Understanding Bangladesh-China relations: Bangladesh’s rising geopolitical agency and China’s regional and global ambitions

ABSTRACT

Bangladesh-China relations has been a matter of much scrutiny since China emerged as Bangladesh’s biggest trading partner in 2006. Most of the research surrounding bilateral relations provided political, economic, and strategic explanations for a rising bonhomie between the two countries. Often, these studies failed to expand the nature of the relationship from regional and global perspectives. This research plans to address these lacunae in the research in understanding the patterns of the contemporary relationship between Bangladesh and China by taking bilateral, regional, and global perspectives into account that reinforce the patterns of the relationship. In other words, this research aims to look into Bangladesh-China relations analyzing the roles of individual and domestic factors, regional politics, and global perspectives. The article, by highlighting China’s involvement in Bangladesh on multiple levels, shall argue that without paying attention to and identifying the interplay among the three levels of analysis, the contours of Bangladesh-China relations cannot be fully explored.

KEYWORDS:

• Bangladesh-China relations
• South Asian Geopolitics
• Bangladesh foreign policy
• Bangladesh-India relations
• international order & South Asia

1. Introduction

Writing about the Superpower rivalry during the Cold War, Peter Frankopan commented, “[R]etaining power and influence in the heart of the world was to become increasingly difficult for the west.”¹ In the 21^st century, this has turned into, paraphrasing the oft-cited allegory – all roads lead to the East now. The understanding of the rise and expanse of the East and the way it is shaping international politics is still inadequate due to the lack of the West’s perspectives on global history. The rise of China and its expanding reach to almost all the continents now stand as a fact. It is no wonder, given China’s sharing of territorial border with four South Asian countries, its gaze would turn to the region with short-term and long-term goals.

Bangladesh, the eighth-largest country in the world in terms of population and the second-largest economy in South Asia with the highest per capita income has been under China’s radar since Bangladesh’s recognition in 1975 and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Bangladesh-China relations received particular attention since 2006, when despite the two countries not sharing territorial borders, China topped India as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. This leap is significant for several reasons. Bangladesh-India shares the fifth largest territorial border where trade between the two countries happens through both formal and informal channels.² To overtake India’s dominance in terms of trade with Bangladesh requires scrutiny of China’s pattern of trade and overall engagement with Bangladesh. From a strategic perspective, India’s dominance has created a traditional unease among its neighbors, China’s increasing involvement in the region is also not viewed lightly by India.o

While analyzing the patterns of Bangladesh-China relations, one must also not overlook how bilateral relations do not only bear regional implications but also is affected by the course of international politics. With the relative decline of American hegemony, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the rise of assertive nonaligned countries of Asia, Africa, and South America as agenda-setters, close collaborations among Russia, India, and China – countries like Bangladesh need to tread carefully through the murky waters of international politics. What emerges in Bangladesh’s discourse is a “dual policy” of engaging with the West and the East simultaneously. It is in this context, that I draw attention to the first part of the title of this paper. The title “past as prologue,” borrowed from Shakespeare’s The Tempest, has a double meaning – either whatever has happened in the past sets the stage for the future or whatever has happened in the past can be taken to create opportunities in the future. In both meanings, the importance of understanding the past stands as a significant cue. In another articulation, “[V]ery deep is the well of the past. Should we not call it bottomless”³ —is when Thomas Mann pointed out the role of history in articulating actions in the present and the future. The article, therefore, brings this as one of the definitive markers of understanding China’s behavior and patterns of doing trade as its central theoretical focus.

This paper takes into consideration this larger geopolitical context as well as geopolitical games near the home as delineated in the previous paragraph. As a theoretical tool, it looks into the root of China’s global pattern of engagement and argues that China’s increasing involvement in Bangladesh would be clearer when analyzed from a broader perspective. In other words, Bangladesh-China bilateral relations is affected by both regional and international politics and thus, cannot be treated in isolation. The paper, similarly points out that Bangladesh’s increasing geopolitical significance creates its agency vis-à-vis China, where the relationship is no longer vertical, but rather horizontal. As an analytical tool, the paper looks into levels of analysis to explain how Bangladesh’s relations with China can be explained through happenings at national, regional, and international levels and are interconnected. After discussing the theoretical framework, the article looks into general patterns of Bangladesh-China relations, where the evolution of the bilateral relations and its present course are outlined. This section particularly highlights defense relations between the two countries which is one of the bedrock of Bangladesh-China relations and a foundation of trust between the two countries. The fourth section extensively illustrates the current pattern of China’s engagements in Bangladesh. It discusses the projects that China is providing financial assistance to and the strategic implications of these projects. In the next section, the article delves into the regional geopolitical scenario and argues why China’s entry to Bangladesh is often seen critically for the latter. The last substantive section discusses the contemporary geopolitical outlook and argues the need for Bangladesh to outline its priorities. The concluding section summarizes the discussions of the article.

Research in International Relations relies on a broad range of analysis, available data, and primary and secondary interviews. It has to extensively depend on news articles published in well-established media and the expertise of the authors to interpret and connect published materials. Articles written on international politics and published in journals like Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Millennium, and European Journal of International Relations reveal a distinct pattern of research, where substance is more prioritized than methodology. While unpacking the contours of Bangladesh-China relations, this article followed the pattern of article writing in the discipline of International Relations. Additionally, it has followed the pattern of research carried out in social sciences in general. A qualitative methodology was chosen based on content analysis of secondary literature, collecting primary data on Bangladesh-China trade, investment, and defense relations, and interviews with relevant stakeholders. The next section explains a general pattern of China’s pattern of behavior with the rest of the world that is rooted in its history.

2. Understanding patterns of China’s engagement: a theoretical framework

We often forget how past experiences, interactions, and patterns of engagement are carried out subconsciously or consciously. Often, these create a culture and in the case of a country, it is a strategic culture that determines its pattern of interaction in international politics. Every nation goes through its unique experiences and these are gradually embedded in their visions and applied in their foreign policies. For China, several scholars have summarized three factors that drive its presentist calculations:

1. Its glorious past;

2. The era of national humiliation; and

3. The fear of losing “sovereignty.”

For China, from its glorious past to the century of humiliation between 1839 to 1949 have fed into the modern fear of losing its sovereignty.⁴ Together, these have led to the affirmation of a modern “security dilemma” for China – where statecraft is not only to be built by its military might but also embed itself in a manner worldwide so that China’s presence is recognized.⁵ In other words, China’s economic aggressiveness is driven by a political strategy of “survival” and thus, the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) is often dubbed as a grand strategy or a geoeconomic strategy put forward by Beijing.⁶ I identify this as China’s “security dilemma,” which also has been identified by several scholars and political commentators under different names. China tends to expand its economic footprints in a manner so that it can create itself as indispensable to different actors, spread around the world, which in turn shall act as a protective shield in the case of any threat to its sovereignty. The idea of “never again” reverberates in China’s psyche, which emboldens its geopolitical ambitions and creates the base of its foreign policy.⁷ While this is well-recognized in contemporary literature, it often fails to take into account in explaining China’s economic statecraft, which is the point argued in this paper. China’s policies are seen from a systemic perspective and the lens of Cold War politics of the 20^th century. In such a linear view, China’s ambitions are seen as global, dominated by the bipolar competition or rivalry between the United States (US)-and China. Such a parochial view overshadows what motivates China even if the bilateral relationship between the US and China is competitive. In other words, China’s strategies are not only driven by competition but also fundamentally driven by the question of self-awareness and preservation of its survival, which is often overlooked. This is supplemented by a general lack of understanding of China’s political and military culture due to using Western lenses to view China.⁸ A potent example of this would be in recent times how President Xi’s absence from the public view after he participated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and returned to China created a rumor of a political coup.⁹

This paper takes into account a pentagonal model as its analytical framework where analysis of the five following factors is discussed:

1. Domestic politics;

2. Economy;

3. Peace and security;

4. International relations (global); and

5. International relations (regional).

To explain further, the section that immediately follows provides a general overview of the first three sections, with a specific emphasis on Bangladesh-China defense relations. In the next broad sections, the paper discusses in detail the economy, international relations (regional), and international relations (global) sections to explain the interplay of different levels that determine the state of Bangladesh-China bilateral relations.

3. An overview of Bangladesh-China relations

Bangladesh-China bilateral relations developed in 1975, four years after Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign country. The Cold War politics and polarity, however, are deeply tied to the birth of Bangladesh.¹⁰ It was Bangladesh’s War of Independence that created a global awakening for the United States (US) to look into Asia differently and reprioritize its strategic partnership in the region. Pakistan played a pivotal role in putting China’s case to the US, as a result of which the US-China relations normalized, the People’s Republic of China was reinstated in its Permanent-Five membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) replacing the Republic of China (Taiwan) and a new era of international politics ushered.¹¹ The long-term strategic implication of this was hardly calculated back in 1971 and very few observers at the international level highlighted the significance of global realignment of power surrounding the birth of Bangladesh. Nonetheless, for Bangladesh this has two significances – China had cast its first veto at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) against Bangladesh’s admission to the UN, which was later considered as a result of China’s geopolitical calculations in 1971.¹² For China, what stood out was unwavering support for its all-weather friend in South Asia – Pakistan, and maintaining its territorial integrity. Second, the geopolitical significance of countries changes with time as evident in both China and the US being embroiled in their strategic persuasion to Bangladesh in the second decade of the 21^st century, not to mention the regional rivalry between China and India to establish their presence in Bangladesh,¹³ points I elaborate later in this article.

Bangladesh-China formal diplomatic relations started with China granting recognition to Bangladesh in 1975. Despite China’s official reluctance to recognize Bangladesh, Bangladesh understood the need to have China on board and pursued diplomacy to gain China’s recognition through unofficial channels.¹⁴ With the setting up of embassies in 1976, formal relationships between the two countries started to solidify identifying each other’s interests and priorities. The initial priorities were of a political and defense-related nature that Bangladesh required from China. Since the domestic political shift in 1975, Bangladesh searched for reliable external guarantors, where China fitted well. With the political shift, Bangladesh moved more toward the Pakistan-China axis from the Indo-Soviet axis. This also meant that the Soviets refused to assist Bangladesh in repairing defense equipment received and bought after the profound political change that took place in Bangladesh. This had a far-reaching consequence that was untenable at that period for the Soviet Union. China found the opportunity to emerge in Bangladesh’s aid in the defense sector and this was the beginning of a long-lasting defense cooperation between Bangladesh and China. From 1975, this relationship traversed a long way for Bangladesh to emerge as the second largest buyer of Chinese defense equipment globally, given Bangladesh has the eighth largest Armed Forces in the world. Although Bangladesh’s single largest defense purchase was with Russia in 2013,¹⁵ China continues to be the single largest supplier in the defense sector providing 73.6% of total defense supplies to Bangladesh.¹⁶

As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported, Bangladesh’s arms imports reduced significantly to 48% compared to the 2013–2017 period,¹⁷ which is also reflected in its arms purchase from China. Bangladesh, however, stands as the 25^th top arms exporter country in the world.¹⁸ The deep nature of Bangladesh-China can be understood by the fact that China is the only country for Bangladesh with which the latter has a defense cooperation agreement.¹⁹ Signed in 2002, the agreement was the first broad-based military agreement between the two countries where the aim was to institutionalize areas of defense cooperation instead of taking a piecemeal approach. The integral part of defense cooperation is military hardware purchase and supplies that include but are not limited to maritime patrol vessels, corvettes, tanks, fighter jets, as well as surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. The relationship also goes beyond hardware purchase and includes training and exchange of military personnel, which was solidified under the signing of four military agreements between the two countries in 2014.²⁰ Bangladesh and China also cooperate in the areas of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), where Bangladesh’s expertise in UNPKOs as one of the top troops contributing countries (TCCs) and China’s contribution as one of the top donors in terms of money as well as one of the top 10 TCCs,²¹ complement each other.²² China is building a submarine dock in Bangladesh,²³ which has become a cause of concern regionally, especially after Bangladesh acquired two Ming-class submarines from China – BNS Nabajatra and Joyjatra. It has been argued that the addition of the submarines in the Bangladesh Navy (BN) in 2016 has transformed it into a “Three Dimensional Force.”²⁴ On the other hand, it has been critically pointed out that China’s increasing involvement in Bangladesh’s naval affairs provides a unique chance for the former to make a strong admission in the Bay of Bengal’s naval race.²⁵

While defense relations became the early years’ building bloc of Bangladesh-China ties, it was the burgeoning economic relationship between the two countries that gradually drew international attention.²⁶ The beginning, however, was modest. Bilateral trade started under the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA – also known as the Bangkok Agreement) with China’s accession into this one of the earliest regional trading blocs, supported by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) in 2001. APTA had five founding members, and China’s entry made it a preferential trading arrangement. Bangladesh’s primary market access facilities and trade arrangements in China are determined under the APTA regime.²⁷ China has also granted Bangladesh the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status as early as 1984.²⁸

Ten Years of Bangladesh-China trade from 2012–2021¹⁶.

Trade relations between the two countries reached a new height in 2006 when China replaced India as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. India encircling Bangladesh on its three sides happened to be a natural trading partner of the latter and enjoyed this status since 1971. With difficult trade and visa regimes between India and Bangladesh, China gradually emerged as a much sought-after trading partner for Bangladesh’s business community. During the last 25 years, the exports of Bangladesh to China have increased at an annualized rate of 11.2%, from $55.2 M in 1995 to $785 M in 2020.²⁹ Bangladesh-China total bilateral trade now stands at USD12 Billion (BDT1.8 trillion) in FY 2021, where exports from China amount to over USD11 billion (BDT1.77 trillion) as opposed to a low amount of exports from Bangladesh (BDT355 billion). The volume of trade stood at USD18.5 billion in 2019, where the rate of annual growth was 24% in the pre-pandemic period.³⁰ It must be acknowledged that trade in services has not happened between the two countries since 2020 due to the COVID-19 endemic. China holds nearly 17% of Bangladesh’s total trade,³¹ while India holds nearly 13%. The US stands as the third largest trading partner where the nature of bilateral trade is completely the opposite of Bangladesh’s trade with China and India as Bangladesh enjoys a trade surplus with the US contrary to the huge trade deficit with China and India.

The geographic position also dictates the pattern and terms of trade for Bangladesh when it comes to China and India. Being geographically distanced from Bangladesh, China lost its edge and status of being Bangladesh’s largest trading partner which it enjoyed since 2006 due to the Covid endemic. Geographic proximity provided India the edge and opportunity to reclaim its lost status, for a short while though. In May 2022, China once again reemerged as Bangladesh’s largest trading partner.³² Bangladesh has recently been granted zero-tariff access to 99% of Bangladeshi goods entry to the Chinese market under the APTA arrangement, which was effective from September 2022.³³ This, however, is yet to provide Bangladesh with the real benefit of increasing its market share of exports to China. As China moves away from the ready-made garments (RMGs) market, there will be a potent opportunity for Bangladesh to grab that particular market. Talks about Bangladesh’s increasing chances in this field and Bangladesh’s increasing export of RMG products in China, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries are already on the table.³⁴ Bangladesh’s share of China’s market is only 0.05% at present.

A study suggests that if Bangladesh cogently calculates and can capture only 1% of China’s market, Bangladesh’s exports to China can reach USD 25 billion.³⁵ Recently, a Joint Economic and Trade Committee has been established between the two countries to identify and increase Bangladesh’s exports to China and overall strengthening of bilateral trade relations through an institutional framework.³⁶ Bangladesh is also negotiating a comprehensive economic partnership with China, given Bangladesh’s graduation from the least-developed country (LDC) category, it shall lose several economic benefits accrued previously.

Bangladesh-China relations have morphed into a “strategic partnership of cooperation” since the visit of China’s President Xi Jinping in 2016.³⁷ The “twin pillars” of Bangladesh-China relations are defense and economy. These have multifaceted dimensions. Defense cooperation is the umbrella term to refer to soft cooperation in defense areas as well as the entire gamut of defense trade. Bangladesh-China trade is only one part of the larger bilateral economic relations. In the first part of the next section, I elaborate on China’s infrastructure diplomacy and its strategies to do business with Bangladesh by identifying domestic considerations that paved the way for broader acceptance of China in Bangladesh.

4. Bangladesh-China relations: three units of analysis

4.1. Infrastructure politics and domestic political considerations in Bangladesh

China has acquired the title of a “Construction Superpower”³⁸ or “Infrastructure Superpower”³⁹ in today’s world. The BRI and its stretch to almost all the continents except North America, show the strengths of China’s economic might and specialization in the areas of infrastructure politics. A significant part of China’s relationship with Bangladesh is also based on infrastructure building. China’s entry into Bangladesh’s infrastructure formalized with President Xi’s visit in 2016, although China has been building Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridges in Bangladesh for quite some time. In the 1980s, China began constructing friendship bridges in Bangladesh, the first of which was initiated in 1986 and was inaugurated in 1989.⁴⁰ Since then, seven more Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridges have been built, the last of which was inaugurated in September 2022. In the Table 1, a list of all the Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridges which have been completed till 2022 are provided.

Table 1. List of Bangladesh-China friendship bridges, 1989–2022 (source: compiled by the author using existing data).

Name	Location	Length	Year of Inauguration
1st Buriganga Bridge 1st Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Dhaka	917 m	1989
Shambhuganj Bridge 2nd Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Munshiganj	1,521 m (4,990 ft)	2008
Mahananda Bridge 3rd Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Munshiganj	1,521 m (4,990 ft)	2008
Karatoya Bridge 4th Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Munshiganj	1,521 m (4,990 ft)	Unknown
Gabkhan Bridge 5th Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Jhalokati	915 m (3,002 ft)	2002
Mukterpur Bridge 6th Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Munshiganj	1,521 m (4,990 ft)	2008
Asmat Ali Khan Bridge 7th Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Madaripur	688 m (2,257 ft)	2015
Bekutia Bridge 8th Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge	Pirojpur	1,493 m (4,898 ft)	2022

The eighth friendship bridge has been hailed as the best yet as it took into account local culture and imbued with the aspirations of a strengthened bilateral relationship.⁴¹ The bridge, adorned with Islamic and Chinese characteristics is a profound embodiment of China’s soft power as well as a reflection of China’s understanding of what appeals to the locals in Bangladesh. The appeal of China’s bridge-building capacity has been such that back in 2015, the government of Bangladesh (GoB) sent a proposal to build five more friendship bridges by China, of which the ninth and the tenth Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridge Projects are identified to be constructed in Patuakhali district,⁴² and the construction of the 11^th bridge is also underway.

During President Xi’s visit to Bangladesh, the latter received USD38.05 billion in economic assistance and investment from China. Although not all of the deals later materialized, Bangladesh stands as the second-largest recipient in South Asia of China’s overall economic commitment. China, so far, has completed several critical projects,⁴³ while several projects have been either postponed or shelved,⁴⁴ and some new projects are being initiated either as fresh projects to compensate for the postponed/shelved projects that are under negotiation.⁴⁵ It has been argued that China’s decision not to carry out a few projects was driven by its geopolitical considerations.⁴⁶ In other words, the projects that would provide connectivity linkages between Bangladesh and India were shelved by the Chinese, although the issue of strategic competition was not cited as a reason for scrapping the project. The cancellation of the Akhaura-Sylhet dual gauge project, in the northeast region of Bangladesh with the potential of its further extensions to Northeast India is a case in point.

As can be seen, Bangladesh and China have developed a strong relationship in the areas of infrastructure building, another aspect of China’s engagement in Bangladesh is often under-studied. China is keen to not only invest at the government-to-government (G2G) level but also to develop business relationships at private levels in different sectors. It is evident in the northern part of the capital city Dhaka, known as Uttara, where Chinese entrepreneurs have invested in renting local buildings and transformed those into hotels to provide cheap boarding and food.⁴⁷ Similarly, several restaurants have sprung up in Uttara which are inexpensive and provide quite authentic Chinese cuisine. Recently, hot pot, a unique Chinese cuisine has been introduced in Bangladesh.⁴⁸

In addition to this, the Chinese strategy of doing business uniquely varies from business carried out by different European countries.⁴⁹ It has been argued that while the Chinese are available and accessible round the clock except during the time of the Chinese New Year, European businesspeople follow a strict schedule and holidays. This makes the Chinese attractive partners for business, whereas the Europeans are lagging and losing their competitiveness. Also, the Chinese domestic market is bigger than any of the individual European countries’ domestic markets for which the Chinese can provide competitive pricing for products. The Chinese have shown keen interest in learning the Bengali language and culture for which they can impress Bangladeshis in getting a business contract. It has also been argued that businesses with Indians have often not been very smooth due to cultural differences, a barrier not experienced with the Chinese. The issue of easing of getting a Chinese visa for Bangladeshi businesspeople to China has also been one of the significant factors for increasing connectivity between the two countries. The issue of getting a Schengen or an Indian visa for Bangladeshis is fraught with many administrative complexities, which often works as a disincentive to go to these places to look for opportunities to do business. A positive image of Bangladesh to China as opposed to a negative portrayal of Bangladesh in Europe and India in general is also a motivating factor to consider doing business with China for Bangladeshis.

The domestic considerations are often not taken in their proper perspectives in assessing the multifaceted and diversifying nature of China’s engagement in Bangladesh. China’s soft power through the Confucius Institute established in different universities as well as offering free education in learning the Chinese language have eased up a smooth entry of China in Bangladesh. There are two Confucius Centers in Bangladesh, the University of Dhaka (DU) and the North South University (NSU),⁵⁰ and Chinese authorities are working to establish more in the country.⁵¹ On top of this, a China Studies Center will be inaugurated by the end of 2023 at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. The social media channels operated by the Chinese, who are well-versed in Bengali language and culture and introduce Chinese culture is another way China is making itself visible to Bangladesh. The appeal of soft culture has often remained quite under-noticed in analyzing how China is making itself “acceptable” to different countries.

Last but not least, the domestic political acceptance of China as a long-term and substantial development partner is what is making Bangladesh-China relations stronger. One substantial example of this was in 2019 when the two major political parties of Bangladesh – the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) – reached an agreement to jointly launch the “Bangladesh-China Silk Road Forum” in 2019.⁵² As the then Chinese Ambassador Li Jiming criticized the US decision not to invite Bangladesh to its Democracy Summit citing Bangladesh’s record on socio-economic progress and democracy in 2021, this caused BNP to overtly criticize China for supporting the current regime.⁵³ One must have to conclude that the diplomatic relations between the two countries have affected the domestic political context. At the same time, as fears grew of the future of Chinese investments globally after what happened in Sri Lanka and the propaganda of the so-called “debt trap diplomacy”, Bangladesh has also been cautioned about the impacts of long-term Chinese investments. All of these, however, have been repeatedly warded off by Bangladesh’s leadership on different occasions.⁵⁴ As it is often argued, “all politics is local”, the greater political bonding between the two countries has also contributed to China’s ease of access to in Bangladesh.

4.2. The fall-out of regional politics: Bangladesh’s balancing act or increasing geopolitical leverage?

The phenomenal development in Bangladesh-China relations has been an issue of scholarly investigation in recent times.⁵⁵ Existing studies on Bangladesh-China relations taking into consideration regional politics can be categorized into three competing groups. Several scholars brought Bangladesh’s relations with India and China using the framework of Bangladesh’s balancing act regionally with both.⁵⁶ Yet, another group of scholars has argued that Bangladesh is hedging against China, keeping in mind its relationship with India.⁵⁷ In the minority group is the argument that promotes Bangladesh’s rising geopolitical significance and how this creates a particular value of Bangladesh for both India and China,⁵⁸ which the paper also asserts taking a wide discussion on Bangladesh’s rising geopolitical significance regionally and globally.⁵⁹ In these analyses of the trilateral relationship between Bangladesh-India-China, only a few studies have analyzed the ever-constant “India factor” that might have a profound impact in shaping Bangladesh and China relations. In other words, Bangladesh-China relations is not immune from the regional context and the locational reality. The diktat of geography determines neighbors. Neighbors cannot be chosen; rather states have to learn to live with them. As for Mexico, the saying goes for its neighbor America: We are so far from God but so close to America, for Bangladesh, India’s presence can be seen in a similar vein. Let me elaborate on this aspect.

South Asia can be regarded as the most asymmetric region in terms of the size of the countries it homes. India is not only large in terms of size but also in terms of population and size of the economy. The unique geographic feature of India lies not only in its size but its physical proximity with all the countries of the region except the island nations of Maldives and Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. This gives India an unprecedented edge over other South Asian countries, who are aware of the presence of India, no matter what type of geopolitical appeal they may have created for the rest of the world. The example of India sending its Foreign Secretary to both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh before holding their national elections is often cited as one of such interventionist policies of the country regarding its neighbors’ internal affairs. The blockade of Nepal, one of the two land-locked countries of South Asia, twice, and that too, the latest one taking place when Nepal suffered devastating earthquakes, did not escape the notice of political observers. One cannot but contemplate the claim of India for its neighbors to view its security concerns from India’s perspective as nothing short of its hegemonic assumption and imposition. As stated, this has become possible due to the unique geographic makeup of the region of South Asia.

Having said that, one cannot but identify that Bangladesh-India bilateral relations is at its best now. The relationship has matured from being clandestine interactions between the neighbors and from the level of blame and counter-blame to a solid institutional level.⁶⁰ Despite that, there are several areas where Bangladesh-India relations stand at critical points. India not providing direct land access to Bangladesh to carry out trade with Nepal and Bhutan is an issue raised by Bangladesh repeatedly. Several obstacles exist in the case of Bangladesh-India border trade that adversely affect Bangladesh, which has influenced the business community to increase its collaborations with China rather than India. As Bangladesh purchased two Ming-class submarines from China, India sold two submarines to Myanmar, which was construed as a retaliation to Bangladesh’s purchase from China. The issue that has recently emerged as a bone of contention among Bangladesh, India, and China is India’s inability to address Bangladesh’s concern about the sharing of the water of the Teesta River,⁶¹ where China has shown interest in providing technical assistance to Bangladesh.⁶²

In a region with one country’s overwhelming dominance, strategic options for other countries become limited in the sense that not only do they have to create a value for themselves to the others but also others must have to be able to see and consider this to be worth cultivating. The closest country and ironically, India’s neighbor with a conflicting bilateral history, to expand its sphere of influence, is China. The value of China for South Asian countries remains in several areas – China is geographically close; China can provide an economic gateway; and China and India have different aspirations and conflicting relationships, among others. China’s deepening relationship with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, and its increasing relationship with Afghanistan shows how China has taken cultivating its relationship in South Asia as one of its foreign policy priorities.⁶³

For countries, even in today’s age where geographical distances are not seen as much of an impediment, China’s geographical proximity matters. Other great powers’ geographical distance, besides their pro-India strategic calculations, does not make them much of a reliable choice for South Asian countries. China’s acceptance has been relatively easier than even its neighborhood because of this primary strategic calculation by South Asian countries. Certainly, this does not mean that South Asian countries are not interested in forging stronger ties with Western great powers and with Japan but it matters more who can they turn to for immediate action. On China’s part – the manner of engagement has been the policy of co-option and remaining sensitive to individual national issues. As China advances its soft power by establishing Confucius Centers in different South Asian countries, it also grows expertise in learning South Asian languages such as Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, and Sinhala, to mention a few. As mentioned in the previous section, Chinese who do business in Bangladesh are well-versed in colloquial Bengali. This provides an extraordinary edge for the Chinese to understand the nuances of a foreign culture and learn the trick of the trade of doing business there.

Interestingly, while India and China are competing to gain ground in South Asia, globally both are developing formidable relationships despite their differences. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought India and Russia closer to Russia and China closer. This has, in essence, brought India and China closer to matching their strategic priorities, an issue that is discussed in the next section.

4.3. Global instabilities and Bangladesh’s choices

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 opened up a new kind of Pandora’s box for international politics than we had seen in the 20^th century. A world with a clear distribution and location of power and dominated by the two superpowers the US and the former Soviet Union sustained with relative peace at the systemic level. Several countries, who called themselves nonaligned to either of the superpowers created a “Third World” as much in an ideological sense as they were in terms of lacking economic might to have a collective agenda-setting power in international politics. The nature of international politics has changed qualitatively in today’s world where countries are increasingly shying away from bloc-politics and prioritizing their national interest based on immediate threats.⁶⁴ The Russian invasion, for the first time in international politics, has shown a distinct response from the Third World where they have largely rejected to provide blanket support to the Western agenda. Major countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America – the trios – have opened up and questioned the legitimacy of the Western claim on the Ukraine issue. Statements have emerged on how Europe, representing only twelve percent of the world’s population, cannot impose its problems on the rest of the world.⁶⁵ Surely, scholars have been writing about the rise of the Rest⁶⁶ and the Easternization of the world⁶⁷ in the 21^st century. It was the Ukraine crisis that solidified the “Eastern” response to the West more coherently and consistently. Coupled with it was the consolidation of the relationship among India, China, and Russia at the global level as well as reenergizing the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – an informal grouping of five countries. BRICS, it is being argued, aims to promote an alternative world order as opposed to the current one dominated by dollar hegemony, i.e. the Western hegemony.⁶⁸ As China has expedited its diplomatic initiatives in different continents, emerged as a peace broker between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and emphasized developing its relationship with Brazil is of paramount importance, one can see how the global order is no longer only West-centric.

In such an environment, Bangladesh needs its development partners to realize its own development goals. A country with almost 170 million people within a small geographic confine cannot afford to pursue a policy of division. Bangladesh, with its policy of “friendship towards all and malice toward none” aims to cultivate relations with all friendly nations of the world that also seek to be its partner. Connected to this is Bangladesh’s locational reality at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal, which makes it a significant regional player as the world increasingly turns to be a “maritime century”. Because of the strategic significance of Bangladesh’s geographic position, countries like the US, Russia, China, Japan, and India, to name a few are turning their gaze toward Bangladesh.⁶⁹ As Bangladesh experiences a “port boom”,⁷⁰ building its deep sea port has become a matter of interest for great powers who are active in the region of South Asia. It has been widely argued that Bangladesh’s attempt to build its first deep sea port at Sonadia, whose contract was to be given to China, was foiled due to India’s objection.⁷¹ Later on, Japan was given the contract to build Bangladesh’s first deep sea port at Matarbari. Japan is also set to establish an “industrial value chain” linking Bangladesh and the Northeast region of India, which will have strategic implications for the region.⁷² Similarly, India and China are also eyeing investing in the development of the Mongla port of Bangladesh, which will have strategic implications for the land-locked South Asian countries Nepal and Bhutan.⁷³ Russia has also made a permanent footprint in Bangladesh by signing a collaborative project at Rooppur to build Bangladesh’s first-ever nuclear power plant, which has a wider regional geopolitical significance.⁷⁴

The question of whether Bangladesh shall join the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) of the US or not has been looming large in the strategic circle.⁷⁵ Bangladesh, being one of the members of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), is one of the few countries of the Indo-Pacific Region (IOR) that is yet to have its Indo-Pacific policies. As news breaks that Bangladesh is formulating its own Indo-Pacific Outlook (IPO), it was initially argued that Bangladesh has finally tilted toward the West in its Outlook.⁷⁶ The idea was, however, pointed out as untrue by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) unequivocally,⁷⁷ which once again emphasized Bangladesh’s policy of neutrality.⁷⁸

The discussion in this section highlights that while international politics is tense and lacks clarity in terms of polarity, Bangladesh has been able to create its strategic position. Bangladesh’s locational endowment has created its value and is now being courted by the great powers who want Bangladesh on their respective sides as well. This creates a special appeal of Bangladesh to China and elevates Bangladesh-China bilateral relations to a new height. This is evident in the very first albeit a short visit of the newly appointed China’s Foreign Minister in Bangladesh in November 2022. The bilateral relations are no longer a one-way traffic between the two countries, as other actors have also unequivocally stated about Bangladesh. Without taking into account Bangladesh’s increasing geopolitical significance, Bangladesh-China bilateral relations cannot be properly evaluated.

5. Concluding observations

This article aimed at understanding Bangladesh-China relations in a nuanced manner. To this end, it has been argued that bilateral relations cannot be understood without probing into regional and international dynamics as well. To argue its case, it took up the theoretical framework of understanding China, its imperatives and prerogatives. The article has shown that China’s glorious past and its century of humiliation have been at the heart of forming its security dilemma, or in other words, its existential priorities. Therefore, its foreign policy is driven by the fear of losing its sovereignty, where its economic statecraft has been seen as an integral part of making itself relevant and recognized worldwide. Therefore, South Asia figures heavily in its foreign policy calculations for China. Alongside, the paper has also taken the Pentagon model, such as domestic politics, economy, peace and security, international relations (global), and international relations (regional) to understand which factor or if any combination of factors can explain Bangladesh-China relations. The paper shows that Bangladesh, being the second largest economy in South Asia, would naturally draw significant Chinese attention. The contours of Bangladesh-China bilateral relations are multifaceted where several factors have drawn both countries toward each other. The bilateral relations is not a one-way street, where the Bangladesh business community is increasingly finding it easier to connect with China than other countries. At the regional level, China often can act as a balancer to counter-hegemony against India for South Asian countries. While Bangladesh-India relations is strong and institutionalized, not all of Bangladesh’s needs can be fulfilled by India where China comes into play. At the international level, the increasing global instability, the consolidation of the non-Western countries, also increasingly being referred to as the Global South, and the rising plurilateralism, among others, have made neutrality a favored position for Bangladesh’s foreign policy, which is already guided by the principle of “friendship towards all, malice toward none.” Given the extensive nature of bilateral relations, regional and international factors also contribute to the strengthening of Bangladesh-China relations. Based on this summary, the paper points out that it is the interplay of regional and international factors coupled with Bangladesh’s geographic location that explains Bangladesh-China relations in its proper perspective. Shortly, Bangladesh’s goal would be to create its agenda-setting ability as well as to work with all of its development partners like the US, India, China, Japan, Australia, and the European Union (EU), among others. In an unstable international political environment, Bangladesh’s policy choices would be to take a neutral stance where all the major partners would be given priority. Bangladesh-China bilateral relations must be seen from this particular perspective.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the JICA Research Institute.

Notes on contributors

Lailufar Yasmin

Lailufar Yasmin is Professor and the current Chairperson at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. She has undertaken her studies at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA, and Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. She has been a recipient of the US Fulbright, the British Chevening, and the Australian International Post-Graduate Research Scholarship (IPRS). She has done her fellowships in the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK; in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, China; at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Hawaii, USA as a FIPSS (Fellowships in Indo-Pacific Security Studies) Fellow; and with the Beyond Borders Scotland, under Scottish Government’s initiative. Her latest publications are on Rohingya issue (Palgrave Macmillan: London) and The Development of International Relations in South Asia (Oxford Research Encyclopedia).

Notes

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26. Aneja, “China – Bangladesh Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partnership?;” Sahoo, “Economic Relations with Bangladesh: China’s Ascent and India’s Decline,”123–139.

27. Razzaque et al., “Bangladesh-China Trade and Economic Cooperation: Issues and Perspectives,” 193–228.

28. Sahoo and Taneja, “China’s Growing Presence in India’s Neighbourhood,” East Asia Forum, February 5, 2010, Accessed December 28, 2022.https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/05/chinas-growing-presence-in-indias-neighbourhood/.

29. “China Exports to Bangladesh,” Trading Economics, N.D. , Accessed December 28, 2022.https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports/bangladesh#:~:text=China%20Exports%20to%20Bangladesh%20was,updated%20on%20December%20of%202022.>

30. “China-Bangladesh,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), N.D. Accessed 26 December 2022. https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/bgd.

31. “Sino-Bangladesh Trade Ties to Prosper Further in Future,” Dhaka Tribune, August 7, 2022.

32. Haroon, “China becomes Bangladesh’s Top Trading Partner Again,” The Financial Express, August 1, 2022; “China Displaces India as Bangladesh’s Top Trading Partner in May,” Fibre2Fashion, Accessed August 4, 2022. https://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/textile-news/china-displaces-india-as-bangladesh-s-top-trading-partner-in-may-282307-newsdetails.htm.

33. “Now 99% Bangladesh Products come under China’s Duty-free Offer,” The Business Standard, August 7, 2022.

34. Siu, “Move over, ‘Made in China.’ It’s the ‘Made in Bangladesh’ Era now,” South China Morning Post, June 8, 2019, Accessed December 28, 2022 https://www.scmp.com/week- asia/economics/article/3013632/move-over-made-china-its-made-bangladesh-era-now, “Bangladesh RMG Exports to Japan Surge to Over $1 Billion in FY 2021–22,” RMG Bangladesh, August 4, 2022, Accessed December 28, 2022;https://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/details/606814/Bangladesh-surpasses-Vietnam-in-RMG-exports, “Bangladesh Surpasses Vietnam in RMG Exports,” Daily Sun, February 23, 2022, Accessed December 28, 2022.https://www.daily-sun.com/printversion/details/606814/Bangladesh-surpasses-Vietnam-in-RMG-exports, ; Mirdha, “Target $100b Export by 2030: BGMEA Focuses on Asia, Non-cotton Items,” The Daily Star, September 8, 2022.

35. “$25b Export to China Possible by 2030,” The Daily Star, June 10, 2021.

36. “Bangladesh in FTA Talks with China: Minister,” BIDA, January 6, 2021, Accessed December 15, 2022. https://bida.gov.bd/details/bangladesh-fta-talks-china-minister, Palma, “We’re Working very Hard to Increase Bangladesh’s Export to China,” The Daily Star, October 1, 2022.

37. Finnigan, “Bangladesh-China Relations have Metamorphosed into a Strategic Partnership,” LSE Blog, June 20, 2019, Accessed December 26, 2022.https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/06/20/bangladesh-china-relations-have-metamorphosed-into-a-strategic-partnership/,

38. Leonard, Connectivity Wars: Why Migration, Finance, and Trade are the Geoeconomic Battlegrounds of the Future.

39. Mahbubani, “How China Could Win Over the Post-coronavirus World and Leave the US Behind..”

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43. A list of projects that have been implemented are: Barapukuria (BPDB) Coal Power Plant, China-Bangladesh International Exhibition Centre, 33/11 KV substation under “Expansion and Strengthening Power Distribution System in the area under DPDC,” Kodda 150 MW (BRPL) Power Plant, Padma (Jashaldia) Water Treatment Plant (phase-1), Well Field Construction Project at Tetuljhora-Bhakurta in Savar Upazila (Phase-1), Shahjalal Fertilizer Factory, Shikalbaha 150 MW Peaking Power Plant, and Telecommunication Network Upgradation from 2.5 G to 3 G.

44. The list includes Akhaura-Sylhet Rail Line Expansion Project, Banshkhali 660 MW (Beximco) Coal Power Plant, Boalkhali (Beximco) Coal Power Plant, Daudkandi 1320 MW Coal Power Plant (Meghna), Dighipara 1000 MW Coal Power Station, The Gazaria 350 MW Coal Power Station (RPCL) (although later replaced by a proposal of 2 × 600 MW LNG-fired power stations), Joydebpur – Ishwardi Rail Line Expansion Project, Joydebpur – Mymensingh Rail Line Expansion Project, Maheshkhali 1320 MW (BPDB-CHDHK) Coal Power Plant, Maheshkhali 1320 MW (BPDB-SEPCO) Coal Power Plant, Mirsarai 300 MW (BSRM-CPCL) Coal Power Station, and Patuakhali 1320 MW (APSCL) Coal-fired Power Plant: Phase I& II.

45. These are the following but not limited to Bangabandhu (Karnaphuli) River Tunnel, Banshkhali 1320 MW (SSPL) Coal Power Plant, China-Bangladesh Friendship (Boga) Bridge (9^th), Barisal 350 MW (BEPCL) Coal Power Plant, Barisal-Bhola (Tentulia-Kalabadar) Bridge, China-Bangladesh Friendship (Mongla) Bridge (10^th), China-Bangladesh Friendship (Jhapjhapia) Bridge (11^th), Chinese Economic & Industrial Zone (CEIZ), Substation construction of Bangladesh Television, Cox’s Bazar-Sitakunda Marine Drive Expressway, Dasherkandi Sewerage Treatment Plant, Dhaka-Chittagong High Speed Railway Project, Dhaka-Ashulia East-West Elevated Expressway, Dhaka-Sylhet-Tamabil Highway Project, Dhirasram Railway Station Inland Container Depot, DPDC Area Power System Network Expansion, “The Gazaria 350 MW Coal Power Station (RPCL)” (later replaced by a proposal of 2 × 600 MW LNG-fired power stations), Mirsarai (Bangabandhu) Economic Zone, Balancing, Modernization, Rehabilitation and Expansion of Public Sector Jute Mills, Expansion and modernization of Mongla Port facilities and Padma Bridge Rail Link project.

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47. This analysis is drawn from the primary interviews taken from Dhaka-based Bangladeshi businessmen.

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49. This section is based on interviews of three businessmen who carries out businesses in China as well as in three European countries.

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