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Inquiry
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Volume 67, 2024 - Issue 4: The Point of View of Shared Agency
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Articles

Practical knowledge and shared agency: pluralizing the Anscombean view

Pages 1018-1045 | Received 20 Apr 2020, Accepted 25 Aug 2020, Published online: 02 Nov 2020

References

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