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Canadian Journal of Philosophy Volume 49, 2019 - Issue 7: Transparency and Apperception
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Articles

Assertion and transparent self-knowledge

Eric MarcusPhilosophy Department, Auburn University, Birmingham, AL, USACorrespondence[email protected]
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John SchwenklerPhilosophy Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USAView further author information
Pages 873-889 | Received 15 Aug 2018, Accepted 02 Sep 2018, Published online: 13 Sep 2018

References

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