The etiquette of bribes – learning, teaching and knowing

ABSTRACT

How are bribes supposed to be given or taken? In this article, we study how individuals from countries with low tolerance of corruption learn, teach others and present themselves as knowledgeable about the etiquette of bribes. This involves the social practices of everyday corruption and petty bribes when working as ’strangers’ in countries where such exchanges are more common. Previous interviews on bribery with Swedish and Danish aid workers, and Swedish representatives from adoption organizations, were searched for descriptions of giving, receiving and avoiding petty bribes. We argue that an appreciation of the etiquette of bribes is important for understanding the social practices of giving and/or taking bribes. Such an etiquette is not ‘random’ but addresses and resolves practical and interactional concerns for the actors involved in those exchanges.

KEYWORDS:

• Etiquette
• corruption
• bribes
• practices
• interviews

Introduction

The subject of corruption has been given a lot of attention in recent years, including from legal authorities and various anti-corruption organizations focused on battling and reducing corruption (Åkerström, 2017; Sampson, 2010). Corruption scandals have also occupied a considerable amount of space in tabloids, newspapers and magazines (Jacobsson & Löfmarck, 2008; Thelander, 2012; Wästerfors, 2004).

Corruption has also received broad scholarly attention from researchers. In many cases, the main concern has been the economic issues surrounding and consequences of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). The big cases of corruption are often the cases that are discussed and analysed, instances of so-called ‘grand’ corruption, involving officials, politicians and businessmen of high social position and status (Dávid-Barett & Fazekas, 2019; Gafar Idowu, 2019; Hagene, 2019; Lasslett, 2017; Rose-Ackerman, 2002). The economic aspects of corruption and bribery are usually highlighted in these kinds of studies, with limited attention on the meaning and interaction of everyday experiences concerning corruption (Hiah, 2020).

Here, we focus on so-called ‘petty’ corruption involving the use of bribes or ‘everyday corruption’ in which less valuable items or services are given (Doig & Theobald, 2000), which may include informal exchanges highlighting the grey zones and relationships between gratuitous and instrumental behaviour (Henig & Makovicky, 2017; Ledeneva et al., 2018). We analyse a specific dimension of the narrated social practices of bribes, namely, learning, teaching and presenting oneself as knowledgeable about the ‘etiquette’ of bribes. By this, we mean that the social practices involving how bribes should be offered, given or sometimes received. As bribes are condemnable acts, norms prescribe that they should be given with discretion and finesse. The present study is a reanalysis (Wästerfors et al., 2014) of two qualitative studies involving Swedish and a few Danish aid workers, representatives from adoption organizations and parents who have adopted children. These studies contain several instances in which the interviewees talk about their experiences with petty corruption, particularly concerning bribes or potential bribes.

Social actions concerning bribes, as well as exchanges of favours, are usually not analysed as being guided by etiquette, but rather as guided by political-economic approaches (Henig & Makovicky, 2017).¹ A possible reason for this is that etiquette is conventionally regarded as being applicable to legitimate, rather than illegitimate, behaviours. Nevertheless, the etiquette of bribes seems to be just as complex as other forms of etiquette.

In this article, we will argue that applying the concept of etiquette for analysing bribes can be illuminating for understanding such informal practices and the efforts entailed in learning them. Our ambition is explorative: How do people from a socio-cultural context of strong condemnation of corruption (mainly Sweden, but also Denmark) learn, teach others and present themselves as knowledgeable about the etiquette of such informal practices? This is an important dimension of the study; our interviewees, being in varying degrees ‘strangers’ or newcomers to certain cultural contexts, need to learn and understand the nature of those exchanges. The concept of etiquette offers a tentative analytical framework that contributes to our understanding of the social practices of petty bribes. The etiquette of such exchanges may be seen as a way of managing practical and interactional concerns about how bribes should be given, received or possibly avoided.

Bribes, gifts and etiquette

A bribe has some similarities to a gift in that it concerns an exchange, as illustrated in the classic study by Marcel Mauss (1923/1990). Mauss studied giftexchanges among tribal societies in Polynesia and found patterns of giftgiving and receiving that he described as relevant and illuminating in his own society. According to Mauss, the giftexchange is characterized by strong social obligations, particularly the obligation to reciprocate. It is in the reciprocal nature of gifts in which the connection to bribes is most clear. Even though gift-giving, and of course bribery, may have both strategic and relational dimensions, their handling requires a delicate balance.

Another field of study that is relevant for understanding bribe practices is the study of social norms and ceremonial rules. There are many such studies, often inspired by Erving Goffman’s (1967, 1990) seminal writings on facework and self-presentations. For Goffman, an integral and ever-present part of social life is that people constantly present themselves to each other. An important observation is that these self-presentations achieve certain objectives in social interaction, mainly preserving, but sometimes also repairing, social relations. In the case of bribery and etiquette, this sheds light on ways in which social actors often use euphemisms and obfuscations in their bribe practices. It is not merely a matter of concealing what may be illegal activities, but another important aspect concerns preserving the social relations of the participants and ensuring that the interaction can continue smoothly without disruptions.

Etiquette and the tactful social practices of bribes

The phenomenon of ‘etiquette’ has been discussed, as mentioned above, although in most cases it is not framed specifically as studies of etiquette, but rather concern-related themes, such as ceremonial orders, adherence to unwritten rules or studies of informal practices. Howard Becker (2000) is one of the few social scientists who has engaged in an explicit analysis of etiquette. Below, we discuss his thoughts on the subject and then move on to discuss the tactful social practices of bribes.

In Becker’s (2000) discussion of etiquette in relation to jazz musicians and improvization, he made a couple of notable observations. The improvization followed an etiquette that was very strict in certain respects. For example, the number of choruses played by the first player in a jam session set, the standard and the other players were obliged to follow; to play more would be rude, to play less would imply that the first player had played too much, which was equally awkward – in both cases, it would be a transgression of the etiquette of jazz improvization.

This could be regarded as a kind of paradox concerning improvization, which is usually regarded as spontaneous and unrestricted. Another observation by Becker (2000) was that no one taught the jazz musicians these rules of etiquette, and they were not written down and formalized. Rather, the musicians ‘learned them [the rules] by quietly observing, as youngsters, what older players did, and noting what happened when someone (usually a novice or some other unsocialized type) failed to obey these rules’ (Becker, 2000, p. 172). Becker’s example of etiquette demonstrates that etiquette may be found in other social contexts than those we presume – such as behaviour at fancy dinner parties. The main argument that we would like to underline is that etiquette contains some sort of learned rules, usually unformalized and unwritten, about how to act tactfully in certain social situations. This, we would argue, is something that is also relevant to understanding the social practices of bribery. There are no formalized instructions or manuals, like handbooks of table manners, on how to offer or receive bribes, but this knowledge still exists and may be learned by observing and learning from others.

Several studies have highlighted how bribes are tactfully given or requested, even if these researchers did not specifically use the term ‘etiquette’. The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality (2018) includes numerous ethnographic studies of informal practices, covering a wide range of regions. Some of those practices may be described as bribes, although such interpretations are often unclear and indefinite. Still, although there is variety, there seems to be recurrent ways of interacting and managing tactful social practices. Another recent anthology by Henig and Makovicky (2017) focuses on what is described as ‘favors’ in the former Soviet Union and post-Maoist China and several other post-socialist societies in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. The authors in this anthology also depict a broad range of informal exchanges and ‘favors’, some of which may be described as corruption (although it is emphasized that such definitions tend to be ambiguous and open for interpretation).

Different examples of social practices for giving bribes (or potential bribes) were described by Schilke and Rossman (2018). They did not specifically write about the etiquette of bribes but described several forms of ‘obfuscated exchange’. One variant is referred to as ‘bundling’, in which the exchange is obfuscated through another service that is seen as legit such as when not allowed to openly give gifts to a politician, one way could be to purchase services or favour his or her business interests if he or she has any (Schilke & Rossman, 2018). Another form of obfuscation is called ‘brokerage’, which is when the exchange between two parties is mediated by a third party. This obscures the connection between the bribe giver and the bribe taker, thus obfuscating that a disreputable transaction is occurring.

A more specific empirical illustration of the social practices of bribes was discussed by Schoeneborn and Homberg (2018). Their example concerns something known as the ‘$20 Sandwich Trick’ in Las Vegas, Nevada (USA), which is a way of getting a hotel room upgrade for a lower price than usual by placing a bill between their credit card and their ID and simultaneously requesting a complimentary upgrade. The researchers found a higher success rate when the payment was handed in the most delicate way, silently, without any verbal clues at all. Naturally, for this strategy of concealment to work, both interaction partners must be knowledgeable about the nature of the trick.

In an interview study of petty corruption in Hungary, Jancsics (2013) wrote about different communication strategies concerning what he refers to as on-the-spot corruption, situations of petty corruption between strangers. One of the informants claimed that you must be cautious in such situations and described the social interactions before a potential corrupt transaction as a ‘mating dance’, where you must be prepared if the other side rejects you (Jancsics, 2013, p. 330). As in the previously discussed studies, Jancsics (2013) did not specifically mention an etiquette for bribes, but we would argue that parts of his discussion could be interpreted along those lines. Another informant, an entrepreneur, said in one of the interviews that ‘you have to know how to ask’ (Jancsics, 2013, p. 331), but the practical knowledge about ‘how to do it’ varied among his informants.

Ledeneva (2008) has studied ‘informal practices’ in Russia, which are described as ‘people’s regular strategies to manipulate or exploit formal rules by enforcing informal norms and personal obligations in formal contexts’ (Ledeneva, 2008, p. 119). In Russia, such practices are often referred to as blat or magharich in Armenia (Avetisyan, 2018). These informal practices have similarities with the Chinese practices of guanxi (Yang, 2002).

All these have resemblances to bribery etiquette, particularly in the sense that these practices involve knowing the unwritten rules about such exchanges. In addition, it requires knowing how to navigate between formal and informal societal constraints. Ledeneva (2011) argued that such unwritten rules can be described as ‘open secrets’, which means that these rules are widespread and well known but simultaneously unknown to outsiders. Also, there is a ‘tacit acceptance that what is known should remain unarticulated’ (Ledeneva, 2011, p. 725).

The notion that bribery and other corrupt activities are secluded activities is part of our everyday conceptions of corruption (cf., Jacobsson, 2005; Reisman, 1979; Werner, 2000). Georg Simmel (1907/1978) once argued that large bribes given openly may take on an ‘official’ nature and avoid being perceived as bribes. Yet, if we look at the instances of everyday or petty corruption described by the interviewed aid workers, discretion is clearly part of the etiquette of bribes.

We have used the concept of discretion in describing the etiquette of these exchanges, as it captures an interactional element. A secret may be shared, but it may also be held by one individual, while discretion is shown in relation to others, in, for instance, protecting a potential loss of face, but it may also involve an interaction pair, or a group, in relation to outside audiences. Furthermore, discretion may be shown as tactful silent agreement among bystanders witnessing a deviation or faux pas. The boundaries between those two concepts, secrets and discretion, may be blurred at times and at times integrated when a divulged secret is responded to with discretion.

In the empirical part of this study, we will seek to illuminate how our interviewees describe how they come to know, are taught or present themselves as knowledgeable about the social practices of petty bribery with examples from interviews with aid workers and adoption agency representatives.

Methods and material

This study is based on a reanalysis of material gathered in two studies on bribery and corruption (Åkerström, 2017; Thelander, 2006). In these studies, the subject of bribes was researched from different perspectives, focusing on a diverse range of experiences. Interviews were carried out with Swedish and a few Danish aid workers, representatives working for adoption agencies in Sweden, an authority that oversees adoption and parents who adopt. The professionals all have experiences, from varying perspectives, with what may be regarded as corruption and bribery, and the parents contributed with concerns about the boundaries between gifts and bribes.

All the professionals had work experiences from different countries and regions (Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa) where corruption and bribery are seen as widespread. To preserve anonymity, it was decided, in agreement with the interviewees, that we would not disclose information about the specific countries involved, only the regions. There are methodological drawbacks in this, as it precludes a discussion of country-specific differences. However, in this study, we focus on aspects of bribe practices that we would argue are not specific to one country or region, despite local and regional variations, but can be seen as part of a more generalized etiquette of bribes. The study of aid workers’ experiences with everyday corruption was carried out by Thelander (2006) and consisted of 18 interviews with Swedish and Danish aid workers (16 Swedish and 2 Danish). The interviewed aid workers, eleven men and seven women, had worked in varying organizational positions and with different kinds of aid work: one senior consultant, one freelance consultant, one coordinator/advisor, one regional administrator, one regional manager, three project leaders, one resource developer and nine volunteer workers (mainly teachers). The study of adoption agencies in Sweden was carried out by Åkerström (2017) and consisted of 10 interviews (three with representatives of adoption organizations, two with governmental organizations and five with adoptive parents). The adoption organizations’ and governmental organizations’ representatives, all of them women, had worked in different countries, but mainly India, China and Eastern Europe. The adoptive parents had adopted from India and Latin America.

All interviews were semi-structured, digitally recorded and conversational with the aim of achieving an active dialogue with the interviewees rather than simply using a question–answer structure (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim in accordance with established conventions in qualitative methods (see, e.g., Silverman, 2011).

The narrative context

Interviews are not performed in a societal vacuum. The narratives and descriptions in the interviews are assembled using the interpretive resources at hand, which consisted of occupation-specific issues and material gained from the general Swedish debates in relation to corruption. It is difficult to conclude how much the socio-historical context was integrated into the various ways that the interviewed persons narrated their experiences (Holstein & Gubrium, 2021). However, it is important to note that, at the time when the main part of the interview material was collected (2001–2006), increasing attention was being given to issues concerning bribery. This ‘bribery gaze’ (Åkerström, 2017) was also directed towards minor transactions that were previously considered to be less harmful. One may note that Sweden, Denmark and other Nordic countries have for several years been ranked among the least corrupt by Transparency International.² However, despite low levels of corruption, in Sweden, there has been a mobilization against corruption that could be witnessed in the founding of a new legal institution, the National Unit Against Corruption, in 2002. In addition to this, there is an increased social attentiveness by the mass media and in the production and use of action plans, manuals and directives produced by local authorities, companies, professional organizations for journalists and doctors and so on. Even an older institution such as the Anti-Corruption Institute, founded in 1923, got an upswing, with more questions from the mass media and inquiries from companies. Not only expensive gifts but also relatively small gifts were targeted as blameworthy, even criminal. For example, a Swedish lawyer who sent a small fruit basket to a staff member at the local court, in what he claimed was a thank-you gesture, was subsequently convicted of bribery (Solna Court, case nr B 5566–09/2009).

It was clear during the interviews that they were aware of a general condemnation of corruption (Thelander, 2006). Sometimes, references were made to organizational policies, ‘zero tolerance’ towards corruption, and to the work of anti-corruption agencies such as Transparency International. However, despite demonstrating a distinct aversion to corruption in general, several interviewees mentioned that it was sometimes difficult to maintain a ‘zero tolerance’ policy. At certain times and in certain situations, they claimed that payments that were possibly bribes (or potential bribes) had to be paid, such as to cross a border to deliver aid materials. Thus, the practices of doing aid work or adoptions sometimes collided with the general policies and guidelines, leading to moral dilemmas that had to be solved, sometimes through resistance and sometimes through a certain degree of cultural accommodation.

Thus, we are not directing our analysis towards various local contexts where bribes are given and taken; rather, our primary focus is on how professionals who are part of a strict moral condemnation of corruption manage informal exchanges, sometimes interpreted as bribes, which they are not culturally accustomed to.

Ethical considerations

All participants in the cited studies were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they could discontinue participation at any time in accordance with the criteria formulated by The Swedish Research Council [Vetenskapsrådet] (2002). The focus of this study was the phenomenon of bribery, not specific individuals. Therefore, identifying information for individuals, as well as specific places, has been altered to preserve anonymity. As mentioned previously, for reasons of anonymity, it was decided not to disclose information about the specific countries involved, only the regions.

Learning, teaching and knowing the etiquette

We focused our analysis on the various ways in which the interviewed individuals describe their experiences with the social practices of bribery. The interviewees describe some instances where they must learn such practices. In doing so, they present their personas as being ‘positively’ innocent to local practices of bribery, thereby portraying themselves as coming from a country (in this case, Sweden or Denmark) where bribery is not inherent in the local culture. In other instances, the interviewees present their personas as knowledgeable, taking the role of teaching others or demonstrating their knowledge about the local practices. Thus, the interviewees could also describe themselves as being competent and pragmatic and as people who are ‘doing expertise’ by explaining the norms of discretion in small bribery transactions or teaching others.

Learning

At times, the practices of small bribery are described by our interviewees as something that a person may be naïve, baffled or frustrated about but still something that they can learn. If regarding small bribes as being part of some occupations, either by rejecting to pay or receive or entering into such a transaction, it is like many tasks in any occupation, something you have to learn informally by observing others who succeed or fail, and at times, you have others tell you or correct your mistakes (cf., Becker, 2000).

Experience in working abroad may provide topics that enable an individual to present their expertise, but our interviewees also told anecdotes about how they failed to understand the local norms but came to realize how things were supposed to be done. Consider Eric’s comments below as an example of the former. He did voluntary aid work as a teacher in a developing country in Africa. He provides a story about a box with clothes and other things that he and his family needed, but he could not get the box out of the docks. Weeks passed; he consulted an agent from the local aid organization, but still the box remained at the docks. When the situation became urgent, he and the local aid worker went to the office at the docks, determined to finally get their hands on the box. This time they succeeded, although only through using bribes. The interviewer asked him if the officials at the docks told him that they wanted a bribe, and he described what happened..

Eric:

No, it was never stated explicitly. And I was far too naïve to underst-, understand how it worked, right, but somehow eh … I misinterpreted the situation and … at one moment I sort of gave up, and then I moved my hand towards my wallet right, towards my back pocket, like this [makes a gesture]. But then I was stopped right, because it shouldn’t be done, shouldn’t be done so obvious.

Interviewer:

Alright. Was it one of them who worked there who stopped you?

Eric:

Yes. And then eh … then it was, well it should be done discretely, through an agent like that, right. So … they went behind some boxes and did the deal, and then they came back.

Interviewer:

So, it wasn’t you who … it wasn’t you who paid someone, rather you gave the money to someone else, right?

Eric:

Yes, I gave the money to someone, who went behind … went secretly, very discreet, and then … then I don’t know where the money finally ended up. But then this person came back, who was my representative. And then it was settled.

The anecdote relies on the fact that when a social norm is broken, which is normally implicit, it may become visible through the participating actors’ actions to uphold the norm. This is the case in the interview extract above when Eric moved his hand towards his wallet: ‘It shouldn’t be done, shouldn’t be done so obvious’. Eric was reproved for breaking the unwritten rules and then told how to deliver the payment. Georg Simmel remarked that money makes discretion possible in bribe transactions: ‘Money, more than any other form of value, makes possible the secrecy, invisibility, and silence of exchange’ (Simmel, 1907/1978, p. 387). Money, in the form of thin paper bills, is by its very nature highly convenient for a discrete transaction. However, in Eric’s case, the indiscrete manner to openly move his hand towards his wallet in the back pocket broke the unwritten rule of how bribes were supposed to be given.

In addition, by using an agent, sometimes referred to as a ‘middle-man’, the bribe giver can distance himself from the transaction. In addition, when Eric is reprimanded for not concealing the payment, it becomes clear that this is a case of an extorted bribe. Otherwise, the unconcealed exchange would have been accepted as payment.

Another aid worker, Nicole from Denmark, has worked primarily as a freelance aid consultant in Africa. She is an example of presenting what may be described as a ‘naïve equal honest’ persona. At the airport in the country where she worked, Nicole had an experience that seems similar to Eric’s:

One time … I don’t remember, I think it was in (country X), I had too much luggage, and eh … then a friend told me, ‘yes, but I can fix that eh … if he’s given a bit of grease.’ So, he went with me, but I still didn’t understand, I was very naïve, right, and … about how he was supposed to do this. And then he checked in my bags, and he checked in that and that and that, and I say: ‘Oh, yes, but I also have this large bag.’ So, he says ‘Shh! Shh! [both laughs] that is the trick!’

The ‘trick’ in the above example is that the airport officer only checks in one bag, although the passenger takes an additional (large) bag onboard. Therefore, Nicole is reproved when she indiscreetly mentions that she has another bag to check in. The reproval is even done discretely: ‘Shh! Shh!’ When a social actor needs help with her role, the instructions should be given in an appropriate way without disturbing the performance (Goffman, 1990). If too much attention was drawn to Nicole’s mistake, it could have done more harm than good. Goffman (1967) also noted the importance of observing and studying such behaviours that are met with social disapproval, as it gives an indication of what is considered socially appropriate. Here, the appropriate behaviour was apparently to be discrete and did not bring unwanted attention to the extra bag.

Both Nicole and Eric described themselves as naïve. Talking about naivety may be regarded as a way of explaining, or ‘accounting’, for bribes (cf., Antaki, 1994; Buttny, 1993; Scott & Lyman, 1968). A person who is naïve may be more easily tricked or extorted to pay a bribe, and in that sense, the actions can be explained or excused. However, in the cases mentioned above, it does not seem to be a question of describing oneself as naïve to explain one’s actions. Rather, it concerns being naïve, or ignorant, about the unwritten rules of how bribes should be given. Someone who does not know the rules risks breaking them, even if it is unintentional. Nicole ‘puts her foot in it’, as it were; she creates an embarrassing situation that simultaneously makes visible the value of discretion.

If something is to be treated discreetly, it cannot be said in plain language. In the interviews, ‘aesthetics of deception’ (Makovicky, 2018, p. 126) are used, that is, local euphemisms from across the world that deflect exchanges from corrupt activities. These can be described as ‘grease’, alluding to the fact that bribes can make something happen when things are slow or seem to be stuck, as in the case of Eric’s box. Sometimes, the aid workers refer to their experiences with other allusions to bribery, but the meaning of allusions has to be learnt or taught. Hannah has worked as a project leader with aid transports in Eastern Europe, mainly shipping medical supplies and clothes, and she described what can happen if a truck filled with aid materials gets stuck at Customs:

And then they [the Customs officers] give little signals about that, ‘I might possibly be able to help you if … ’ But they never say in plain language that, ‘then you must give me two hundred dollars.’ And then you have to figure out for yourself what the ‘if’ means. [short laughter]

This, we would argue, is an illustration of ‘learning by doing’, figuring out what various symbolic gestures imply. Due to its condemnable nature, corruption and bribery make it necessary to negotiate consensus between the participating actors. Jörg R. Bergmann (1993) referred to bribery when he discussed the nature of gossip. In both cases, the actors must establish mutual involvement in the act that is about to occur: ‘Thus, before the conduct of the real transaction can occur, the corruptibility of the other has to be secured and gradually transformed into an unambiguous consensus through guarded proposals and vague demands’ (Bergmann, 1993, p. 86). An anecdote may further illustrate this phenomenon. The daughter of an acquaintance of ours has worked in Latin America; on one occasion, she was going through Customs at an airport together with a more experienced colleague. The civil servant at Customs discretely showed four fingers around the waistline height. The daughter’s colleague in turn showed two fingers in the same fashion, upon which the civil servant nodded, and two bills changed owners. She ended this telling by stating: ‘You learn as you go’.

Teaching

Above, Eric and Nicole made a faux pas when making a gesture that indicated that the money would be offered openly (as a bribe) or in not understanding how a companion had helped (through a bribe). Both situations may be interpreted as learning occasions in which Eric’s and Nicole’s transgressions are reproved and corrected immediately during the situation at hand.

There are, however, other instances when people are told in advance how to act to avoid direct bribe associations. In such cases, the advice can involve the type of gift that should be given to stay on the correct side of the gift/bribe divide (i.e. being perceived as gifts rather than bribes). One such example was given by Sara, a representative for an adoption agency. Sara told the interviewer about the importance of telling parents-to-be to give judges or others involved in the adoption process the morally correct item, both in terms of value and in terms of the type of object. Flowers, chocolate, a packet of coffee or a nice pair of kitchen towels were seen as appropriate items, whereas a bottle of whisky was a no-no, no matter the price of the bottle.

Another adoption representative also considered the dimension of time when determining if a gift will be interpreted as a bribe. Usually, a bribe is when a gift is given before the favour is reciprocated. In a legal sense, this timing does not have any decisive significance, at least not in Swedish law, but in the folk logic of the definition of what constitutes a bribe, it seems to be important (Jacobsson, 2012).

According to this folk logic, Rebecca, another representative for an adoption agency in Sweden, argued that the timing of gifts is essential. In the quote below, she gives an example of what she tells prospective parents. This concerned a couple who said that they wanted to present a gift to the children’s home from which they were going to adopt their child. Rebecca explained how she instructed the parents:

‘Yes,’ I said, ‘but in that case after the adoption. The way you are dealt with must not be dependent on this [gift]. After the adoption we obviously can’t prohibit you from making a gift to the children’s home. And at that point we can help you so that it gets to the right place.’ And that’s what we did, and they gave 3,000 dollars in a lump sum. And the children’s home was delighted. But it wasn’t anything we’d promised; we hardly knew anything about it. And we could have said no, but I thought that was a bit … because all children’s homes need money for all sorts of things, after all.

For Rebecca, apparently, time is an essential factor if you want to avoid a payment possibly being perceived as a bribe. One may also add that Rebecca was careful to distance herself from the parents’ actions when she told her story: ‘It wasn’t anything we’d promised; we hardly knew anything about it’. This distancing remark suggests that the ‘bribery gaze’ concerning adoption stipulates that even gifts given after the adoption could be seen as a bribe. This was explained by a representative for the Swedish Intercountry Adoptions Authority that oversees adoptions as the possibility of parents who gave gifts to orphanages being given advantages if they adopt again from the same orphanage.

The above narrative is framed as gift-giving, which may depend on Rebecca naturally wanting to avoid presenting herself as someone who would teach others how to offer (potential) bribes. However, another interviewee who had been involved in aid work told us about how he and his family always had to teach newcomers about local ways of getting through Customs. This involved having some bills ready and to tell them about how to hand them over in a tactful way. Yet, another aid worker told us that he usually had coffee and some cinnamon buns in his truck, when he was crossing the border and that these could be offered to the Customs officers. Not as bribes, he carefully emphasized during the interview, but as small gifts, freely offered and given. Nevertheless, it was clear that such gifts were instrumental in the sense that they were aimed at creating a favourable impression.

Knowing

In some cases, there is not an apparent element of neither learning nor teaching in the interview narratives. Rather, the interviewees seem to describe themselves as proficient and well versed in the social practices of bribes. However, this knowledge is not described as something that they have read about and acquired from books or manuals, at least it was not brought up during the interviews. On the contrary, they describe themselves as experienced and thus well acquainted with the local practices in the countries where they worked.

Those ‘in the know’ talk about different ways to dissociate oneself from bribery, such as by using intermediaries, or what may be described as ‘agents’. Jan has spent several years in Africa working as a regional manager for a large Swedish aid agency, and he talked about what he considers to be the common way of dealing with the transportation of goods into one of the countries. Notably, this aid worker is the only interviewee in our material who explicitly described transactions/actions as bribes:

Jan:

If you were to transport goods into the country. Then … if you went to ask a forwarding firm what they would take for handling Customs clearance and such things. ‘Oh, but then of course there are fixed costs, but that is regulated, and then there is always the administrative cost, or handling cost’. ‘Alright, what do you mean?’ ‘Well … in order for the Customs officers to even look at the papers, but that is okay, you put that in as administrative costs’. So, when you received a bill it said ‘administrative costs’ for a certain amount, and … that would hold up if there was an audit.

Interviewer:

Yes. And that was to get the stuff into the country?

Jan:

Yes, so you let them bribe instead.

Interviewer:

Yes. Or … what did you say?

Jan:

You let the forwarding firm bribe at the Customs and at the docks, instead of doing it yourself.

The arrangement is described as common, as indicated by using the pronoun ‘you’ (i.e. it is not ‘we’ or ‘I’). The way it is discrete is that any potential corrupt activities are removed from those wanting goods to be transported by labelling payments as ‘administrative costs’. It was also pointed out that this kind of arrangement in which intermediaries or agents are used facilitates deniability. If questions are raised, such as in an audit, it would be possible to argue that the organization did not know anything about the activities of the forwarding firm. The arrangement that Jan described resembles what Schilke and Rossman (2018) refer to as ‘brokerage’.

Another example of an experienced aid worker is Henry. He works as a senior consultant for aid-financed projects within the building sector in a country in Latin America and presents himself during the interview as knowledgeable in his field of work, with many years of experience. As a ‘folk ethnographer’ (Wästerfors, 2008), he describes corruption as ‘institutionalized’ in the building sector:

[You] were always contacted by someone who said, ‘Well, we can help you get this job, but … ’ and then they close the door. Then they close the door and tell you how much they want.

What Henry describes is the simultaneously inclusive and exclusive nature of bribery. You ‘close the door’, so others do not know what is going on. In that sense, the transaction is obfuscated (Schilke & Rossman, 2018). Although Henry dissociated himself from these practices later during the interview and emphasized that he was personally not involved, he gives a distinct example of the need for seclusion in corrupt activities. Also, he portrays himself as competent regarding those activities, as someone who knows what he is talking about.

References to ‘signals’ and ‘codes’ appear in several of the aid workers’ descriptions in the interviews. Such vague descriptions have the advantage of deniability, and as Goffman (1967) has pointed out, hinted communication and are deniable communication. One could also use the different connotations in words, something that Swedish aid worker Yvonne reflects on in the following extract. She has worked for aid agencies in African countries for several years, as a coordinator and an advisor in rural development. In contrast to the previous example with Hannah, where she had ‘to figure out’ how to get a truck through Customs, Yvonne does not describe the signals and codes as something that must be learned. Rather, she describes the meaning of ‘chai’ as something that she is aware of and knowledgeable about.

Yvonne:

Chai then, the word for tea, it was also, also meaning ‘help’ right, in different ways so that eh …

Interviewer:

Right, so it is some kind of double meaning?

Yvonne:

Mm. And the police officers used that if they pulled you over, and say ‘do you have some chai?’ And then like ‘what do you mean, tea?’ [laughs]. But you know what they mean, and then they are going to have something to go, go and take a cup of tea when they have worked hard then, they want something in their pockets.

Knowing the double meaning of the word ‘chai’, an established euphemism for small bribes (cf., Gupta, 2005; Werner, 2000), is a way to present a certain amount of ‘folk knowledge’ and implies being informed about the local practices concerning bribes. Allusions and ambiguities are a way of solving the problem. An example of similar practices was described by Hiah (2020). Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Romania referred to small-scale payments to public officials (i.e. petty bribes) as xiao fei, which literally means ‘small fee’ or ‘expense’.³ Yvonne observed that, by never saying in plain language that it concerns bribes, it is possible for the parties to retreat if they are confronted by the other. Such use of words and formulations are ‘alerting phrases’ that Gerald Mars (1982) noted were common when he studied fiddling in workplaces, formulations that ‘alert the fiddler but not the non-fiddler’ and are used to test if a newcomer is ready to take part in the fiddling (Mars, 1982, p. 178).

Discussion

We have discussed some recurring themes in formulations that touch upon the etiquette of bribe practices. As mentioned by Becker (2000), rules of etiquette are not always written down and formalized but may be informally learned by observing others or being reproved for behaving wrongly. Also, as we have noted, it may sometimes be achieved through teaching others. The individuals in our study – aid workers and those involved in international adoptions – are mainly Swedish and a few Danish, countries that are ranked by Transparency International (2021) as having among the world’s lowest levels of corruption. In spite of this, there was a sharpened moral sensitivity against corruption when the data were gathered, a ‘bribery gaze’ (Åkerström, 2017) on exchanges concerning minor transactions as potentially being considered corrupt.

By studying how those accustomed to a stricter stance on bribery learn how to manage small bribery when working or being otherwise engaged in a country where petty corruption is common, we can enhance our understanding of the social practices of petty corruption and bribery. Within the analytical framework of etiquette, informal practices and unwritten rules can be illuminated. The etiquette of bribes is characterized by the need for discretion; bribes (or exchanges that might resemble bribes to an observer) are given and taken while taking care that they are not observed by a third party. The form of a bribe given discretely seems to be the one that most closely resembles our everyday conceptions concerning bribes. However, it is possible that unconcealed bribes, for which recompense cannot be directly connected to the bribe, may be just as hard to reveal precisely because they do not live up to the norms of a ‘typical’ bribe. On the other hand, these unconcealed bribes fit our idea of gifts, which may prevent them from being regarded as bribes.

One may ask, what is it that leads to a certain variance in the etiquette of bribes? Why do those involved in bribes seek to achieve concealment and discretion in different ways? To answer this exhaustively would require more research into the etiquette of bribes, but there are some clues. There is, of course, a situational and contextual element involved. In certain situations, such as when Eric wanted his box delivered from the docks, it is naturally difficult to conceal the box but possible to conceal the payment. In other situations, the conditions for delay may exist, such as when Rebecca emphasized the temporal aspect if a donation is made to the children’s home. It might be possible to conceal the donation in some way, but that would imply that there was something wrong with the donation. In that situation, a temporal delay is likely the most practical solution to dealing with the problem at hand. Thus, we would argue that the etiquette of bribes is not ‘random’ but addresses and resolves practical and interactional concerns for the actors involved in a specific situation and in a specific context.

Tentatively, it seems that the representatives for adoption organizations exhibited more expressive caution (Silverman, 1997), whereas the aid workers were more inclined to speak as ‘folk ethnographers’ (Wästerfors, 2008) explaining how things were ‘out there’ in other countries and cultures. Petty bribery was often referred to and sorted under the social practices ‘over there’; they were described as practices that strangers had to accommodate, at least to a certain extent.

For the adoption agency representatives, involvement in potentially corrupt activities seems to have been a more sensitive issue than for the aid workers. As Viviana Zelizer (1985, 2005) noted in her socio-historical studies, anything that hints at pricing or instrumentality is sensitive in relation to ‘the intimate sphere’, which includes close relations, especially children. Thus, any suspicions of ‘corruption-like’ exchanges, even if petty, may have more serious consequences for adoption representatives than for aid workers. This may be why the representatives for adoption agencies spoke about avoiding notions of impurity of motives by giving suitable gifts and the timing of such gifts. More importantly, they refrained from discussing their own involvement, but spoke about how they had instructed the parents. When narrating their own experiences, their stories focused on how they had taken different measures to avoid even suspicion of corruption.

Another dimension is the type of position the interviewees had in their organizations and their previous work experience. Some of the aid workers had spent many years in the regions where they worked and could navigate through issues of corruption and bribery more confidently and handle those situations with more knowledge than newcomers. Jan, for instance, had several years of experience as a regional manager for a large aid agency. For Jan, using an intermediary (the forwarding firm) to deal with potential bribes at Customs or the docks seemed to be commonplace and routine. For those who did voluntary work as teachers, their experiences in aid work were less extensive. In this sense, it is illuminating that Eric, who was a voluntary worker with little previous experience of aid work, described himself as naïve in the situation where he had trouble getting his box out of the docks.

In this study, we have attempted to delineate some aspects of the etiquette of bribes, in particular, concerning how individuals who are to a certain extent ‘cultural strangers’ perceive this. In future research, this etiquette can be elaborated upon further and described in more detail. For example, it would be interesting to discuss the contextual and cultural variations of bribe etiquette, and how these variations can be interpreted and possibly incorporated into a wider framework. This would be helpful for understanding not only the similarities but also the differences, between such exchanges and how they may be interrelated.

Ethical approval

At the time when the empirical material was gathered, there was no need for formal approval from an ethical board.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In the introduction to their anthology on economies of favours (some which include what is commonly understood as bribes), Henig and Makovicky (2017) state that they want to ‘ … refocus our attention from functional questions of exchange and reciprocity to questions about the ethical and expressive aspects of human life’ (2017, p. 3). For similar arguments, see, Åkerström (2017).

2. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021. Denmark shares the number 1 position with Finland (and New Zealand), and Sweden shares the number 4 position with Norway (and Singapore), in the yearly published Corruption Perceptions Index.

3. In Ledeneva et al. (2018), several such forms of informal practices and exchanges are described, in the grey zone somewhere between gift and commodity, and between gift and payment.