarly, they point out that CNMC’s acquisition of the Luanshya mine is at least politically significant given the fact that it expanded China’s copper reserves and ownership in Zambia.

23. Alden, China in Africa.

24. Fraser, “Boom and Bust in Zambian Copper Mining: Donors, Multinationals, China and the Populist Response.”

25. Alden, China in Africa; Li, The Myth and Reality of Chinese Investors: A Case Study of Chinese Investment in Zambia’s Copper Industry.

26. In an interview, the Zambian representative of the Confucius Institute said that promoting correct information and understanding is one of the key missions of the Confucius Institute in the context of misunderstandings in information and perceptions toward China (February 2023).

27. Shi and Seim, A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of Chinese Investment in Zambia.

28. Ibid.

29. Brautigam, Aid With Chinese Characteristics: Chinese Foreign Aid and Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime.

30. Shi and Seim, A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of Chinese Investment in Zambia.

31. e.g., Kastner and Pearson, “Exploring the Parameters of China’s Economic Influence.”

32. Ratigan, Are Peruvians Enticed by the China Model? Chinese Investment and Public Opinion in Peru.

33. Several students explained in interviews that they had some understanding of the structure of international relations through their university courses on international politics and on social media.

34. These options were referenced to the Afrobarometer.

35. Due to an error in the tabulation data, no figures are available.

36. e.g., Shi, and Seim, A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of Chinese Investment in Zambia.

37. Musiitwa, “Chinese Mining Companies and their Social License to Operate in Zambia.”

38. According to interviews, compensation for a house and farmland is generally paid at 50,000 NMW and 35,000 ZMW (equivalent to 2,500US$ or 1,800US$ as of 30^th May 2023) for farmland only.

39. Tensions have arisen in the mines and elsewhere where Chinese nationals have been attacked and murdered.

40. Brautigam, How Zambia and China CO-Created a Debt Tragedy of the Commons.

41. During the 1970s and 1980s, rapidly globalizing Japanese companies were found to have lower levels of localization than their Western counterparts. This was apparently due to the belief that Japanese-style management was the key strategy for increasing a company’s competitiveness (Shi Seim, 2021).

42. Motambo et al, citing the Chinese are aware of the historical background of Africans and the continent’s current travails under Western domination (Ogunrotifa, 2011: 235), argue that some African countries are being forced by the US and other global economic powers to monitor their internal affairs and dance to the tune of donor countries with regard to their political, economic and even social demands.

43. In Sri Lanka, for example, the joke Chi(Sri)Lanka was heard until 2022, when China’s emergence was marked.

44. See Chellaney (2017).

45. Singh, The Myth of Debt-trap Diplomacy and Realities of Chinese Development Finance; Brautigam, A Critical Look at Chinese Debt-trap Diplomacy: The Rise of a Meme.