- Under the Fair Trading Act 1973, especially Parts I and IV.
- For the first report see, Monopolies Commission, Report on the Supply of Petrol to Retailers in the United Kingdom (1964-65) HC 264; for the second, Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Wholesaling of Petrol, (1978) Cmnd. 7433.
- For such controls, see generally Daintith and Willoughby, eds., United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (2nd. ed., 1984), Part I ch. 9; and Salter, United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas Law (1986).
- See Daintith and Willoughby, supra note 3, part ch. 10 and Sas, “Legal Aspects of Risk Management and Forward Oil Trading: The US and UK Regulatory Regimes”, (1989) 7 J.E.R.L. 142.
- Daintith and Willoughby, eds., A Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (paperback ed., 1984), Ch. 3.
- By virtue of the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982, Part I.
- On “golden shares” see Prosser and Graham, “Privatising Nationalised Industries: Constitutional Issues and New Legal Techniques”, (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 16, at 36–38.
- S.I. 1984 No. 1832.
- S.I. 1988 No. 1213.
- See generally Daintith and Willoughby, supra note 3, Part I, ch. 7.
- Ibid., Part I, ch. 10.
- Infra, pp. 12.
- S.I. 1954 No. 23, made under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, s. 1.
- The latest licence, dated December 4, 1987, came into effect on January 1, 1988.
- This extended from 1914, by virtue of the Agreement with Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd., Cd. 7419 (1914), until 1987, when the government sold its shareholding to BP.
- The position with regard to the purchase of gas was more complex. Upon nationalisation the industry had been given the right to acquire any gas surplus to the requirements of those ancillary undertakings which had not been taken into public ownership. S.4 of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, however, envisaged that existing gas undertakings, whether public or private, would first be given an option of purchasing any onshore gas supplies before it was offered to anyone else. This statutory right of pre-emption of existing suppliers was later extended to offshor. gas by s.9 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (replaced with Energy Act s.9).
- See generally, Williams, A History of the British Gas Industry, 1981.
- Section 12 replaced BCG's monopoly with a new three-tier arrangement. Private suppliers could supply premises taking more than 2 million therms a year subject only to notification procedure. They could also supply premises taking less than 2 million therms annually with the Secretary of State's consent, but if the premises were within 25 yards of a distribution main the demand had to exceed 25,000 therms a year, or the Corporation must not object. BGC retained its monopoly of supply in relation to premises within 25 yards of a distribution main taking less than 25,000 therms per year, unless it did not object to their supply by another person and the Secretary of State gave his/her consent. The BGC's residual monopoly of supply was therefore coterminous with its statutory obligation to supply on request under the Gas Act 1972.
- The consents themselves could be restricted to individual cases or could provide a general authorisation to supply gas (S.29(3)(b)). Conditions could be attached to the consent at the discretion of the Secretary of State, but these were designed to ensure the provision of incentives and guarantees to would-be private suppliers, and not to impose restrictions upon them. See further, Page, ‘Competition and Monopoly in United Kingdom Energy Supply—the Case of Gas’, (1984) 2 J.E.R.L. pp. 30–40, at p.34.
- Department of Energy Press Release, no. 1794, December 18, 1985.
- Select Committee on Energy, Regulation of the Gas Industry, First Report, 1985–86, HC 15, para. 41.
- Provided that the Secretary of State does not notify objections on any of the grounds listed in s..6(2).
- Ss. 7(9) and 8(5) provides that an authorisation shall not include in the designated area any area which is situated within 25 yards from the main of another public gas supplier, unless the other public gas supplier has consented in writing to the area being so included.
- In other words customers whose supply of gas BG may not interrupt: BG may also supply gas on an interruptible basis to industrial and commercial customers under terms which give it a right to interrupt supplies for up to 63 days. All customers supplied on this basis are contractually responsible for arranging any alternative fuel supply and for being able to switch readily from gas if interrupted. In the year ended March 31, 1988 about 56 per cent. of the number of therms sold by BG were on an interruptible basis.
- “To premises within 25 yards of a main taking less than 25,000 therms per annum”. Under the 1986 Act all public gas supplies are under a duty to develop and maintain an efficient, coordinated and economical system of gas supply and must comply with any reasonable request to supply gas where there is economical (s.9). A public supplier also has a specific obligation to supply, upon request, any premises within 25 yards of a distribution main, subject to a maximum of 25,000 therms per annum (s.10). In October 1989 a new company, Quadrant Gas, applied for authorisation to be a public supplier of gas.
- p.12.
- House of Lords Official Reports, June 5, 1986, cols. 1158–1159.
- Select Committee on Energy, First Report, supra, n. 21, para. 53.
- Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1982 (S.I. 1982 no. 1000) Sched.5, cl.27.
- Select Committee on Energy, The Development and Depletion of the United Kingdom's Gas Resources, Seventh Report, Session 1984–85, HC 76–1, paras, 94–103.
- Energy Act 1976 s.9, as revised by the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982 Sched. 3 para. 37.
- Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, s.20. See also the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 1982, HL 190 paras. 14 and 15.
- The Arco and Shell cases: these cases were referred to during proceedings on the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill, House of Commons, Standing Committee Reports, col. 1081 (26th sitting: March 23, 1982).
- The existing rules are contained in the Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954, as amended.
- See above, p. 7.
- Standing Committee E, Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Bill, col. 916 (21st sitting: March 11, 1982).
- See Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Energy, 1984–85, HC76-I, paras. 94–103.
- MMC, Gas. A Report on the Existence or Possible Existence of a Monopoly Situation, Cm. 500, 1988, para. 3.36.
- Back-up gas may be provided to a third party supplier under the terms of a common carriage contract when the exercise of the suppliers’ rights to have gas conveyed through BG's pipelines is temporarily discontinued because of his inability to get gas from other sources.
- Sections 20 and 21 regulate extensions and modifications to a public supplier's pipelines, and once again transfer powers to the Director General to make necessary directions in the interests of third parties. So far no such directions have been issued.
- For a criticism of the absence of “positive discrimination” in favour of competitors, see Select Committee on Energy, 1985–86, supra, n.21, para. 47.
- MMC Report, supra, n.38, para. 7.35.
- BG issued a statement of its willingness to negotiate prices in the contract sector and a statement, pursuant to Condition 5 of its Authorisation, that it would not set prices so as to distort, restrict or prevent competition.
- For further criticisms, see the Select Committee on Energy, supra, n.21, paras. 76–78.
- MMC Report, supra, n. 38, para. 6.25.
- MMC Report, supra, n. 38, para. 6.80.
- OFGAS, Press Release, March 1989.
- For full details of OFGAS's so-called “seven-point plan” on price schedules, see OFGAS, Press Release, October 16, 1989.
- OFGAS, Press Release, May 18, 1989.
- Financial Times, October 24, 1989.
- Gas Matters, June 30, 1989, p.7.
- Cm.332, HMSO, 1988.
- Department of Energy, Energy Trends, April 1988, p.2, Table 9.
- Helms and Yarrow, “The Regulation of Utilities” (1988) 4 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, no. 2, pp. i–xxx.
- Created by the Hydro-Electric Development (Scotland) Act 1943 and the Electricity (Scotland) Act 1955.
- Scottish electricity legislation was consolidated by the Electricity (Scotland) Act 1979.
- S.19(2) provided that nothing in the Act required a Board to “undertake expenditure in connection with a scheme which does not meet the financial criteria applied by the Board in relation to other expenditure of the Board”. S.7 further stipulated that the principles on which tariffs for private producers were based would not increase the prices payable by the customers of the Board for electricity supplied, and would reflect the Board's avoidable costs.
- Select Committee on Energy, Third Report: The Structure, Regulation and Economic Consequences of Electricity Supply in the Private Sector, HC 30–1, Session 1987–88.
- Hammond, Helm and Thompson, “Competition in Electricity Supply: Has the Energy Act Failed? (1986) Fiscal Studies, pp. 11–33.
- S.9 provided that certain other disputes, including a Board's handling of the initial request under s.5, could be referred to the Secretary of State.
- This varied widely from local authority to local authority and could put private generation at a substantial cost disadvantage. The government has recently announced changes to the rating basis of private generating plants (Hansard, Parlt. Debates, March 10, 1988). The ESI is currently subject to a cumulo formula rating under the specific provisions of s.34 and Sched. 7 of the General Rate Act 1967 and the Electricity Boards (Rateable Values Order) 1976. The CEGB paid no rates on power station construction sites until the station is commissioned. Private generators in England and Wales could either be rated according to the contractor's test or the profits test. The former is based on the capital cost of the rateable parts of the development, including plant, building and pipes. The latter test is used in unusual cases where the property enjoys a monopoly position. Income generated by a scheme less the running costs is the basis of assessment. It has been estimated that if the “contractor's test” is used the rates levied might be some ten times higher than those of the competing public utilities on formula rating for equivalent supplies of energy.
- Nor did they enjoy certain exemptions in land use and planning law to acquire compulsorily land, wayleaves and easements etc. which the ESI as statutory undertakers enjoyed. In particular neither the Local Government (M.P) Act 1976, ss. 11 and 12 nor the Control of Pollution Act 1974, S.21, provided a full code of legal powers and duties necessary for private generators and in particular CHP/DH operators to provide electricity supply. Such powers could only be conferred by Private Bill, as for example, in the case of the recent Channel Tunnel Bill.
- For the background to this, see Power in Europe, 1989, no. 57, pp. 2–3.
- Cm.327, page 9, para. 52.
- Supra, n. 52, para 56.
- Additional duties are imposed in respect of the Scottish market. Tariff structures must not discriminate on the basis of geographical area; public suppliers should not, however, be disadvantaged in competing with private suppliers.
- Clauses 23–25 give the DGES certain powers to make orders where it appears to him that there has been a contravention or there is likely to be a breach of a licence.
- Case 72/83 [1984] ECR 2727.
- See, Council Resolution on the Community's Energy Objectives for 1995, O.J. 1986, C241/1.
- The full statement is reproduced in Power in Europe, 1989, no. 55, p.4.
- An authorised electricity broker is someone who, not being an authorised supplier or generator, carries on business in the purchases and sales of electricity from and to authorised electricity operators.
- It would appear from the package of proposals announced by John Wakeham, the Secretary of State for Energy, on September 29, 1989, that for an initial four-year period National Power and Power Gen will in aggregate, by licence be limited to supplying no more than 15 per cent. of the demand in any one Area Board's territory except with the Director General's written consent. This would be raised to 25 per cent. in a second four-year period, and would then be abolished. Similarly, a four-year limitation will be placed on the issuing of second-tier (direct contract) supply licences for supply to premises taking 1 MW or less (years 0–4 from vesting). A further four-year limitation on issuing second-tier licences to premises taking less than 0.1 MW will then be imposed (years 5–8 from vesting), Power in Europe, 1989, no. 60, pp. 2–3.
- For details of the contractual arrangements, see Power in Europe, supra n.72.
- First Report of the Select Committee on Energy, The Coal Industry, Session 1986–87, HC 165, 1987.
- MMC, National Coal Board, Cm. 8920, 1983, p. 257.
- Cm. 8877, 1982, p. 25, para. 74.
- Financial Times, August 26, 1989.
- Cmnd 8920, supra, n.75, p. 257.
- Open General Import Licences may, however, be imposed. See Part I, above, p. 8.
- Case 36/83 Mabanaft [1984] ECR 2497.
- For the Scottish situation, see MMC, South of Scotland Electricity Board, Cm. 9868, HMSO, 1986, paras. 9.36–9.38.
- MMC, The Central Electricity Generating Board, HC 315, 1981, p. 161.
- Hansard, Parl. Debs., March 3, 1979, col. 588.
- S.3(2) of the 1946 Act does, however, give the Secretary of State power to issue general directions.
- MMC, Central Electricity Generating Board, supra, n.82, para. 7.11.
- MMC, Central Electricity Generating Board, supra, n.82, p. 287.
- In breach of the Competition Act 1989, s.3.
- The Economist, November 12, 1988, pp. 41–42.
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