6
Views
4
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Original Articles

Post Piper Alpha: Some Reflections on Offshore Safety Regimes from a Norwegian Perspective

Pages 281-289 | Published online: 08 Jun 2015

  • Cf. the illustrative statement by a prominent industry representative cited (and generally endorsed) in the Cullen Report (The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, Cm 1310, November 1990) at p. 355: “It is my fundamental belief that safety cannot be legislated, while recognising that enough legislation or regulation needs to exist to ensure that minimum standards are maintained.”
  • See Bentham, “The United Kingdom Offshore Safety Regime: Before and After Piper Alpha”, above, pp. 273–280.
  • See section 3 infra.
  • As can also be seen from the Cullen Report, important elements of the now proposed—and partially even implemented—modifications to the UK regime are well in line with the views and recommendations presented by the Burgoyne Committee, though it may seem that Lord Cullen takes a more radical approach. See Offshore Safety, Cm 7866 (March 1980), in particular chapter 6.
  • In addition to the NPD, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate act as a regulatory supervisory body in this area. This is due to the fact that in the Norwegian sector a distinction has been made between mobile and fixed installations, both for regulatory and supervisory purposes. Cf. s. 1 of the 1985 Petroleum Act (infra, note 16), which states that the Act (and regulations made pursuant to it) does not apply to mobile installations themselves as opposed to “petroleum activities” taking place onboard them. This creates a factual and legal situation which must be described as fairly complex to both industry and the supervisory bodies themselves.
  • A presentation and discussion of the Norwegian offshore safety regime can be found in Kaasen, Sikkerhetsregulering i petroleumsvirksomheten (“Safety Regulation of Offshore Petroleum Activities”, with a summary in English), Oslo 1984, in particular the summary at pp. 485–555 (see also the English summary at pp. 588–597). The main lines of the Danish offshore safety regime are similar to the Norwegian.
  • Royal Decree, August 25, 1967 relating to Safe Practice in the Exploration and Drilling for Submarine Petroleum Resources, issued pursuant to the Continental Shelf Act of June 21, 1963. This Act provides basis for all Decrees issued in this area until the passing of the 1985 Petroleum Act (infra, note 16).
  • Royal Decree of April 9, 1965 relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine Petroleum Resources, s. 38: “Exploration for or exploitation of petroleum must be carried out in a prudent manner in accordance with good practice,…”.
  • Royal Decree of December 8, 1972 relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum… s. 39 (almost identical to s. 38 of the 1965 Decree, supra note 8).
  • Royal Decree of October 3, 1975, replacing but closely resembling the 1967 Decree (supra, note 7).
  • Royal Decree of July 9, 1976 relating to Safe Practices for the Production, etc. of Submarine Petroleum Resources.
  • Royal Decree of June 24, 1977, replaced by Decree of June 1, 1979. s. 1 of the latter states that the Working Environment Act shall apply to petroleum activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, while s. 2 modifies this by stating that the Act shall not apply to Norwegian mobile installations “except in cases concerning workers who are not covered by Norwegian maritime legislation”. Further, in cases of “flotels”, i.e. mobile installations being used as accommodation for workers on fixed installations, the Act “shall be applicable with respect to these workers”. This delimitation of the scope of application of the relevant legislation is very complicated. It must be seen as an effect of the basic distinction made in the Norwegian regime between fixed and mobile installations, supra, note 5.
  • See s. 3 of the 1975 Decree and s. 4 of the 1976 Decree, the latter stating that “any person who conducts [petroleum activities comprised by the Decree] shall comply with the provisions of this Decree and of the regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto, and shall ensure that they are observed in his activity”.
  • A more precise definition is to be found in the 1985 Internal Control Decree (see infra, note 18) s. 2: “Internal control: All systematic actions which the Licensee shall initiate to ensure that the activity is planned, organized, executed and maintained according to requirements stipulated in or in accordance with acts or regulations.”
  • “Guidelines for the Licensee's Internal Control”, stipulated by NPD May 15, 1981.
  • Act of March 22, 1985 pertaining to Petroleum Activities.
  • Royal Decree of June 28, 1985 concerning Safety, etc. relating to the Petroleum Act. The 1975 and 1976 Safety Decrees (supra, notes 10 and 11) were repealed.
  • Royal Decree of June 28, 1985 concerning the Licensee's Internal Control in Petroleum Activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The Decree replaced the 1981 guidelines (see supra, note 15) and constitutes statutory requirements.
  • See e.g. the 1985 Safety Decree s. 39, the only provision of the Decree dealing specifically with fire safety: “Installations shall be laid out to minimize the consequences of fire and explosion. Systems and components shall be designed and used to minimize the probability of fire and explosions, and to facilitate effective fire fighting and limiting the extent of damages.”
  • See e.g. Regulations for Production and Auxiliary Systems on Production Installations etc. stipulated by NPD 3 April 1978 (as later amended), s. 6.4.4.: “Surface materials used on production installations shall have low smoke development and low flame dispersion properties.”
  • A brief description of the Norwegian system for regulatory supervisory activities regarding safety on the Norwegian Continental Shelf is to be found in Royal Decree of June 28, 1985 concerning Regulatory Supervisory Activities.
  • Described in the Cullen Report at p. 269 (para. 16.45) on basis of testimony by Mr. Ognedal, Director of Safety and Working Environment Division of the NPD. See also the Report at p. 356 (para. 21.5) regarding the same attitude shown by the U.K. Health and Safety Commission (HSC).
  • I have dealt with some legal aspects of this accident in “Alexander L. Kielland—Tackling a Catastrophe”, in the proceedings of the 1984 IBA International Energy Law Seminar (Matthew Bender 1984) at pp. 628–659.
  • See NOU (Norwegian Official Report) 1977:47 (on the Bravo blow-out) and 1981:11 (on the Alexander L. Kielland).
  • See the paper referred to supra, note 23 at p. 641 for details.
  • Ibid., at pp. 641–642.
  • See NPD's Annual Report 1988, para. 4.16.1.
  • See NPD's Annual Report 1989, para. 4.17.
  • NPD's letter to the Ministry for Local Government (which administers safety matters including those in petroleum) dated May 8, 1991 enclosing NPD's evaluation of the Cullen Report.
  • The NPD recommend that Norwegian authorities keep in close and effective contact with British authorities and industry in the course of the period of implementation of Lord Cullen's recommendations in order to benefit from experience gained: see p. 3 of the note enclosed to the letter.
  • The Cullen Report at pp. 387–390 (para. 1–13).
  • Ibid., at pp. 387–388 (para. 2–3), and also at p. 370 (para. 21.56).
  • Ibid., at pp. 390–391 (para. 17–22), and also at p. 373 (para. 21.67) and at pp. 355–356 (para. 21.4).
  • One important difference, however, remains: The Cullen report (at p. 362—para. 21.33) propose no change to the concept of a Certifying Authority issuing a Certificate of Fitness for an offshore installation as a prerequisite for obtaining consent for installing and operating the installation. In the Norwegian sector this concept has a parallel in the certifying system imposed by the maritime legislation for mobile installations registered in the Norwegian registry of ships. But the Norwegian regime for fixed installations contains no parallel to the U.K. certifying authority. See also Kaasen, supra note 6 at pp. 554–555, 598–599.
  • See Royal Decree of June 28, 1985 concerning Safety (issued pursuant to the 1985 Petroleum Act) ss. 10 and 11. A special regulation has been passed by the NPD specifically covering these aspects, see Regulations concerning Implementation and use of Risk Analyses in Petroleum Activities, issued by the NPD June 12, 1990.
  • See supra note 18.
  • The Cullen Report at p. 390 (para. 14–15).
  • For a general description, see Royal Decree mentioned supra, note 21, item 1 (Premises and Principles of the Supervisory Activities).
  • Bentham supra, note 2, text at note 26.
  • Ibid., at note 27.
  • The Cullen Report at p. 355 (para. 21.1).
  • Formal Investigation, mv Herald of Free Enterprise, Report of Court No. 8074, London 1987, at p. 14 (para. 14.1).
  • NOU (Norwegian Official Report) 1991:1A: The Scandinavian Star disaster on April 7, 1990, at p. 86.
  • IMO Resolution A.647(16).
  • NOU 1991:1A (see supra, note 43) at p. 195 (para. 13.2.4.2). Similar considerations were touched upon in the Herald of Free Enterprise report (see supra, note 42) at p. 59 (para. 59), but no conclusion was drawn.
  • The Cullen Report at p. 369 (para. 21.51).
  • Ibid., at p. 361 (para. 21.26), citing Mr. Ognedal of the NPD.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.