Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Analysis and Assessment

ABSTRACT

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Biden Administration was published in October 2022. What is its focus and how should we evaluate it? How is it different from previous administrations? Does the NPR reflect Biden’s proactive statements before its publication? This article introduces and examines pressing issues of the international security environment and threat perceptions, nuclear deterrence, declaratory policy, arms control, and nuclear capability as reflected in the NPR. Analysis is presented from two aspects, military and diplomacy, as the NPR emphasizes to “put diplomacy first”. The military aspects of the NPR, to strengthen and modernize nuclear deterrence as the main role of nuclear weapons, is strongly emphasized. On the other hand, diplomatic aspects of the NPR are narrowly and superficially treated, and it does not include proactive proposals. Future NPRs should include military and diplomatic positions more equally.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear Posture Review
• President biden
• nuclear weapons
• deterrence
• arms control
• declaratory policy

Introduction

On 27 October 2022, the Biden Administration released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to guide US nuclear policy (US Department of Defense 2022a). This is a new policy statement by a new administration in the United States regarding nuclear weapons, following the Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. It is a detailed statement of the new Biden administration’s nuclear policy, which is of vital importance to international peace and security.

It is interesting to see how this NPR of the Biden administration is different from the NPR of the Trump administration, which advocated an “America First” policy, and how Biden, who was the vice president of the Obama administration, will carry on the policies of the Obama administration, and what basic stance on nuclear policy the United States will take in the international community.

Furthermore, the NPR was issued in a highly confrontational international environment, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and threats to use nuclear weapons, and at a time when China is pursuing great power status in the international community, both militarily and politically, and is increasingly at odds with the United States.

President Biden had actively communicated his views on the NPR during his pre-election campaign, and it was expected that the NPR would be released soon after the new administration took office. However, the announcement of the NPR was delayed, and the fact sheet (US Department of Defense 2022b), which is a brief statement of the core content of the NPR, was released as follows on 29 March 2022.

The 2022 NPR represents a comprehensive, balanced approach to US nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and forces. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence and strong and credible extended deterrence commitment, remains a top priority for the Department of Defense and the Nation.

The NPR underscores our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and reestablishing our leadership in arms control. We will continue to emphasize strategic stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk reduction and arms control arrangements wherever possible.

In concert with completion of these strategic reviews, the President has articulated his vision for US nuclear deterrence strategy: As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of US nuclear arsenal is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce and analyze the newly released NPR of the Biden Administration and to examine how it should be evaluated in terms of maintaining and strengthening peace and security of the international community.

The first issue is to examine how the United States understands the current international security environment and how it intends to respond to it. Second, this paper will consider the role nuclear weapons play in US strategy, i.e. what is the role of nuclear deterrence. Third, it will introduce and analyze US declared policies regarding the employment of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of a “sole purpose” policy. Fourth, it will identify how the United States plans to address issues of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Fifth, it will address the issue of how the US nuclear force will be configured under the various policies described above. Finally, this paper will provide an overall assessment of the Biden Administration’s NPR from the perspective of international peace and security.

The International Security Environment and Threat Perceptions

Chinese and Russian Threats

With regard to the current security environment, the NPR first emphasizes the Chinese threat stating that “In large part due to the actions of our strategic competitors, the international security environment has deteriorated in recent years. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the overall pacing challenge for US defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating our nuclear deterrent. The PRC has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad. The PRC likely intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade”.

As for Russia, the report citing its threat states that “Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy, modernize and expand its nuclear forces, and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy. Its modern nuclear arsenal, which is expected to grow further, presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and our Allies and partners”.

Russia has been pursuing an extensive military modernization program for more than 20 years that poses a direct threat to NATO and its neighbors, maintaining 1,550 strategic warheads regulated by the New START Treaty and 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons not regulated by the treaty. It is pursuing several new nuclear systems.

The United States thus recognizes that China and Russia are the two greatest threats to the United States and states that “By the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries. This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control, and risk reduction”. In addition to China and Russia, the NPR mentions North Korea and Iran as threats to the United States (US Department of Defense 2022a, 4–5).

Challenges and Comparison with Previous Administrations

The challenges ahead include the importance of current and future nuclear weapons in the strategies and capabilities of our competitors, which increases the risks associated with strategic competition and the degree of danger of crisis and military conflict, and the new complexities presented by China’s nuclear expansion and the changes it brings to strategy.

In the Clinton administration’s NPR, the United States won the Cold War and Russia was no longer considered a threat; nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons were considered threats (Nuclear Information Project 1994). Under the Bush administration, the threat was not Russia, but the so-called “rogue states” of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to them (Nuclear Posture Review 2001). The Obama administration also believed that the greatest threat was not Russia, but nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons (US Department of Defense 2010). The Trump administration recognized that Russia had returned to the “great power competition” and was the greatest threat, and that we were now in a period of “great power competition” with China (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). This time around, the Biden administration recognizes that Russia continues to be a threat, that China is expanding its nuclear capability in a new and rapid manner, and that these two countries are the greatest threats.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in US Strategy: Nuclear Deterrence

Purpose and Role of Nuclear Deterrence

This NPR report states in the first part of Chapter 1 that “This Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms a continuing commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence and strong and credible extended deterrence. Strategic deterrence remains a top priority mission for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nation”, making clear that strategic deterrence is a top priority. It further clarifies the purpose of deterrence by stating that US nuclear weapons deter aggression, assure Allies and friends, and enable the president to achieve his objectives should deterrence fail. It also specifies that one of its future actions will be “to take steps to strengthen extended deterrence and assurances to Allies” (US Department of Defense 2020b. 1).

The specific roles of nuclear weapons are defined as (i) deterring strategic attacks, (ii) assuring Allies and friends, and (iii) achieving US objectives in the event deterrence fails.

1. With regard to deterring strategic attacks, it states that “the United States affirms that its nuclear forces will deter all forms of strategic attacks. They serve to deter nuclear employment of any scale directed against the US homeland or the territory of Allies and partners. … Any adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would fundamentally alter the nature of conflict, create the potential for uncontrolled escalation. … We must therefore be able to deter both large-scale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries. … We have concluded that nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attacks, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks”.

2. Regarding assurances to Allies and partners, it stipulates that “the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) require strengthening security structures in key regions in order to fully leverage the capabilities of Allies and partners to deter. The US global alliance and partnership network is a military center of gravity. US extended nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of this network”.

3. Regarding the achievement of US objectives if deterrence fails, it states, “We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and flexible nuclear capabilities to achieve our objectives should the President conclude that the employment of nuclear weapons is necessary. In such a circumstance, the United States would seek to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms. … As part of the NPR implementation, the United States will update nuclear weapons employment guidance in accordance with the policy and strategy established by the President following publication of this report” (US Department of Defense 2022a, 7-8).

Integrated Deterrence

Although it has been discussed in the past, what is clearly and actively presented in this NPR is the combination of nuclear and conventional weapons elements in deterrence and defense, which is called “integrated deterrence”. Chapter 1 states that “Consistent with the concept for integrated deterrence, DoD will seek to identify and assess the ability of non-nuclear capabilities to contribute to deterrence and integrate these capabilities into operational plans as appropriate”. One of the decisions in this NPR is “to adopt an integrated deterrence approach that works to leverage nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to tailor deterrence under specific circumstances”.

It states that “the key goal of integrated deterrence is to develop tailored options that shape adversary perceptions of benefits and costs. The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities could complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. … Another important element of integrated deterrence is better synchronizing nuclear and non-nuclear planning, exercises, and operations” (US Department of Defense 2022a, 10).

Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda appreciate this emphasis on “integrated deterrence” in the NPR stating that “conventional integration can also serve to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear strategic attacks, and could therefore pave the way for a sole-purpose policy in the future”, but they argue that “a significant challenge of deeper integration in strategic deterrence is to ensure that it does not blur the line between nuclear and conventional war and inadvertently increase nuclear signaling during conventional operations” (Kristensen and Korda 2022).

Declaratory Policy on the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Declaratory Policy

As the first of several important decisions contained in Chapter I of the NPR, it states to “adopt a strategy and declaration policy that maintains a very high bar for nuclear employment while assuring Allies and partners, and complicating adversary decision calculus” (US Department of Defense 2022a, 3).

As for the declared policy on the employment of nuclear weapons, it states that “United States declaratory policy reflects a sensible and stabilizing approach to deterring a range of attacks in a dynamic security environment. This balanced policy maintains a high bar for nuclear employment, while also complicating its adversary decision calculus, and assuring Allies and partners”. It stipulates the following as the basic declaratory policy on the employment of nuclear weapons:

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies and, partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners (US Department of Defense 2022a, 9).

Non-Adoption of “Sole purpose” Policy

Regarding the adoption of a policy of “no first use (NFU)” or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons, the United States has stated that “We conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy – including both No First Use and Sole Purpose policies – and concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of non-nuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategic-level damage to the United States and its Allies and partners. Some Allies and partners are particularly vulnerable to attack with non-nuclear means that could produce devastating effect. We retain the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration and we will work with our Allies and partners to identify concrete steps that would allow us to do so” (US Department of Defense 2022a, 9).

President Biden has long taken a proactive stance on nuclear disarmament, having expressed support for a “sole purpose” policy on the use of nuclear weapons in 2006 when he was vice president of the Obama administration, and in his presidential campaign he stated in Foreign Affairs in early 2020 that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack and, if necessary, to retaliate against it (Biden 2020). Furthermore, the Democratic Party platform adopted in July 2020 stipulated that Democrats believe that the sole purpose of our nuclear weapons should be to deter nuclear attack and, if necessary, to retaliate against it (Democratic Party 2020).

Stephan Young wrote, “This NPR does not reflect the sensible steps President Biden proposed as a candidate to reduce the nuclear threat. … It abandons the pledge Biden made on the campaign trail to support no first use policy” (Young 2022). Lisbeth Gronlund also criticized the NPR by stating that “his NPR does not include a sole purpose policy and far worse, it rejects a sole purpose policy now and far into the future, stating that it would result in an unacceptable level of risk and that for the foreseeable future US nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrent effect. These unique deterrent effects refer to the belief that nuclear weapons are uniquely capable of deterring and responding to some no-nuclear threat” (Gronlund 2022).

Declaratory Policy of Successive Administrations

The basic declaratory policy regarding the employment of nuclear weapons is that “The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners”, and in this part, it is the same as the ones of the Obama and Trump administrations. The Trump administration’s declaration, however, states that “Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attack. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the US, Allies, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on US or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” (US Department of Defense 2018. 21), emphasizing the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a broad range of situations. The Biden administration is more strict without reservation.

As for future directions, the Biden administration stated that it “maintains the goal of acting toward a declaration of sole purpose and will work with Allies and friends to identify specific measures that will enable us to do so”, which is a clear indication that the Biden administration cannot adopt sole purpose now. This is similar to the Obama administration’s forward-looking statement that while we cannot adopt the sole purpose now, we will work to set the conditions under which such a policy can be safely adopted.

The reasons why the “sole purpose” was not adopted by the Obama and Biden administrations are essentially the same: opposition from Allies and the military. Even during the Obama administration, Allies, including Japan, expressed concern that adoption of “sole purpose” would increase the likelihood that states in conflict with the United States would launch non-nuclear attacks against Allies because there would be no counterattack with nuclear weapons. In addition, the military’s inherent nature of wanting to retain as many modern weapons as possible and to be able to use them as freely and without restrictions as possible, has generally led it to dislike restrictions from the political or diplomatic side, and this is again a major reason why “sole purpose” could not be adopted in this case (Gordon 2022).

Challenges

As for challenges, since “sole purpose” is a critical factor in advancing the important goal of the US NPR of “reducing the role of nuclear weapons”, careful explanation, response, and persuasion to allies will be necessary. In implementing the idea of “integrated deterrence” emphasized in the NPR, the United States should clearly indicate the direction in which conventional weapons can fully perform certain deterrence functions while maintaining a clear boundary between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, in relations among nations, discussion of this issue should be promoted as a common agenda item in order to resolve the problem. China has traditionally and consistently insisted on “no first use”, and in its working paper on “security assurances” submitted to the 2022 NPT Review Conference, China insists that (1) nuclear-weapon states should make a clear commitment to no first use and (2) nuclear-weapon states should conclude a multilateral treaty on no first use of nuclear weapons (Tenth NPT Review Conference 2022). Even if there is an element of propaganda in China’s presentation, the United States should take these as an opportunity to actively develop the debate.

Negative Security Assurances

Regarding the policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, or negative security assurances (NSA), the NPR stipulates that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations”. This declaration by Biden is the same as that of the Obama and Trump administrations. The Obama administration reserved the right to make adjustments, however, given the destructive potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development. The Trump administration reserved the right to make adjustments to assurances that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and US capabilities to counter threats. The Biden Administration has explicitly provided negative security assurances without reservation.

Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control

General Comments

In Chapter 1 of the NPR, it states that “deterrence alone will not reduce nuclear dangers, The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places a renewed emphasis on arms control, nonproliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally”. One of the decisions in the NPR explicitly states the objective of “pursuing enhanced security through arms control, strategic stability, nonproliferation, and reducing the risks of miscalculation” (US Department of Defense 2022a, 1–3).

The NPR states, that “Beyond the critical role played by deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation play indispensable roles in further reducing nuclear dangers. Together, they are mutually reinforcing tools for preserving stability, deterring aggression and escalation, and avoiding arms racing and nuclear war. We are placing renewed emphasis on arms control, nonproliferation, and risk reduction”.

It added, “In particular, limitation on and greater transparency into adversary nuclear and possibly non-nuclear strategic capabilities through arms control is central to any approach to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Mutual, verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective, durable and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and preventing their use. Consistent with our commitment to put diplomacy first, the United States will pursue new nuclear arms control arrangements that address the full range of nuclear threats and advance global nonproliferation interests”. This statement asserts that arms control is the best path to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and preventing their use and emphasizes “put diplomacy first” policy.

It also expresses a positive attitude toward nuclear arms control by stating, “We will seek opportunities to pursue practical steps to advance the goals of greater transparency and predictability, enhanced stability, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and ultimately, a world without nuclear weapons”.

In a specific response, the report states, “Russia will remain a focal point of US efforts given the size, diversity, and continuing modernization of its nuclear arsenal. However, we will need to account for the PRC’s nuclear expansion in future US-Russia nuclear arms control discussions”, emphasizing the need to incorporate China in the future, although Russia will be the focus in the short term (US Department of Defense 2022a, 16).

Nuclear Arms Control and Risk Reduction

With regard to specific nuclear arms control and nuclear risks, the NPR emphasizes a proactive stance in relations with Russia, saying, “Upon taking office in January 2021, the President immediately extended the New START Treaty for a full five years provided in the treaty. … The United States is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START Treaty when it expires in 2026, although negotiation requires willing partners operating in good faith. Our priorities include fostering transparency and mutual risk reduction, pursuing initiatives that limit destabilizing systems or posture, and reducing chance of miscalculation”.¹ The Biden administration is rather active to nuclear arms control and risk reduction.

In the area of relations with China, the NPR states that “The scope and speed of the PRC’s nuclear expansion, as well as its lack of transparency and growing military assertiveness, raise questions regarding its intentions, nuclear strategy and doctrine, and perceptions of strategic stability. This underscores the need for discussion on practical steps to reduce strategic risks, including steps that could lay the groundwork for additional discussion of mutual restraints in capabilities and behavior. Although the PRC has been reluctant to discuss these issues, the United States remains ready to engage the PRC on a full range of strategic issues, with a focus on military de-conflictions, crisis communications, information sharing, mutual restraint, risk reduction, emerging technologies, and approaches to nuclear arms control”. It also indicates its intention to actively engage China. Further, it emphasizes that PRC should adopt a moratorium on fissile material production to prevent the growth of its nuclear arsenal (US Department of Defense 2022a, 16–17).

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The United States argues that it remains dedicated to preserving and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirms its commitment to the NPT, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its nuclear safeguards, along with effective export controls impede nuclear proliferation and should be strengthened.

On Iran, it is US policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and that it is pursuing principled diplomacy in coordination with Allies and partners to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities, and on North Korea, it calls for a calibrated diplomatic approach to secure practical progress that increases security of the United States, its Allies and partners, and deployed forces. At the same time, it will continue to press North Korea to comply with its obligation under various UN Security Council resolutions.

Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament

First, regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the United States supports it and is committed to working to achieve its entry into force. The United States continues to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain such a moratorium.

Second, regarding a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the United States continues to support the commencement of FMCT negotiations provided they are done by consensus and all key states participate, and it continues to encourage all countries, including China, to declare and maintain such a moratorium.

Third, regarding the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which entered into force in January 2021, it states that “while the United States actively pursues the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, it does not consider the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to be an effective means to reach that goal. The United States does not share the underlying assumption of the TPNW that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved irrespective of the prevailing international security environment. Nor do we consider the TPNW to be an effective tool to resolve the underlying security conflicts that lead states to retain or seek nuclear weapons (US Department of Defense 2022a, 18–19).

Emma Foley states that on its surface, the review might encourage anyone looking for progress on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation – all of which receive repeated explicit commitments in the text. It eliminates two outstanding artifacts of the Trump administration’s nuclear overkill – the SLCM-N and the B-83 gravity bomb. It affirms the goal of a world without nuclear-weapons, and the desirability of reducing the role of nuclear weapons. However, she criticizes it saying, “Yet in ways that count, it digs in its heels and sets a course for a long future for the US nuclear arsenal”. As concrete examples, she states that ICBM modernization is proceeding without credible cost assessments and despite its destabilizing effects, and that it presents keeping the missiles on “day-to-day alert as a stable, acceptable state of affairs” (Foley 2022).

Zafar Khan notes that “the NPR does not primarily focus on nuclear disarmament which the United States along with the P5 pledged as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The NPR is rather critical on nuclear disarmament which may not be achieved anytime soon. It broadly criticizes Russia and China for advancing their nuclear capabilities. However, the NPR failed to elaborate why Russia and China policy documents perceive security threats from the United States” (Khan 2022).

US Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

Overall Direction

Chapter 1 of the NPR states that “the United States is committed to the modernization of its nuclear forces, nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems, and production and support substructure”, and stipulates as one of its decisions “to affirm full-scope Triad replacement and other nuclear modernization programs, including NC3”, and advocates very aggressive nuclear capabilities. The NPR also states that the decision affirms the full range replacement of the nuclear triad and other modernization programs, including NC3, retires the B83–1 gravity bomb, and cancels the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) program (US Department of Defense 2022a, 3).

In particular, the NPR states that “The three legs of nuclear Triad are complementary, with each component offering unique attributes. Maintaining a modern triad possessing these attributes – effectiveness, responsiveness, survivability, flexibility, and visibility – ensures that the United States can withstand and respond to any strategic attack, tailor its deterrence strategies as needed, and assure Allies in support of our extended deterrence commitments”.

The B83–1 gravity bomb, which is 60 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, will be retired due to increasing limitations on its capabilities and rising maintenance costs.

In addition, the United States will cancel its nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) program. Although the Trump Administration decided in the 2018 NPR to deploy them to enhance deterrence of limited nuclear uses in regional conflicts, the Biden Administration has reevaluated and concluded SLCM-N was no longer necessary given the deterrence contribution of the W76–2, uncertainty regarding whether SLCM-N on its own would provide leverage to negotiate arms control limit on Russia’s NSNW, and the estimated cost of the SLCM-N in light of other nuclear modernization programs and defense priorities. This could be one of the most important shifts the Biden administration has made.

As a result, the decisions on US nuclear capabilities in this NPR are summarized as follows (US Department of Defense 2022a, 21):

Land-Based Force

1. Fully fund the Sentinel ICBM replacement program of record in the 2023–27 Future Years Defense Program.

2. Sentinel will replace the Minuteman III (MMIII) one-for-one to maintain 400 ICBMs on alert.

3. Sentinel will field the W87–0/Mk21 and W87–1/Mk21A warheads and aeroshells.

4. Any alternative to the Sentinel program of record that extends MMIII life and replace it in the future would increase risk and cost.

Sea-Based Force

1. Fully fund the COLUMBIA-Class SSBN program to deliver a minimum of 12 boats to replace the OHIO-Class fleet beginning in 2030.

2. Prioritize near-term investments in the submarine construction industrial base and OHIO-class sustainment until the completion of the COLUMBIA-class transition.

3. Prioritize near-term investment in the Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System second life extension. Complete the W88 Alt 370 program, which does not introduce any new military capability.

4. Continue the W93 warhead program. Continue to support the United Kingdom with its Replacement Warhead Program, Common Missile Compartment, and Mk7 aeroshell.

Air-Based Force

1. Modernize the B-52 H Stratofortress bomber fleet through 2050 as a nuclear standoff platform with global reach.

2. Fully fund the B-21 Raider bomber to replace the B-2A Spirit fleet. The Air Force will acquire a minimum of 100 B-21 aircraft.

3. Fully fund the Long-Range Standoff weapon and associated W80-4 warhead to replace the Air-Launched Cruise Missile.

4. Retire the B83-1 gravity bomb.

Supplemental and DCA Capabilities

1. Retain the W76-2 low-yield Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile option and periodically reassess its deterrent value.

2. Cancel the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program.

3. Continue nuclear certification of the F-35A fighter aircraft and transition from the F-15E to the F-35A to support NATO’s nuclear mission.

4. Replace B61-3/4/7 nuclear gravity bombs with the life-extended B61-12.

Thus, the NPR basically emphasizes the promotion of nuclear force modernization and stipulates the retirement of the B83–1 gravity bomb and the cancellation of the SLCM-N program. However, there have been some views expressed against the cancellation of the SLCM-N program arguing that it is necessary to maintain a balance with Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons (Wall Street Journal Editorial Board 2022; Geller 2022).

As for the US nuclear capability part, Daryl Kimball strongly criticizes the NPR, stating that Biden’s NPR report also rubber-stamps most of the long-planned multibillion-dollar program for modernizing US nuclear arsenal. … This includes 400 new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new fleet of nuclear-armed strategic submarines, a new strategic bomber, a new air-launched cruise missile, a newly designated nuclear warhead (the W-93), and refurbishment of other nuclear warhead types. Bidens’ NPR also endorses President Donald Trump’s initiative for the W76–2 lower-yield warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Kimball 2022).

Overall Assessment of the NPR

The NPR strongly asserts that it represents a comprehensive and balanced approach to US nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and forces. Its central assertion is that it maintains a commitment to safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence and strong and credible extended deterrence. This is the basic US position on the military aspect of this NPR.

At the same time, the NPR emphasizes that the United States will reduce the role of nuclear weapons, reestablish our leadership role in arms control, emphasize strategic stability, avoid costly arms races, and promote risk reduction and arms control arrangements wherever possible. This is what the NPR is all about. This is the basic US position related to the political and diplomatic aspect of this NPR. With regard to nuclear disarmament and arms control, the United States has clearly stated its commitment to “put diplomacy first”, and the “diplomacy first” principle is strongly advocated, along with the assertion that arms control is the best way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to prevent their use. It is essential, therefore, to consider these two aspects equally while evaluating the NPR.

Furthermore, the declaratory policy of the United States on the use of nuclear weapons states that “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our Allies and partners”. This contains a critical point regarding the military use of nuclear weapons, namely, when to use nuclear weapons from a political and diplomatic point of view.

Analyzed from the perspective of maintaining and promoting the peace and security of the international community, a posture based solely on the buildup of military power will elicit countermeasures by potential adversaries and lead to the continuation and intensification of the nuclear arms race, thereby reducing the level of security of each state and the security of the international community. The level of security of each state will be reduced, and the security of the international community will also be diminished.

Even if there is some justification for possessing nuclear weapons to deter attack by an opposing nation, a nuclear arms race that is completely unregulated will not only lower the security of all nations, but also the security of the international community. What is needed, therefore, is a political and diplomatic response. The necessary basic actions are the progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control, the prohibition or restriction of the use of nuclear weapons, and the reduction of nuclear risks, which has been strongly advocated recently.

When we evaluate the current Nuclear Posture Review from this perspective, it is necessary to note that nuclear deterrence is described in Chapter III on the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy, in Chapter IV on tailored nuclear deterrence strategies, in Chapter V on strengthening regional nuclear deterrence, and in Chapter VII on US nuclear capabilities. Based on the fact that nuclear deterrence is widely described in the NPR, the military aspect is strongly emphasized in this report.

Conversely, despite the NPR’s emphasis on the slogan “put diplomacy first”, the content describing political and diplomatic measures is not as strong. The issue of nuclear arms control is described as only a small part of Chapter VI on arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, and counterterrorism. Although it aims in the direction toward nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control, its determination to initiate negotiations with Russia and China does not appear to be strong, and it seems to be hoping for a change in their behavior.

Furthermore, the policy of “the sole purpose”, which is concerned with the fundamental rule of the use of nuclear weapons, was not adopted this time either. President Biden has repeatedly stated that he would adopt such a policy, and it was clearly stated in the Democratic Party Platform during his presidential campaign, and yet it was not adopted.

This may be because, in considering the two aspects of the Nuclear Posture Review, i.e. the military aspect and the political and diplomatic aspect, the view from the military aspect was the priority. The NPR, which examines whole posture of nuclear weapons, is written under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense. As a result, it cannot be denied that it mainly reflects the opinion from a military point of view.

Related to this view, Joe Cirincione questioned the process by which the NPR was prepared, stating that “every president in the nuclear age has struggled to control the weapons supposed under his sole authority. Primarily this is because US nuclear posture is not a rational response to an external threat environment. It is driven by those who see nuclear superiority as a tool of global power, those who use nuclear security as a wedge issue in partisan politics, and by those powerful arms corporations that realize vast profit from manufacturing, marketing, and maintaining these deadly arsenals. The question is complicated by a process that gives those most interested in continuing nuclear programs the authority to write the policy governing these weapons. The Pentagon controls the pen” (Cirincione 2022).

Furthermore, Tom Nichols states that “Biden’s report does make some changes. … Yet we’re keeping the same kinds of forces and the same strategies that we used during our long struggle with the Soviet Union. … Yet the big questions remain unanswered. Does the strategic arsenal exist only to deter the use of similar weapons against US? Or does it exist to fight and prevail in a nuclear war? Biden’s solution is the same compromise found in the four other posture reviews: America hopes for a world in which nuclear arms only deter nuclear arms, but that world isn’t here yet” (Nichols 2022).

Victor Gilinsky noted that “the NPR claims the United States is pursuing ‘a world without nuclear weapons’, yet everything in it points the opposite direction, toward keeping things as they are. The abolition of nuclear weapons is an unrealistic goal for now, but so is the notion that the present state of affairs can continue indefinitely. The goal of abolition is always going to be unrealistic unless we start talking about it” (Gilinsky 2022).

As indicated by these various views, the limitations of the Nuclear Posture Review prepared by the Ministry of Defense is that it gives priority to military perspectives and does not fully incorporate political and diplomatic perspectives. Future nuclear posture reviews should be more comprehensive, with the president at the center and the entire US government working together to address the issue of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

The Nuclear Posture Review by the Biden administration was expected to be progressive toward nuclear disarmament based on his previous statements. However, partially because of the deterioration of the international security environment and Russia’s military aggression to Ukraine and its threat to use nuclear weapons, his policy in the NPR is not much different from the previous administrations.

The new NPR emphasizes that it takes a comprehensive and balanced approach. We can conclude, however, that it gives much weight to the military aspect of nuclear weapons, which will strengthen nuclear deterrence and modernize its nuclear weapons, and gives little weight to political and diplomatic aspects that orient toward strengthening international peace and security.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mitsuru Kurosawa

Mitsuru Kurosawa is a professor emeritus at Osaka University and Osaka Jogakuin University. He was the founding president of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies (JADS) from 2009 to 2013 and an advisor to the Japanese Delegation to the NPT Review Conference in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.

Notes

¹ On February 21, 2023 Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his annual address that “Moscow is halting its participation in the New START deal” with the United States. He stressed that Russia was not leaving the accord, but just halting its participation. Russia will continue to abide by the limits set by the treaty.